Bhandarkar Oriental Series No. 28

THE METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE EARLY VAIŚEṢIKAS

With An Appendix
DAŚAPADĀRTHĪ OF CANDRAMATI

(A Translation with a Reconstructed Sanskrit Text, Notes and a Critical Edition of the Chinese Version)

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PUNE 411 004 (India)
1996

Printed at : The Bhandarkar Institute Press, Pune.

Published by : A. M. Ghatage, Honorary Secretary,
Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute,
Pune 411 004 (India)

FOREWORD

It is a matter of great pleasure to write a few words about this work of Prof. Keiichi Miyamoto of Kakugakuin University, Tokyo, Japan.

Both in content and language the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* seem to be earlier than the *Nyāyasūtras*. Although we have fairly good idea of the history of the tradition of the *Nyāyasūtras* preserved through the commentary on the *sūtras* and the commentaries thereon called *Nyāya-caturgranthikā*, the picture of the development of the tradition of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* is not clear. The history of the development between the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* and the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* is very dark, since we are not left with materials which can throw light on this period.

The work of Prof. Miyamoto is a very positive and sincere approach to bridge this graph. Fortunately, a Chinese translation of the *Daśapadārthī* was available. Prof. Miyamoto has reconstructed the Sanskrit text from this Chinese translation. The Chinese translation is so literal that Prof. Miyamoto could present the reconstructed Sanskrit text. While restoring, he has made use of the language of the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* and other materials available on the *Vaiśeṣika* tradition. Since I have gone through the entire reconstructed text of the *Daśapadārthī*, I can say, for certain, that the reconstruction is faithful and in keeping with the idiom of the *Vaiśeṣika* tradition. There are sufficient grounds to believe that Candramati's *Daśapadārthī* is a Pre-Praśastapāda text.

Prof. Miyamoto deserves our appreciation. I am confident that scholars of early Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya philosophy will receive this work with joy.

I wish that Prof. Miyamoto takes up other Sanskrit treatises which are available only in Chinese or Tibetan translations and presents to us their reconstructed Sanskrit versions.

The present volume is a valuable contribution to the study of the early Vaiśeṣika philosophy and logic.

1st April, 1995

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PREFACE

In the several centuries before and after the Christian Era there appeared six Brahmanical systems of Indian philosophy. The Vaiśeṣika system of philosophy was one of the oldest among them.

Though the origin of this system has been discussed by many scholars, it is still obscure. However, its thoroughly realistic and analytic system of categories must have influenced the Vaiyākaraṇas, especially Patañjali, the author of the *Mahābhāṣya*, and the medical sciences where the representative work is the *Carakasaṃhitā*. It is also likely that the Vaiśeṣika system (including atomism) influenced the Buddhists, who established the Sarvāstivāda system. Besides, it is well known that the Naiyāyika system was established on the basis of the Vaiśeṣika system. These facts strongly indicate that the Vaiśeṣikas played the most important role in the development of the philosopy of those days.

In the course of time, while the Sāṅkhya system with its dualism, and the Vedāntic system with its monism, became more and more popular, the Vaiśeṣika system itself became less popular and was absorbed by the Naiyāyikas. It is natural, therefore, that there were only a few modern scholars of Indian classical philosophy who specialized in the study of the early Vaiśeṣika system. But, there are now many scholars who have become very much interested in this system. Their motivations are various, but they seem to agree that the Vaiśeṣika system was the most important during the formative times of the main Indian systems of philosophy.

The present treatise, I believe, will contribute something to the study of the early Vaiśeṣika system of philosophy.

I used the term 'early' to refer to the period which covers the three available Vaiśeṣika texts—the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, the *Daśa-*

padārthī and the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* (*Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*).

The *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* is difficult to understand in full. This is mainly because it was compiled over a long time, during which the various systems of philosophy were developing, or already established systems were becoming more and more sophisticated. The compiler of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, confronted with criticism by other various systems, inserted many new *sūtras* into the text, neglecting the original *sūtra* order which had maintained thematic continuity. This resulted in the original sequence of the *sūtras* being broken in many places. Confusion about the sequence of the *sūtras* led to confusion about their content. As a result, there appeared enormous variations in *sūtrapāṭhas* and in their interpretations. I have used the *sūtrapāṭhas* mainly presented by Candrananda's *Vṛtti*, and showed other variations when they were necessary. This is because the *Vṛtti* is evidently the oldest commentary available now, and its *sūtrapāṭhas* and interpretation are comparatively the most consistent and reasonable. Nevertheless, it is still difficult to understand the original intentions behind many of the *sūtras*.

In many cases the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* is very useful for studying the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*. It is certain that the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* is not a commentary in the ordinary sense, because it introduces a great deal of terminologies not found anywhere in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*. But, if we are willing to read the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* carefully, we can become aware of its astonishing faithfullness to the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*. This must be the reason why it has been called '*Bhāṣya*' traditionally.

Its explanations which coincide with the content of the *sūtras* can be used as 'the oldest commentary' now available. But, it is also true that the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* contains many explanations which do not originate (at least directly) in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*. The *Daśapadārthī* provides us with a bridge between the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* and the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*. I infer from many reasons that the *Daśapadārthī* (now available in the Chinese version only) was written far before the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*. I will present the reasons in my forthcoming papers.

In Part I, I investigate the metaphysical features of soul. With regard to the early Vaiśeṣikas' idea of soul, the efforts of modern scholars have focussed on the problem of how the Vaiśeṣikas demonstrate its existence. This problem itself is important enough. But the Vaiśeṣikas, in their earliest stage, must have had far more interest in what the soul was or in its fundamental features. I have chosen to discuss three issues related to these questions. They are the question of its number, its dimension (or its size) and its actions. I investigate them in Chapters 1, 2 and 3 respectively. In fact, these issues are deeply connected with each other, and tell us the logical structure of the Vaiśeṣika system very well. As is well known, the soul theory of the Vaiśeṣikas suffered dramatic changes in the course of time. I traced them taking the controversies between the Vaiśeṣikas and other philosophers into consideration. I conclude that the fundamental logical structure of the Vaiśeṣika system did not change at all inspite of the dramatic changes in the soul theory.

In Part II, I deal with some problems pertaining to cognition. However, what I investigate is not necessarily the epistemology itself but the metaphysical structure on which the epistemology is based. I believe that 'pure' epistemology is independent of metaphysics (ontology). But, in reality, most epistemologies which have appeared in the world are entangled by metaphysics. The epistemology of the Vaiśeṣikas is not an exception. As a result, my investigation focussed on the problem of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*), the qualificand (*viśeṣya*), the qualified (*viśiṣṭa*) and the direct cognition (*pratyakṣajñāna*). On this point, the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* is very faithful to the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*. I stress the importance of *Saṅkhyā-nirūpaṇa* of the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*. For, despite the fact that the causality of cognition is argued in the most detail here, most scholars have not paid attention to this *nirūpaṇa* whose main theme is nothing but the structure of (direct) cognition. Without investigating this *nirūpaṇa*, none will succeed in understanding *Pratyakṣa-nirūpaṇa* and the several *sūtras* which expound the theory of direct cognition.

In Part III, I clarify the fundamental structure and some difficult points in the Vaiśeṣika theory of causality. The Vaiśeṣika theory of causality is called *asatkāryavāda* or *ārambhavāda*, which is contrasted with *satkāryavāda* or *pariṇāmavāda* which were asserted mainly by the Sāṅkhyas. While the terms '*asatkārya*' and '*satkārya*' indicate the relation between cause and effect, the terms '*ārambha*' and '*pariṇāma*' indicate the way effects are produced from causes. These are, of course, not different from '*asatkārya*' and '*satkārya.*' These pairs of terms have different connotations, but their extension is one and the same. Namely, '*ārambhavāda*' is nothing but another name of '*asatkāryavāda.*' Most scholars have interpreted the term '*ārambhavāda*' as another name for atomism. It is true that Vaiśeṣika atomism is explained by '*āramabhavāda.*' But it is not right to limit '*āramabhavāda*' to atomism. Furthermore, I analyze the theory of *pākajotpatti* and the theory of bodily elements in order to reveal the logical structure underlying these theories, because without becoming familiar with them it is not possible to fully understand the Vaiśeṣika theory of causality.

In the Appendix, I have translated the *Daśapadārthī* which is available in the Chinese version only. I did not translate it directly from Chinese as Dr. H. Ui, who was an expert in reading Chinese Buddhist texts, did about seventy years ago. To do so is almost impossible, because the Chinese translation itself is so problematic. In fact, Dr. Ui's translation reflects many of these problems and, therefore, is so full of mistakes that we can understand very little about the *Daśapadārthī*. Therefore, I have reconstructed the Sanskrit text while critically editing the Chinese version, and then translated it into English. It is the style of an amazingly literal (but unreliable) translation by the Chinese translator that enabled me to adopt such a procedure. There are several unclear points, and there will be those scholars who maintain that it is not an orthodox approach. But I am confident that the reconstructed Sanskrit text coincides very well not only with every phrase of the Chinese version, but also with Vaiśeṣika-like expressions and content. The *Daśapadārthī* is too brief for

us to understand completely because it lacks the necessary examples and background discussions. But, we can still point out that the *Daśapadārthī* which is probably the oldest text now available after the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* is a very important text which not only links the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* and the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, but also presents a great deal of information about the historical development of ancient Indian philosophy.

The present treatise is composed of ten chapters and the Appendix. With the exception of the Appendix, the chapters are based on papers which were originally written in Japanese. I amended the original papers in several places, but did not alter the original arguments or spirit.

Correspondence to my original papers in Japanese is as follows :

Part I

Chapter 1 "Shoki Vaiśeṣika-gakuha no Ātman-kan—Ātman no Yuiitsu-sei to Tasū-sei ni tsuite," *Mayeda Sengaku Hakase Kanreki Kinen Ronshū—<Ga> no Shisō* (*The Jubilee Volume to Dr. Sengaku Mayeda's 60th Birthday—Ideas of 'Self'*). Tokyo: Shunju-sha, 1991, pp. 17-32.

Chapter 2 "Ātman no Ōkisa—Shoki Vaiśeṣika-gakuha no Kenkai wo megutte," *Kokugakuin Zasshi* (*The Journal of Kokugakuin University*) 92-5, 1991, pp. 1-15.

Chapter 3 "Shoki Vaiśeṣika-gakuha ni okeru Ātman no Undō," *Kokugakuin Zasshi* (*The Journal of Kokugakuin University*) 92-11, 1991, pp. 216-239.

Part II

Chapter 1 "Vaiśeṣika-gakuha no Sūtai (*saṃkhyā*)-ron," *Tōyō Bunka Wabun Kiyō, Tōyō Gakuhō* (*The Journal of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko*) 57-3.4, 1976, pp. 213-240.

Chapter 2 " Vaiśeṣika-gakuba no *apekṣābuddhi,*" *Indo-gaku Bukkyō-gaku Kenkyū* (*The Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies*) 25–2, 1977, pp. 908–903.

Chapter 3 "*svarūpa* to *viśeṣaṇa*—Praśastapāda no *pratyakṣa*-ron," *Tamura Yoshirō Hakase Kanreki Kinen Ronshū—Bukkyō Kyōri no Kenkyū* (*The Jubilee Volume to Dr. Yoshiro Tamura's 60th Birthday—Studies of Buddhist Doctrines*). Tokyo: Shunju-sha, 1982, pp. 523–26.

Part III

Chapter 1 " ārambhavāda Oboe-gaki," *Hirakawa Akira Hakase Koki Kinen Ronshū—Bukkyō-shisō no Shomondai* (*The Jubilee Volume to Dr. Akira Hirakawa's 70th Birthday—Problems of the Buddhist Thoughts*). Tokyo: Shunju-sha, 1985, pp. 52-57.

Chapter 2 " Inchū-muka-ron ni okeru Gen'in no Rikinō (*śakti*)," *Bukkyō-gaku* (*The Journal of Buddhist Studies*) 5, 1978, pp. 69–88.

Chapter 3 " Indo Shizen Tetsugaku no Kenkyū—Vaiśeṣika-gakuha no *pākajotpatti*-riron," *Shūkyō Kenkyū* (*The Journal of Religious Studies*) 225, 1975, pp. 29–50.

Chapter 4 " Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-gakuha no Ningen-kan." *Tōyō ni okeru Ningen-gainen* (*Concepts of Human Beings in the East*). Ed. by Mayeda, Sengaku. Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai. 1987. pp. 147–163.

I would like to express my thanks to Prof. Hajime Nakamura who was my first supervisor and who led me to the study of the Vaiśeṣika system of philosophy and kindly accepted me as a research fellow of Tōhō Kenkyūkai (Institute of the East) of which he was and still is the president, to Prof. Minoru Hara who was my second supervisor and who taught me the abundant fruit of Sanskrit philology, and to Prof. Sengaku Mayeda who was my third

supervisor and who taught me the importance of broadening the scope of the study of Indian philosophy. I also wish to express my thanks to Prof. V. N. Jha, Director of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit (CASS) of the University of Poona, who accepted me as a research scholar of CASS in 1994 and 1995. Without his help I could not have completed this treatise. He read my manuscript, discussed it with me, suggested valuable points, and moreover took the trouble to correct my English translation and the reconstructed Sanskrit text of the *Daśapadārthī*. I was very fortunate to become acquainted with Mr. Parimal Patil, Tutor in Philosophy of the Harvard University, who specializes in the study of works of Udayana and Wittgenstein. He read through my manuscript and very kindly took the trouble to correct my English. I will never forget his kindness. Dr. R. P. Goswami, Librarian of CASS, and Mr. V. L. Manjul, Librarian of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, helped me to use the library facilities. Mr. Manjul was my all-round consultant. With his heartful help I could spend my scholarly life in Pune successfully. I would like to close my preface by expressing my thanks to the Kokugakuin University who gave me the opportunity to study in India for one year, and to my colleague of the Department of Philosophy whom I troubled much during my absence in Japan.

Keiichi Miyamoto

Pune,
9th September, 1995

TEXTS USED IN THE TREATISE

Vaiśeṣikasūtra : *Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda, with Commentary of Candrānanda*. Ed. by Muni Sri Jambuvijayaji. Gaekwad's Oriental Series No. 136. Baroda : Oriental Institute, 1961.

Vṛtti : See *Vaiśeṣikasūtra.*

Vyākhyā : *Vaiśeṣikadarśana of Kaṇāda with an anonymous Commentary*. Ed. by Prof Anatalal Thakur. Darbhanga : Mithila Institute, 1957.

Upaskāra : *Vaiśeṣikadarśanam Kaṇādamunipraṇītaṃ Śrīśaṅkaramiśrakṛtavaiśeṣikasūtropaskārasamalaṅkṛtam*. Ed. by Srijivanandavidyasagarabhattacharya. Calcutta : Sarasvati Yantra, 1886.

Padārthadharmasaṅgraha : The same as below.

Praśastapādabhāṣya : *The Praśastapāda Bhāṣya with Commentary Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara*. Ed. by V. P. Dvivedin. Delhi : Sri Satguru Publications, 1984.

Vyomavatī : *The Praśastapādabhāṣyam by Praśastadevāchārya, with a Commentary called Vyomavatī by Vyomaśivāchārya.* Ed. by Gopinath Kaviraj and Dhundhiraj Shastri. Banaras : Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1931.

Nyāyakandalī : See *Praśastapādabhāṣya.*

Kiraṇāvalī : *Praśastapādabhāṣyam, with the Commentary of Udayanācārya.* Ed. by Jitendra S. Jetley. Gaekwad's Oriental Series No. 154. Baroda : Oriental Institute, 1971.

Tarkabhāṣā ; *Tarkabhāṣā by Keśavamiśra.* Ed. by N. N. Kulkarni. Poona : Oriental Book Service Agency, 1924.

Tarkasaṅgraha : *Tarkasaṅgraha of Annambhaṭṭa, with author's own Commentary 'Dīpikā' and Govardhana's 'Nyāyabodhinī.'*

Ed. by Sri Athalye and Dr. A. D. Pusalker. Poona : Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1963.

Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī : See *Kārikāvalī.*

Kārikāvalī : *Kārikāvalī of Viśvanātha Pañchānana, with the Commentary Muktāvalī, Dinakarī and Rāmarudrī.* Ed. by Anana Sastri. Bombay : Nirnaya Sagar Press, 1916.

Tarkāmṛta : *Tarkāmṛta of Jagadīśa Bhaṭṭāchārya.* Ed. with the Prakasa and Hindi Commentaries and Notes by Acharya Ramchandra Mishra. Varanasi : Chowkhamba Vidyabhawan, 1973.

Maṇikaṇa : *Maṇikaṇa—A Navya-Nyāya Manual.* Ed. with English Translation and Notes by Dr. E. R. Sreekrishna Sarma. Madras : The Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1960.

Nyāyasūtra : *Nyāyadarśanam.* (Chapter I, II & III). Ed. by A. M. Tarkatirtha & T. Nyaya-Tarkatirtha. Calcutta Sanskrit Series Vol. XVIII. Calcutta : M. P. & P. House Ltd., 1946.

Nyāyabhāṣya : See *Nyāyasūtra.*

Carakasaṃhitā : *The Charakasaṃhitā by Agniveśa. Revised by Charaka and Dridhabala with Āyurvedadīpikā Commentary of Charakapāṇidatta.* Ed. by Vaidya Jadavaji Trikamji Acharya. Third Edition. Bombay : Nirnaya Sagara Press, 1941.

Prasthānabheda : *Prasthānabhedaḥ by Madhusūdanasarasvatī.* Ed. by Tarkadarsanatirtha, Calcutta : University of Calcutta, 1939.

Sāṅkhyakārikā : *The Tattvakaumudī. Vācaspati Miśra's Commentary on the Sāṅkhya-Kārikā.* Translated into English by M. Ganganatha Jha. Poona : Oriental Book Agency, 1965.

Tattvakaumudī : See *Sāṅkhyakārikā.*

Brahmasūtra : *The Brahmasūtra-Śāṅkarabhāṣya with the Commentaries : Bhāṣyaratnaprabhā, Bhāmatī and Nyāyanirṇaya of*

Shrīgovindānanda, Vācaspati and Ānadagiri. Ed. by Mahadeva Shastri Bakre. Bombay : Nirnaya Sagara Press, 1909.

Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣya : See *Brahmasūtra.*

Upadeśasāhasrī : *Śaṅkara's Upadeśasāhasrī*, critically edited with introduction and indices by Sengaku Mayeda. Tokyo : The Hokuseido Press, 1973.

Mānameyodaya : *Mānameyodaya of Nārāyaṇa.* Ed. with an English Translation by Kunhan Raja and S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri. Second Edition. Madras : The Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1975.

Upaniṣad : *Aṣṭādaśa-Upaniṣadaḥ—Eighteen Principal Upaniṣads.* Prathamakhaṇḍaḥ. Ed. by V. P. Limaye and R. D. Vadekar. Poona : Vaidika-samsodhana-mandalam. 1958.

Chāndogyopaniṣad : See *Upaniṣad.*

Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad : See *Upaniṣad.*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

UNITY AND PLURALITY OF SOUL

The Vaiśeṣikas were considered as orthodox (*āstika*) from the viewpoint of Brahmanism because they were thought to have accepted the Vedas as their authority. But, as is the case with their other theories, it is not certain which part of the Vedas their theory of the soul really depended upon. Also from the period of the (first) *Sūtrakāra* to the period of the commentators the Vaiśeṣika views of the unity and plurality of soul changed. The commentators, unable to completely explain the *sūtras* themselves, seem to have interpreted the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* in light of what was in fact a much later version of the theory. This led to a great deal of confusion among the commentators. In order to document the history of the changes in the Vaiśeṣika theory of soul and to explain the sources of the commentators' confusion it is necessary to examine, in detail, the early Vaiśeṣika texts.

1. Vaiśeṣikasūtra 3.2.15-17

The *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* refers directly to the problem of the unity and plurality of soul thus.

a) *sukhaduḥkhajñānaniṣpattyaviśeṣād aikātmyam.* (3.2.15)

b) *nānā vyavasthātaḥ.*[1] (3.2.16)

c) *śāstrasāmarthyāc ca.* (3.2.17)

Literal translation is as follows :

a) " Soul is one because of non-differentiation in the production of pleasure, pain and cognition. "

b) " [Soul is] plural because of each establishment (difference). "

1 *Upaskāra* reads : *vyavāsthāto nānā.* Udayana's *Kiraṇāvalī* quotes the *sūtra* and reads : *nānātmā vyavasthātaḥ.*

c) " [Soul is plural or one and at the same time plural] because of the effectiveness of the traditional scholarship (or sacred texts)"[2].

The *Vṛtti*, the *Vyākhyā* and the *Upaskāra* basically agree in their interpretation that it is an opinion of the opponents that the soul is one, and that it is right for the Vaiśeṣikas to admit that it is plural.

The *Vyākhyā* omits the last *sūtra*, and presents a *sūtra* which seems to have combined the first two. It is as follows :

> *sukhaduḥkhajñānaniṣpattyaviśeṣād aikātmye na vyavasthā.*[3]
> ("If soul is one because of non-differentiation in the production of pleasure, pain and cognition, then, there would not be each establishment. [This is absurd.]")

The *Praśastapādabhāṣya* very briefly describes this problem.

> "By the expression 'each establishment' the number [of soul is already demonstrated]."[4]

The expression 'each establishment' is derived from *sūtra* 3. 2. 16, which notes the plurality of soul. Nowhere in the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* can we find any word which refers to the unity of soul. The *Praśastapādabhāṣya* is as well a commentary on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, though not an ordinary one. Thus, all the available commentaries on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* agree that the soul is plural, and reject the opinion that soul is one.

By the way, it is difficult to understand the true meaning of *sūtra* 3. 2. 15 which asserts the unity of soul. The *Vṛtti* only explains the words without notable interpretation. On the other hand, the *Upaskāra* presents a brief, but interesting comment, the whole of which is as follows :

> " Even though there are differences among the bodies of Caitra, Maitra etc., soul is only one. Why? Because of non-differentiation in the appearance (*niṣpatti*), or the production (*utpatti*), of pleasure, pain and cognition. Or because the production of pleasure, pain and cognition is not differentiated by limitation (*avaccheda*) which is caused by all bodies. If there were other probans (*liṅga*) which are the evidence of the existence of difference among souls, then, differences among souls [namely, the plurality of soul] could be established. But there does not exist such a thing (an evidence). This would be illustrated by the examples which are as follows : Even though [apparently different] sounds are produced by limitation which is caused by different places, the probans 'sound' [itself] is not differentiated. Therefore, ether is only one. [And] because the probans or the cognition '[These are] simultaneous' is not differentiated, time is only one. [And] because the probans or the cognition '[That is] prior [to this],' '[This is] posterior [to that] etc., is not differentiated, space is only one."[5]

The intention of the above passage offered by the *Upaskāra* should be as follows :

> Pleasure, pain and cognition are enumerated as the probans of the soul. Since the production of pleasure etc. differs in each individual, the soul should exist in each individual separately. (This could have been considered common

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2 The words '*śāstra*' means, according to *Vṛtti* and *Upaskāra*, the Vedas. Quotations from them by *Vṛtti* are : *grāmakāmo yajeta*; *svargakāmo yajeta*. Those by *Upaskāra* are : *dve brahmaṇī veditavye*; *dvā suparṇā sayujā sakhāyā samānaṃ vṛkṣaṃ pariṣasvajāte.*

3 This *sūtrapāṭha* presupposes that there is nothing to discuss on because it was doubtless for the author (probably Bhaṭṭavādīndra) that the unity of soul is a false opinion of the opponents.

4 *vyavasthāvacanāt saṅkhyā.*

5 *eka evātmā caitramaitrādidehabhede 'pi. kutaḥ sukhaduḥkhajñānānāṃ niṣpatter utpatter aviśeṣāt. sarvaśarīrāvacchedena sukhaduḥkhajñānānām utpattir aviśiṣṭaiva yataḥ. yady ātmabhedasādhukam liṅgāntaraṃ bhavet tadā sidhyed ātmabhedaḥ. na ca tad asti. yathā tattatpradeśāvacchedena śabdaniṣpattāv api śabdaliṅgāviśeṣād ekam evākāśam, yaugapadyā 'ipratyayaliṅgāviśeṣād eka eva kālaḥ, pūrvāparāt pratyayaliṅgāviśeṣād ekaiva dik.*

sense in ancient India.) But, looking at it from another point of view, pleasure etc. themselves are produced in every individual. Namely, the production of pleasure etc. is found to be common to every individual. Their production is, therefore, 'not differentiated' in this sense. This leads to the conclusion that it is the plurality of bodies, not the plurality of the soul, that produces differetiation in the production of pleasure etc. Therefore, we can conclude that : Although the soul is only one, the production of pleasure etc. appears to differ in each individual because of the limitation caused by bodies[6].

It is curious, however, that there would not be a problem even if we considered this *sūtra* to reflect the Vaiśeṣikas' own opinion. The opinion of the opponents as presented in the *Upaskāra* is logical enough to prevent against it. Here, the following question arises: Why should all the commentaries reject it as false?

The *Vṛtti*, the *Vyākhyā* and the *Upaskāra* rely on common sense. It is impossible, on their view, for all individuals to experience the same pleasure etc. at the same time. But this common sense viewpoint was already refuted by the opponents. The puzzle is : how could the commentators simply re-assert the common sense view as their only argument against the opponents?

2. Commentaries on the Praśastapādabhāṣya

As was seen above, the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* refers very briefly to the *sūtra* which expounds the plurality of soul, and affirms it.

6 Śaṅkara's way of thinking resembles the present point at issue. It is as follows : *ucyate pramāyā nityatve 'nityatve ca rūpaviśeṣābhāvāt. avagatir hi pramā. tasyāḥ smṛtīcchādipūrvikāyā anityāyāḥ kūṭasthanityāyā vā, na [sva-] rūpaviśeṣo vidyate. yathā dhātvarthasya tiṣṭhatyādeḥ phalasya gatyādipūrvakasyānityasyāpūrvasya nityasya vā, rūpaviśeṣo nāstīti tulyo vyapadeśo dṛṣṭaḥ tiṣṭhanti manuṣyāḥ, tiṣṭhanti parvata ityādi. tathā nityāvagatisvarūpe 'pi pramātari pramātṛtvavyapadeśo na virudhyate, phalasāmānyād iti.* (*Upadeśasāhastrī* II. 103.) *Upaskāra* adds one *sūtra* which expounds the unity of other (*śabdaliṅgāviśeṣād viśeṣaliṅgābhāvāc ca*) after the *sūtra* 2. 1. 28.

But it does not refer to the *sūtra* which expounds the unity of soul. *Praśastapāda* seems to have intentionally avoided discussing this point. However, all its commentaries develop several arguments on the unity and plurality of soul.

First, Śrīdhara's *Nyāyakandalī*, after denying the notion of the unity of soul on account of differentiation in the production of pleasure and pain, argues as follows :

> " [Objection:] While the Supreme Self (*paramātman*) is only one, individual souls (*jīvātman*) are each established, because they are different from each other.
>
> [Answer:] This is not right. [Because] the established Advaita theory would collapse if there is any differentation in the Supreme Self, [and because] it contradicts the words of the Vedas which tell us as follows :
>
> > " I wish to enter into [these three *devatās* (heat, water and food)] together with soul or the life (*jīva*), and to develop the name and form (*nāmarūpa*). " (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6. 3. 2)
>
> [Objection :] Difference between individual souls and the Supreme Self is a product of ignorance (*avidyā*).
>
> [Answer :] To what does the ignorance belong?[7] Does it belong to *brahman* or to individual souls? First *brahman* is not connected. with ignorance because by its nature it is pure and awakened Second, [the notion that] ignorance depends on individual souls is defeated by the defect of mutual dependence which is of the form of 'difference among individual souls is a product of ignorance, and ignorance depends on individual souls'. "[8]

7 Śaṅkara avoided dlscussing on the locus of ignorance, for he was an exeellent pragmatist. But his followers managed to clarify it in many ways in vain, I think.

8 *ekatve 'pi paramātmano jīvātmanāṃ parasparabhedād vyavastheti. tad asat paramātmano bhede 'dvaitasiddhāntakṣatiḥ. anena jīvenātmanānu-*

(Continued on next page)

Since the phrase 'the established Advaita theory' and the term '*avidyā*' are used in the argument, it is clear that, according to Śrīdhara, the opponents who declare the unity of soul are the Advaitins. But it is impossible for us to conclude that the opinion expressed in *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 3. 2. 15 is that of the Advaitins. Śrīdhara must also have been aware that the *sūtra* could not refer to the Advaita theory which was only developed much later. Therefore, we should consider the following : Śrīdhara had to fight many contemporary enemies, among whom were the Advaitins, the most powerful sect of the Vedāntins. The core of their theory was the unity of soul. Śrīdhara tried to refute this older and more general Vedāntic idea by arguing against the more specific view of contemporary Advaitins.

It has already been pointed out by many scholars that the relation of the Supreme Self and individual souls, expounded in the *Brahmasūtra*, was the relation of their being different and yet the same (*bhedābheda*). This was not the view of the Advaitins who used technical terms such as ignorance (*avidyā*), illusion (*māyā*). It was, however, the view of other Vedāntins. Moreover, the *Brahmasūtra* was compiled much later than the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*. Therefore, even if we admit that *sūtra* 3. 2. 15 is referring to the Vedāntins, it must be referring to, so to speak, 'the proto-Vedāntins.'

Second, Udayana in his *Kiraṇāvalī* speculates on the phrase 'each establishment' in three ways.

1) 'Each establishment' means 'one transmigrates, and another is in the final release.' He denies the unity of soul by using the following mixed hypothetical syllogism : If soul is only one, there ought not to exist any being who transmigrates even when only one being has got final release. But it is impossible. Therefore, soul is not only one.

2) 'Each establishment' means 'one is the Lord (*Īśvara*), and another is not.' Udayana tried to demonstrate the existence of soul in his *Ātmatattvaviveka*, and the existence of the Lord in his another work, the *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, with the result that later Hindus appreciated him highly as a magnificent disputant who guarded Hinduism from the ill-willed Buddhists. For him, the Lord exists undoubtedly, and is the same as 'Supreme Brahman' (*parabrahman*). A later formulation of his idea can be found, for example, in Annambhaṭṭa's *Tarkasaṅgraha* :

> "Soul is the locus of cognition. It is of two kinds: the Supreme Self and individual souls. Of these, the Supreme Self is the Omniscient Lord, and is only one. Individual souls are different according to each body, are omnipresent, and eternal."[9]

3) 'Each establishment' means 'one feels pleasure, and another pain.' Here he introduces an opinion, probably of the Advaitins, and refutes it from the viewpoint of common sense as was seen above.

But, though Udayana was confident that he had succeeded thereby in demonstrating the plurality of soul, he could not neglect the words of the Vedas which expound the unity of soul. He, therefore, says:

> "The plurality of soul does not contradict the words of the Vedas which expound its unity. Soul is substantially only one for a person who is seeking final release because he ought to abandon everything, and decidedly stand upon his own soul [only]."[10]

(*Continued from last page*)

praviśya nāmarūpe vyākaravāṇīti jīvaparamātmanos tādātmyaśrutivirodhāc ca. avidyākṛto jīvaparamātmanor bheda iti cet, kasyeyam avidyā. kiṃ brahmaṇaḥ kim uta jīvānām. na tāvad brahmaṇo 'sty avidyāyogaḥ śuddhabuddhasvabhāvāt. jīvāśrayāvidyeti cānyonyāśrayadoṣaprahatam. avidyākṛto jīvabhedo jīvāśrayāvidyeti.

9 *jñānādhikaraṇam ātmā. sa dvividhaḥ paramātmā jīvātmā ca. tatreśvaraḥ sarvajñaḥ paramātmaika eva. jīvātmā pratiśarīraṃ bhinno vibhur nityaś ca* (*Tarkasaṅgraha*, p. 12.)

10 *anekātmatve aikātmyaśrutivirodha ity api nāsti. mumukṣuṇā sarvam vihāya svātmapratiṣṭhena bhavitavyam. sa ca eka eveti tātparyād iti.*

...2

Śrīdhara explains the same problem in the following way :

> " We would like to say that [the words of] the Vedas which expound non-difference [between the Supreme Self and individual souls should be interpreted not in the literal meaning, but] in the secondary (figurative) meaning. "[11]

Third, Vyomaśiva in his *Vyomavatī* introduces a somewhat different argument, and refers to *sūtra* 3. 2. 15 directly. He maintains that the supposition of the unity of soul leads to a logical absurdity with respect to transmigration and final release, and he refutes the opinion that the Supreme Self is the cause of individual souls. He writes as follows :

> "Now, atoms are the material causes of their effects, earth etc., as it is recognized that the smaller are the causes of the larger, namely, the effects. But this [way] cannot be applied to the case of Supreme Self. Because he is omnipresent, and it is not experienced that those which have form (*mūrta*)[12] are produced by those formless material causes in which they (the effects) inhere. And, even if we should say, ' the Supreme Self is plural and is the material cause which has a minute dimension, ' such a saying can be derived only from difference of names, [according to which the Supreme Self is nothing but an individuai soul]. "[13]

The dimension of soul will be discussed later in 1. 1. Here we should focus on his unique interpretation of *sūtras* 3. 2. 15–16. His argument continues one sentence later as follows :

> " And the sentence [of the *sūtra* 3. 2. 15] which expounds the unity [of soul] should be interpreted as that which presupposes the Supreme Self in the above sense (' according to which the Supreme Self is nothing but an individual soul '). Because [the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* has] already established the existence of soul by inference from its effects (expiration, aspiration etc.).[14] And it is in order to deny the existence [of plural souls] in one body that [the *sūtra* 3. 2. 16 expounds] ' the only one soul is each established in each body. ' The Buddhists assert that [plural] souls named plural cognitions (*vijñāna*) exist in one body. In order to deny such an assertion [*sūtra* 3. 2. 16 expounds that] there exists only one, not plural [soul]. The sentence [of the *sūtra*] which expounds the plurality [of soul means] the same matter. "[15]

' The Buddhists ' referred to here are the Yogācāras. According to their theory that all are cognition only (*vijñapti- / vijñānamātratā*), eight kinds of cognitions beginning with a storing fundamental cognition (*ālayavijñāna*) are snpposed to be the principles which enable us to live in the world. Vyomaśiva identifies such cognitions with souls. This is quite interesting. For he regarded the Yogācāra theory as the *ātmavāda* (the theory which affirms the existence of soul), despite the fact that they allegedly succeeded in re-establishing the *nirātmavāda* (the theory which negates the existence of soul).

Now, setting this problem aside, let's return to our topic. It is notable that, according to Vyomaśiva, both *sūtras* 3. 2. 15 and 3. 2. 16 expound established Vaiśeṣika theories. However, according to him, the meaning of the unity of soul is totally different from what the Vedāntins maintain. Of course, for chronological

11 *abhedaśrutayas tu gauṇārthā iti dik.*

12 As for *mūrta* and *amūrta* see II. 1.

13 *paramāṇavas tu kṣityādeḥ kāryasyopādānakāraṇaṃ kāryaparimāṇād dhīnaprimāṇasya kāraṇasyopalabdheḥ. na ca paramātmā tasya vyāpakatvāt. na cāmūrtopādānasamavetamūrtam utpadyamānam dṛṣṭam iti. yadi cānekam aṇuparimāṇaṃ copādānaṃ paramātmeti syāt sañjñābhedamātram,*

14 Cf. *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 3. 2. 4.

15 *yac caikatvapratipādakaṃ vākyaṃ tat pramātmāpekṣayā vyākhyeyam. tasya hi kāryānumānena pūrvam eva vyavasthāpanāt. yac cedam eka evāyam ātmā dehe dehe vyavasthita iti ekasmin śarīre 'nekatvapratiṣedhārtham etat. tathā hy ekasmin śarīre 'nekam vijñānam ātmeti śākyā manyante. tatpratiṣedhārthaṃ pratiśarīram eko nānekaḥ. tathā nānātvapratipāda[ka]m eva vākyam astīti alam atijalpitena.*

reasons it is absurd to believe that the *Sūtrakāra* composed these *sūtras* in order to refute the Yogācāras. Still, much attention needs to be paid to the fact that Vyomaśiva accepted *sūtra* 3. 2. 15 as expressing an established Vaiśeṣika theory, and not an opinion of the opponents.

3. The explanatory structure of the Vaiśeṣikasūtra

In the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* there are several basic patterns, which are very important for reconstructing the so-called ' proto-*Vaiśeṣikasūtra* '. One of these patterns is found in the section where five substances (ether, space, time, soul and mind) are explained. It is as follows :

(a) Enumeration of probans (*liṅga*).
(b) It is a substance, and is eternal.
(c) It is only one.
(d) It is (or seems to be) plural for some reason.

With regard to ether, space, time and mind, all the commentaries on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* interpret these four items as expounding established Vaiśeṣika theories. See below.

ether : (a) 2. 1. 26.[16]
(b) 2. 1. 27.[17]
(c) 2. 1. 28.[18]
(d) omitted. (supplemented by the *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya*.)

space : (a) 2. 2. 12.[19]
(b) 2. 2. 13.[20]

16 *liṅgam ākāśasya.* The preceding two *sūtras* deny the possibility of sound to be the quality of other substances.

17 *dravyatvanityatve vāyunā vyākhyāte.*

18 *tattvaṃ bhāvena.*

19 *ita idam iti yatas tad diśo liṅgam.*

20 *dravyatvanityatve vāyuuā vyākhyāte.*

(c) 2. 2. 14.[21]
(d) 2. 2. 15.[22]

time : (a) 2. 2. 6.[23]
(b) 2. 2. 7.[24]
(c) 2. 2. 8.[25]
(d) 2. 2. 9.[26]

mind : (a) 3. 2. 1.[27]
(b) 3. 2. 2.[28]
(c) 3. 2. 3.[29] (one in each body, according to commentaries).
(d) omitted. (its plurality is implied by (c).)

The same pattern is applied in the case of soul as well. It is as follows :

(a) 3. 2. 4.[30]
(b) 3. 2. 5.[31]
(c) 3. 2. 15.
(d) 3. 2. 16.
[(e) 3. 2. 17].

21 *tattvaṃ bhāvena.*

22 *kāryaviśeṣeṇa nānātvam.*

23 *aparasmin paraṃ yugapad ayugapad ciraṃ kṣipram iti kālaliṅgāni.*

24 *dravyatvauityatve vāyunā vyākhyāte.*

25 *tattvaṃ bhāvena.*

26 *Kāryaviśeṣeṇa nānātvam.*

27 *ātmendriyārthasannikarṣe jñānasyābhāvo bhāvaś ca manaso liṅgam.*

28 *dravyatvanityatve vāyunā vyākhyāte.*

29 *prayatnāyaugapadyāj jñānāyaugapdyāc caikaṃ manaḥ.*

30 *prāṇāpānanimeṣonmeṣajīvanamanogatīndriyāntaravikārāḥ sukhaduḥkhe icchādveṣau prayatnaś cety ātmaliṅgāni.*

31 *dravyatvanityatve vāyunā vyākhyāte.*

While, as for the former four (ether etc.), the *sūtras* in question are arranged in succession, there is a large break from 3. 2. 5 to 3. 2. 15. No doubt, in the so-called 'proto-*Vaiśeṣikasūtra*', there was not such a break. As time passed, there must have been frequent arguments on soul between the Vaiśeṣikas and their various opponents. The main opponents were the Sarvāstivādins, the Mādhyamikas and the primitive Yogācāras. They criticized the Vaiśeṣikas from the grounds of no soul theory. Moreover the Vaiśeṣikas were being irritated by the Sāṅkhyas as well as the proto-Vedāntins. This motivated them to compose new *sūtras*, to strengthen their theory, and led them to neglect the well-ordered structure of the 'proto-*Vaiśeṣikasūtra*.' This resulted in a large break in the original order of the text. It is likely that this break confused the later Vaiśeṣikas.

But, if we observe this pattern carefully, we can see that *sūtra* 3. 2. 15 expounds the established Vaiśeṣika (original) theory instead of an opponents' theory as believed by many of the later commentators. It is probable that the Vaiśeṣikas, in their earliest stage, maintained in a way somewhat similar to the Vedāntins that soul, thaugh essentially only one, is plural by bodily limitation.

5. Conclusion

The above argument can be summarized as follows :

1. All of the commentaries on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, including the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, affirm the plurality of soul, and deny its unity. Praśastapāda, however, does not refer directly to the unity of soul. Praśastapāda's silence on this matter has resulted in a great deal of confusion.

2. Among the commenators of the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, Śrīdhara and Udayana agree with all of the commentators of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*. Udayana shows the interpretation that soul is each established in the form of the Supreme Self and individual souls. Later this becomes the formula 'It is of two kinds : the Supreme Self and individual souls.' However, Vyomaśiva interprets *sūtra* 3. 2. 15 as expounding the unity, though in the sense that the one soul exists in each body.

3. There is found in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* a certain pattern which explains the five substances (ether etc.). According to this pattern, it is natural for us to admit that *sūtra* 3. 2. 15 expounds the established Vaiśeṣika (original) theory.

These points lead us to the following assumption.

The Vaiśeṣikas, in their earliest stage, considered that one soul appears as numerous individual souls by bodily limitation. This limitation was probably of the same kind as for ether. Recollect the frequently used example, namely, 'ether in a pot.' This idea can be attributed to Uddālaka Āruṇi's cosmology found in the *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, though the Vaiśeṣikas must have rejected the theory of emanation (*pariṇāmavāda*) in some way. Thus, we can conclude with a high degree probability that both the unity and the plurality of soul were originally their own established theory.

Later, however, a crisis was created by the Sāṅkhyas who powerfully argued for the plurality of *puruṣa* (=soul) by asserting the emanation of the world from one non-intellectual principle (*mūlaprakṛti*). The Vedāntins, who asserted the theory of emanation from the monistic point of view, were getting more and more powerful.

Therefore, the Vaiśeṣikas, in order to preserve their theory of new production (*ārambhavāda*)[32] which is inconsistent with the theory of emanation, abandoned their traditional theory of the soul which was more or less similar to that of 'different and yet the same.' As a result, they re-interpreted *sūtra* 3. 2. 15 as ex-

32 The precise meaning of '*ārambha*' is by no means 'aggregation,' though having been used by many scholars for a long time. See III. 2.

pounding the opinion of the Vedāntins. Yet, the memory that it had originally expounded their own theory survived, and transformed itself to the sublte interpretation of Vyomaśiva.

On the other hand, the worship of the Lord (*īśvara*, *maheśvara*), the Supreme Self, became more and more prevalent given the background of the rising waves of Hinduism (especially Bhakti Movement and Tantrism). The Vaiśeṣikas, together with the Naiyāyikas, became absorbed in demonstrating the existence of the Lord, which Udayana is said to have completed. However, they stressed the utter difference between the Lord, the Supreme Self, and individual souls to clarify the difference between their theory and that of the Vedāntins.

[A BRIEF REVIEW]

I would like to summarize the interpretations of some well known scholars on the present problem, and to criticize them briefly.

A. B. Keith (*Indian Logic and Atomism*. Oxford 1921, p. 242): He says the notion of the plurality of soul belongs to the Vaiśeṣikas, and that of its unity to the Vedāntins. This type of interpretation is not persuasive at all as I have shown above. He thinks the omnipresence or the maximum dimension of soul can be explained by its being infinitely numerous. Probably, this depends on Śrīdhara's comment that soul is infinite in number, and that otherwise, the world, which is made from the deeds of beings, would vanish entirely when all beings obtain final release. But Śrīdhara does not connect the problem of the number of soul with that of its omnipresence. Keith's misunderstanding.

P. Deussen (*Allgemeine Geschichte der Philhsophie*. 1-3. Leipzig 1920, SS. 351-352): He says both the notion of the plurality of soul and that of its unity belong to the Vaiśeṣikas. According to him, although soul is essentially only one, it takes

phenomenal forms as the Supreme Lord and many individual souls. This is, however, a typically Vedāntic assumption, and does not fit the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, where no reference is made to 'the phenomenal forms.'

O. Strauss (*Indische Philosophie*. München 1925, S. 153): He says both notions belong to the Vaiśeṣikas, in the sense that the Supreme Self is only one and individual souls are plural. This depends completely upon Udayana's idea. Moreover, Udayana denies the unity of soul.

S. Dasgupta (*A History of Indian Philosophy*. Cambridge 1922, p. 290 fn.): He says both notions belong to the Vaiśeṣikas, in the sense that soul, though essentially only one, is regarded as plural by many limitations and by the need of the practice of justice imposed by the sacred texts. If we bring in here the word '*avidyā*' (ignorance), this suddenly transforms itself to the Advaita theory.

S. Radhakrishnan (*Indian Philosophy*. II, London 1927, p. 190): He says only the notion of the plurality of soul belongs to the Vaiśeṣikas, while criticizing S. Dasgupta. The Vaiśeṣikas, according to him, are thorough pluralists, are interested in empirical distinctions only and are quite indifferent to the ultimate truth. But it is possible for soul to be only one even in pluralism. It is ensured even by the Vaiśeṣika notion that ether, space and time are each essentially one. Besides, the word 'the utimate truth' is a mere word, and means nothing here.

H. Ui (*Indo Tetsugaku Kenkyu* [The Studies in Indian Philosophy]. III, Tokyo 1926, pp. 522-523): He says both notions belong to the Vaiśeṣikas. He derives its unity from its omnipresence. The problem of its unity, however, has no relation with that of its omnipresence. Soul can be omnipresent even when it is plural. As for this problem, see I. 2.

E. Frauwallner (*Geschichte der indischen Philosophie*. II. Salzburg 1956, SS. 64-65): He says only the notion of the plura-

lity of soul belongs to the Vaiśeṣikas. Soul is, according to him, limited spatially, and the Vaiśeṣikas admit many individual souls. I cannot understand what 'limited spatially' means, and where in the Vaiśeṣika texts it is found. Besides, he says the *sūtras* which expound the omnipresence of soul are imposed in order to accept invisible entity (*adṛṣṭa*) as a quality of soul. His assumption is a mistake, which was already pointed out by M. Nozawa (" Vaiśeṣika ni okeru Shōji ni tsuite [The Vaiśeṣikas on *janmamarana*]," *Nihon Bukkyōgaku Nenpō* [The Annual of the Buddhist Studies in Japan]. Vol. 46, 1970) and others.

CHAPTER 2

DIMENSION OF SOUL

In the last chapter it was argued that the Vaiśeṣikas, in their earliest stage, took Uddālaka Āruṇi's 'the philosophy of the existent (*sat*)' into consideration, and maintained that soul, though only one in some sense (*Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 3. 2. 15), was plural because of its being established in each body (*ibid.* 3. 2. 16).

By the way, Yājñavalkya was probably the first who clearly declared that the subject of transmigration is soul. He told Janaka, the king of Videha, as follows :

> " Just as a leech in [one leaf of] grass creeps to the edge of the [leaf of] grass, and, intending to transfer to another [leaf of grass], creeps [to there], so this soul abandons this body, drives unconsciousness away, and, intending to transfer to another [body], moves [to there]. "[1] *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* (4. 4. 3)

Transmigration is one kind of action, and transmigration implies performing deeds and enjoying the effects of deeds. The Vaiśeṣikas, in their earliest stage, seem to have maintained that soul has action (*kriyā*, *karman* etc.), or is a doer (*kartṛ*). Such an idea of soul is in coincident with that of Yājñavalkya. However, the assumption that soul is only one and at the same time is a doer is difficult for us to understand. For, as is shown in the following passage spoken by Uddālaka Āruṇi :

> " This whole [world] has this — this minute element — as its essence.

It is truth. It is soul. You are it. "[2] (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6. 8. 7) the one soul ought to be omnipresent and to have maximum

1 *tad yathā tṛṇajalāyukā tṛṇasyāntaṃ gatvānyam ākramam ākramyātmānam upasaṃharati. evam evāyam ātmedaṃ śarīraṃ nihatyāvidyāṃ gamayitvānyam ākramam ākramyātmānam upasaṃharati.*

2 *sa ya eṣo 'ṇimaitad ātmyam idaṃ sarvam. tat satyam. sa ātmā; tat tvam asi.*

dimention. It is difficult for us to apprehend that a doer is omnipresent.

On the other hand, the Sāṅkhyas asserted that *puruṣa* (=soul) does not act and is not the subject of transmigration. They succeeded in establishing a highly sophisticated system of philosophy the core of which is based on ' the philosophy of the existent. ' Confronted by their arguments, the Vaiśeṣikas, it is guessed, could not help reformulating their theory of soul by re-interpreting the already existing *sūtras*, or by composing new ones. In the present chapter, we shall examine the Vaiśeṣika argument on the dimension of soul, which is indispensable for understanding the Vaiśeṣika ontology of soul as a whole.

1. The Vaiśeṣikasūtra and its commentaries

The dimension of soul is mentioned in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* as follows :

" Ether is large because of its omnipresence ". *vibhavād mahān ākāśaḥ* (7. 1. 28)

" So also is soul. " *tathā cātmā*. (7. 1. 29)

As was seen in the last chapter, all the commentaries on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* and on the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* affirm the plurality of soul, and deny its unity. However, the notion that soul is omnipresent like ether and, therefore, large (maximum) in dimension seems to support the theory of its unity, not its plurality. And the word ' so ' (like ether) could be considered to mean ' as only one ether is, so. ' We shall examine what the commentators thought.

First, the *Vṛtti* states as follows :

" [As to *sūtra* 7. 1. 28 :] ' Because of its omnipresence, ' namely, because, as ether, without acting by itself, becomes connected with [all] those which have form and came from outside, it is considered to have the largest size. "[3]

3. *vibhavād mūrtadravyaiḥ samāgatair agacchataḥ saṃyogāt paramamahattvam ākāśasyāstīti gamyate.*

" [As to *sūtra* 7. 1. 29 :] As is ether, so also is soul to be regarded as having the largest size. Because [, although there ought to be a word ' ether, space, time and soul, ' the word mentioned here] is not a compound, therefore, space and time are large (have the largest size), too. "[4]

Second, the *Vyākhyā* states as follows :

" Omnipresence means simultaneous connection with all substances which have form. The word ' also ' (*ca*) implies longness etc. which are not mentioned here."[5]

Both the *Vṛtti* and the *Vyākhyā* are very brief here, and do not refer to the problem of their denying the unity of soul.

Third, the *Upaskāra* states as follows :

" [This *sūtra*] expounds the essence of the dimension of ether etc. which is inferred from the probans, or their being substances.

Omnipresence is the state of being connected with all those which have form. That such a state is impossible unless [ether] has the largest size indicates that it has the largest size. Besides, it is experienced that sounds arise in Vārāṇasī and in Pāṭaliputra simultaneously. In this case, the one ether is the material cause [of these sounds]. Therefore, the ether's state of being a pervader is established. And, because the state of being a pervader is tied up with the largest size, the assumption that ether is plural commits the defect of superfluousness. Therefore, ether ought to be regarded as only one. The expression ' places of ether ' is used in a secondary meaning which originates from its connection with pots etc. which occupy [particular] places. And, [that it is used in] a secondary mean-

4 *ākāśam ivātmāpi paramamahān draṣṭavyaḥ. asamāsā[d] dikkālāv api mahāntau.*

5 *vibhavo yugapat sarvamūrtadravyasaṃyogaḥ. cakāro 'nuktadīrghatvādisamuccayārthaḥ.*

ing is the same as that [ether is] connected with substances which occupy [particular] places.

' So also is soul ' means : As ether has the largest size because it is omnipresent, namely, is connected with all those which have form, so also has soul the largest size. If soul is not connected with all those which have form, there would not arise any action which is caused by their connection with soul accompanied by *adṛṣṭa* (that which is not verifiable by direct cognition, and which has latent power to produce phenomena whose appearance cannot be explained with it). Because, when *adṛṣṭa,* whose substratum is different [from that of action], comes near [to those which have form], action arises [in them]. And its coming near is the same as that [those which have form] are connected with soul which is accompanied by *adṛṣṭa*. Similarly, it is not possible that cognition, pleasure etc. are produced in accordance with a body moving to and fro unless soul is omnipresent.[6] Therefore, soul is omnipresent. Still, it is not only one. It is unlike ether. Because it is mentioned [by *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 3. 1. 16] as ' because of each establishment. ' Such is what [the present *sūtra* intends to] mean. And its (soul's) largeness reaches its maximum as smallness of atoms its minimum, and is eternal. And, as the result of the above argument, it should be assumed that ether etc. have the longest size, and that atoms have the shortest size. " [7]

6 According to the opinion, for example, that soul has the dimention which corresponds to that of a body, soul ought to have action so that cognition, pleasure etc. may be produced here and there. In those days, the Vaiśeṣikas were already used to denying any action of soul.

7 *dravyatvena hetunākāśādīnām anumitasya parimāṇasya svarūpam aha.*

vibhavaḥ sarvamūrtasaṃyogitvam, tac ca paramamahattvam antareṇānupapadyamānaṃ paramamahattvam anumāpayati. dṛśyate ceha vārāṇasyāṃ pāṭaliputre ca yugapad eva śabdatpattiḥ. tatra caikam evākāśaṃ samavāyikāraṇam ity ākāśasya vyāpakatvaṃ siddham. vyāpakatvaṃ ca

(*Continued on the next page*)

Thus, as for negation of the unity of soul, the *Upaskāra* only says " because it is mentioned as ' because of each establishment.' " This does not seem to have explained anything about the point at issue. No notable explanation is seen as to why soul is ' unlike ether. '

2. The Praśastapādabhāṣya and its commentaries

Praśastapāda in the *Ātma-nirūpaṇa* of his *Praśastapādabhāṣya* very briefiy says :

> " By the words [of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*] as ' So also is soul ' [it is already established that soul has] the largest size. " [8]

But the commentaries contain some notable arguments which pursue this problem.

First, Śrīdhara in his *Nyāyakandalī* states the following :

> " [The brief phrase of Praśastapāda] means that by such words of the *Sūtrakāra* as ' Ether is large because of its omnipresence. So also is soul ' it is already established that. because soul is also omnipresent like ether, it is the largest. And that soul is omnipresent is inferred from flaring upward of fire, and from zigzag movement[9] of air.

(*Continued from the last page*)

paramamahatparimāṇayoga eva nānākāśakalpane gauravam ity eka evākāśo abhyupagantavyaḥ. ākāśasya pradeśa iti tu vyapadeśaḥ pradeśavadbhir ghaṭādibhiḥ saṃyoganibandhano bhāktaḥ. bhaktiś ca pradeśavaddravyasaṃyogitvam.

tathātmeti yathākāśaṃ vibhavāt sarvamūrtasaṃyogitvāt paramamahat tathātmāpi paramamahān. yady ātmanaḥ sakalamūrtasaṃyogitvaṁ na bhavet tadā teṣu teṣu mūrteṣv adṛṣṭavadātmasaṃyogāt kriyā notpadyeta vyadhikaraṇasyādṛṣṭasya pratyāsattyapekṣayā kriyājanakatvāt. sa ca pratyāsattir adṛṣṭavadātmasaṃyoga eva. evaṃ sañcāriṇi śarīre tatra tatra jñānasukhādīnām utpattir ātmano vaibhavam antareṇānupapannety ātmāpi vyāpakaḥ. sa ca nākāśavad eka eva vyavasthādarśanād ity uktam iti bhāvaḥ. tac ca mahattvaṃ sātiśayaṃ nityaṃ ca paramāṇvaṇutvavat. evam ākāśādau paramādīrghatvaṃ paramāṇuṣu ca paramahrasvatvam ūhanīyam.

8 *tathā cātmeti vacanāt paramamahatparimāṇam.*

9 ' *tiryakgamana* ' according to another version (Gaṅgānāths Jhā Granthamālā).

For they are produced by *adṛṣṭa*. Besides, *adṛṣṭa* which is not related to the substratum [of flaring upward etc.] (fire or air) cannot be its cause. Because [, otherwise, such an assumption] would commit [the defect of] over-application. Moreover, *adṛṣṭa* which is inherent in soul cannot be related directly to another substance. Therefore, it should be that *adṛṣṭa*, through relation of its own substratum (soul) [with fire and air], comes to be related [to fire and air]. Thus, it turns out to be established that soul's state of being related to all those which have form is the feature of its omnipresence.

[Objection :] Flaring upward of fire is ascribed to its nature, not to *adṛṣṭa*.

[Answer :] What is the nature then ? If [it should be] fireness, burningness or a particular colour, [flaring upward] could be seen of fire which exists in an iron ball. [But we do not experience it.] If the state that it emerges from a particular fuel should be the nature, [fire which] does not emerge from any fuel[10] or [fire which] emerges from lightning would not flare upward. [But we do not experience it.] If you assert that some nature which is beyond our sense organs exists in some individual [fire], then, why do you avert admitting that [such nature is nothing but] a quality of soul ? Any action whose cause is not weight, fluidity or velocity occurs from the proper quality of soul. The cause of flaring upward [of fire]. zigzag movement [of air] etc. is not weight etc. Because [weight etc.] do no exist [in fire and air], and because [weight etc.] go against each effect [flaring upward and zigzag movement]. Therefore, it is logical to consider that these [actions] are produced by the proper quality of soul.

[The syllogism to this is as follows :]

10 Such fires as the sun, the moon, stars, light of fireflies.

[Statement] Flaring upward [of fire] and zigzag movement [of air] are produced by the proper quality of soul.

[Reason] Because they are actions under the condition that there are no such causes as weight etc..

[Illustration] Like action of a hand which is produced by effort of soul. "[11]

The term '*adṛṣṭa*' appears in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* several times.[12] It is something which pervades the world and produces mysterious phenomena such as 'a jewel moves towards a thief,' 'pins are drawn to magnets.' The *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* does not explain what it is.

Soon after the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* was completed, the Vaiśeṣikas became absorbed in reforming their system of philosophy. They identified *adṛṣṭa* with merit and demerit which are the causes of transmigration, and enumerated it as one of the proper qualities of soul. Then, their explanation became as follows : Soul is the substratum of *adṛṣṭa*. The latter appears everywhere in the world, or is, so to speak, omnipresent. Therefore, soul ought to be omnipresent as well.

11 *vibhavān mahān ākāśas tathā cātmeti sūtrakāravacanād ākāśavad ātmano 'pi vibhutvāt paramamahatparimāṇaṃ siddham ity arthaḥ. vibhutvāt cātmano vahner ūrdhvajvalanād vāyos tiryakpavanād avagatam. te hy adṛṣṭakārite. na ca tadāśrayeṇāsambaddham adṛṣṭaṃ tayoḥ kāraṇaṃ bhavitum arhati atiprasaṅgāt. na cātmasamavetasyādṛṣṭasya sākṣād dravyāntarasambandho ghaṭate iti svāśrayasambandhadvāreṇa tasya sambandha ity āyātam. tataḥ samastamūrtadravyasambandhalakṣaṇam ātmano vibhutvaṃ siddhyati. svabhāvata eva vahner ūrdhvajvalanaṃ nādṛṣṭād iti cet ko 'yaṃ svabhāvo nāma yadi vahnitvam uta dāhakatvaṃ rūpaviśeṣo vā taptāyaḥpiṇḍe vahner api syāt. athendhanaviśeṣaprabhavatvaṃ svabhāva ity anindhanaprabhavasya vidyudādiprabhavasya cordhvajvalanaṃ na syāt. athātīndriyaḥ ko 'pi svabhāvaḥ kāsucid vyaktiṣv asti yāsām ūrdhvajalanaṃ dṛśyata iti puruṣaguṇe kaḥ pradveṣaḥ. yasya karmaṇo gurutvadravatvavegā na kāraṇaṃ tatsyātmaviśeṣaguṇād utpādaḥ yathā pāṇikarmaṇaḥ puruṣaprayatnād. ūrdhvajvalanatiryakpavanādīnāṃ karmaṇāṃ gurutvādayo na kāraṇam abhāvāt tatkāryaviparītatvāc ca. tasmād eṣāṃ apy ātmaviśeṣaguṇād evotpādo nyāyyaḥ. ūrdhvajvalanatiryakpavanāny ātmaviśeṣaguṇakṛtāni gurutvādikāraṇābhāve sati karmatvāt puruṣaprayatnajapāṇikarmavat.*

12 As for its detail, see I. 3.

...4

It was natural for Śrīdhara to utilize the above logic in demonstrating the omnipresence of soul.

Many scholars considered this to be the *raison d'être* of the *sūtra* which expounds the omnipresence of soul. But, as M. Nozawa pointed out,[13] such a *raison d'être* was introduced by modern scholars carelessly into the interpretation of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* on soul. The *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* itself does not use any word to suggest that *adṛṣṭa* is the same as merit and demerit, that it is the proper quality of soul, or even that it is a quality at all.

Second, Udayana in his *Kiraṇāvalī* mentions the following :

> "On the ground that [soul is] already established as to dimension because of its being a substance, [Praśastapāda] says, 'By the words [of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*] 'So also is soul.'" This reminds us of the *sūtra* 'Ether is large because of its omnipresence. So also is soul.' This means that, as ether is large because it is omnipresent, so also is soul, namely, that [soul is] large because it is omnipresent.
>
> [Objection :] Why is it omnipresent ?
>
> [Answer :] [Do] not [think so]. Because cognition, pleasure etc., which are its effects, are found everywhere.
>
> [Objection :] This is able to be explained merely by movement of a body.
>
> [Answer :] No. Because [soul has] no form (*amūrta*).
>
> [Objection :] Why [can you say] so too ?
>
> [Answer :] Because, if [it is] of the smallest size, there would be led a false conclusion that [it is] not directly cognized,[14] and that [it is] not a locus of qualities which are directly cognized. [And we can say neither that it is simply small, nor that it is simply large. For, in these cases, it should be said to be composed of smaller parts. This means that it has parts.] Because, if it should have parts, there would be led a false conclusion that it is non-eternal. And because, if it should have beginning (to be non-eternal means to have beginning), there would be led a false conclusion that it is not possible that [re-]birth is not seen of a person who is detached from desires. [If soul has beginning, there will not be any cause which produces the first connection of a body with soul. For there could exist no deed which is to bring the next birth to soul.]"[15]

13 M. Nozawa, "Vaiśeṣika ni okeru Shōji ni tuite [The Vaiśeṣikas on *janma-maraṇa*]", *Nihon Bukkyōgaku Nenpō* [The Annual of the Buddhist Studies in Japan]. Vol. 46, 1970.

14 This is based on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 4. 1. 6 : "Direct cognition is produced of a large [substance] by its having many substances [as its causes] and by its colour." (*mahaty anekadravyavattvāt rupāc copalabdhiḥ*).

Thus, Udayana intends to establish the omnipresence of soul on the ground that it has the largest size and has no form. This is almost the same strategy as that of the ***Vaiśeṣikasūtra***. We shall discuss this later.

Third, Vyomaśiva in his *Vyomavatī* mentions as follows :

> "[The sentence of Praśastapāda] refers to the ***sūtra*** 'ether is large because of its omnipresence. So also is soul.' [This means,] 'As ether is large because of its omnipresence, so also is soul.' That is, the largest size [of soul] is proved by [the reason] 'because of its omnipresence' [mentioned in the above passage].
>
> [Objection :] Because soul has the same dimension as a body, the largest size of [soul] is not proved. Because [soul] is small in a small body and large in a large one,

15 *dravyatvena parimāṇayoge siddhe saty āha — tathā cātmety vacanād iti. vibhutvān mahān ākāśas tathā cātmeti sūtraṃ smarayati. vibhutvād yathākāśo mahāṃs tathā tata eva vaibhavād ātmāpi mahān ity arthaḥ. vibhutvam eva tasya kuta iti cet, na tatkāryasya jñānasukhādeḥ sarvatra darśanāt. śarīrasya gatyaiva tad upapannam it cet, na amūrtatvāt. etad api kuta iti cet, paramāṇutve 'pratyakṣatvaprasaṅgāt pratyakṣaguṇānadhikaraṇatvaprasaṅgāc ca. avayavitve 'nityatvāprasaṅgād ādimattayā vītarāgajanmadarśanānupapatteś ceti.*

there is no evidence for soul existing separately from a body.

[Answer :] According to this opinion [soul] has contraction and stretch as its attribute. If so, there would not arise any recollection as to [soul's dimention] being various [in correspondence with various stages of one's growth]. That is to say, such a recollection should be of the form of ' Soul [of the former dimension] in the body of my childhood vanished [after I grew up], and there were as well souls of various [dimensions corresponding to various stages of] my growth.' However, the latter dimension could not be produced unless the former one should have been destroyed before. [Generally speaking,] it is when the locus of the former dimension has been destroyed [that the former dimension comes to be destroyed]. [This is absurd because soul is eternal.] Moreover, if connection of a body [with soul] is not gained in heaven etc., there would not be [its] enjoyment [of reward in such and such realm].

[Objection :] [Therefore,] movement [of soul] is required.

[Answer :] Then, [you would be confronted with such a difficult point as follows : In our opinion, soul having the largest size, its being formless, its being eternal and its being actionless, all these mean the same matter. But you do not admit its having the largest size, maintain that it has such action as movement, and assert that it has the same dimension as a body. Namely, you have a notion that it is that which has form that has a certain degree of dimension. This means that, according to you, [it is] that which has form that is large (not the largest). Then, you are required to tell the cause which produces [that dimension]. [But that which has any cause is non-eternal, and, as for dimension, that which is the locus of the non-eternal dimension is also non-eternal. Then, your assumption leads to an absurd conclusion that soul is non-eternal.] Therefore, [your

assumption] turns out to be denied like [the Cārvāka's assumption] that elements are spiritual. "[16]

This passage continues by mentioning another way in which Vyomaśiva tries to prove that soul has the largest size because of its being the locus of *adṛṣṭa*. This is almost the same argument used by Śrīdhara.

Vyomaśiva's argument quoted above is directed against a naive, but popular conception that the dimension of each soul corresponds to that of each body. If my voluminous supplements inserted into his brief argument are valid, the dimension of soul can be decided by an argument on dimension itself. This is exactly what was done by Udayana. It is interesting that Vyomaśiva used both the argument on dimension itself and that on soul being the locus of *adṛṣṭa*, while Udayana used the former one only and Śrīdhara the latter one only.

Here, let's return to the theory of dimension expounded by the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* in order to clarify the point.

3. The Vaiśeṣikasūtra on dimension and eternity

Vaiśeṣikasūtra 7. 1. 15–35 concentrates on arguing on dimension. We shall refer to this briefly. With regard to the present problem, its argument for eternity (in the first *Āhnika* of the fourth *Adhyāya*) is also notable.

To begin with, the definition of eternity is as follows :

16 *tathā cātmavacanāt paramamahatparimāṇam iti. vibhavān mahān ākāśas tathā cātmeti sūtram darśayati. yathā vibhavān mahān ākāśas tathātmāpīti vibhutvād eva paramamahattvaṃ siddham. atha śarīraparimāṇatvād ātmano 'siddhaṃ paramamahattvaṃ tathā cālpaśarīre 'lpo mahati mahān atmeti na śarīravyatirekeṇātmano 'stitve pramāṇam asti. nanv etasmin pakṣe saṅkocavikāśadharmakatvād bālaśarīre 'py ātmano vināśe vṛddhāvasthāyāṃ nānātmā sampadyata ity anyatve smaraṇaṃ na syāt. 'na ca pūrvaparimāṇasyānivṛttāv uttaraparimāṇena śakyam bhavitum iti pūrvaparimāṇasyāśrayavināśād eva nivṛttiḥ. svargādisthāneṣu śarīrasambandhānupapattāv upabhogo na syāt. atha iṣyata eva gamanam. tarhi mūrtatve sati mahāparimāṇatvād yata utpattis tat kāraṇaṃ vācyam iti bhūtacaitanyavat pratiṣedhaḥ.*

"That which is existent and has no cause is eternal." *sad akāraṇavat tan nityam.* (4. 1. 1)

Next, the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* uses five terms which show various kinds of dimensions. They are as follows:

mahattva (7. 1. 21, 22) — largeness

aṇutva (7. 1. 21, 22) — smallness

dīrghatva (7. 1. 23) — longness

hrasvatva (7. 1. 23) — shortness

parimaṇḍala (7. 1. 26: *pārimaṇḍalya*) — the smallest size only according to Praśastapāda, but both the largest and the smallest size according to the *Daśapadārthī*. All the commentaries on *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* follow Praśastapāda.

The *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* expounds the eternity of the atoms of earth, water, fire and air in 7. 1. 23, of ether in 7. 1. 28, of soul in 7. 1. 29, of mind in 7, 1. 30, of space in 7. 1. 31 and of time in 7. 1. 32. Its explanation is not so clear as the explanation in the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, but it is utterly consistent. Moreover, it states:

"It (*mahattva, aṇutva, dīrghatva,* or *hrasvatva*) is non-eternal when it exists in a non-eternal [substance]." *tad anitye 'nityam.* (7. 1. 25)

And it is very probable that the *Sūtrakāra* utilized the division into that which has form and that which has no form, even though it does not appear in the *Sūtra*. He might not have introduced it in the *Sūtra* because he was able to develop the argument without it.

First, as for those four elements (earth etc.) which have form, the largeness of a substance has many large substances etc. as its causes (7. 1. 16). Thus, large substances are non-eternal by definition. Small substances are contrary to them (7. 1. 17). Still, while the smallest (and the largest) substances are eternal, the other small (and large) substances are non-eternal.

Second, as for the five substances (ether etc.), the *Sūtrakāra* must have considered that eternal substances are either large or small. The problem of omnipresence is related to this. We are able to construe the term '*vibhutva*,' '*vibhava*' and the like as originally meaning 'to exist spreading widely.' It is not natural to conceive that that which exists spreading widely is small. Therefore, ether, space, time and soul should be large. But mind is conceived to be quite limited in dimension. Therefore, it should be small. And its being of quite limited in dimension was considered to imply that it is that which has form. It is self-evident, however, that ether etc. do not have form. Thus, that which has no form is large. Now, it is already established that ether etc. are eternal. Therefore, their dimension ought to be neither the halfway largeness nor the halfway smallness.

The above argument on dimension implicit in the *Vaśeṣikaūtra*, was made more sophisticated by Praśastapāda and Candramati. Their division of dimension is as follows:

mahattva eternal = *paramamahattva* (the largest size) = a quality of ether, space, time and soul. *Pārimaṇḍalya* is its other name according to Candramati.

non-eternal = *mahattva* — a quality of earth, water, fire and air as a triad (*tryaṇuka*) etc.

aṇutva eternal = *paramāṇutva* (the smallest size) — a quality of atoms of earth, water, fire and air, and of mind. *Pārimaṇḍalya* is its other name according to both Candramati and Praśastapāda.

non-eternal = *aṇutva* — a quality of a diad (*dvyaṇuka*) of earth, water, fire and air.

Here it becomes more obvious that any locus of the largest size has no form, while the others have form. Those statements which indicate that *adṛṣṭa* is a quality of soul are not found in the

Vaiśeṣikasūtra which argues about the dimension of soul only by the argument of dimension itself. The division into that which has no form and that which has form is not stated there. But we cannot deny the possibility that the division lies latently there because this division could dissolve the problem of dimension, and is consistent with the *sūtras* with great ease.

4. Conclusion

It is difficult for us to understand the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* completely. For it took long time for the Vaiśeṣikas to complete it, and in the meantime it suffered many additions in response to various circumstances. Therefore, we are frequently perplexed by differences between *sūtras* and later interpretations.

But, as to the dimension of soul, it is notable that the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* states very clearly that soul is the largest from the very definition of dimension itself. Some modern scholars argue that soul came to be conceived as the largest after *adṛṣṭa*, which pervades the world, had come to be regarded as having soul as its locus. This argument is upside-down. From the earliest stage, it was already established that soul is the largest. In this stage, *adṛṣṭa* was so obscure that it was not argued for in detail. Later, the Vaiśeṣikas, while reforming their theorics, put *adṛṣṭa* into the category of quality, and regarded it especially as the proper quality of soul by identifying it with merit and demerit. Later, commentators, having forgotten the original theory, tried to establish the soul being the largest with the help of the later constructed theory that *adṛṣṭa* is the proper quality of soul. Such an upside-down interpretation confused many modern scholars. The fact is that soul came to be considered the locus of *adṛṣṭa* just because soul was already established as being the largest, not vice versa.

Another reason which has confused many modern scholars might be the misunderstanding that the Vaiśeṣikas from the beginning affirmed the plurality of soul only, and denied its unity. As was argued in I. 1, it is natural to consider that the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* affirmed both its unity and plurality. The Vaiśeṣikas, in their

earliest stage, must have not felt any unfitness with regard to the soul being the largest. But, later, they came to affirm its plurality only, and to deny its unity, and introduced another reason to explain the notion that plural souls are the largest. It was that soul is the locus of *adṛṣṭa*. This led many modern scholars to the above misunderstanding.

Moreover, the notion that plural souls are the largest is still confusing them. If all souls are the largest, they should be completely fused into one.... To prevent such confusions the following two points ought to be understood.

First, the original meaning of the term '*mūrti*' is 'coagulation,' which stands as well for 'being spatially exclusive to others,' or 'being an obstacle to others.' Therefore, those which have form (*mūrta*) are spatially exclusive to each other, and so, cannot be fused into one. On the contrary, those which have no form (*amūrta*) are not spatially exclusive to each other, and, therefore, can be fused into one. For example, I keep a bird and let him fly free in my room. As far as the area of my room is concerned, my area and his area are completely fused into one. That they occupy one and the same space. Yet, this area is my area for me as well as his area for him. And, it is definite that we are utterly independent beings.

Second, it is not only soul that is the largest. The Vaiśeṣikas maintain that ether etc. are also the largest. Therefore, it should be said, for example, that ether and soul are completely fused into one. Then, should they be considered one and the same entity ? Answer is 'no'. Ether and soul exist utterly independently. Ether is one, and soul is another. This does not present a problem.

We can conclude that, for the Vaiśeṣikas, the soul is the largest regardless of whether it is only one or not. This is the reason why the commentators do not mention it in detail with regard to this a problem.

CHAPTER 3

ACTION OF SOUL

The problem as to whether soul has action (*kriyā, karman* etc.) or not is important for considering the development of Indian philosophy. It is tightly connected with the arguments on the essence of soul and with the conception of transmigration and final release. According to the theory of later Vaiśeṣikas, soul has no action. The *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* and the later commentaries do not, however, seem to be in agreement on this point. We shall clarify what the earliest Vaiśeṣika theory was on this issue.

1. Definition of substance

Substance is defined in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* as follows :

> " To have action, to have quality and to be a material cause is the definition (feature) of substance. " *kriyāvad guṇavat samavāyikāraṇam iti dravyalakṣaṇam.* (1. 1. 14)[1]

Substance is classified into nine kinds such as earth, water, fire, air, ether, space, time, soul and mind. At this point arises a question, ' It is absurd that ether etc. have action. ' The *Vṛtti* explains as follows :

> " But ether, time, space and soul are excluded. "[2]

While the *Upaskāra* does not specifically mention it, the *Vyākhyā* argues about it by pointing out the following two interpretations.

> " (The first interpretation :)
>
> [Objection :] To have action is not the definition of substance. Because it does not include ether etc.

1 *Upaskāra* reads : *kriyāguṇavat samavāyikāraṇam iti dravyalakṣaṇam.*

2 *anyatrākāśakāladidātmabhyaḥ.*

[Answer :] [You are] not right. Because [this definition] is that of substances which have form (*mūrta*). After having let us understand that those which have form are substance by the reason ' to have action ', [it makes us aware] by inferences that ether etc. are as well [substances].

(The second interpretation :)

Or [the following interpretation is possible]. The term ' *kriyā* ' (a noun derived from verbal root *kṛ-*) here does not mean ' deed ' (*karman*), but ' production and destruction ' because [they are] what the verbal root really means. Besides, that [they are] what the verbal root really means is possible by the reason that there is found such a usage as ' [*kriyā*] is produced and destructed. ' Production is nothing but pre-absense. [Now, ' *-vat-* ' in ' *kriyāvat-* ' is] a suffix which means the seventh case (locative case) as shown [by the expression] ' *kriyā* exists here. ' Therefore, ' *kriyāvat* ' is a substratum of pre-absence as well as destruction. This is the meaning [of the *sūtra*]. Then come to be established two definitions, namely, ' Substance is a substratum of pre-absence, ' and ' Substance is a substratum of destruction. ' It is not that these two [definitions] do not include [those to be defined] sufficiently. Because every substance is a substratum of pre-absence and destruction of connection. [These two definitions do] not commit surplus inclusion. Because pre-absence and destruction exist in material causes only, and also because ' *-vat-* ' means relation [between substratum and superstratum].[3] "

3 *kriyāvattvaṃ na dravyalakṣaṇam. gaganādāv avyāpakatvād iti ced na, mūrtadravyalakṣaṇatvāt kriyāvattvena mūrtānāṃ dravyatvam āpādya tannidarśanenākāśādīnām api. tadanumānāt. yad vā, kriyāśabdenātra na karmābhimatam. kim tūtpattivināśau dhātvarthatvāt. dhātvartho hi kriyā, dhātvarthatvaṃ ca utpadyate vinaśyatīti prayogadarśanāt. utpattiś ca prāgabhāva eva. kriyā vidyate' sminn iti saptamyarthe pratyayaḥ. tena kriyāvad iti prāgabhāvādhikaraṇaṃ pradhvaṃsādhikaraṇaṃ cety arthaḥ syāt. tathā ca prāgabhāvndhikaraṇaṃ pradhvaṃsādhikarṇaṃ ca dravyam*

(*Continued on the next page*)

The second interpretation ensures that it is only a substance that can be the locus of action, that all the substances need not have action, and that no problem arises, even if there is a substance which has no action.

Thus, the definition of substance shown above turns out to be perfect. This is, needless to say, a later interpretation. But, even so, it is consistent with the *sūtras*. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to imagine that this interpretation is very close to the original intention of *sūtra* 1. 1. 14.

Dr. H. Ui, in whose times the only available commentary on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* was the *Upaskāra*, pointed out that this definition was defective because of the word 'to have action', and it only drew a rough sketch of substance.[4] Dr. Ui's interpretation is, however, not correct. Why then did he misunderstand the *sūtra*? The reason is simple. It resulted from the following words of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*:

> "And space, time and ether, while being different from those which have action, have no action." *dikkālāv ākāśaṃ ca kriyāvadbhyo vaidharmyān niṣkriyāṇi.* (5. 2. 23)[5]

But this *sūtra* contains another problem. For, while only three (space, time and ether) are referred to here, all of the commentaries interpret it by adding 'soul'. If there were the word 'etc.', such an interpretation might be possible. But there are no such words. Two possible explanations are offered by the commentaries. They are:

(1) That which has no form (*amūrta*) has no action.

(*Continued from the last page*)
iti lakṣaṇadvayaṃ sidhyati. na cānayor avyāpakatvam. sarvadravyānāṃ saṃyogādiprāgabhāvapradhvaṃsādhikaraṇatvāt. nātivyāpakatvam. prāgabhāvapradhvaṃsayoḥ samavāyikāraṇamātraniṣṭhatvāt. sambandhamātrasya vatyarthatvāt.

4 See H. Ui. *Indo Tetsugaku Kenkyū* (Studies in Indian Philosophy), Vo. 3. Iwanami Shoten, 1926 (reprint 1965), p. 469.

5 *Upaskāra* reads: *dikkālāv ākāśaṃ ca kriyāvadvaidharmyān niṣkriyāṇi.*

(2) The word 'and' (*ca*) implies soul.

Actually, the later Indian philosophers, when they intended to interpret texts in a manner consistent with their own views, utilized the second way frequently. Bu the first reason should be examined in detail.

2. That which has no form

The division of substance into that which has form and that which has no form is a key for understanding the Vaiśeṣika theory of substance. This point was already examined a little in I. 2. Here, we shall investigate it in detail. The first thing to be recognized is that in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* there is no word directly connected with such a division. But there is a possibility that the earliest Vaiśeṣikas, while arguing for the omnipresence and unity of ether etc... relied on it, and yet did not refer to it because they could describe their theories without it.

The *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* expounds that the four (ether, space, time and soul) of nine substances are omnipresent,[6] and that the remaining five are not. The post-*Sūtra* Vaiśeṣikas were busy defending their system against the Sāṅkhyas, the Buddhists and the (proto-) Vedāntins. Probably, while arguing against them, the Vaiśeṣikas found it convenient to utilize in full this very persuasive division. As was argued in I. 2, the standard which decisively gave commentators grounds for developing the post-*Sūtra* Vaiśeṣika theory on dimension of soul was nothing but this very division. Modern scholars' confusion about the Vaiśeṣika theory of soul seems to result for the most part from their misunderstandings of the true meaning of this division.

Now, the word-form 'that which has no form' (*amūrta*) is obtained by adding a negative prefix '*a*-' to '*mūrta*,' which is derived from the verbal '*mūrch*-.' '*Mūrta*' has etymologically the same origin as '*mukta*' which means 'pearl,' though frequently mixed up with the same-formed word '*mukta*' which

6 *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 7. 1. 28, 29, 31, 32.

means 'released.' '*Mūrta*' means, in the first, 'coagulated,' then, in the second, 'spatially exclusive' and, in the last, 'that which has no from'.[7] The word-form '*mūrti*' is usually translated as mere 'form.' However, '*mūrti*' of some deity, for example, does not mean a mere form, but means the state that the deity exists here as coagulated, concretely existent.[8]

The Vaiśeṣikas etc. must have considered that that which has form (*mūrta*) has two features. They are as follows:

(I) The space which it occupies is finite.

(II) Plural *mūrtas* never occupy the same space. They are nerer fused into one. They are spatially exclusive to each other.

Then the feature of *amūrta* is contrary to the above. Namely:

(i) The space which it occupies is infinite.

(ii) Plural *amūrtas* occupy the same space. They are fused unlimitedly. They are never spatially exclusive to each other.

The oldest of the currently available Vaiśeṣika texts, after the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* is either the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* or the *Daśapadārthī*. The former states the following:

"Earth, water, fire, air and mind have action, form, priority, posteriority and velocity."[9]

The remaining substances, of course, do not have action etc.

7 A Chinese translation of the word '*mūrta*' reflects such original meanings. Its literal meaning is 'coagulated and exclusive.'

8 I would like to pay many thanks to Professor M. Hara, from whose lecture of nearly twenty years ago I was acquainted with the original meaning of '*mūrti*', '*mūrta*' etc.

9 *kṣitijalajyotiranilamanasāṃ kriyāvattvamūrtatvaparatvāparatvavegavattvāni.*

"Ether, time, space and soul are omnipresent, the largest, and the place common to all that are connected [with them]."[10]

Two phsases in this sentence, namely, 'omnipresent' (*sarvagata*) and 'the place common to all that are connected [with them]' (*sarvasaṃyogisamānadeśa*), should be examined. For there might arises the doubt that they repeat the same matter. A mere repetition is a logical defect. Here Śrīdhara explains skilfully as follows:

"[The meaning of] '*sarvagatatva*' is [as follows]: It is that ether etc. are connected with all that have form, but not that they move to everywhere, [though '*gata*' is the past participle derived from the verbal root '*gam-*' [which means 'go,' 'move,' etc.]. Because they have no action. ... [The meaning of] '*sarvasaṃyogisamānadeśatva*' is] as follows]: It is that ether [etc.] are the place common to all that are connected [with thm] or to all that have form, in other words, are their substratum."[11]

Second, the *Daśapadārthī* states the following:

"Among such nine substances, how many have action, and how many do not have action? Five, namely, earth, water, fire, air and mind, are with action. The remaining four substances are without action. As these are with and without action, so they should be known to be with and without form, with and without velocity, and with and without priority and posteriority."[12]

This statement is summarized as follows:

10 *ākāśakāladigātmanāṃ sarvagatatvaṃ paramamahattvaṃ sarvasaṃyogisamānadeśatvaṃ ca.*

11 *sarvagatatvaṃ sarvair mūrtaiḥ saha saṃyogaḥ ākāśādīnāṃ na tu sarvatra gamanam teṣām niṣkriyatvāt. .. sarvasaṃyogisamānadeśatvaṃ sarveṣāṃ saṃyoginām mūrtadravyāṇām ākāśaḥ samāno deśa eka ādhāra ity arthaḥ.*

12 See the paragraphs [83] ... [85] (in the Appendix).

(1) earth, water, fire, air, mind — that which has action, form, velocity, priority and posteriority.

(2) ether, time, space, soul — that which has no action, no form, no velocity, no priority and no posteriority.

The contrast between the two groups of substance are clearly depicted here. We can understand that to have action or not and to have form or not are inseparable. Moreover, when we take the theory of dimension into consideration, the logic of the Vaiśeṣikas becomes clear as follows : That which has no form ought to be the largest, and that which is the largest ought to have no action.

Now, although we have understood that what has no action is precisely the same as what has no form, another question still remains. It is a question about the reason by which it is fixed that ether, time, space and soul have no form. As for ether, time and space, it might have been a kind of intuition that led to the conviction that they have no form, namely, that they are not coagulted, not exclusive to each other. But this is not the same in the case of soul. There must have been another reason why soul has no form. The reason came from the need to make the *sūtra* more consistent with the theory of the later Vaiśeṣikas. We shall reconfirm this point.

First, the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* expounds as follows :

"Ether is large because of its omnipresence." *vibhavād mahān ākāśaḥ.* (7. 1. 28)

"So also is soul." *tathā cātmā.* (7. 1. 29)[13]

It is certainly easy to explain these *sūtras* if we admit, in advance, the conception that ether and soul have no form. But, as was argued in I. 2, these *sūtras* can be explained only by the theory of dimension (*ibid.* 7. 1. 15–32). The Vaiśeṣikas had been, no doubt, since their earliest stage. familiar with the eternity of both ether and soul. Only if we admitted the definition of the eternity

13 Cf. I. 1.

given in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, as shown below, would it be easy to deduce that eternal substances ought to be either the smallest or the largest.

"That which is existent and has no cause is eternal." *sad akāraṇavat tan nityam.* (4. 1. 1)[14]

Now, ether, soul etc. cannot be conceived the smallest. Therefore, they are the largest. Such is the logic of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra.*

Repeatedly speaking, the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* did not utilize the state of 'having no form' as the reason to establish that soul is largest.

On the other hand, *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 5. 2. 23, which enumerates those which have no action does not refer to soul.

If the state of 'having no form' is taken into consideration, the word 'soul' should be put in this *sūtra*. Why doesn't the the *sūtra* expound that soul has no action, while there is another *sūtra* which expounds that it is the largest ? There are two possible reasons.

(1) The convenient division of substance into that which has form and that which has no form was not yet conceived as indispensable.

(2) There was intense hesitation to admit that soul has no action. The *Sūtrakāra* continued to support the popular conviction that it has action.

Several statements which imply the second reason are found in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra.* We shall investigate them below.

3. The sūtra 'Action of soul is produced'

Ancient images of *ātman* will be classified into three kinds.

(1) A principal which makes an individual be as he is. A basis of self-identity.

14 *Vyākhyā* and *Upaskāra* read ; *sad akāraṇavan nityam.*

(2) The substratum of cognition, action (deed) etc. So-called 'ego.'

(3) The substratum of transmigration. So-called 'soul.' The second and the third seem to have been the prevailing images of *ātman* for the early Vaiśeṣikas.

Yājñavalkya said to Janaka, the king of Videha, as follows:

"Just as a leech in [one leaf of] grass creeps to the edge of the [leaf of] grass, and, intending to transfer to another [leaf of grass], creeps [to there], so this *ātman* abandons this body, drives unconsciousness away, and, intending to transfer to another [body], moves [to there]." (*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 4. 4. 3)[15]

He states that *ātman* abandons an old body and moves to another one when a being, after having died, is about to be reborn. Here, *ātman* is depicted as the substratum of transmigration — 'a soul.' Soul as such has action because it transfers. In course of time, the conviction that it is the substratum of conition (*jñātṛ*) as well as that of action (*kartṛ*) became more and more popular. This also means that soul has action. The Vaiśeṣikas, in their earliest stage, must have adopted such a conviction in their system. The *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* states as follows:

"Action [is produced] in a hand by its connection with soul and by internal effort." *ātmasaṃyogaprayatnābhyāṃ haste karma.* (5. 1. 1.) "Likewise, action of a pestle [is produced] by its connection with a hand." *tathā musalakarma hastasaṃyogāc ca.* (5. 1. 2)[16] "Connection with a hand is not the cause of action of a pestle which is produced by a hit [of a pestle to a mortar] because [a hand is already] cut off [from internal effort to push a pestle onto a

15 As for the original text, see note 1 on I. 2.

16 *Vyākhyā* omits. *Upaskāra* reads: *tathā hastasaṃyogāc ca musalakarma.*

mortar]." *abhighātaje musalakarmaṇi vyatirekād akāraṇaṃ hastasaṃyogaḥ.* (5. 1. 3)[17]

"Likewise, connection [of a hand] with soul] is not the the cause] of action of a hand and of a pestle." *tathātmasaṃyogo hastamusalakarmaṇi.* (5. 1. 4)[18]

"Rather, action [is produced] in a hand by a hit of a pestle [to a mortar], [and] by connection [of a hand] with a pestle." *musalābhighātāt tu musalasaṃyogād dhaste karma*" (5. 1. 5)[19]

"Likewise, action of soul [is produced] by [its] connection with a hand, too." *tathātmakarma hastasaṃyogāc ca.* (5. 1. 6)[20]

To sum up:

Connection of a hand with soul, and internal effort.

Action of hand.

↓

Action of a pestle connected with a hand.

↓

A hit [of a pestle to a mortar].

↓

Action of a pestle (springing up by reaction).

↓

Action of a hand connected with a pestle.

↓

Action of soul connected with a hand.

The first action of a hand is a conscious one according to the terminology of Praśastapāda. But, it is a physical hit that produces an action in a pestle, namely, springing up from a mortar.

17 *Upaskāra* reads *abhighātaje musalādau karmaṇi vyatirekād akāraṇam hastasaṃyogaḥ.*

18 *Vyākhyā* and *Upaskāra* read: *tathātmasaṃyogo hastakarmaṇi.*

19 *Vyākhyā* reads: *musalābhighātāc ca musalasaṃyogād dhaste karma.* *Upaskāra* reads: *abhighātān musalasaṃyogād dhaste karma.*

20 *Upaskāra* reads: *ātmakarma hastasaṃyogāc ca.*

This is an unconscious one. Action of soul seems to be a little difficult for us to understand. However, from such words of Yājñavalkya as :

"This great and unborn soul is composed of cogniton (*vijñānamaya*) among life-functions (*prāṇa*), and lies in ether inside of a heart." (*Bṛhdadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 4. 4. 22)[21]

and from such words as :

"Soul, as an inner self just of the size of an a thumb, always abides in a heart of every being." (*Kaṭhopaniṣad* 6. 17)[22]

it is not absurd if action of soul is produced by action of hand. Because soul, which abides in a heart and, therefore, in a body, moves when a body receives a motion of a hand which inheres in the very body.

But, after it was established that soul has no action, the word '*ātman*' in *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 5. 1. 6 was not interpreted literally. The *Vṛtti* interprets it as 'one place of a body' (*śarīraikadeśa*), the *Vyākhyā* as 'a body,' and the *Upaskāra* as 'a part of a body' *śarīrāvayava*). Praśastapāda, while illustrating the same point shown in *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 5. 1. 1–5, does not refer to 'action of soul.' Moreover, he does not state any word which could be read as 'action is produced in [a part] of a body.' It is probable that he neglected *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 5. 1. 6 because he was aware that this *sūtra* was critical of the Vaiśeṣikas. Candramati's *Daśapadārthī* is thorough-going in neglecting action of soul.

4. Yoga and final release

Other *sūtras* which can be regarded as directly indicating that soul has action are found in the second *Āhnika* of the fifth *Adhyāya* of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*. Here, in the first, actions of earth, water, fire and air are expounded. In the second, actions

21 *sa va eṣa mahān aja ātmā yo 'yam vijñānamayaḥ prāṇeṣu. ya eṣo 'ntarhṛdaya ākāśas tasmia chete.*

22 *aṅguṣṭhamatraḥ puruṣo 'ntarātmā sadā janānāṃ hṛdaye sanniviṣṭaḥ.*

of mind and soul are expounded. And in the last, ether, time and space having no action are expounded. It is to be noted here that action of mind is expounded in order to explain *yoga*, and that of soul in order to explain final release. Now, we shall investigate *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 5. 2. 14–20 one by one.

"Flaring upward of fire, zigzag blowing of air and the first action of atom and mind are products of *adṛṣṭa*," *agner ūrdhvajvalanaṃ vāyoś ca tiryakpavanam aṇumanasoś cādyaṃ karmety adṛṣṭakāritam.* (5. 2. 14)[23]

'*Adṛṣṭa*' comes later to be a synonym of 'merit and demerit.' This *sūtra* leads directly to the notion that the world is composed of [effects of] deeds. We shall argue about '*adṛṣṭa*' in the next section. That mind has the same dimension as that of an atom is expounded in *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 7. 1. 30.[24] Candramati says, 'Of the first action of atoms of four kinds of elements which produce the causes of a body, the nonmaterial cause is merit, demerit and connection [of atoms] with soul.' (the paragraph [225]. See the reconstructed Sanskrit text in the Appendix.) Then, the next *sūtra* :

"Action of mind is already explained by action of a hand," *hastakarmaṇā manasaḥ karma vyākhyātam.* (5. 2 15)[25]

'Action of a hand' is expounded by *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 5. 1. 1 etc., which be already examined in the former section. The present *sūtra* implies that action of mind is produced by its connection with soul.

The next two *sūtras* are usually conceived as an explanation of *yoga*.

"Pleasure and pain [are produced] by contact of soul, a sense organ, mind and an object. Not to newly produce[26]

23 *Vyākhyā* reads : *agner ūrdhvajvalanaṃ vāyos tiryakpavanam aṇumanasoś cādyam karmety adṛṣṭakāritāni.* *Upaskāra* reads : *agner ūrdhvajvalanaṃ vāyos tiryakpavanam aṇūnāṃ manasaś cādyaṃ karmādṛṣṭakāritam.*

24 *tadabhāvād aṇu manaḥ.*

25 *Vyākhyā* omits.

26 As for why I translated thus, see III. 1.

them (pleasure and pain) [is *yoga*]." *atmendriyamano-'rthasannikarṣāt sukhaduḥkhe tadanārambhaḥ.* (5. 2. 16)

"When mind rests in soul, there [are] not [produeed] pleasure and pain to a body-possessor (soul). This is *yoga,*" *ātmasthe manasi saśarīrasya sukhaduḥkhābhāvaḥ sa yogaḥ.* (5. 2. 17)[27]

Mind comes and goes rapidly between soul and sense organs, with the result that pleasure and pain are produced. 'Them' in the phrase of 'not to newly produce them [is *yoga*]' should, therefore, be pleasure and pain. It is action of mind that produces contact of the four things. In the *Yogasūtra* which is much later than the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* the following definition is found :

"*Yoga* is the perfect supression of the functions of mind." *yogaś cittavṛttinirodhaḥ.* (1. 2)

'The functions of mind' in this phrase can be regarded as 'action of mind' in the terminology of the Vaiśeṣikas, though 'the functions of mind' of the Yōgins are explained by the Sāṅkhya theory.

Now, the next three *sūtras* are usually considered as explaining transmigration and final releas from the viewpoint of action of soul.

"Action of soul is already explained by action of a body." *kāyakarmaṇātmakarma vyākhyātam.* (5. 2. 18)[28]

'Already explained by action of a body' presupposes some preceding *sūtra* which explains action of a body. For the time being, we can point to the following *sūtra* :

27 *Vyākhyā*, dividing it into four, reads : [*ātmendriyamano' rthasannikarṣāt sukhaduḥkhe.*] *tadanārambhaś cātmasthamanasi. saśarīrasya sukhaduḥkhābhāvaḥ. saṃyogaḥ. Upaskāra* reads : *ātmendriyamano'rthasannikarṣāt sukhaduḥkhe, tadanārambha ātmasthe manasi śarīrasya duḥkhābhāvaḥ sa yogaḥ.*

28 *Vyākhyā* reads : *kāyakarmaṇātmakarmadharmayor anutpattiḥ. Upaskāra* omits.

"Because 'Devadatta goes' and 'Viṣṇudatta goes' are figurative expressions, [it is] the direct cognition of a body [not that of soul that is indicated by such expressions]." *devadatto gacchati viṣṇudatto gacchatīti copacārāc charīra-pratyakṣaḥ.* (3. 2. 11)

If we take into consideration that 'action of soul is already explained' by this *sūtra*, we can guess that the earliest Vaiśeṣikas, though eonceiving soul as utterly different from a body, actually regarded the movement of a living body being produced by soul which is the possessor of the very body. The notion that soul moves is based on a popular conviction about soul.

Now, action of mind is expounded by *sūtras* (5. 2. 14–17). The *sūtra* 5. 2. 18 declares that action of soul is already explained. The there comes a *sūtra* which expounds that ether, time and space have no action. The description in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* is in a reasonable order here. Nevertheless, the commentators could not interpret the present *sūtra* literally because they believed firmly that soul has no action. For example, the *Vṛtti* mentions as follows :

"Here, 'air' [is denoted] by the word '*ātman.*' As action of a hand] is produced] by connection of air with soul and by internal effort, so action named 'restriction of breath' [is produced] by connection of air with soul and by internal effort."[29]

Here, 'air' means 'breath.' 'Restriction of breath' is, according to the *Yogasūtra*, one of the preliminary stages in the 'eight-branched *yoga.*' It is certain that restrictien of breath is one kind of action of air. But, although both soul and breath are conceived traditionally as the root causes of life, it is unreasonable to interpret *ātman* here as breath (air). As for *yoga*, it is already explained by action of mind (5. 2. 16–17). Nevertheless, the *Vṛtti* presents here restriction of breath as preliminary to *yoga* (in

29 *iha ātmaśabdena vāyuḥ, yathātmasaṃyogaprayatnābhyāṃ haste karma lathātmavāyusaṃyogāt prayatnāc ca prāṇāyāmakarma.*

the narrow sense). This is unnecessary. Moreover, such an interpretation breaks the links between the present *sūtra* and the following two *sūtras*. One of them is on transmigration and the other on final release. The next *sūtra* is as follows:

> "Moving away and moving near, connection with foods and drinks, and connection with other effects are products of *adṛṣṭe*." *apasarpaṇam upasarpaṇam aśitapītasaṃyogāḥ kāryāntarasaṃyogāś cety adṛṣṭakāritāni* (5. 2. 19)[30]

Because this *sūtra* is put just after action of soul is expounded, it is natural to consider that the four items enumerated here are all ascribed to soul. 'Moving away' means that soul moves away from the body at the time of death. 'Moving near' means that soul moves closer to another body at the time of rebirth. 'Connection with foods and drinks' means that soul enjoys in the womb those foods and drinks which are digested by his mother. 'Connection with other effects' means that soul becomes connected with various bodily things (*kalala*, *arbuda* etc.) one after another in the womb. Thus, soul comes to be reborn. *Adṛṣṭa* is to be conceived as the merit and demerit stored in a previous life. In short, the present *sūtra* expounds the process of transmigration. The next *sūtra* is as follows:

> "When it (*adṛṣṭa*) does not exist, then, connection [with foods and drinks and with other effects] does not exist, and there is no appearence [of soul accompanied by some body in the world] any more. This is the final release." *tadabhāve saṃyogābhāvo prādurbhāvaḥ sa mokṣaḥ.* (5. 2. 20)[31]

These two *sūtras* are easy to understand, because they are based on a popular conviction that soul is the substratum of transmigration and final release. But the commentators, who maintained the later theory that soul has no action, could not

30 *Vyākhyā* and *Upaskāra* read: *apasarpaṇam upasarpaṇam aśitapītasaṃyogaḥ kāyāntarasaṃyogaś cety adṛṣṭakāriiāni.*

31 *Vyākhyā* and *Upaskāra* read; *tadabhāve saṃyogābhāvo 'prādurbhāvaś ca sa mokṣaḥ.*

admit that actions such as moving away and moving near inhere in soul. They interpreted as follows:

It is 'mind' according to the *Vṛtti* that moves away or moves near, and 'breath and mind' according to the *Upaskāra*. (The *Vyākhyā* mentions nothing worth discussing.) Thus, both commentaries explain that it is not soul, but mind, that is the substratum of transmigration. But, from a common sense point of view, it is still difficult to conceive of mind as the root cause of life. Therefore, the *Upaskāva* adds 'breath' to mind. The reason is as follows: If mind alone moves away from a body, it is not death, but mere unconsciousness that results. But, if both mind and breath move away from a body together, death is the inevitable result.

The naive conviction about soul tells us that it is soul that is the root cause of life and the substratum of transmigration. This conviction is found in the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*. But, in order to continue to maintain their view that soul has no action, the later Vaiśeṣikas could not admit that soul causes the activities of life. The *Upaskāra* apparantly broke through this difficulty. However, it was an inconvenience for the Vaiśeṣika theory that breath was not an independent substance, but merely a form of air.

Then, how did the commentators interpret the *sūtra* which expounds final release? The *Vṛtti* interprets it as follows:

> "When it (*ādṛṣṭa*) does not exist, then, connection [of mind with soul, which is named 'life activity,'] does not exist, and there is no appearence [of another body], This is the final release."[32]

The *Vyākhyā* is silent about this. The *Upaskāra* interprets it as follows:

> "When it (appearence of a body in the next life) does not exist, then, connection [of soul with the previous body]

32 The original text is as follows: *evaṃrūpasyānādyapasarpaṇādinimittasyādṛṣṭasyābhāve jīvanākhyasyātmamanaḥsaṃyogasyābhāvo 'nyasya ca śarīrasyāprādurbhāvo yaḥ sa mokṣaḥ.*

...7

does not exist, and there is on appearence [of a body any more, unlike in the case of solution of the world]. This is the final release. "[33]

As for the substratum of transmigration and the root cause of life, while the *Upaskāra* regards it as breath and mind, the *Vṛtti* regards it as a connection of mind with soul and names it 'life activity' (*jīvana*). This term appears both in the *Daśapadārthī* and the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*. But the *Vṛtti*'s interpretation is not in accardance with its own interpretation on the previous *sūtra*, according to which the substratum is mind only.

By the way, between *sūtra* 5. 2. 20 on final release and *sūtra* 5. 2. 23 on no action of ether, time and space, there are two *sūtras* which argue about darkness[34]. The commentators agree in their explanation that darkness and light mean ignorance and right cognition respectively. They probably do so because they considered that these two *sūtras* were related to the problem of transmigration and final release. But this is not the true intention of these *sūtras*. It is clear that they intend to deny the opinion that darkness is an independent category. and to assert that it is the mere absence of light. Probably these *sūtras* were later inserted into this section where most of the explanations about substances. qualities and actions were about to be compleled.

Now, as was examined above in detail, the later Vaiśeṣikaṣ, who maintained the notion that soul has no action, managed to devise a skilful interpretation that it is mind that transmigrates, while it is soul that obtains final release. But we can say that this interpretation is forced. Take the following *sūtra* for example :

33 The original text is as follows : *tatra yogino .... pūrvaśarīreṇa sahātmano yaḥ saṃyogābhāvaḥ sa eva mokṣaḥ. tadabhāva ity anāgataśarīrānutpāde saṃyogābhāva ity arthaḥ. nanv iyam avasthā pralayasādhāraṇīty ata āha, aprādurbhāva iti. yadanantaraṃ śarīrādeḥ punaḥ prādurbhāvo na bhavatīty arthaḥ, sa mokṣa iti tasyām avasthayāṃ yo duḥkadhvaṃsaḥ sa mokṣa ity arthaḥ.*

34 *dravyaguṇakarmavaidharmyād bhāvābhāvamātraṃ tamaḥ.* (5.2.21) [*Vyākhyā* and *Upaskāra* read : *dravyaguṇakarmaniṣpattivaidharmayād abhāvas tamaḥ.*] *tejaso dravyāntareṇāvaraṇāc ca.* (5. 2. 22) [*Vyākhyā* omits.]

" The final release is already explained in [the section of] action of soul. " *ātmakarmasu mokṣo vyākhyātaḥ.* (6. 2. 19)

'The section of soul' corresponds to *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 5. 2. 18–20. But, the *Vṛttl* interprets '*ātman*' in the present *sūtra* as 'mind,' despite the fact that it interpreted the same term as 'air' before. The *Vṛtti* is clearly not reliable in this case.

5. Adṛṣṭa

The term '*adṛṣṭa*' appears seven times in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* :

(1) That which makes a magical jewel move towards a thief, and which makes a pin be drawn to a magnet. (5. 1. 15)[35]

(2) That which causes special actions of earth (earthquake etc.). (5. 2. 2)[36]

(3) That which causes special falling down of water (showeres in rainy seasons ?). (5. 2. 4)[37]

(4) That which makes water go upward in a tree. (5. 2. 8)[38]

(5) That which causes flaring upward of fire, zigzag blowing of air and the first action of atom and mind. (5. 2. 14)[39]

(6) That which makes beings be reborn. (5. 2. 19)[40]

35 *maṇigamanaṃ sūcyabhisarpaṇam ity adṛṣṭakāritāni.* [*Upaskāra* reads : *maṇigamanaṃ sūcyabhisarpaṇam adṛṣṭakāraṇakam.*

36 *tad viśeṣeṇādṛṣṭakāritam.* [*Vyākhyā* omits.]

37 *tad viśeṣeṇādṛṣṭakāritam.* [*Vyākhyā* and *Upaskāra* omit.]

38 *vṛkṣābhisarpaṇam ity adṛṣṭakāritam.* [*Vyākhya* reads : *vṛkṣābhisarpaṇam ity adṛṣṭakāritāni.*]

39 *agner ūrdhvajvalanaṃ vāyoś ca tiryakpavanam aṇumanasoś cādyaṃ karmety adṛṣṭakāritāni.* [*Vyākhyā* reads : *agner ūrdhvajvalanaṃ vāyos tiryakpavanam aṇumanasoś cādyaṃ karmety adṛṣṭakāritāni. Upaskāra* reads : *agner ūrdhvajvalanaṃ vāyos tiryakpavanam aṇūnāṃ manasaś cādyaṃ karmādṛṣṭakāritam.*]

40 See note 30.

(7) That which makes beings bear desires for things which they have never seen, or whieh are not useful for them. (6. 2 15)[41] There is another *sūtra* (6.2.2)[42]

which claims that the rituals etc. which do not produce effects that can be experienced during one's lifetime produce *adṛṣṭa*. This type of *adṛṣṭa*, resembles *apūrva* of the Mīmāṃsakas.

Among these the first five are those which cause physical phenomena which are impossible to be otherwise explained. The last two are the causes of transmigration. Some modern scholars suspect that, while the proto-*Vaiśeṣikasūtra* contained the first five only, the last two were added later to explain transmigration and final release. They suspect so on the grounds that the Vaiśeṣikas were, in their earliest stage, indiffernt to transmigration and final release because their orlginal spstem was a natural philosphy. It is certain that the Vaiśeṣikas do not appear to be enthusiastic about final release. But we should pay more attention to the *sūtras* which expound transmigration and final release. They refer to 'action of soul,' which probably originates from the oldest Vaiśeṣika theory of soul. Moreover, 'action of soul' is tightly connected with the problem of transmigration. The conviction that soul moves from a previous body to another one at the time of death has an old origin. Is it not a prejudice to believe that a natural philosophy should be indifferent to transmigration and final release? In fact, these two matters are essential to soul. It would be absurd if natural philosophies in India were not interested in arguing about them. We should be careful not to impose the trends of natural philosophies in ancient Greece on to those in India.

Now, the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* does not mention what *adṛṣṭa* is. *Adṛṣṭa* should belong to either the class of substance, quality,

41 *adṛṣṭāt*. [*Vyākhyā* and *Upaskāra* read : *adṛṣṭāc ca*.]

42 *abhiṣecanopavāsabrahmacaryagurukulavāsavānaprasthyayajñadānaprokṣaṇadinnakṣatramantrakālaniyamāś cādṛṣṭāya*. [*Vyākhyā* and *Upaskāra* read : *ābhiṣecanopavāsabrahmacaryagurukulavāsavānaprasthayajñadānaprokṣaṇadinadinnakṣatramantrakālaniyamāś cādṛṣṭāya*.]

action of something other than them, namely, an independent category[43]. But the Vaiśeṣikas were too eager to set up a new category, Moreover, it had been fixed since ancient times that substance is of nine kinds, and action is of five kinds. But the divisions of quality were not yet fired firmly. The *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, while enumerating seventeen kinds of qualities in 1. 1. 5[44], deals with weight, velocity etc. as if they were also qualities. As was said by M. Nozawa[45], 'the frame of the number of qualities was still open.' Then, the later Vaiśeṣikas enumerated *adṛṣṭa* as a quality when they fixed the number of qualities. However, they must have found it difficult to declare that *adṛṣṭa* is the quality of soul. The reason is as follows:

The conviction that soul is the substratum of transmigration and that the cause of transmigration is deeds had prevailed since the earliest Upaniṣads. But, on the other hand, it had been problematic for philosophers to declare that it is soul that causes deeds, bears them in latent form and enjoys their effects. For, according to the typical Upaniṣadic notion, soul is self-established, and, therefore, is not influenced by anything other than itself, even though it is apparantly the substratum of transmigration.

The Sāṅkhyas are perhaps the first to have answered this question. They devised a skilful system, namely, dualism. According to it, soul has no action. It is an just an individual, or a

43 Needless to say, the term 'category' (*padārtha*) does not appear in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* except in the version of the *Upaskāra* (1. 1. 4) which is undoubtedly the very quotation from the beginning part of the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*.

44 Seventeen are: colour (*rūpa*), taste (*rasa*.), smell (*gandha*), touch (*sparśa*), number (*saṅkhyā*), dimension (*parimāṇa*), separateness (*pṛthaktva*), connection (*saṃyoga*), separation (*vibhāga*), priority (*paratva*), posteriority (*aparatva*), cognition (*buddhi*), pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*), desire (*icchā*), aversion (*dveṣa*), and internal effort (*prayatna*). The *Praśastapādabhāṣya* enumerates twenty-four by adding the following seven to the above: weight (*gurutva*), fluidity (*dravatva*), moisture (*sneha*), impression (*saṃskāra*), merit (*dharma*), demerit, (*adharma*), and sound (*śabda*).

45 M. Nozawa, "Vaiśeṣika ni okeru Shōji ni tsuite [The Vaiśeṣikas on *janma-maraṇa*], " *Nihon Bukkyogaku Nenpō* [The Annual of the Buddhist Studies in Japan]. Vol. 46, 1970.

subtle body, which emanates from the fundamental non-intellectual principle that tranmigrates. In short, soul has no responsibility for transmigration. Besides, it is the apprehension that is the object of self-consciousness (the notion of 'I') which emanates from apprehension.

On the other hand, the Vaiśeṣikas conceived of soul as related to apprehension (cognition), and, moreover, even asserted that the notion of 'I' was one piece of evidence for the existence of soul[46].

The Buddhists and the (proto-) Vedāntins forced them into a more difficult situation. The Buddhists, especially the Sarvāstivādins, attacked the soul theory as represented by the Vaiśeṣikas etc. They devised the highly systematic theory that the continuum of mind is produced and destroyed momentarily (*kṣaṇika*). Moreover, the (proto-) Vedāntins were systematizing their monistic theory which asserted that the soul is by its very nature only one. According to their theory the soul is in final release from the beginningless past, and, therefore, does not transmigrate at all.

For the Vaiśeṣikas, since mind is merely a substantiated form of attention, it is not able to undertake all of the matters that pertain to transmigration. Furthermore they regarded the Sarvāstivādins' theory of continuum of mind as inconsistent with the law of transmigratory causality because, according to this theory, any continuing bearer of deeds does not exist. Therefore, they could not help appointing soul as a continuing bearer of deeds and an enjoyer of them, while, on the other hand, they were compelled to maintain that soul has no action.

The *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* expounds both action of soul and its omnipresence. Later commentators, being unable to admit that soul which is the largest has action, devised forced explanation. But, the *Sūtrakāra* must not have imagined that action of soul contradicts its omnipresence. For, if that which is omnipresent has no action, there would arise an odd conclusion that, despite

46 *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 3. 2. 9, *aham iti śabdavyatirekān nāgamikam.*

the fact that soul has a body, an individual cannot act at all. As Praśastapāda explained, it is because soul causes action that an individual can act. That a corpse does not act is his evidence. Or, it can be said that an omnipresent soul acts through the body it has. Anyway, action of soul is consistent with its omnipresence.

On the other hand, the Vaiśeṣikas came to assert, in order to keep the law of transmigratory causality, that the bearer of merit and demerit is soul. From the notion that the world is composed of effects of deeds, they regarded *adṛṣṭa*, which pervades the world, as a proper quality of soul. This was possible just because omnipresence of soul had been established since the earliest stage of the Vaiśeṣikas. Thus, their theory of soul became more consistent.

Some modern scholars argue that, in order to incorporate *adṛṣṭa* into the class of the quality of soul, new *sūtra*-s were added which asserted the omnipresence and the largert size of soul. It is clear that their argument is upside-down.

Interestingly enough, while using the term '*adṛṣṭa*' as a synonym of merit and demerit, they avoided using the more popular term '*karman*' (deed). The reasons are probably as follows :

(1) The term '*karman*' has the some form as the name of another category (action). The Vaiśeṣikas could not use the term to denote 'quality.' In short, they avoided the confusion of the terminology.

(2) If they said, 'Soul is the locus of *karman*,' there would arise the doubt that they were destroying their own theory that soul has no action.

6. Conclusion

From the above investigtion, we will be able to sketch the changes in the Vaiśeṣika theory of soul :

The Vaiśeṣikas, in their earliest stage, considered simply that soul transmigrates, or it has action. In the '*proto-Vaiśeṣikasūtra*'

there were also those *sūtra*-s which maintained that soul is both one and plural, and that it is the largest of its omnipresence. However, after the compilation of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* was over, they were compelled to assert that it has no action. Almost at the same time, they came to explicitly utilize the division of substance into that which has form and that which has no form, and to declare that that which has no form is omnipresent, is the largest, and has no action. And they added soul to the group of those which have no action. Almost at the same time, they abandoned their traditional theory that soul is both one and plural, and affirmed the latter only. For their traditional theory closely resembled that of the Vedāntins, which was based on the theory of emanation which is inconsisent with the Vaiśeṣika theory of new production. And soon they solved the unclear problem of *adṛṣṭa* by ascribing it to one of the proper qualities of soul.

PART II
ON COGNITION

8

CHAPTER 1

ON NUMBER (SAṄKHYĀ)

Except for Vaiśeṣika texts there are few texts which argue from the purely theoretical point of view how we acquire the cognition of numbers.[1] We shall examine the *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya* and the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* in detail, and show that their theory of number is deeply connected with their theory of cognition, particularly direct cognition.

1. Definition of number

Number belongs to the category of quality. Praśastapāda defines number as follows :

"Number is the cause of pragmatics of 'one' etc."[2] According to Candrạmati and Śrīdhara, 'pragmatics' (*vyavahāra*) here indicates both 'cognition' and 'expression'. Consequently

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1 The Vaiśeṣika theory of number seems to have been difficult also for traditional scholars to understand. Since the thirteenth century there has prevailed, for example, following proverb :

> "One who retains unshakable understanding as to [and destruction of] the number two, the production of [qualities which are] produced by burning and separation which is produced by separation is indeed known as a Vaiśeṣika."
>
> *dvitve ca pākajotpattau vibhāge ca vibhāgaje,*
> *yasya na skhalitā buddhis taṃ vai vaiśeṣikaṃ viduḥ.*
> (Mādhava's *Sarva'arśanasaṅgraha, Aulūkyadarśana*, pp. 81–82; Keśavamiśra's *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 32)

As for *pākajotpatti*, sec III, 3. The Mīmāṃsakas also enumerate number as one of qualities, but they do not refer to the complicated process of our attaining the cognition of number. Cf. *Mānameyodaya*, p. 241.

2. *ekādivyavahārahetuḥ saṅkhyā*. The term '*vyavahāra*' has many meanings — 'cognition,' 'expression,' 'volition,' 'behaviour,' 'secular life' and so on. I translated it as 'pragmatics' with intention to include such many meanings. The term 'pragmatics' itself has recently been used in order to build a new philosophy which should overcome reductionism and nihilism.

number is not 'one' (*eka*) etc., but it is the cause of the cognition and expression 'This is one' etc., and it is conceived as the number one (*ekatva*), the number two (*dvitva*) etc. We should be conscious of the fact that *dvitvattva* as a universal, for example, was sometimes also written as '*dvitva*'.[3] We need to distinguish between *dvitva* as a quality and as a universal.

2. How we get the cogniton of number...in the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*...The process of the production and destruction of the number two...

The Vaiśeṣikas distinguish between the number one and other numbers in the following way.[4]

First of all, the number one inheres in one substance. The eternity and non-eternity of the number one depends on whether its locus is eternal or not. The number one is conceived as existing independently of cognizers. Direct cognition of the number one is produced by contact of the sense organs and the number one.

Secondly, the numbers two etc. inhere in plural substances, and are all non-eternal. The numbers two etc. do not exist independently of cognizers. First of all, the numbers two etc. are produced and come to inhere in plural substances through the

3 To distinguish beiween two kinds of *dvitva*, the terms of *dvitvasāmānya* (=*dvitvatva*, twoness) and *dvitvaguṇa* (the number two) are also used.

4 "And it [is divided into] that which has one substance and that which has many substances. Of them, that which has cne substance is, like colour etc. of atoms of water etc., [in one case] eternal and [in another case] non eternal. On the other hand, that which has many substances is the number two to the maximum number, [and is non-eternal]." (*sā punar ekadravyā cānekadravyā ca. tatraikadravyāyāḥ salilādiparamāṇurūpādīnām ivānityanityatvaniṣpattayaḥ. anekadravyā tu dvitvādikā parārddhāntā.*) 'Water etc.' means water, fier and air. Colour etc. of their atoms eternal. But those of atoms of earth are not so. They turn into another ones by burning, and are called qualities which are produced by burning. As for the Vaiśeṣika and Naiyāyika theory of the production of them, see III. 3.

process of counting, and only then direct cognition of the numbers two etc. is produced. To understand the Vaiśeṣika theory of number, therefore, is to understand their theory of direct cognition.

Praśastapāda explains the process of the production and destruction of the number two as follows[5] : (Each of the nine stages represents only one moment.)

(1) A visual sense organ and two substances come to be in contact.

(2) The cognition of oneness (*ekatvasāmānya=ekatvatva*) is produced.[6]

(3) The cognition as efficient cause (*āpekṣābuddhi*),[7] which takes two number ones as its objects, is itself produced by oneness, the relation between oneness and two number ones, and the cognition of oneness.[8]

(4) The number two is produced in its loci (two substances) by the cognition as efficient cause.


5 *yadā boddhuś cakṣuṣā samānāsamānajātīyayor dravyayoḥ sannikarṣe sati tatsaṃyuktasamavetasamavetaikatvasāmānyajñānotpattāv ekatvasāmānyatatsambandhajñānebhya ekaguṇayor anekaviṣayiṇy ekā buddhir utpadyate tadā tam apekṣyaikatvābhyāṃ svāśrayayor dvitvam ārabhyate. tataḥ punas tasmin dvitvasāmānyajñānam utpadyate. tasmād dvitvasāmānyajñānād apekṣābuddher vinaśyattā, dvitvasāmānyatatsambandhatajjñānebhyo dvitvaguṇabuddher utpadyamānatety ekaḥ kālaḥ tata idānīm apekṣābuddhivināśād dvitvaguṇasya vinaśyattā, dvitvaguṇajñānaṃ dvitvasāmānyajñānasya vināśakāraṇam, dvitvaguṇatajjñānasambandhebhyo dve dravye iti dravyajñānasyotpādo dvitvasya vināśo dvitvaguṇabuddher vinaśyattā dravyajñānāt saṃskārasyotpadyamānatety ekaḥ kālaḥ. tadanantaraṃ dravyajñānād dvitvaguṇabuddher vināśo dravyabuddher api saṃskārāt.*

6 The cognition as efficient cause (*apekṣābuddhi*), at this moment, comes to the state of being about to be produced.

7. It is not in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, but in the *Daśapadārthī* and the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* that the term '*apekṣābuddhi*' appears. *Apekṣābuddhi* has been misunderstood by many modern scholars. As for the correct meaning of *apekṣābuddhi*, see II. 2.

8 Vyomaśiva and Śrīdhara mention that, in this case, two substances are the material cause, two number ones are the non-material cause and *apekṣābuddhi* is the efficient cause.

(5) The cognition of twoness (*dvitvasāmānya = dvitvatva*) is then produced. The cognition as efficient cause is about



ek	ekatva	ap.	apekṣābuddhi	ex. d. g. jñ. v-t. ‖ dvitvaguṇajñāna-vinaśyattā
d.	dvitva	u.	utpatti	
dr.	dravya	u-t.	utpadyamānatā	
g.	guṇa	v	vināśa	
s.	sāmānya	v-t.	vinaśyattā	
jñ.	jñāna	saṃ.	saṃskāra	

to be destroyed (*vinaśyattā*).[9] The cognition of the number two is about to be produced (*utpadyamānatā*)[10] by twoness, the relation between twoness and the number two, and the cognition of twoness.

(6) The cognition as efficient cause is then destroyed. The number two is about to be destroyed. The cognition of the number two is produced. The cognition 'These are two substances' is about to be produced by the number two, the relation between the number two and two substances, and the cognition of the number two.

(7) The cognition 'These are two substances' is then produced. The number two is destroyed. [The cognition of twoness is destroyed.] The impression (*saṃskāra=smṛti*) is about to be produced. The cognition of the number two is about to be destroyed.

(8) The impression is then produced. The cognition of the number two is destroyed. [The cognition 'These are two substances' is about to be destroyed.][11]

(9) [The cognition 'These are two substances' is destroyed.]

This is the process of the production and destruction of the number two. Next, we shall examine some reasons which require such a process.

A. *Cognition produces the number two*

It is a vital point that the number two is produced by cognition. According to Śrīdhara, it is not a mystery, but it is well

9 All the commentators mention that the state of being about to be destroyed means that [all the] causes of destruction are present (*vināśa-kāraṇa[-sāmagrī-] sānnidhya*).

10 All the commentators mention that the state of being about to be produced means that [all] causes of production are present (*utpatti-kāraṇa[-sāmagrī-]sānnidhya*).

11 According to Praśastapāda, it takes three *kalas* for the process to pass from stage (2) to stage (7). According to Śrīdhara, 1 *kala*=2

(Continued on the next page)

known that an external object can be produced by cognition.[12] This is refuted by the oppenents (probably the Buddhists) sa follows :

> "Because it is established that a substratum of two qualities (two number ones) makes emerge the number two, it is not that [the number two] is produced determinately immediately after the cognition [is produced]."[13]

Śrīdhara presents the following syllogism as a reply.

> "[Statement] the number two is produced by cognition.
>
> [Reason] Because [the number two is] cognized by only one cognizer.
>
> [Illustration] All that are cognized by only one cognizer are those which are produced by cognition, like pleasure etc.
>
> [Application] The number two is also cognized by only one cognizer.
>
> [Conclusion] Therefore, [the number two] is also produced by cognition."[14]

Udanaya, while presenting almost the same syllogism[15] as Śrīdhara's also presents another syllogism :

(*Continued from the last page*)

kṣaṇas. Including stages (1) and (8), whole process takes eight *kṣaṇas*, which also accords with the explanation of the *Upaskāra* on the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* 7.2.9 (7.2.8 according to the *Upaskāra*).

12 *jñānād arthasyotpāda iti nālaukikam idaṃ saṅkhyādīnāṃ tasmād utpattidarśanāt. bāhyārthasyotpādo na dṛṣṭa iti na, vaidharmyamātraṃ tattanvayatirekeṇānuvidhāyitvāsyobhayatrāviśeṣāt.*

13 *ubhayaguṇālambanasya dvitvābhivyañjakaive siddhe sati jñānasya tadā nānantaryaniyamotpattiḥ.*

14 *prayogas tu—dvitvaṃ buddhijam. niyamenaikapratipattṛvedyatvāt. yan niyamenaikapratipattṛvedyaṃ tad buddhijaṃ yathā sukhādikam. niyamenaikapratipattṛvedyaṃ ca dvitvam. tasmād idam api buddhijam.*

15 *dvitvam buddhijam. pratiniyatapuruṣavedyatvāt. sukhavad iti.*

> "[Statement] The cognition as efficient cause produces the number two.
>
> [Reason] Because [the cognition as efficient cause is] actually followed by it (the number two), while [substances are] impossible to make emerge [the number two].
>
> [Illustration] Like connection and separation in the case of sound."[16]

Thus, in order to explain the production of the number two, it is necessary to conceive that cognition produces external objects. The Vaiśeṣikas say, we acquire the cogniton 'These are two' not by cognizing the number two which already inheres in external objects, but by cognizing the number two after it has been produced by cognition.

But this does not mean that cognition is the material cause of the number two. According to the Vaiśeṣikas, a quality connot be the material cause of a quality.[17] As Vyomaśiva etc. point out, the material cause of the number two is the two substances, the non-material cause is the two number ones, and the efficient cause is cognition.[18]

B. Destruction of the number two by the destruction of cognition

At stage (6) (see above), the number two is about to be destroyed by the destruction of the cognition as efficient cause, and it is destroyed at stage (7). The question then arises as to whether qualities can be destroyed by the destruction of its effici-

16 *apekṣābuddhis tu dvitvasyotpādikā. vyañjakatvānupapattau tenānuvidhīyamānatvāt. śabdaṃ prati saṃyogavad iti.*

17 See the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1.1.16 which expounds the definition of quality. It reads: *dravyāśrayī aguṇavān saṃyogavibhāgeṣv akāraṇam anapekṣa iti guṇalakṣaṇam. Vyākhyā* reads : *dravyāśrayī na guṇavān saṃyogavibhāgeṣvakāraṇam anapekṣa iti guṇalakṣaṇam.*

18 See note 8.

...9

ent cause. A piece af cloth, for example, is destroyed by the destruction of its threads, namely, its material causes, but it is not influenced at all by the destruction of the shuttle of the loom etc., namely, its efficient cause.

Śrīdhara does not mention any particular argument about this. It is an empirical fact for him that a quality can be destroyed by the destruction of its efficient cause. He illustrates this by the case of final release. When one is about to attain final release, the last true cognition is destroyed by the destruction of his body. The last true cognition is a quality, and his body is an efficient cause.[19]

Udayana presents a syllogism as follows :

"[Statement] The nnmber two is destroyed by the destruction of its efficient cause.

[Reason] Because it is destroyed, even if its loci (two substances) are not destroyed, and, moreover, even if there does not appear another quality which is incompatible with it, and although it is a quality.

[Illustration] Like the last cognition [immediately before the final release]."[20]

C. *Different levels of cognition*

At stage (3), the cognition of two number ones comes after the cognition of oneness. At stage (5), the cognition of the number two comes after the cognition of twoness. At stage (6), the cognition 'These are two substances' comes after the cognition of the number two. In this way, the cognitions, which lead to the cognition 'These are two (or three) substances,' proceed from stage to stage by first grasping universals, then qualities and finally substances. This rule is the key to the Vaiśeṣika theory of

19 *dṛṣṭo guṇānām nimittakāraṇād api vināśo yathā mokṣaprāptyavasthāyām antyatattvajñānasya śarīravināśāt.*

20 *dvitvaṃ nimittavināśavināśyam. āśrayanāśavirodhiguṇāntaraprādurbhāvābhāve guṇasya sato vināśitvāt caramajñānavat.*

number. This seems to make the theory of number confusing.[21] But it is quite consistent in light of the theory of direct cognition.

As is well known, the Vaiśeṣikas divide direct cognition into two kinds. This division originates in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*. One is the direct cognition which is not verbalizable (*nirvikalpajñāna*), and which cannot be memorized, while another is the direct cognition which is verbalizable (*savikalpakajñāna*), and which can be memorized, although the terminology developed much later. The latter belongs to the group of cognition of what is qualified (*viśiṣṭa*) by the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*). For example, the cognition 'This is a cow' is a cognition of the qualified (this) by cowness, the qualifier.

Praśastapāda utilizes this division, though used different terminology. As for the essence of the theory of direct cognition, we shall examine it in detail in II. 3.

Now, taking the theory of direct cognition into consideration, we shall investigate some points about the theory of number.

First of all, the cognition 'These are two substances' is the cognition of what is qualified by some qualifier. For example, in the case of the cognition of mere man, but the cognition of a man qualified by a stick, the qualifier. Śrīdhara presents the following syllogism :

"[Statement] The cognition 'These are two substances' comes after the cognition of the qualifier.

[Reason] Because of its being the cognition of the qualified.

[Illustration] Like the cognition 'He is a man with a stick.'"[22]

21 Faddegon, who failed to understand the theory of number, says: "this capricious and after all nonsensical construction" (B. Faddegon, *Vaiśeṣika-System.* Wiesbaden : Dr. Martin Sandig oHG, 1969 [Reprint of 1818], p. 206).

22 *dve dravye iti jñānaṃ viśeṣaṇajñānapūrvakam. viśiṣṭajñānatvāt, daṇḍīti jñānavad iti.*

In this way, if a cognition is the cognition of the qualified, it ought to come after the cognition of the qualifier. The cognition of the qualifier is the cause of the cognition of the qualified. In the case of the cognition 'These are two substances,' its cause is the cognition of the number two. And this ensures that the cognition of the number two precedes the cognition 'These are two substances.' This means that the two cognitions take place in different moments.

Thus, the cognition of the qualifier precedes the cognition of the qualified. Now, Śrīdhara quotes an opponent who argues that these two cognitions could be simultaneous.

> " Now, there are some who assert that the qualifier and the qualificand (*viśeṣya*) are the objects of the same cognition. — But, for them, how about [the cognition of] 'This is a sandal wood with good fragrance' ? — A visual sense organ does not take good fragrance as its object, and a sense organ of smell does not catch the substance. Therefore, two [sense organs] do not perceive the relation [between two objects] ... This [cognition] should be produced by a visual sense organ and a sense organ of smell simultaneously, and takes both as its objects through the ability of two causes. "[23]

The direct cognition of a sandal wood with good fragrance is produced by special contact (*sannikarṣa*) which is strictly defined in later texts as *jñānalakṣaṇā*. Now, Śrīdhara refutes the opponents in the following way (summary) :

> A cognition has no parts. If the opinion of the opponents is admitted, the cognition would have to have parts, then,

23 *ye tu viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyayor ekajñānālambanam āhuḥ, teṣāṃ surabhi candanam ity atra kā vārttā? na hi cakṣur gandhaviṣayaṃ na ca ghrāṇaṃ dravyam ādatte. ata eva na tābhyāṃ sambandhagrahaṇam. .... cakṣurghrāṇābhyāṃ sambhūya janyamānam idaṃ kāraṇadvayasāmarthyād ubhayaviṣayaṃ syād (ity eke samarthayanti).*

> a visual cognition, and a smelling cognition etc. would be confusing in one and the same cognition.[24]

Then, he presents the following syllogism :

> " [Statement] The cognition of the qualificed, the point at issue, takes only the qualificand as its object.
>
> [Reason] Because of its being a direct cognition.[25] and, moreover, of its being the cognition of the qualificand.
>
> [Illustration] Like the cognition of 'This is a sandal wood with good fragrance.' "[26]

But, as to the meaning of 'takes only the qualificand as its object,' another opinion is presented. It is as follows :

> " If we admit that a mere substance itself is the object of the cognition of the qualificand, then, we should be able to attain the same cognition even when the qualifier should not exist. Besides, even if it is [possible to consider] that, as the qualifier produces [the cognition of the qualificand], the cognition of the qualificand would not be produced without its existence, this [cognition of the qualificand] would not differ from the cognition of the substance itself.

24 *tad api na sādhīyo nirbhāgatvāt. yadi jñānam sabhāgaṃ syāt tadā kaścid asyāṃśo ghrāṇeṇa janyate kaścic cakṣuṣety upapadyate vyavasthā,*

25 Inferential cognition is excluded from this phrase according to Śrīdhara. (*pratyakṣatve satīti laiṅgikajñānavyavacchedārtham.*)

26 *vivādhādhyasitaṃ viśeṣyajñānaṃ kevalaviśeṣyālambanam. pratyakṣatve sati viśeṣyajñānatvāt. surabhi candanam iti jñānavat.* Śrīdhara asserts that we attain the eognition of 'This is a sandal wood with good fragrance' in the following way : "Therefore, after good fragrance was percieved by a sense organ of smell, the cognition of the qualificand which takes only the qualificand as its object is produced by a visual sense organ assisted by that [former] perception." *tasmād ghrāṇena gandhe gṛhīte paścāt tadgrahaṇasahakāriṇā cakṣuṣā kevalaviśeṣyālambanam evedaṃ viśeṣyajñānaṃ janyate.*

Because a cognition is not differentiated if its object is not differentiated. "[27]

If the qualificand is regarded as the same as 'a mere substance itself,' this opinion would be reasonable. But Śrīdhara insists that the object of this cognition ought to be the qualified, not 'a mere substance itself.' He says :

"Being the qualified is quite different from [a thing] itself. "[28]

For example, he says, the object of the cognition 'This is a man with a stick' is neither a mere man nor his mere connection with a stick, but a man different from others owing to his being charac- terized by a stick, and, therefore, the qualifier is said the limitative (*vyavvacchedaka*).[29]

Now, taking the above argument into consideration, let's return to the process of the production and destruction of the number two.

First of all. Praśastapāda uses the following compound in stage (3) : *ekatvasāmānya-tatsambandha-jñānebhyaḥ.*[30]

Śrīdhara, after mentioning the following :

27 *nanu yadi dravyasvarūpamātram eva viśeṣyajñānasyālambauam, asaty api viśeṣaṇe tathā pratyayaḥ syāt. atha viśeṣaṇasya janakatvān na tadabhāve viśeṣyajñānodayaḥ, tathāpi dravyarūpapratyayād asya na viśeṣaḥ, viṣayaviśeṣam antareṇa jñānasya viśeṣāntarābhāvāt.*

28 *viśiṣṭatā ca svarūpātirekiṇy eva.*

29 [*viśiṣṭatā ca svarūpātirekiṇy eva*] *yā daṇḍīti jñāne pratibhāsate na khalu tatra puruṣamātrasya pratītir, nāpi daṇḍasaṃyogitāmatrasya. tathā ca* ᵈ*aṇḍīti pratīiāv itaravilakṣaṇa eva puruṣaḥ saṃvedyate. vailakṣaṇyaṃ cāsya daṇḍopasarjanatvam eva. ata eva viśeṣaṇaṃ vyavacchedakam iti gīyate. daṇḍo hi svopasarjanatāpratipatiim puruṣe kurvan puruṣam itarasmād vyavac- chinatti.* Hereafter Śrīdhara refers to the discrimination of *viśeṣaṇa* and *upalakṣaṇa*, which is to come to be an important point at issue for the Navyanaiyāyikas, He says : *ayaṃ cāsyopalakṣaṇād viśeṣaḥ. upalakṣaṇam api vyavacchinatti na tu svopasarjanatāpratītihetuḥ. na hi yathā daṇḍīti daṇḍopasarjanatā puruṣe pratīyate tathā jaṭābhis tāpasa iti tāpase jaṭopasar- janatā. daṇḍopasarjanatā puruṣasya prādhānyaṃ cārthakriyāyām upabhogāti- śayānatiśayāpekṣayā.*

30 *Vyomavatī* reads ; *-tajjñānebhyaḥ.*

"The cognition of the qualifier is the cause of the cognition of the qualificand (=the qualified). Two number ones are the qualificand, and oneness is the qualifier. Therefore the cognition is thought [to be produced] of it (oneness) in the first. "[31]

analyzes the compound into the following three components.

(1) oneness, (2) the relation of oneness with qualities, or two number ones, (3) the cognition.

It is clear that 'the cognition' is of oneness. Udayana interprets this in the same way, and clarifies 'the relation' as inherence. Vyomaśiva also interprets it in almost the same way.

Second, Praśastapāda uses the following compound in stage (5) : *dvitvasāmānya-tatsambandha-tajjñānebhyaḥ*[32].

Śrīdhara's interpretation is as follows :

(1) twoness, (2) the relation of twoness with a quality, or the number two, (3) the cognition of twoness.

Udayana's and Śrīdhara's interpretations are the same as Śrīdhara's.

Thirdly, Praśastapāda uses the following compound in stage (6) : *dvitvaguṇa-tajjñāna-sambandhebhyaḥ* [33]

All the commentators interpret it as follows :

(1) a quality, or the number two, (2) the cognition of the number two, (3) the relation [of the number two with two subjects].

Udayana also mentions the following :

"Because the qualifier (the number two, a quality) and its relation [with the cognition of 'these are two sub-

31 *viśeṣaṇajñānaṃ viśeṣyajñānasya kāraṇam. ekaguṇayoś ca viśeṣya- yor ekatvasāmānyaṃ viśeṣaṇam. tenādau tatraiva jñānaṃ cintyate.*

32 *Kiraṇāvalī* omits *-taj-*.

33 *Vyomavatī* and *Kiraṇāvalī* read : *dvitvaguṇajñānatatsambandhe- bhyaḥ.*

stances'] are already established, and there is nothing more necessary."[34]

Thus, the causes of the qualificand (strictly speaking, the qualified) can be formulated under the following three headings.

(i) the qualifier

(ii) the relation between the qualifier and the qualificand

(iii) the cognition of the qualifier

Now, the basis of such formulation, which consists of the three causes of cognition, can be found in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*. The most important is *sūtra* 8. 9.

> "By an inherent white colour and by the cognition of the white colour the cognition of a white [substance is produced]. These two [kinds of cognitions] are in relation of causality."
>
> *samavāyinaḥ śvaityāc chvaityabuddheḥ śvete buddhis te kāryakāraṇabhūte.*[35]

The *Vṛtti* interprets it as follows:

> "By a universal, or whiteness, which is inherent in a quality, or a white colour, and by the cognition of a universal, or whiteness, the cognition of a quality, or whiteness, is produced. The relation between a universal and a quality must be taken into consideration too. Therefore, the cognition of the qualifier is the cause, and the cognition of the qualificand is the effect."[36]

34 [*guṇajñānam eva hi carman dravyajñānasyotpādakaṃ*] *viśeṣaṇatat-sambandhayoḥ pūrvasiddhatvāt apekṣaṇīyāntarābhāvāt.*

35 *Vyākhyā* and *Upaskāra* read : *-buddheś ca sve-*.

36 *śvetaguṇasamavāyinaḥ śvaityasāmānyāt śvaityasāmānyāt śvaitya-sāmānyājñānāc ca śvetaguṇajñānaṃ jāyate. sāmānyaguṇasambandho 'pi draṣṭavyaḥ ato viśeṣaṇabuddhiḥ kāraṇam viśeṣyabuddhiḥ kāryam.* From the context of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* itself, the *Vṛtti*'s interpretation is the most rational. Cf. II, 3.

This interpretation seems to be suitable because, since the resulting cognition is of a substance, '*śvaitya*' ought to be a white colour, or a quality, not whiteness, or a universal.

The *Vyākhyā* interprets it as follows :

> "'By an inherent' = by the relation between a quality, or a white colour, and a substance, 'by a white colour' = by a quality, or a white colour, and 'by the cognition of the white colour' = by the cognition of a quality, or the white colour, the cognition of 'a white' = a piece of cloth which is qualified by a quality, or a white colour, is produced. This way [is applied] to other cases. 'These two' = the cognition of the qualifier and that of the qualificand, or the cognition of the qualifier and that of the qualified, are 'in relation of causality.' This is ascertained by direct cognition with the help of positive and negative concomitance.[37] Because the cognition of the qualified is produced when there exist the relation between the qualifier [and the qualificand], the qualified and the cognition [of the qualifier], and, besides, the former is not produced when the latter does not exist."[38]

Udayana interprets it as follows :

> "......Thus, in the case of the cognition of a white shell etc., it is said that the inherence of a white colour, or a quality, a white colour and the cognition of the qualifier, or a white colour, are the causes. Thus, [it is said that] the relation between the qualifier [and the qualificand], the qualifier

37 *anvayavyatireka*. This means here the method to examine causal concomitance of two matters. *Anvaya* : presence of A is accompanied by presence of B. *Vyatireka*: absence of A is accompanied by absense of B. If two matters are attested to be in concomitance, they are said to make causality.

38 *samavāyineti śuklaguṇapaṭasambandhāt, śvaityād iti śuklaguṇāt śvaityabuddher iti śuklaguṇabuddheḥ. śvete śuklaguṇaviśiṣṭe paṭe buddhir jāyaie. tad cānyatrāpi, te viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabuddhī viśeṣaṇajñānaviśiṣṭabuddhī ca, kāryakāraṇabhūte anvayavyatirekashitapratyakṣeāṇvasite, viśeṣaṇasambandhaviśeṣaṇajñāneṣu satsu viśiṣṭapratyayodayād asatsu cānudayāt.*

and the cognition of it (the qualifier) are the causes of the right cognition, or the cognition of the qualified."[39]

As was examined above, *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 8.9 is understood as expounding the typical Vaiśeṣika theory of direct cognition that the so-called 'causal triad' (*kāraṇatraya*—Vyomaśiva) causes the cognition of the qualified.

Praśastapāda also quotes *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 8.9 in discussing two problems which pertain to the production and destruction of the number two. One of these will be investigated in subsection D. The present problem is stated by an opponent. It is summarized as follows :

> 'Even if the number two is destroyed and does not exist any more. the cognition of two substances is possible to be produced merely by the existence of the cognition of the number two.'[40]

Before quoting the *sūtra* concerned, Praśastapāda states the following :

> "Because, as the cognition of the qualificand (strictly speaking, the qualified) has similarity [with the qualifier]. it cannot exist without its relation with the qualifier."[41]

39 *evañ ca śvetaḥ śaṅkha ityādipratītau śvaityasamavāyasya śvaitya-guṇasya śvaityaviśeṣaṇajñānasya ca kāraṇatvam ity uktam tathā ca viśeṣaṇa-sambandhaviśeṣaṇatajjñānānām viśiṣṭapratyakṣapramām prati kāraṇatvam iti.*

40 "[Objection:] [The cognition of two substances is possible,] like inference, [to be produced] merely by cognition,
[Answer :] This should mean : In such a cash as 'that which did not appear [is the probans] of that which appeared' (one phrase from *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 3.1.8), without probans, the cognition of substances is possible, like inference, to be produced merely by the cognition of a quality even if the quality (the number two) might have been destroyed." *laiṅgikavaj jñānamātrād iti cet? syān matam, yathābhūtam bhūtasyety atra liṅgābhāve 'pi jñānamātrād anumānam tathā guṇavināśe 'pi guṇabuddhimātrād dravya-pratyayaḥ syād iti.*

41 *na hi viśeṣyajñānam sārūpyād viśeṣaṇasambandham antareṇa bhavitum arhati.*

The word 'similarity' is, according to Udayana, the same as 'commonness' or as 'having the same substratum.' According to Śrīdhara, it indicates that the cognition of the qualificand is characterized by the qualifier, that the qualifier is the nature of the qualificand, and that the qualifier is the cause which lets us cognize that it is attached to the qualificand.[42] Now if the qualifier does not exist, it is not possible for the above mentioned relation to exist. Therefore, since the cognition 'These are two substances' is the cognition of the qualificand, it is needed that the number two which qualifies the two exist when the cognition 'These are two substances' is produced.

Praśastapāda quotes the *sūtra* concerned immediately after the above argument. Although he does not present any interpretation of it, it is clear that he quoted it in order to emphasize the theory of 'causal triad' of direct cognition.

D. Non-simultaneity of cognitions

The theory of the production and destruction of the number two is based on the rule that two cognitions are unable to exist simultaneously in one person. This rule originates from the traditional idea that mind, since it is singular in one person and the smallest, is unable to come in contact with many sense organs simultaneously.[43]

Now, Praśastapāda says that the non-simultaneity or incompatibility of things can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, it means being 'impossible to coexist' (*sahānavasthāna*); and, on the other hand, it means the relation between 'a to-be-killed and a killer' (*vadyaghātaka*). Let's take two things A and

42 *viśeṣaṇam viśeṣyasya svarūpam viśeṣyānurañjakam viśeṣye svopa-sarjanatāpratītihetur iti yāvat. na cāvidyamānasyānurañjakatvam svopasarja-natāpratītihetutvam yuktam ato na viśeṣyajñānam viśeṣaṇasambandham anta-reṇa bhavitum arhati viśeṣyajñānam sādṛśyād viśeṣaṇānuraktatvād viśeṣaṇa-sambandham antareṇa bhavitum arhati.*

43 Cf. *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 3.2.3; *Nyāyasūtra* 3.2.57–60; *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya*, the *Manaḥ-nirūpaṇa*.

B, and assume that A precedes B. In the case of being 'impossible to coexist.' A is destroyed at the moment when B is produced. It is literally impossible for A and B to coexist. But, in the case of being 'a to-be-killed and a killer,' A is destroyed at the moment after B is produced. It is possible for A and B to coexist for one moment only. Then, what is the relationship between the two cognitions? As can be guessed from the list of the stages in the process (see also figure 1), the correct relationship is 'a to-be-killed and a killer.' The reason is as follows :

If the non-simultaneity of cognitions meant impossibility of coexistence, the Vaiśeṣika theory of number would collapse. That is to say, if it is impossible for two cognitions to coexist, at stage (5) the cognition as efficient cause would be destroyed at the moment when the cognition of twoness was produced. Then, the number two would be about to be destroyed at the moment when cognition as efficient cause was destroyed. At the next moment when the cognition of the number two is produced the number two is destroyed. If so, the number two, which produces the cognition 'These are two substances,' would not exist at this moment. This leads to the conclusion that the eognition 'These are two substances' is never produced, For the cognition 'These are two substances' is the cognition of the qualificand (the qualified). Its production needs the following 'causal triad' : (i) number two, (ii) the relation between the number two and two substances, (iii) the cognition of the number two. But, at the moment when the cognition 'These are two substances' is to be produced, (i) and (ii) do not exist. Therefore, the cognition 'These are two substances' is never produced. This is absurd. Therefore, the relationship between two cognitions is not 'impossible to coexist,' but 'a to-be-killed and a killer.'

3. Conclusion

The theory of number has been thought to be one of the most difficult of the Vaiśeṣika theories. But after having investigated it in detail, we are now able to understand that it is established strictly in accordance with the Vaiśeṣika rules. The key-stone of these rules is the 'causal triad,' on which the Vaiśeṣika theory of direct cognition is based. And it is notable that the idea of 'causal triad' originates in *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 8.9. The theory of direct cognition in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* is extremely perfect beyond our imagination. This interesting point will be investigated in datail in II. 3.

CHAPTER 2

APEKṢĀBUDDHI : A SPECIAL COGNITION

The term '*apekṣābuddhi*' plays an important role in the throughly realistic (in contrast with nominalistic) Vaiśeṣikas. This term does not appear in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, but appears for the first time in the *Daśapadārthī*[1] and then in the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*. Of these two the latter uses it far more frequently. So we shall investigate the true meaning of the term '*apekṣābuddhi*' by examining the way it is used in the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*. Praśastapāda succeeded in explaining the production and destruction of things deeply related to our consciousness. The later Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas were so satisfied with his explanation that they did not attempt to reinterpret it. Besides the term is apparently a curious compound whose first member is '*apekṣā*' and whose second member is '*buddhi*.' This has led many modern scholars to a great deal of confusion, misunderstanding and non-understanding. A list of their translations of the term '*apekṣābuddhi*' reveals the extent of the confusion.

* relating cognition (Keith, *Indian Logic and Atomism*, p. 187).
* distinguishing perception (Apte, *The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary* : Cowell, tr. of the *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha*).
* fundamental intellection (Faddegon, *Vaiçeṣika System*).
* distinctive notion (G. Jha, tr. of the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha of Praśastapāda with the Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara*).
* unitary conception (G. Jha, tr. of the *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*).
* die auf die Mannigfaltigkeit der Dinge gerichtete Geisteshaltigkeit (*PW*)

1 See the paragraphs [134] and [137] in the Appendix,

* sabetsu suru ishiki [distinguishing consciousness] (Y. Kanakura, *Indo no Shizen Tetsugaku* [Natural Philosophy of India]).
* sōtai-kankei no ishiki [consciousness of relativity] (H. Nakamura, *Sankō Bunka Kenkyūjo Nenpō*] Annual of Cultural Institute of Sanko] Vols. 6–7, 1973–74).

Except Faddegon's translation which is too obscure, the others agree in interpreting *apekṣābuddhi* in such a way that the subject of the verbal root *apekṣ-* (which means 'to expect,' 'to respect for' etc.) is *buddhi* (cognition). This is, however, quite doubtful. Before refuting this, we shall examine in detail the Vaiśeṣika usage of the term concerned.

1. The five cases in which apekṣābuddhi functions

The term '*apekṣābuddhi*' is the key to explaining the production and destruction of the number two, the separateness of two (substances), priority and posteriority.

[1] The following sentence is found in *Guṇa-sādharmya-vaidharmyanirūpaṇa*.

> "Priority, posteriority, the number two, separateness of two (substances) etc. are *buddhyapekṣāḥ*."[2]

The commentators offer the following explanations: Priority etc. 'do' *apekṣ- buddhi* when they are to be produced. (Vyomaśiva)[3]; They do not come into existence without *buddhi*. (*Do.*)[4]; *Buddhi* is considered the efficient cause of their production. (Śrīdhara)[5]; This very *buddhi* is *apekṣābuddhi*. (Udayana).[6]

That is to say, priority etc. do not exist independently of a cognizer, but are produced only through the process of counting.

2 *paratvāparatvadvitvadvipṛthaktvādayo buddhyapakṣāḥ.*
3 *Vyomavatī*, p. 435 *l.* 20.
4 *Ibid.*, p. 435 *l.* 23.
5 *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 116 *l.* 6.
6 *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 108 *l.* 23.

Take number for example. The number one exists in every substance utterly independently of a cognizer and is cognized by the same process as other external things are cognized. But the number two does not inhere in two substances independently of a cognizer. It comes to inhere in two substances through the counting of a cognizer. Only then, it is directly cognized[7].

[2] *Apekṣābuddhi* which functions in the process of the production of the number two was already examined in II. 1.


[3] *Apekṣābuddhi* as concerned with the production of separateness of two (substances) etc. functions in the same way as that of the number two.

[4] Priority and posteriority are each divided into spatial one and temporal one. Here we shall take spatial priority as an example. It is produced and destroyed through the following process.

(1) A man looks at two things, A and B, which are located in the same direction. First, the distance between the man and A and between the man and B are divided into parts by using some kind of unit of length. Next, the numbers of connections of each part with its adjoining part which exist in the distance between the man and A and in that between the man and B are counted. If there is cognized a difference between two numbers (consider the latter is more), the *buddhi* ' B is further than A ' is produced with A as a standard. This *buddhi* is the *apekṣābuddhi*.

(2) Priority is produced by the material cause, namely, B, the non-material cause, namely, a connection qualified by moreness, and the efficient cause, namely, the *apekṣābuddhi*.

7 Śrīdhara presents a syllogism as follows : "[Statement] The number two is produced by cognition. [Reason] Because [the number two is] cognized by only one cognizer. [Illustration] All that are cognized by only one cognizer are those which are produced by cognition, like pleasure etc. [Application] The number two is as well cognized by only one cognizer. [Conclusion] Therefore, [the number two] is produced by cognition." As for the original text, see note 14 on II. 1.



dr.	dravya	jñ.	jñāna	v.	vināśa
g.	guṇa	ap.	apekṣābuddhi	saṃ.	saṃskāra
s.	sāmānya	u.	utpatti		

(Figure 2)

(3) The cognition of prioritiness is produced.

(4) The cognition of priority is produced. The *apekṣābuddhi* is destroyed by the production of the cognition of prioritiness.

(5) The cognition of substances (' B is prior to A ') is produced. Priority is destroyed by the destruction of *apekṣābuddhi*. The cognition of prioritiness is destroyed by the production of the cognition of priority.

[(6) The impression is produced. The cognition of priority is destroyed by the production of the cognition of substances.

(7) The cognition of substances is destroyed by the production of the impression.][8]

[5] *Apekṣābuddhi* also appears in the argument on dimension. Non-eternal dimension is produced by number, dimension

8 (6) and (7) in [ ] is complemented by me from the analogy to Praśastapāda's explanation of *dvitvotpatti*.

and collection. The number of atoms and diads which human beings are unable to cognize is produced by the *buddhi* of the Lord. This *buddhi* is *apekṣābuddhi*. It functions in the same way as in the case of the number two etc.

2. The usage of the term 'apekṣābuddhi'

We have looked at all of the cases where the term '*apekṣābuddhi*' appears in the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*. At this point we are able to understand how it functions, but we need to further examine the use of the term '*apekṣābuddhi*' in order to acquaint ourselves with its exact meaning.

Its usage in the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* is as follows :

[A] In the cases where the object of the *apekṣābuddhi* is indicated, the term '*apekṣābuddhi*' is not used. Only the term '*buddhi*' (seven times) is used.

anekaviṣaya-buddhi- (twice)[9]

anekaviṣayiṇī buddhiḥ (once)[10]

sannikṛṣṭā buddhiḥ (once)[11]

asannikṛṣṭā buddhiḥ (once)[12]

viprakṛṣṭā buddhiḥ (once)[13]

[B] In the cases where the effect of the *apekṣābuddhi* is indicated, the term '*buddhi*' is also used exclusively (seven times).

buddhy-apekṣāḥ (once)[14]

buddhim / *tām apekṣya* (six times)[15]

9 *Saṅkhyā-nirūpaṇa.*

10 *Loc. cit.*

11 *Paratvāparatva-nirūpaṇa.*

12 *Loc. cit.*

13 *Loc. cit,*

14 *Saṅkhyā-nirūpaṇa.*

15 Once in *loc. cit.* and five times in the *Paratvāparatva-nirūpaṇa.*

(C) On the other hand, in the cases where only its own production and destruction are referred to without any relation to its object or effect, the term '*apekṣābuddhi*' is used (twenty-two times).[16]

In later texts, as far as I know, usage [A] is found almost always. As for [B], while in the cases where the *buddhi* (= *apekṣābuddhi*) appears together with those verbal roots as *apa-īkṣ-*, *ā-rabh-*, *bhū-* (*vinā na*) or with their derivatives the term '*buddhi*' is used, in those cases where it is combined with the verbal root *jan-* or its derivatives both the terms '*buddhi*' and '*apekṣābuddhi*' are used optionally[17]. Furthermore, when combined with the verbal root *ut-pad-* or its derivatives, the term '*apekṣābuddhi*' seems to be used exclusively[18]. Usage [C] is without exception. Besides, the term '*apekṣābuddhi*' is sometimes replaced with the term '*nimittakāraṇa*'[19].

From the above examination we can conclude that the Vaiśeṣikas, in using the term '*apekṣābuddhi*' in some cases and '*buddhi*' in other cases, meant the following : The antecedent '*apekṣā-*' is not used at all when the object of the cognition is indicated. Because the meaning of the term '*apekṣā-*' and the object the cognition are not related. The effect produced by [*apekṣā-*] *buddhi*, for example the number two, is the grammatical subject of the verbal root '*apekṣ-*' while the grammatical object is nothing but *buddhi*.

3. Conclusion

We can summarize the above investigation as follows :

16 For example : *apekṣābuddhivināśād dvitvaguṇasya vinaśyattā* (*Saṅkhyā-nirūpaṇa*).

17 For example : *apekṣābuddhijanyaḥ* (*Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 108 *l.* 23), *dvitvam buddhijam* (*Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 129 *l.* 12).

18 For example : *apekṣābuddhis tu dvitvasyotpādikā* (*Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 129 *l.* 10), *na cāpekṣābuddhiṃ vinotpattiḥ* (*Vyomavatī*, p. 464 *l.* 29).

19 The cases of such a replacement are too many to enumerate in later texts. '*Apekṣābuddhi*' is replaced by '*apekṣākāraṇa*' in the *Vyomavatī* (p. 464 *l.* 20 and *l.* 28). It is mentioned in the *Vyomavatī* (p. 517 *l.* 17) that the term '*apekṣā*' means '*kāraṇa*'.

[I] Priority, posteriority, the number two etc. and separateness of two (substances) etc. do not inhere in substances, in advance, independently of a cognizer, but come into existence only through the intellectual activity of a cognizer. Although priority etc. could be said to be the products of ideas, they are by no means like phantoms, but they are external existents which inhere in substanees. Only then, do they become the objects of direct cognition. This is what is postulated in Vaiśeṣika realism.

[II] The antecedent '*apekṣā-*' in the compound '*apekṣābuddhi*' indicates the causality between *buddhi* and its effect, in other words, *apekṣābuddhi* is the efficient cause of priority etc. Its verbal root '*apekṣ-*' is not related with the object of the cognition.

Thus, the term '*apekṣābuddhi*' etymologically means 'expectation [of-something-directed-to-] cognition' or 'cognition [which is] expected [by something (priority etc.) which is to be produced by it],' and actually means 'cognition as efficient cause.' Except for the obscure translation of Faddegon, all of the translations by modern scholars which were listed in the beginning were due to a completely upside-down understanding of the grammatical object and subject of the verbal root '*apekṣ-*.'

CHAPTER 3

SVARŪPA AND VIŚEṢAṆA — PRAŚASTAPĀDA AND THE VAIŚEṢIKASŪTRA ON DIRECT COGNITION (PRATYAKṢA)

The later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas divide direct cognition into non-verbalizable cognition (*nirvikalpakajñāna*) and verbalizable cognition (*savikalpakajñana*). Generally, the former is defined as 'a [direct] cognition which does not apprehend the qualifier, the qualificand and their relation' (*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyasambandhānavagāhi jñānam*)[1] and the latter as 'a [direct] cognition which apprehends them' (*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyasambandhāvagāhi jñānam*). Praśastapāda even though he did not use the terminology was the first to explicitly use this distinction, though it originates in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*. Vācaspatimiśra, however, was the first to explicitly define and use these terms[2]. Praśastapāda offers in *Pratyakṣa-nirūpaṇa*, in the framework of an argument on the contact which produces direct cognition, the following four explanations about direct cognition.

T-1 : *dravye tāvat trividhe mahaty anekadravyavattvodbhūtarūpaprakāśacatuṣṭayasannikarṣād dharmasāmagrye ca svarūpālocanamātram.*

1 Cf. The *Nyāyakośa*, by M. B. Jhalakīkar, Poona : The Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1978.

2 *Nyāyasūtra* 1. 1. 4 expounds the definition of direct cognition as follows : *indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakaṃ pratyakṣam.* Vācaspatimiśra in his *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* interpreted '*avyapadeśyaṃ* [*pratyakṣam*]' as *nirvikalpakajñāna* and '*vyavasāyātmakaṃ* [*pratyakṣam*]' as *savikalpakajñāna.* His interpretation was epoch-making in the sense that the ancient Naiyāyika theory of cognition was ultimately repalaced and re-grounded by the traditional Vaiśeṣika theory. This made Udayana try to construct the strict system of terminology, which led to the establishment of the Navya-naiyāyikas.

T-2 : *sāmānyaviśeṣadravyaguṇakarmaviśeṣaṇāpekṣād ātmamanaḥsannikarṣāt pratyakṣam utpadyate sad dravyaṃ pṛthivī viṣāṇī śuklo gaur gacchatīti.*

T-3 : *tatra sāmānyaviśeṣeṣu svarūpālocanamātraṃ pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇaṃ prameyā dravyādayaḥ padārthāḥ pramātātmā pramitir dravyādiviṣayaṃ jñānam.*

T-4 : *sāmānyaviśeṣajñānotpattāv avibhaktam ālocanamātraṃ pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam. asmin nānyat pramāṇāntaram asti aphalarūpatvāt.*[3]

Prof. M. Hattori examined the above passages, and concluded the following[4].

3 T—1 : "To begin with, [there is produced] a mere observation of feature of three kinds of large substances (earth, water and fire) by their having many substances, by the emerged colours, by light and by the contact of the four (soul, mind, sense organ and object), and in the condition that a set of causes as merit etc. is present."

T—2 : "[There] is produced the direct cognition of 'A white cow which is existent, is a substance, is [made of] earth and has horns walks' by the contact of soul and mind which is assisted by the qualifier — universals, particulars, substances, qualities and actions."

T—3 : "In this case, the instrument of cognition is the direct cognition as a mere observation of feature of universals and particulars, the object of the cognition is such catagories as substance etc., the subject of the cognition is soul, and the cognition attained is the cognition whose object is the substance etc."

T—4 : "As for the production of the cognition of universals and particulars, the instrument of cognition is the direct cognition as a mere observation which is unseparated [from any cognition or from themselves]. There is no other instrument of cognition in [the case of] this [cognition]. Because it is not the result [of any other cognition]."

4 M. Hattori, "Two Types of Non-qualificative Perception," *WZKSO*, Bd. XII–XIII, 1968/69. L. Schmithausena, in his article ("Zur Lehre von der Vorstellungsfreien Wahrnehmung bei Praśastapāda," *ibid.*, Bd. XIV, 1970), critisized his interpretation on *sāmānyaviśeṣa*. While Hattori interpreted it as 'generic character' as if it were a mere common word, Schmithausen interpreted it as lower universals (*dravyatva* etc.). Recently Y. Mikogami, in his article "Vaiśeṣika-Gakuha no Chikaku-setsu — *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* VIII–1–5 wo megutte [The Vaiśeṣika Theory of Cognition — around *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* VIII–1–5]," *Ryūkoku Daigaku Ronshū*,

(*Continued on the next page*)

(1) The Vaiśeṣika *nirvikalpakajñāna* is of two types. One is *svarūpālocanamātra* (especially *ālocana*), which is the first stage in the psychological process of the production of perception, first discussed by Praśastapāda. The other is *viśeṣaṇajñāna* which originated in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* and was postulated logically as a presupposition of the production of *viśiṣṭajñāna.*

(2) Vācaspatimiśra could not distinguish between these two types and was confused.

(3) Praśastapāda, influenced by Dignāga, expounded *nirvikalpakajñāna* as *svarūpālocanamātra.*

Prof. Hattori's interpretation is interesting enough. but it is problematic. We shall investigate the theory of direct cognition as it is discussed in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* and the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* in detail.

1. The Vaiśeṣikasūtra on direct cognition

The most important *sūtras* on direct cognition are *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 8. 5–9. To begin with, we shall investigate them one by one.

"The cognition of universals and particulars [is produced] only by it (contact) because universals and particulars do not exist in universals and particulars." *sāmānyaviśeṣeṣu sāmānyaviśeṣābhāvāt tata eva jñānam.* (8. 5)

(*Continued from the last page*)

Vol. 442, 1993, criticized both, and tried to interpret it as 'the object of the accompanying inclusion (*anuvṛtti*) and exclusion (*vyāvṛtti*) (*dravyādi*),' or 'objects as universal and particular features, that is, substance etc.'. My original Japanese paper of this chapter was published in 1982. To my regret, he does not seem to have read it. His interpretation is quite odd to me. I do not agree with Hattori and Schmithausen. The reason will be clearly understood from my argument in this chapter.

Nothing inheres in universals and particulars. Namely, there is no qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) of universals and particulars[5]. This means that there never exists the cognition of the qualifier which precedes the cognition of universals and particulars. Therefore, only contact (*sannikarṣa*) exists as its cause. This *sūtra* corresponds exactly to T-4 of the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*.

Of course '*tata eva*' can be translated as 'by themselves (universals and particulars)'[6]. But, given the contact as the cause of cognition, my translation is more approriate. This is because the argument in *sūtras* 8. 5–9 concentrates on the qualifier and the cognition of the qualifier as the causes of direct cognition.

> " [The cognition] of substance, quality and action [is produced] assisted by universals and particulars." *sāmānya-viśeṣāpekṣaṃ dravyaguṇakarmasu.* (8. 6)

The cognition of substance is, for example. 'This is *sat* (existent).' 'This is substance.' 'This is earth' etc. And it is also the cognition of what is qualified (*viśiṣṭa*) by universals and particulars (*sattā, dravyatva, pṛthivītva* etc.)[7], namely, the qualifier. This corresponds exactly to one half of T–2.

5 This is a kind of axiom of the Vaiśeṣikas to avoid reduction ad infinitum (*anavasthā*).

6 As is well known, the Vaiśeṣika usage of the terms '*sāmānya*' and '*viśeṣa*' is threefold as follows :

(1) *sāmānya=sattā* ; *viśeṣa=dravyādi* (including *antyaviśeṣa*) (Praśastapāda calls the former '*paraṃ sāmānyam.*')
(2) *sāmānya=sattā, dravyādi* ; *viśeṣa=antyaviśeṣa.*
(3) *sāmānyaviśeṣa=dravyādi* (excluding *sattā* and *antyaviśeṣa*) (This corresponds to '*aparam sāmānyam*' of Praśastapāda.)

The *Daśapadārthī* enumerates three categories about *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* as follows :

(i) *sāmānya=sattā*
(ii) *sāmānyaviśeṣa=dravyādi* (excluding *sattā* and *antyaviśeṣa*)
(iii) *viśeṣa=antyaviśeṣa*

The *Daśapadārthī* follows faithfully the argument on *sāmānya and viśeṣa* in *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1. 2. 4–6.

7 According to the *Vṛtti*, while *sāmānya* means *sattā* and *dravyādi*, and *viśeṣa* means *antyaviśeṣa* in *sūtra* 8. 5, *sāmānya*, in *sūtra* 8. 6, means

(*Continued on the next page*)

> " [The cognition] of substances [is produced] assisted by substance, quality and action." *dravye dravyaguṇakarmāpekṣam.* (8–7)

The cognition of substance in this case is, for example, 'This cow has horns,' 'This cow is white,' 'This cow walks' etc., or 'This white cow with horns walks.' It is the cognition of what is qualified by the qualifiers, namely, substance (horns), quality (a white colour) and action (walk). This *sūtra* corresponds exactly to the other half of T-2.

> " [The cognition] of quality and action assisted by quality and action does not exist because qualities and actions do not exist in qualities and actions." *guṇakarmasu guṇakarmābhāvād guṇakarmāpekṣaṃ na vidyate.* (8. 8)[8]

As for quality and action, there exists no cognition of the qualified whose qualifier is quality or action. The cognition of quality (and action) is explained in the next *sūtra*.

> " By an inherent whiteness and by the cognition of whiteness the cognition of a white colour [is produced]. These two [cognitions] are in relation of causality." *samavāyinaḥ śvaityāc chvaityabuddheḥ śvete buddhis te kāryakāraṇabhūte.* (8. 9)[9]

(*Continued from the last page*)

sattā, and *viśeṣa* means *dravyādi*. That is to say, the *Vṛtti* conceives *viśeṣa* in *sūtra* 8. 6 wider than that in *sūtra* 8. 5. Probably Candrānanda was anxious of that, if *viśeṣa* in *sūtra* 8. 6 means *antyaviśeṣa*, this *viśeṣa* should be impossible to inhere in quality and action. For *antyaviśeṣa* inheres only in eternal substances, which are directly cognized only by such special persons as yogins. From his anxiety it is inferred that it was more ordinary for Candrānanda to conceive that *sāmānya* means *sattā* and *dravyādi*, and that *viśeṣa* means *antyaviśeṣa* only. This concept corresponds to the division by Praśastapāda. Cf. note 6.

8 Cf. *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1. 1. 15 : (*dravyāśrayī aguṇavān saṃyogavibhāgeṣv akāraṇam anapekṣam iti guṇalakṣaṇam*) and 1. 1. 16 (*ekadravyam aguṇaṃ saṃyogavibhāgeṣv anapekṣaṃ kāraṇam iti karmalakṣaṇam*).

9 Only the *Vṛtti* interprets '*śvaitya*' as 'whiteness' and '*śveta*' as 'a white colour.' This interpretation probably holds ground by conception

(*Continued on the next page*)

This *sūtra* immensely influenced the later Vaiśeṣikas. It led to the theory of the 'causal triad' (*kāraṇatraya*)[10] — the qualifier, the relation between the qualifier and the qualificand and the cognition of the qualifier. Such a 'causal triad' produces the cognition of the qualified. Praśastapād utilized it fully in explaining the process of the production and destruction of the number two in *Saṅkhyā-nirūpaṇa*.

Prof. Hattori assumed that the *Sūtrakāra's* idea that the cognition of the qualifier is the cause of the cognition of the qualified was 'postulated' from a logical point of view. He also assumed that it was Vācaspatimiśra who identified the logically postulated cognition of the qualifier with *nirvikalpakajñāna*, and not Praśastapāda. While his first assumption is correct, his second assumption is based upon a misunderstanding of Praśastapāda's views on direct cognition. The reason is as follows.

2. Praśastapāda on the cognition of the qualifier

Praśastapāda discusses direct cognition, not only in *Pratyakṣa-nirūpaṇa*, but also in *Saṅkhyā-nirūpaṇa*[11] whose main theme is 'how direct cognition is produced.' Without examining argument in *Saṅkhyā-nirūpaṇa* it is impossible to understand the Praśastapāda's theory of direct cognition as a whole. The biggest mistake of many modern scholars has been their neglect of *Saṅkhyā-nirūpaṇa*. Therefore, we shall begin by examining the argument in *Saṅkhyā-nirūpaṇa*.

(*Continued from the last page*)


that this *sūtra* should refer to the direct cognition of qualities (and actions) because it is expounded in the last *sūtra* that the cognition of qualities and actions which takes qualities and actions as its efficient cause is not produced like the cognition of substances. This is rational. But, from common sense, the term '*śveta*' means 'a white [substance].' Therefore, it is also natural that all other commentators took the interpretation which is different from that of the *Vṛtti*. Cf. II. 1.

10 See II. 1.

11 See II. 1 which investigated the *Saṅkhyā-nirūpaṇa*.

Praśastapāda's argument on the process of the production of the cognition 'These are two substances' is summarized as follows (see figure 3):

First of all, a visual sense organ comes in contact with two substances. Then, the cognition of oneness which inheres in the number one, a quality, is produced. By this cognition is produced



(Figure 3)

the cognition of two number ones, which produces the number two, a quality. Then is produced the cognition of twoness, which produces the cognition of the number two. By this cognition is produced the cognition 'These are two substances,' which produces the impression.

Now, Praśastapāda enumerates the cause of the cognition of two number ones, the cognition of the number two and the cognition of two substances. They are as follows:

The causes of the cognition of two number ones: (1) oneness. (2) the relation [between oneness and the number one]. (3) the cognition [of oneness].

The causes of the cognition of the number two: (1) twoness. (2) the relation [between twoness and the number two]. (3) the cognition [of twoness].

The causes of the cognition of two substances: (1) the number two. (2) the relation [between the numer two and two substances]. (3) the cognition [of the number two].

These three cognitions are the cognition of the qualified. They each have the following three causes (causal triad):

(1) the qualifier.

(2) the relation between the qualifier and the qualificand.

(3) the cognition of the qualifier.

This is clear from Praśastapāda's own words as well:

"Because, as the cognition of the qualificand (strictly speaking, the qualified)[12] has similarity (*sārūpya*) [with the

12 The Navyanaiyāyikas would write '*viśiṣṭajñāna*' without exception. Commentators mixed both notations partially because they could not help using the term '*viśeṣyajñāna*' as they made commentaries on the very *Praśastapādabhāṣya*. The *Nyāyakośa* defines *viśiṣṭajñāna* as '*viśeṣaṇavad-viśeṣyajñāna*.'

qualifier], it cannot exist without the relation with the qualifier."[13]

It is clear that such an idea originates in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* because he quotes *sūtra* 8. 9 in order to support his idea. Besides, causes precede effects without exception for the Vaiśeṣikas. The 'causal triad' (1), (2) and (3) precede the cognition of the qualified. In other words, the cognition of the qualifier precedes that of the qualified. In reality. Praśastapāda utilizes fully the idea of 'two types of perceptions which are postulated logically.'

3. Praśastapāda's usages of the term 'ālocana'

Then, what is *svarūpālocanamātra* which Prof. Hattori interpreted as the first stage in the psychological process of the production of perception ? He translated this term as 'simple presentation of [the object] itself.' As for T–1, he translated it as 'simple presentation of a substance itself' because the cognized (perceived) is a substance (*dravye ... svarūpālocanamātra*)[14]. In short, he translated '*svarūpa*' as 'itself' (self-reflective pronoun). This interpretation, however, is doubtful.

Here we shall examine Praśastapada's usage of the term '*ālocana*'.

[I] *ālocanajñāna* in *Saṅkhyā-nirūpaṇa*

In *Saṅkhyā-nirūpaṇa* Praśastapāda states the following:

[It is] not [right]. Because it is [only] the cognition of a set (*samūhajñāna*) that [can be] the cause of impression. [Namely,] it is only the cognition of a set, not *ālocanajñāna*, that [can be] the cause of impression."[15]

This is Praśastapāda's reply to an opponent who argues that the cognition 'These are two substances' would not be produced if

13 *na hi viśeṣyajñānaṃ sārūpyād viśeṣaṇasambandham antareṇa bhavitum arhati.* As for interpretations by commentators, see II. 1.

14 M. Hattori, *op. cit.*

15 *na, samūhajñānasya saṃskārahetutvāt. samūhajñānam eva saṃskārakāraṇaṃ nālocanajñānam.*

the cognition as efficient cause[16], namely, the cognition of two number ones, produced the impression[17]. The intention of this argument is as follows.

Generally speaking, two cognitions do not coexist. Only, 'do not coexist' here does not mean that they do not coexist for even a moment (*sahānavasthāna*), but that, while a new cognition destroys an old one, they coexist for one moment only. They are in the relation between 'a to-be-killed and a killer' (*vadhyaghātaka*)[18]. Only such an assumption allows for the explanation of the production of the cognition 'These are two substances.' But one problem still remains.

If the cognition of two number ones (*ek. g. jñ.*, see figure 3) produces the impression, it should be destroyed two moments after its own production, when the cognition of twoness (*d. s. jñ.*) is produced. Now, since an impression is also one kind of cognition, the cognition of two number ones and the impression should be in the relation of 'a to-be-killed and a killer,' when the number two (*d. g.*) is produced. Then, the number two which was produced by the cognition of two number ones (*ek. g. jñ.*) would be destroyed by the destruction of the cognition of two number ones, when the cognition of the number two (*d. g. jñ.*) is produced. If so, one moment before the cognition 'These are two substances' (*dr. jñ.*) is to be produced, its

16 As for this translation, see II. 2.

17 "[Objection :] Even if [you] assert that [two cognitions are] in relation between a to-be-killed and a killer, the same fault [should be followed].

[Complement by Praśastapāda :] Intention [of the objection] should be as follows : Even if [you] assert that [two cognitions are] in relation between a to-be-killed and a killer, the fault of non-production of the cognition of substance should be followed. Why? Because the cognition as efficient cause should be destroyed by [the production of] the impression at the moment when the cognition of twoness is produced," *vadhyaghātakapakṣe 'pi samāno doṣa it cet, syān matam — nanu vadhyaghātakapakṣe 'pi tarhi dravyajñānānutpattiprasaṅgaḥ. katham? ditvasāmānyabuddhisamakālaṃ saṃskārād apekṣābuddhivināśād iti.*

18 See II. 1.

qualifier, namely, the number two, and the relation between the qualifier and the qualificand would not exist. Then, since two components of the 'causal triad' do not exist, the cognition 'They are two substances' would never be produced. This absurd consequence is due to the presupposition that the cognition of two number ones produces an impression. For just this reason Praśastapāda declares that the cognition of two number ones does not produce an impression, that *ālocanajñāna* does not produce an impression, and that it is only the cognition of a set that produces it.

Now, the *samūhajñāna* denotes here the cognition 'These are two substances.' In reality, it is only this cognition that produces an impression. Here it becomes clear that the cognition of (i) oneness (*ek. s. jñ.*), (ii) two number ones (*ek. g. jñ.*), (iii) twoness (*d. s. jñ.*) and (iv) the number two (*d. g. jñ.*) are all *ālocanajñānas*. Among them, (i) and (iii) are not preceded by any cognition, and produce (ii) and (iv) respectively. Therefore, they can be said to be 'pure' cognition of the qualifier. Besides, although (iv) is the cognition of the qualified which is produced by (iii), it is at the same time the cognition of the qualifier which produces the cognition 'They are two substances.' Therefore, it can be said that three cognitions (i), (iii), (iv) are the cognitions which lead to the final cognition which produces an impression. The final cognition is the cognition of a set, or a verbalizable cognition, or a definite cognition (*vyavasāya*)[19].

Only cognition (ii) is problematic. This cognition produces the number two, but produces no cognition. Although it is the

19 The term '*vyavasāya*' is used in *Nyāyasūtra* 1. 1. 4 in the form of '*vyavasāyātmakam*', which Vācaspatimiśra interpreted as *savikalpakajñāna* (almost the same as *viśiṣṭajñāna*). The later Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas formulated it as follows : In the first, contact of a sense organ with an object. Next, the *viśeṣaṇajñāna* called '*nirvikalpakajñāna*.' Next, the *viśiṣṭajñāna* or the *savikalpakajñāna* called '*vyavasāya*,' for example, the cognition of 'This is silver' (*idaṃ rajatam iti jñānam*). Next, the consciousness of the cognizer being its subject called '*anuvyavasāya*,' for example, 'I cognize it as silver' (*idaṃ rajatatvena jānāmi*).

cognition of the qualified and seems to be the final cognition, it does not produce an impression. In reality, we cannot imagine an impression such as 'That was the number one and that was another number one.' Besides, if it was a definite cognition, an additional definite cognition (*anuvyavasāya*, self-consciousness) with the form 'I know this and that as the number one respectively' (*idam idaṃ caikatvatvena jānāmi*) should be produced afterwards. But such an odd cognition is never produced. In this way, the cognition of two number ones is destroyed without producing an impression. Therefore, it is impossible for cognition (ii) to be included in the group of *savikalpakajñāna*. For just this reason, it is called the '*ālocanajñāna.*'

Thus, '*ālocanajñāna*' is a direct cognition which leads to the final cognition, and is, with the exception of the cognition of two number ones, namely, *apekṣābuddhi*, the cognition of the qualfier.

[II] *ālocanamātra* in *Anadhyavasāya-nirūpaṇa*

Praśastapāda defines the non-determinate cognition (*anadhyavasāya*) as the *ālocanamātra* with the form 'What is this ?'

> "To a Vāhīka, for example, is produced a non-determinate cognition of a *panasa* tree etc."[20]

To a man such as a Vāhīka the determinate cognition 'This is a *panasa* tree' is not produced. But it is neither the case that the content of his cognition is totally obscure, nor the case that he is only seeing the *panasa* tree 'itself.'

Praśastapāda continues :

> "As to it (a *panasa* tree), [after the *ālocanamātra* is produced,] a determinate cognition assisted by [such qualifiers as] the highest universal (*sattā*), substanceness, earthness, treeness, the state of having colours etc. and branches etc. is produced. Moreover there is certainly directly cognized even the *panasa*-tree-ness (*panasatva*) which is accompanied by [every] *panasa* tree and utterly excluded from mango trees etc. Merely, [he] does not know its particular name because [the has] never been taught [that it is called 'a *panasa* tree']."[21]

20 *yathā vāhikasya panasādiṣv anadhyavasāyo bhavati.*

The *ālocanamātra* here grasps the qualifier which exists in the *panasa* tree. Therefore, the *ālocanamātra* produces the determinate cognition, or the cognition of the qualified 'This is *sat*,' 'This has branches' etc. It grasps even the *panasa*-tree-ness. But, because a Vāhīka does not know the name '*panasa* tree' it does not produce the deteminate cognition 'This is a *panasa* tree.' This *ālocanamātra* — the cognition of the qualifier which grasps the qualifier, namely, *panasa*-tree-ness — is certain to produce the cognition of the qualified if he knows its name. That is to say, the *ālocanamātra*, which is a non-determinate cognition, is the cognition of the qualifier which does not produce the final cognition of the qualified. In this respect it is similar to *apekṣābuddhi*, though *apekṣābuddhi* can be called 'the cognition of the qualified.'

[III] *ālocana* in *Pratyakṣa-nirūpaṇa*

It is said in T–1 that the first direct cognition — *svarūpālocanamātra* — is produeed by contact of the four (soul, mind, a sense organ and an object). But it is said in T–2 that the direct cognition of substance is produced only by contact of mind with soul. Contact of a sense organ with an object has already taken place when *svarūpālocanamātra* is produced. The direct cognition in T–2 is produced by this very *svarūpālocanamātra*[22]. In other words, soul and mind come in contact after *svarūpālocanamātra* has already taken place. On the other hand, this contact is considered to be assisted by qualifiers such as universals, particulars, substances, qualities and actions. The expression 'A is B–*apekṣa*,' in the Vaiṣesika context, generally indi-

21 *tatra sattādravyatvapṛthivītvavṛkṣatvarūpavattvādiśākhādyapekṣo 'dhyavasāyo bhavati. panasatvam api panaseṣv anuvṛttam āmrādibhyo vyāvṛttam pratyakṣam eva. kevalaṃ tūpadeśābhāvād viśeṣasañjñāpratītir na bhavati.*

22 This means that *svarūpālocanamātra* here is the instrument of cognition (*pramāṇa*).

...13

cates that B is the efficient cause of A[23]. Then, it comes to be that the qualifier, or a universal etc., is the efficient cause of the contact of mind with soul. Its being a cause means that it precedes their contact, or that it is somehow responsible for their contact.

Then, how can the qualifier be responsible for their contact ? Neither Praśastapāda nor the commentators explain this directly. But, taking the theory of the 'causal tried' expounded by Praśastapāda himself into consideration, we can assume that the qualifier here is responsible for their contact through the 'causal triad' — (1) the qualifier, (2) the relation between the qualifier and the qualificand and (3) the cognition of the qualifier — and that it is also responsible for the cognition of the qualified which is produced by the contact of mind with soul. This *svarūpālocanamātra* in T-1 is nothing but the cognition of the qualifier. This is because, while many cognitions can be the cause of the cognition 'This is a cow,' the most direct cause is the cognition of the cowness[24].

The term '*svarūpālocanamātra*' appears again in T-3, it is mentioned there that instrument of cognition (*pramāṇa*), in cases where the cognition of substance etc. is the result (*pramiti*), is the direct cognition named *svarūpālocanamātra*. This direct cognition named *svarūpālocanamātra* is a direct cognition of universals and particulars. The universals which are mentioned here is the highest universal (*sattā*), and the particulars are substanceness, qualitiness, actionness, earthness, cowness etc. These are the qualifiers of the existent (*sat*), of substances, of qualities, of actions, of earth, of cows etc. respectively. Therefore, T-3 can be understood to expound that the *svarūpālocanamātra* which is the cognition of the qualifier produces a cognition of the qualified such as 'This is a cow.' This corresponds exactly to *Vaiśeṣikaśūtra* 8. 6.

It is mentioned in T-4 that, in cases where the cognition of universals and particulars is the result, the direct cognition which is an 'unseparated' (*avibhakta*) *ālocanamātra* is the instrument of cognition. There is no qualifier of universals and particulars here. It is the axiom of the Vaiśeṣikas that universals and particulars do not inhere in universals and particulars. It is possible to assume, for example, substancenessness (*dravyatvatva*), but it is not a qualifier, but a mere individual attribute (*upādhi*)[25]. Therefore, we cannot consider that the cognition of the qualifier is the cause of the cognition of universals and particulars. In short, the *ālocanamātra* mentioned here which produces the cognition of universals and particulars is not a cognition at all. Then, what is the cause of this cognition which itself is not a cognition ? This question leads to the conclusion that the *ālocanamātra* here is the contact of the four[26]. Besides, this contact is said to be 'unseparated.' Then, from what is it unseparated ? The commentaries interpret that 'unseparated' means 'not assisted by any cognition.'[27] This interpretation is quite natural. The contact here is not produced by any cognition. In other words, it is not separated from any cognition.

The contact which is not assisted by any cognition is mentioned in T-4. The contact mentioned in T-2 is assisted by the qualiffer, and is, therefore, assisted by the *svarūpālocanamātra*

23 Cf. my forthcoming paper : "The Early Vaiśeṣikas on *asamavāyikāraṇa* and the term '*apekṣ-*'" *Imanishi Junkichi Hakase Kanrekikinen Roushū* (The Jubilee Volume to Dr. J. Imanishi's sixteenth Birthday), Tokyo : Shunju-sha, 1996.

24 There are more complicated cases. For example, although (1) the cognition of 'This is a man with a stick' (*ayaṃ daṇḍīti jñānam*) is preceded by (2) the cognition of stickness and (3) the cognition of the stick, the direct cause is (3) only, and (2) is the cause of (3).

25 For example, unless *viśeṣaṇa* stops at the level of *gotva*, there should be assumed infinite *viśeṣaṇa*-s as *gotvatva*, *gotvatvatva* etc., and also infinite cognitions as *gotvatvajñāna*, *gotvatvatvajñāna* etc.

26 For example, Śrīdhara interprets it as follows : *ālocyate 'nenety ālocanam indriyārthasannikarṣas tanmātram*. Here, *indriyārthasannikarṣa* is not other than *ātmendriyamano 'rthasannikarṣa*. *Nyāyasūtra* 1. 1. 4 also omits soul and mind.

27 The term '*avibhakta*' is interpreted by commentaries as follows : *viśeṣaṇajñānaśūnyam* (*Vyomavatī*); *kevalaṃ jñānānapekṣam iti yāvat* (*Nyāyakandalī*); *jñānāviśiṣṭaṃ śuddham iti yāvat* (*Kiraṇāvalī* — '*jñānaviśiṣṭam*' in GOS version is clearly a mistake).

which is the cognition of the qualifier. Here we come to the following conclusion.

(1) The cognition as *svarūpālocanamātra* in T–1 cannot be a verbalizable cognition. It is not preceded by any cognition of the qualifier.

(2) The cognition of universals and particulars in T–4 cannot be the cognition of the qualified. Because there is no qualifier of universals and particulars.

Eventually, T–4 corresponds exactly to *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 8. 5.

4. 'Svarūpa' and 'mātra' in the compound 'svarūpālocanamātra'

As is clear from the above investigation, *svarūpālocanamātra* in T–1 is the cognition of the qualifier which is, according to T–2, the cognition of the highest universal, substanceness, earthness, horns, white colour, cowness, walk etc, *Svarūpālocanamātra* in T–3 is the cognition of the qualifier — the highest universal, substanceness, qualitiness, actionness etc. In these cases *svarūpālocanamātra* is the cognition of the qualifier, but is not the cognition of such a strange and mysterious thing as something 'itself.' It can, therefore, be concluded that the term '*svarūpa*' means the qualifier[28]. *Svarūpa* of 'this,' for example, in the cognition 'This is a cow' is cowness — the qualifier of the qualificand, or 'this.' And again, *svarūpa* of 'this,' for example, in the cognition 'This has horns' is horns — the qualfier of the qualificand, or 'this.'

The term '*svarūpa*' is not compounded with the terms which appear in *Saṅkhyā-nirūpaṇa*, *Anadhyavasāya-nirūpaṇa* and T–4. *Ālocanajñāna* in *Saṅkhyā-nirūpaṇa* and *ālocanamātra* in *Anadhyavasāya-nirūpaṇa* are cognitions which do not need the term '*svarūpa.*' Because, while they are surely cognitions of the qualifier, they stop part way without producing the final cognition of the

28 Śrīdhara interprets the term '*sārūpya*' (similarity) in the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* (see note 13) as follows : "The qualifier is *svarūpa* of the qualificand, dyes the qualificand, and is the cause which lets us cognize that it is attached to the qualificand." *viśeṣaṇaṃ viśeṣyasya svarūpaṃ viśeṣyānurañjakaṃ viśeṣye svopasarjanatāpratītihetur iti yāvat.*

qualified. Therefore, Praśastapāda avoided attaching the term '*svarūpa*' (=*viśeṣaṇa*) to them. It is quite natural that the term '*ālocanamātra*' in T–4 lacks the term '*svarūpa.*' For it is not a cognition, but contact, which has nothing to do with '*svarūpa*' or *viśeṣaṇa*.

Consequently, the meaning of the term '*mātra*' becomes clear too. [*Svarūpa-*] *ālocanamātra* is not the final cognition, but is the cognition which produces it. The term '*mātra*' means that [*svarūpa-*] *ālocana* is not the final cognition, but that it is *merely* part way to the final cognition. The term '*ālocanajñāna*' lacks the term '*mātra*' because, although it stops part way without producing the final cognition, it is by itself the final cognition. The series of cognitions is broken by the production of the number two[29]. That is to say, *ālocanajñāna*, namely, *apekṣābuddhi*, is the final cognition in the first half of the series of cognitions. On the other hand, *ālocanamātra*, namely, *andahyavasāya*, contains the term '*mātra*' because, though it can produce the final cognition, it stops part way because of various reasons such as ignorance of the name of the object.

5. Conclusion

Praśastapāda's theory of direct cognition is based on the theory of the relation between *viśeṣaṇa*, *viśeṣya*, *viśiṣṭa*, *viśeṣaṇajñāna* and *viśiṣṭajñāna*, though he does not use these terms. He followed *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 8. 5–9 very faithfully. This is not shaken by the fact that he used the term '*ālocana*' which does not appear in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*. It is certain that the term '*ālocana*' has a somewhat psychological sense. But he used it from a thoroughly logical point of view. Thus, it is impossible for us to agree with Prof. Hattori's assumption that there are two types of *nirvikalpakajñāna*, psychological and logical.

Therfore, we cannot locate Praśastapāda after Dignāga at least from the reason that the former used the term '*ālocana*,' though we are able to do so from many other reasons.

29 See figure 3.

CHAPTER I

A NOTE ON ĀRAMBHAVĀDA

Madhusūdanasarasvatī mentions the following in the last part of his *Prasthānabheda* :

> " In short, there are only three ways in all [the systems of philosophy]. Among them the first way is *ārambhavāda*, the second one is the theory of emanation (*pariṇāmavāda*), and the third one is the theory of metamorphosis (*vivarta-vāda*). According to the first way, [it is explained that] four kinds of atoms of earth, water, fire and air do *ā-rabh-* diads to the cosmos one after another, [and that] an effect which exists nowhere [in a cause] is produced by the function of the cause. This is a theory of the Logicians and the Mīmāṃsakas. According to the second way.... "[1]

The term ' the Logicians ' here, of course, means the Naiyayikas and the Vaiśeṣikas. It is particularly the latter who devised this theory. And it seems to be quite clear what they intended to mean by the term ' *ā-rabh-* ' and its derivatives like ' *ārambha*, ' ' *ārambhaka* ' etc. Its meaning is conveyed, for example, in V. Varadachari's translation, namely, ' effect arises anew. '[2] And we can easily understand its meaning (as far as the classical Sanskrit term is concerned) by consulting some reliable Sanskrit dictionaries.

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1 *sarveṣām ca saṅkṣepeṇa trividha eva prasthānabhedaḥ. tatrārambhavāda ekaḥ, pariṇāmavādo dvitīyaḥ, vivaratavādas tṛtīyaḥ. pārthivāpyataijasavāyavīyāś caturvidhāḥ paramāṇavo dvyaṇukādikrameṇa brahmāṇḍaparyantaṃ jagad ārabhante. asad eva kāryaṃ kāraṇavyāpārād utpadyata iti prathamas tārkikānāṃ mīmāṃsakānāñ ca....iti dvitīyaḥ pakṣaḥ....*

2 Karl H. Potter ed., *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II. Nyāya Vaiśeṣika.* Delhi, Varanasi, Patna : Motilal Banarsidass, p. 443, *ll.* 14-15.

But, in reality, many scholars following H. Ui[3] have been using the term 'aggregation' and the like to translate the term '*ārambha.*' The meaning 'aggregation' might be derivable from the term '*ārambha*' in the context of atomism. But it is certain that 'aggregation' does not convey the entire meaning of the term '*ārambha*' as it is technically used by the Vaiśeṣikas. To interpret '*ārambha*' as 'aggregation' and the like results in misunderstanding what the Vaiśeṣikas really wanted to convey by the term '*ārambha.*' Consequently, it will be important for us to examine how the term is used by the Vaiśeṣikas.

1. Śaṅkara's criticism against the Vaiśeṣikas

By only considering the use of the term '*ārambha*' in the *Prasthānabheda* it seems to be a technical term which explains the theory of atomism. This theory maintains that two atoms produce one diad by their 'aggregation.' and then that three diads produce one triad by their 'aggregation' and then that various combination of triads produces the cosmos by their 'aggregation.' Such a conception is, of course, based upon a reason. Here, we shall first of all investigate why Madhusūdanasarasvatī described *ārambhavāda* in this way.

Madhusūdanasarasvatī is an Advaitin scholar. Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* is probably the oldest Vedāntic text to have quoted the Vaiśeṣika theory on atomism by using the term '*ārambha*' and to have tried to refute it. Śaṅkara, interpreting *Brahmasūtra* 2. 2. 11–18, tries to refute the Vaiśeṣika assertion that atoms are the cause [of the world]. Śaṅkara, immediately before interpreting *Brahmasūtra* 2. 2. 11, introduces the Vaiśeṣika criticism of the Vedāntins as follows :

> " A quality which is inherent in substances as the causes does *ā–rabh–* another homogeneous quality in a substance

3 H. Ui, ed. by F. W. Thomas, *The Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, according to the Daśapadārthaśāstra, Chinese Text with Introduction, Translation and Notes:* Varanasi: The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1962, p. 143 and so on.

> as the effect. Because, while it is seen that a piece of white cloth is produced by white threads, the contrary is not seen. Therefore, if it is admitted that intellectual *brahman* is the cause of the world, it should be that intellectuality (*caitanya*) inheres as well in the world as its effect. But, as such a matter is not seen, intellectual *brahman* cannot be the cause of the world. "[4]

Śaṅkara says, *Brahmasūtra* 2. 2. 11 intends to point out the fault in the Vaiśeṣika theory by appealing to the Vaiśeṣika argument quoted above. *Brahmasūtra* 2. 2. 11 is as follows :

> " As the long and the large [are produced] by the short and the smallest [respectively, so is produced the world from *brahman*]. "[5]

Its intention is, according to Śaṅkara, as follows (a summary) :

> The Vaiśeṣikas enumerate dimension as one of the qualities. Dimension is, first of all, divided into four kinds—largeness, smallness, longness and shortness. And largeness is subdivided into two kinds—the largest size and ordinary largeness. The former inheres in ether, space, time and soul, and the latter in those which are larger than diads. And smallness is subdivided into two kinds — ordinary smallness and the smallest size.[6] The former inheres in diads, and the latter in four kinds of atoms and in mind. Then, here arises absurdity. Because, when a diad is produced by two atoms, the smallest size which is the quality inherent in an atom as the cause does *ā–rabh–* another kind of quality, or smallness, in a diad as its effect. And also

4 *kāraṇadravyasamavāyino guṇāḥ kāryadravye samānajātīyaṃ guṇāntaraṃ ārabhante, śuklebhyas tantubhyaḥ śuklasya paṭasya prasavadarśanāt tadviparyayādarsanāc ca. tasmāc cetanasya brahmaṇo jagatkāraṇatve 'py upagamyamāne karye 'pi jagati caitanyaṃ samaveyāt. tadadarśanāt tu na cetanaṃ brahma jagatkāraṇaṃ bhavitum arhatiti.*

5 *mahaddīrghavad vā hrasvaparimaṇḍalābhyām.*

6 Cf. *Parimāṇa-nirūpaṇa* of the *Praśastapādabhāṣya.*

because, when a triad is produced by three diads, smallness does *ā-rabh-* another kind of quality, or largeness.[7] Therefore, even if the non-intellectual world should be produced by intellectual *brahman*, the Vaiśeṣikas are unable to refute it.

Hereafter, he tries to demonstrate in various ways that the assumption that atoms exist is itself absurd. Here he also utilizes such terms as '*ā-rabh-*' and the like many times. It is probably Śaṅkara's way of arguing against the Vaiśeṣika atomism that made Madhusūdanasarasvatī conceive *ārambhavāda* as if it were atomism itself.

2. The usage of the term 'ā-rabh-' etc. in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra

The following *sūtras* are found in the first chapter of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra.*

"Substances do *ā-rabh-* another substance." *dravyāṇi dravyāntaram ārabhante.* (1.1.8)

"And qualities [do *ā-rabh-*] another quality." *guṇāś ca guṇāntaram.*[8] (1.1.9)

7 There are seen various opinions of the Vaiśeṣikas on the process of the production of diad and triad from atoms. Cf. M. Ishitobi, "Vaiśeṣika Gakuha ni okeru Genshiron" (The Vaiśeṣikas on atomism), *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies), Vol. 31 No. 1 1982.

8 *Vyākhyā* reads : *guṇāś ca.* It interprets as follows : "[The words of this *sūtra*] are connected with 'do *ā-rabh-* another quality.' The word 'and' (*ca*) is possible to be interpreted in two ways. In one way [it is interpreted as] 'it is not that only substances do *ā-rabh-* another substance, but that qualities also [do *ā-rabh-* a substance] because connection, cognition of the Lord etc. which do *ā-rabh-* a substance produce such substances as a piece of cloth etc.' In another way [it is interpreted as] 'qualities [do *ā-rabh-*] another quality.'" *guṇāntaram ārabhanta ity anuṣaṅgaḥ. cakārasya dvau vilāsaviṣayau. tatraikaḥ—na kevalaṃ dravyāṇi dravyāntaram ārabhante, kim tu guṇā api, dravyārambhakasaṃyogeśvarajñānādīnāṃ paṭādidravyajanakatvād iti. anyas tu guṇās tu guṇāntaraṃ ceti.*

"There is no action which is to be established by [another] actions." *karma karmasādhyaṃ na vidyate.* (1.1.10)

The *Vṛtti* interprets *sūtra* 1.1.8 as follows :

"Because ['substances'] can be divided into 'two substances and three or more substances,' one [substance] cannot be *ārambhaka* of [another substance]. Substances as material causes do *ā-rabh-* a substance as their effect which is different from themselves. But such substances as ether etc.[9]—ultimate wholes—do not *ā-rabh-* [another substance]. Because [only] those causes which have form, action, colour etc., are of the same kind, and are two or three or more [substances] are *ārambhakas* of their effect. But ether etc. are not like them. Mind is not a cause of a substance because it has no touch.[10] And substances as ultimate wholes are not the causes of a substance because they are not visible."[11]

We will be aware from the above explanation that only four kinds of substances—earth, water, fire and air—are able to do *ā-rabh-* another substance, and that five kinds of substances—ether, space, time, soul and mind—are not so. Fundamentals of the former four are atoms. Thus, as far as substances are concerned, the terms '*ā-rabh-*' etc. seem to be related only to atomism.

But it is to be noted that the *Vṛtti* paraphrases the word 'another' as 'their effect which is different from themselves.' The *Vyākhyā* calrifies this point very well. It says :

9 Ether, space, time and soul are singular, cannot be divided and have the largest size. As for singurality or unity of soul, see I. 1.

10 Mind has the smallest size like atoms. And it is only earth, water, fire and air that have touch.

11 *dravye ca dravyāṇi ceti vigarahād ekam anārambhakam. samavāyikāraṇāni dravyāṇi svātmavyatiriktaṃ kāryadravyam ārabhante. ākāśādyantyāvayavidravyāṇi tu dravyaṃ nārabhante, tulyajātīyānāṃ mūrtikriyārūpādimatāṃ dvayor bahūnāṃ vā kāraṇānāṃ kāryārambhakatvāt. na caivaṃvidhāny ākāśādīni. manaso 'sparśatvād dravyākāraṇatvam antyāvayavidravyāṇāṃ cādṛṣṭatvāt.*

"The word 'another' is put here to make us realize that a substance as *ārabhya* is different from substances as *ārambhaka*. For the Sāṅkhyas conceive that effects are not different from causes. They present the following syllogism.

[Statement] A piece of cloth is not different from threads.

[Reason] Because of [their] being the causes of a piece of cloth.

[Illustration] Anything which is different from a piece of cloth is not the cause of a piece of cloth, like a pot.

But [this is] not right. Because there is deviation to a weaver who is determinately different from a piece of cloth. [According to their syllogism, a weaver ought not to be different from a piece of cloth.] Besides, [even if the 'reason' of their syllogism should be replaced by] 'because of [their] being material causes,' [this would] not be [possible to be] 'a reason.' Because it is not established for others (the Sāṅkhyas) that a thread is a material cause. And because it is not established for us that [threads] emanate in the form of it (a piece of cloth.) Besides, because colour etc. which both admit in common are not mentioned. It is an object of direct cognition and of inference that *ārabhya* is different from *ārambhaka*.

[Firest syllogism:]

[Statement] This thread is different from this piece of cloth.

[Reason] Because of [its] being a thread.

[Illustration] Like another thread.

[Second syllogism:]

[Statement] This piece of cloth is different from this thread.

[Reason] Because of [its] being a piece of cloth.

[Illustration] Like another piece of cloth."[12]

In short, when the Vaiseṣikas use the term '*ā-rabh-*' and the like, they are always conscious of the theory of emanation, or the theory of effects being existent in their causes (*satkāryavāda*) of the Sāṅkhyas. According to the latter theory all effects pre-exist latently in their causes, in other words, effects and their causes are essentially the same. On the contrary, the Vaiśeṣikas assert the theory that effects do not exist in their causes and have never existed in their causes (*asatkāryavāda*). Although the Vaiśeṣikas could not help assuming 'potentiality (*śakti*) of cause' or 'nature (*svabhāva*) of a thing,'[13] they insisted that effects and their causes are utterly different.

Let's return to the passage of the *Prasthānabheda* quoted in the beginning of this chapter. Immediately after the description which apparently points out that *ārambhavāda* is nothing but another name for atomism, the sentence 'an effect which exists nowhere [in a cause] is produced by the function of a cause' is added. This implies the theory that effects do not exist in their causes. In short, *ārambhavāda* is nothing but another name for this theory.

In general, the term '*ā-rabh-*' as in classical Sanskrit means 'to begin,' 'to undertake,' 'to newly produce' etc.

For example, adjectives such as *ārabdhavyāpāraka* or *anārabdhavyāpāraka* are used to modify the word 'deed'.[14] A deed

12 *ārabhyārambhakadravyayor bhedapratipattyaratham antarapadam. sāṅkhyā hi kāryakāraṇayor abhedam icchanti. pramāṇayanti ca tantavaḥ paṭān na bhidyante, paṭakāraṇatvāt, yad paṭād bhidyate na tat paṭakāraṇam yathā ghaṭa iti. tan na, paṭād bhinnatvena niścite kuvindādau vyabhicārāt. na ca paṭopādānatvaṃ hetuḥ tatsamavāyitvasya tantau parasyāsiddheḥ, tadākārapariṇāmitvasyāsmākam asiddheḥ, tadubhayānugatasādhāraṇarūpānirūpaṇāc ca. ārabhyārambhakayor bhedaḥ pratyakṣānumānaviṣayaḥ. ayaṃ tantuḥ etasmāt paṭād bhidyate, tantutvāt, tantvantaravat. ayaṃ paṭa etasmāt tantor bhidyate, paṭatvāt, paṭāntaravad iti.*

]3 See the next chapter.

14 For example, the *Maṇikaṇa* p. 60,

as *ārabdhavyāpāraka* means 'a deed which has already begun to function to produce its effect,' and a deed as *anārabdhavyāpāraka* means 'a deed which has not yet begun to function to produce its effect.' The former is not able to be destroyed by any means until it finishes producing its effect. It is destroyed only by its being enjoyed. The latter is destroyed by the apprehension of truth. A man is said to have attained final release when he has destroyed all deeds as *anārabdhavyāpāraka* by the apprehension of truth. Such final release is called 'final release attained by one who is still alive' (*jīvanmukti*). And this person attains the perfect final release when he has finished enjoying all of the effects of deeds which are *ārabdhavyāpāraka*, namely, when he dies. Such a perfect final release is called 'final release of one who is void of any body' (*videhamukti*).[15]

The term '*ā-rabh-*' from which '*ārabdha*' is derived cannot, in this case, mean 'to (make) aggregate,' but must mean 'newly to produce' or 'to produce anew,' which in the Vaiśeṣika context can be paraphrased as 'newly to produce one which has never existed in its cause.' This makes it clearer that *ārambhavāda* is nothing but another name for *asatkāryavāda*.

3. The usage in the Praśastapādabhāṣya

The following phrases are found in *Guṇagranthe sādharmyavaidharmya-nirūpaṇa* of the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* :

> "Colour, taste, smell, non-hot touch, sound, dimension, the number one, separateness of one substance and moisture are *ārambhakas* of those of the same kind.
>
> And pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and internal effort are *ārambhakas* of those of the different kind.
>
> Connection, separation, number, weight, fluidity, hot touch, cognition, merit, demerit and impression are *ārambhakas* of those of the same kind and of the different kind.

15 *Jīvanmukti* and *videhamukti* correspond to Buddhist *sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇa* and *nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa* (or *parinirvāṇa*) respectively.

> Cognition, pleasure, pain, aversion, mental impression and sound are *ārambhakas* of those which inhere in their substrata.
>
> Colour, taste, smell, touch, dimension, moisture and internal effort are *ārambhakas* [of those which inhere] in [things] other [than their substrata].
>
> But connection, separation, number, separateness of one (substance), weight, fluidity, velocity, merit and demerit are *ārambhakas* [of those which inhere] in both [their substrata and things other than their substrata]."[16]

These phrases are derived from the ideas in *Vaiśeṣikhasūtra* 1. 1. 9. We can determine that some *ārambhakas* are related to atomism while others are not. A phrase such as 'the colour of a cause (substance) is the *ārambhaka* of the colour of its effect' is possible to be interpreted as a part of the theory of atomism. But a phrase such as 'cognition is the *ārambhaka* of cognition,' 'merit is the *ārambhaka* of pleasure while demerit is that of pain' etc. can never be interpreted in this way.

4. Conclusion

Those phrases where the term '*ā-rabh-*' and its derivatives are used are not necessarily related to atomism. Only, in the case 'substances do *ā-rabh-* a substance' is it possible for the term '*ā-rabh-*' to be used in the framework of atomism. For the 'substances' mentioned here are limited to earth, water, fire or air whose fundamental units are atoms. Besides, in this case plural (not singular) substances 'aggregate' and produce some sub-

16 *rūparasagandhānuṣṇasparśaśabdaparimāṇaikatvaikapṛthaktvasnehāḥ samānajātyārambhakāḥ. sukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnāś cāsamānajātyārambhakāḥ. saṃyogavibhāgasaṅkhyāgurutvadravatvoṣṇasparśajñānadharmādharmasaṃskārāḥ samānāsamānajātyārambhakāḥ. buddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣabhāvanāśabdāḥ svāśrayasamavetārambhakāḥ. rūpārasagandhasparśaparimāṇasnehaprayatnāḥ paratrārambhakāḥ. saṃyogavibhāgasaṅkhyaikapṛthaktvagurutvadravatvavegadharmādharmās tūbhayatrārambhakāḥ.*

...15

stance. It might be because of this special case that there arose the understanding as that *ārambhavada* is another name for atomism and, therefore, could be tanslated as 'the theory of aggregation' etc.

It is clear from our short examination that such an understandng is not correct. Strictly speaking, *ārambhavāda* is another name for *asatkāryavāda*, not for atomism. Therefore, *ārambhavāda* should be translated as 'the theory of new production.'

CHAPTER 2

POTENTIALITY (ŚAKTI) OF CAUSE IN ASATKĀRYAVĀDA

In Indian philosophies the world is said to be beginningless and endless. To know precisely how the world or an individual in the world came to be as it is was considered, in India, to be nothing other than knowledge of the truth which leads to final release. The most important function of Indian theories of causality is to systematically clarify the way the world or an individual in the world came to be as it is[1]. Logic is said to be the language of philosophy. Analogically speaking, theories of causality are the languages of ontology. We can also say that theories of causality in India are different from those theories in the West which have been argued about in the context of theistic dialectics or have been linked with criticism of human ability for understanding.

Indian theories of causality are divided into two kinds. One is *satkāryavāda* which asserts that effects pre-exist latently in their causes. The other is *asatkāryavāda* which denies this. In the context of the production and destruction of the world, the former is given the name 'the theory of emanation' (*pariṇāmavāda*) and the latter 'the theory of new production' (*ārambhavāda*). The *Prasthānabheda* of Madhusūdanasarasvatī sketches the theory of new production as follows :

> "[It asserts that] four kinds of atoms, earth, water, fire and air newly produce diads upto the cosmos one after

1 Only, there were also those who asserted that the world is a procuct of chance (*animitta, yadṛccha* etc.). Cf. *Nyāyasūtra* 4. 1.22; *Yuktidīpikā* on *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 15; etc.

another, [and that] an effect which exists nowhere [in a cause] is produced by the function of the cause. "[2]

He sketches the theory of emanation as follows :

> " [It asserts that] the very main principle composed of [three] subordinate components, namely, purity, activity and darkness emanates successively as the large, the self-consciousness upto the forma of the world, [and that] an effect which existed in advance in a subtle forma emerges by the function of the cause. "[3]

We shall investigate the Vaiśeṣika version of the theory of new production in detail. However, the theory of causality has many features which are entangled with each other. It will facilitate our discussion to divide the theory of causality into its three components.

(1) A formal feature, or definition, of causality : It is the temporal priority and posteriority of two things that was most important for the Vaiśeṣikas. A pot, for example, is the material cause of its colour. Therefore, the colour of a pot is produced definitely after the pot is produced. The colour of the pot does not exist at the moment when the pot is produced, and then comes into existence one moment after the production of the pot[4]. The

2 *Prasthānabheda*, p. 16 *ll.* 15–17 : *pārthivāpyataijasavāyavīyāś caturvidhāḥ paramāṇavo dvyaṇukādikrameṇa brahmāṇḍaparyantaṃ jagad ārabhante. asad eva kāryaṃ kāraṇavyāpārād utpadyata iti.* Two atoms make one diad (*dvyaṇuka*). Three diads make one triad (*tryaṇuka*). Four triads make one tetriad (*caturaṇuka*). But it is likely that there were those who asserted that two diads make one tetriad. Cf. *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* on *Brahmasūtra* 2. 2. 11.

3 *Prasthānabheda*, p. 16 *ll.* 18–20 : *sattvarajastamoguṇātmakaṃ pradhānam eva mahadahaṅkārādikrameṇa jagadākāreṇa pariṇamate. pūrvam api sūkṣmarūpeṇa sad eva kāryaṃ kāraṇavyāpāreṇābhivyajyata iti.* Madhusūdanasarasvatī enumerates the theory of metamorphosis (*vivartavāda*) as the third one, which, he mentions, is as follows : *svaprakāśaparamānandādvitīyaṃ brahma svābhāsavaśān mithyaiva jagadākāreṇa kalpyata iti tṛtīyaḥ pakṣo brahmavādinām.*

4 According to this assumption, there appears a substance with no quality. This might contradict the definition of substance (*Vaiśeṣikasūtra*

(*Continued on the next page*)

causal relationship between two things, such as a pot and its colour, is not only established by their priority and posteriority, but also by the inevitable concomitance that X is produced exclusively by Y. Keśavamiśra in his *Tarkabhāṣā* defines causality as follows :

> " A cause is that whose temporal priority to the effect is determinate and is without any deviation. "[5]

Such a formal feature of causality was not explicitly maintained by the earliest Vaiśeṣikas. But we can find a more primitive version of this theory in the words of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* :

> " There is no effect without cause. " (1. 2. 1)[6]
>
> " It does not mean the absence of the cause that there is no effect. " (1. 2. 2)[7]
>
> " Because the number one and separateness do not exist in an effect and its cause, the number one and separateness do not exist [either in qualities or in actions]. " (7. 2. 8)[8]

(2) Kinds of causes : According to the Vaiśeṣikas, causality is possible only among substances, qualities and actions. Causes are divided into material causes and non-material causes, and those which do not belong to either of these categories are called ' efficient causes. ' The Vaiśeṣikas explain all phenomena by refer-

(*Continued from the last page*)

1. 1. 14). Thus, Udayana devised a new definition of substance which is as follows : "Substance is that which is not a locus of the absolute absence of qualities." (*guṇātyantābhāvānadhikaraṇaṃ dravyam. Lakṣaṇāvalī*, Benares 1897, p. 2) As for this problem, see the next chapter.

5 *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 2 *ll.* 16–17 : *yasya kāryāt pūrvabhāvo niyato 'nanyathāsiddhaś ca tat kāraṇam.*

6 *kāraṇābhāvāt kāryābhāvaḥ.*

7 *na tu karyābhāvāt kāraṇābhāvaḥ.*

8 *kāryakāraṇaikatvapṛthakatvābhāvād ekatvapṛthakatve na vidyate.* As the number one, or number, and separateness are qualities, they are impossible to exist or inhere in qualities and actions. According to the Vaiśeṣikas it is in figurative sense that we have the cognition and expression as ' one colour, ' ' two movements ' etc. As for the Vaiśeṣika theory of number, see II. 1.

ring to these three kinds of causes, though the term 'efficient cause' is not found in either the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* or the *Daśapadārthī*.

(3) Potentiality of cause: The theory of causality is not fully defined by the above two features. These formal features of the theory only provide the external structure. When two things are said to be causally related, the question arises as to exactly why Y produces X and X only. This question is about the potentiality of a cause, and it is deeply connected with the core of the Vaiśeṣika theory that an effect never pre-exists in the cause. Traditionally there were many arguments about exactly what the potentiality of a cause was.

We shall examine the Vaiśeṣika idea of the potentiality of a cause in detail and clarify one by one the points of argument.

1. Potentiality of cause and the category

Candramati's *Daśapadārthī* enumerates the potentiality and non-potentiality of a cause as independent categories. The ordinary (or orthodox) Vaiśeṣikas enumerate six categories only — substance, quality, action, universal, particular and inherence, and later a seventh by adding absence to the list. It is only the Prābhākaras who, other than Candramati, enumerate potentiality of a cause as an indepedent category. Candramati's view on the potentiality and non-potentiality will be examined later. Here, to begin with, we shall examine the Mīmāṃsakas' position and the Vaiśeṣikas' criticism of it.

A. *The Mīmāṃsakas on potentiality of cause*

The Bhāṭṭas admit the existence of the potentiality of a cause. But, according to them, it is only one item in the category of quality [9] and is not considered to be an independent category.

9 According to Nārāyaṇa, the Bhāṭṭas divide objects of cognition into five categories. They are substance, universal (*jāti*), quality, action and absence. Substance is subdivided into eleven : earth, water, fire, air,

(*Continued on the next page*)

For example, Nārāyaṇa in his *Mānameyodaya* says :

"The Kumārilas (Bhāṭṭas) maintain that the potentiality has potentialitiness, or a universal, exists in substances, qualities and actions, and is realized from the Vedas and postulation."[10]

Fire, a substance, has potentiality to burn things. The killing, an action, has potentiality to put the killer into hell[11]. As for the potentiality of qualities, he mentions the following :

"In such a case as 'one who desires prosperity should attain a white offering which is to be dedicated to the god Vāyu' etc., because a substance which is qualified by a white colour etc., a quality, is referred to here as a means of obtaining prosperity, some prominent power should be assumed to exist in qualities. It is called the potentiality which exists in qualities."[12]

It is interesting that the prominent power is called potentiality here.

He refers to the following differences between the Prābhākaras and the Bhāṭṭas.

(*Continued from the last page*)

darkness, ether, time, space, soul, mind and word (*śabda*). Quality is of twenty-four kinds : colour, taste, smell, touch, number, dimension, separateness, connection, separation, priority, posteriority, weight, fluidity, moisture, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, internal effort, impression, physical sound (*dhvani*), clearly-cognizedness (*prākaṭya*) and potentiality. Action is of five kinds which are completely the same as those enumerated by the Vaiśeṣikas. On the other hand, the Prābhākaras set up eight categories : substance, quality, action, universal (*jāti*), potentiality, similarity (*sādṛśya*), number and inherence.

10 *śaktitvasāmānyavatīṃ dravyakarmaguṇāśrayām.*
śrutyarthāpattijñeyāṃ śaktim āhuḥ kumārilāḥ.
(*Mānameyodaya*, p. 263)

11 *tatrāgnyadīnāṃ dāhakatvaśaktir dravyagatā. hiṃsādīnāṃ narakapātasādhakatvaśaktiḥ karmagatā.* (*Ibid.*, p. 264).

12 *'vāyavyaṃ śvetaṃ labheta bhūtikāmaḥ' ityādiṣu śvetatvādiguṇaviśiṣṭasyaiva dravyasya bhūtisādhanatvaśravaṇād guṇagato 'py atiśayaḥ kalpanīyaḥ. sa eva guṇagatā śaktir ity ucyate.* [*evaṃ sarvatra draṣṭavyam*]. (*Ibid.*, p. 264).

The Prābhākaras :

(1) Potentiality is an independent category.

(2) Potentiality is cognized by inference.

The Bhāṭṭas :

(1') Potentiality is included in the already established category of quality. It is so by logical economy.[13]

(2') Potentiality is cognized by postulation.

While being silent about how potentiality is inferred, Nārāyaṇa describes the process of postulation (*arthāpatti*) as follows :

" Because, while burning is always seen when there is connetion [of things] with fire, it (burning) is not seen in spite of the existence of connection [of things] with fire when spells etc. are used, there exists some cause — visible or invisible — other than connection [of things] with fire. An ordinary cognition [of burning] contradicts the congnition of its absence which is derived from the fact that that which is to be seen is not seen. [Then] some invisible cause ought to be assumed so that [we may be able to conceive] it as that which is without contradiction [even] when both are thus [apparently] in contradiction. It (something invisible) is called ' potentiality.' "[14]

B. *The Vaiśeṣikas' criticism*

The Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas criticize the conception that potentiality is an entity and an independent category. For

13 Only, he mentions also as follows : " The Kumārilas, it is certain, admit that potentiality is an independent category." (*Ibid.*, p. 265)

14 *yādṛśād agnisaṃyogāt sarvadā dāhadarśanam,*
tādṛśād eva mantrādiprayoge tadadarśanāt.
agnisaṃyogātiriktaṃ yat kiṃcit kāraṇāntaram,
asti dṛśyam adṛśyaṃ vety evaṃ sādhāraṇā pramā.
dṛśyādarśanajābhāvapramāṇena vihanyate,
tatrānayor virodhe saty avirodhasya kalpyate.
adṛśyaṃ kāraṇaṃ kiṃcit sā śaktir iti gīyate. (*Ibid.*, p. 267)

example, Viśvanāthapañcānana in his *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* introduces the opinion of the Prābhākaras as follows :

" Why are categories limited to this number (seven)[15] while potentiality, simlarlity etc. are as well independent categories ? Burning is not produced of fire which is located near a magical jewel (a moonlight stone) etc., but is produced of fire which is apart from them. Thus, it is assumed that the potentiality of fire to burn [things] is destroyed by a magical jewel etc., and is produced [again] by [some] prompter (a sunbeam stone etc.) or by removal of a magical jewel etc. "[16]

His refutation of this view is as follows :

" [It is] not right. Fire etc. which are qualified by the absence of a magical jewel etc., or the absence of a magical jewel should be assumed as an independent cause of burning etc. Because, as these are all that is needed, it is not proper to assume innumerable potentialities, pre-absences and destructions of them. Moreover, you should not raise a question as to ' Why does burning exist, when some prompter exists, despite the fact that an obstacle exists ? ' Because the absence of a magical jewel which is qualified by the absence of a prompter is the cause. "[17]

Thus, the causes of burning are as follows :

(α) Fire, or fire which is qualified by the absence of a magical jewel etc.

15 Absence included.

16 *nanu katham eta eva padārthāḥ ? śaktisādṛśyādīnām apy atiriktapadārthatvāt. tathā hi — maṇyādisamavahitena vahninā dāho na janyate, tacchūnyena tu janyate, tatra maṇyādinā vahnau dāhānukūlā śaktir naśyate, uttejakena maṇyādyapasāreṇa ca janyata iti kalpyate.* (*Siddhāntamuktāvalī*, pp. 36–39)

17 *na. maṇyādyabhāvaviśiṣṭavahnyāder dāhādikaṃ prati svātantryeṇa maṇyabhāvāder eva vā hetutvaṃ kalpyate, anenaiva sāmañjasye 'nantaśaktitatprāgabhāvadhvaṃsakalpanānaucityāt. na cottejake sati pratibandhakasadbhāve 'pi kathaṃ dāha ity vācyam. uttejakābhāvaviśiṣṭamaṇyābhāvasya hetutvāt.* (*Ibid.*, pp. 39–40)

...16

(β) The absence of a magical jewel etc., an obstacle, or the absence of a magical jewel which is qualified by the absence of a prompter.

The concept of potentiality is, therefore, not needed from a theoretical point of view.

Then, do the Vaiśeṣikas deny every kind of potentiality? The answer is "No." The Vaiśeṣikas, although they deny the potentiality as a kind of an independent entity, do not deny its existence in another sense. Because for them totally to deny its existence makes it impossible for them to explain the internal sutructure of the theory of causality. This does not fit the thorough realism of the Vaiśeṣikas.

Annambhaṭṭa in his *Tarkadīpikā* mentions the following:

> "That which is indicated by the term 'potentiality' is nothing but 'a cause.'"[18]

In other words, 'potentiality' and 'cause' are synonyms according to him. Nārāyaṇa in his *Mānameyodaya* mentions the following:

> As to this point, the Logicians consider that potentiality [as an entity] does not exist. They explain the potentiality of fire etc. to burn [things] etc. by various natures (*svabhāvabheda*) [of fire etc.]."[19]

18 *kāraṇasyaiva śaktipadārthatvāt.* (*Tarkadīpikā*, p. 65)

19 *atra śaktir eva nāstīti tārkikānāṃ matam. agnyādīnāṃ dāhakatvādiśaktiṃ ca svabhāvabhedena samarthayanti.* (*Mānameyodaya*, p. 264) Immediately after this Vaiśeṣika argument, criticism against it is mentioned as follows: "It is not right. Because the nature continues to exist even while the substance [as its locus] exists. And because burning etc. are extinguished by a magical jewel, spells etc. And also because [there arises on your side] a fault that, even if [you use] the term 'nature,' [you will be obliged to] mention the very potentiality as its synonym" (*tad ayuktam. svabhāvasya yāvaddravyabhāvitvāt. dāhakatvādeś ca maṇimantrādinirākāryatvāt. svabhāvaśabdenāpi śakter eva paryāyāntareṇa grahaṇaprasaṅgāc ca.*)

Form the above we can guess that the Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas held a conception as 'potentiality = cause' or 'potentiality = nature of the thing.' But the above statement is too brief for us to understand in full. We shall, therefore, examine Śrīdhara's *Nyāyakandalī* which contains a detailed explanation of this problem.

2. Śrīdhara on potentiality of cause

A. Dispute against the Sāṅkhyas

With respect to the problem of causality the biggest opponents of the Vaiśeṣikas were the Sāṅkhyas who argue a version of theory that an effect pre-exists latently in a cause, which was incompatible with the Vaiśeṣika theory of causality. Śrīdhara in his commentary on *Saṃyoga-nirūpaṇa* argues against the Sāṅkhyas. He, first of all, introduces Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṅkhyakārikā* [9]:

> "An effect exists [latently in a cause in advance] because of (1) [a cause being] not [possible to] produce that which does not exist, of [2] [an effect] using a material cause, of (3) everything [being] not [possible to] come into existence [from everything without particularization], of (4) a potentiality-bearer producing that which the potentiality reaches and of (5) [an effect being] homogeneous with a cause."[20]

Śrīdhara comments on these five reasons one by one[21]. He comments on the fourth reason in the following way:

> "And then, is that which produces [an effect] (A) that which has potentiality or (B) that which has no potentiality? In the first, if (B) that which has no potentiality

20 *asadakaraṇād upādānagrahaṇāt sarvasambhavābhāvāt, śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt kāraṇabhāvāc ca sat kāryam.*

21 The way of Śrīdhara's interpretation here is very much similar to that of Vācaspatimiśra in his *Tattvakaumudī*, a commentary on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*.

produces [an effect], there would be the fault of over-application [that any effect may be produced by any cause]. Next, if (A) that which has potentiality produces [an effect], does its potentiality reach (a) everything or (b) only some [particular thing] ? In the case (a) where [it] reaches everything, there would also be the fault of over-application [that everything may be produced by only one cause]. In the case (b) where [it] reaches only some [particular thing], if an effect does not exist [latently in a cause in advance], there ought to arise a question as to why potentiality of cause reaches the very effect. Because that which does not exist cannot be the object [of potentiality]. Therefore, because that which has potentiality produces that which potentiality reaches, or an object of potentiality, that which potentiality reaches surely exists [latently in a cause in advancc] before it comes into existence. "[22]

In this way the Sāṅkhyas try to establish their theory of causality by utilizing the conception of potentiality. Then, Śrīdhara begins to refute the reasons mentioned above.

" [The Sāṅkhyas :] Then, how does that which has never existed before come into existence ?

[Śrīdhara :] Because a cause has a causal ability (*sāmarthya*). A shuttle of loom etc. have some power which, when they aggregate and function, produce a piece of cloth etc. as have never existed before.

[The Sāṅkhyas :] If that which has never existed and has never been connected [with a cause] should come into existence, there would be the fault of over-application.

22 *api ca śaktasya janakatvam aśaktasya vā. aśaktasya janakatve tīvad atiprasaktiḥ. śaktasya janakatve tu kiṁ asya śaktiḥ sarvatra kvacid eva vā. sarvatra cet saivātivyāptiḥ. atha kvacid eva katham asati tasmin kāraṇasya tatra śaktir niyateti vaktavyam. asato viṣayatvāyogāt. tasmāc chaktasya yac chakyaṃ śaktiviṣayo yo 'rthaḥ tasya karaṇāt prāg api śakyaṃ sad eva.* [*ito 'pi sat kāryam*]. (*Nyāyakandalī*, p. 143 *ll.* 15–19)

[Śrīdhara :] No. Because that which belongs to a class of threads has a causal ability which reaches only that which belongs to a class of cloth.

[The Sāṅkhyas :] How is it so ?

[Śrīdhara :] [Before replying to it, I would like to ask you] how it is so according to your opinion, too.

[The Sāṅkhyas :] The state of being the essence of cloth exists only in threads, not in everything. Because such is the nature of things.

[Śrīdhara :] This is completely the same with our case. Therefore, a particular material cause [is used to produce a particular effect]. Because it is attested by positive and negative concomitance[23] that potentiality of some class reaches only some particular class. "[24]

Both Śrīdhara and the Sāṅkhyas admit that the potentiality which produced only a particular effect is nothing but the nature of a thing. It is to be noted that positive and negative concomitance is considered as a means for attesting whether or not potentiality reaches another thing. Śrīdhara uses this frequently.

B. Dispute against the Mīmāṃsākas

Śrīdhara, immediately after refuting the Sāṅkhyas, brings his argument against the Mīmāṃsakas. First of all, he introduces the opinion of the Mīmāṃsakas as follows :

23 Positive concomitance (*anvaya*) : If A exists, then B exists. Negative concomitance (*vyatireka*) : If A does not exist, then B does not exist.

24 *yad asat pūrvam āsīt tasya kathaṃ sattvam iti cet, kāraṇasāmarthyāt. asti sa ko 'pi mahimā turyādīnāṃ yad eteṣu sambhūya vyāpriyamāneṣv asann eva paṭaḥ sambhavati. asato 'sambaddhasya janyatve 'tiprasaktir iti cen, naitat. tantujātīyasya paṭajātīya eva sāmarthyāt. kuta etat. tvatpakṣe 'pi kuta etat. tantuṣv eva paṭātmatā na sarvatreti vastusvābhāvyād iti cet, tad no 'trāpi bhaviṣyati. ata eva copādānaniyamo 'nvayavyatirekābhyāṃ tajjātīyaniyamane tajjātīyasya śaktyavadhāraṇāt.* (*Ibid.*, p. 114 *ll.* 14–20).

"Now, it should be examined what potentiality is. Noble men (the Mīmāṃsakas) maintain that [potentiality is] something which is beyond our sense organs. But this is not right, Because there is no instrument with which to know the existence of such a thing.

[The Mīmāṃsakas:] It is well known that burning is produced by fire. But, when spells, botanical drugs etc. exist nearby, [burning] of fire of the same kind is not seen. If some visible feature is surely the cause of burning, it will be impossible that burning does not appear because such a visible feature exists [even when spells etc. exist nearby]. This, implying that some invisible feature [of fire] is lacking, makes us assume that there exists in fire the potentiality which is suppressed or destroyed by spells etc. and is beyond our sense organs. In the case where an effect appears again by force of a counteractor, [it should be considered that the potentiality was] suppressed. And in the case where [an effect] appears no more, [it should be considered that the potentiality was] destroyed.

It should not be said as follows: Why are spells, which are neither connected with nor inherent in fire, possible to destroy the potentiality whose substratum is different [from that of spells]? If [spells] destory [the potentiality], there would be the fault of over-application.

Because [spells in this case] are directed to it (the potentiality of fire) as their object. Although cursing is not connected with a person as its target, such cursing as is directed to the person kills the very person only, but not other persons. Likewise, spells which are directed to [the potentiality of] a certain individual thing destroy the potentiality of the very individual thing only, but not everything."[25]

25 *etat tu vimṛṣyatām keyaṃ śaktir iti. atīndriyā kācid ity āryāḥ. tad ayuktam. tasyāḥ sadbhāve pramāṇābhāvāt.*

(*Continued on the next page*)

The Mīmāṃsakas' argument on potentiality here is basically the same as Nārāyaṇa's passages in his *Mānameyodaya* quoted in section 1. But here it is stressed that potentiality is beyond our sense organs, that it is invisible and that it is suppressed or destroyed by spells etc. Here there is also an answer to the question as to why an obstacle destroys the potentiality of something particular. Even though it is illustrated only by cursing, this example is not referred to by the Vaiśeṣikas.

The Mīmāṃsakas finish their argument by asserting that potentiality is, like similarity, an independent category. Śrīdhara, then, introduces the Vaiśeṣika theory as follows and argues against the Mīmāṃsakas.

"[Śrīdhara:] Even though an effect does not appear when spells etc. are nearby, it does not make us infer an invisible feature [of fire]. As fire which is attested to have a causal ability by positive and negative concomitance is the cause of burning, so the pre-absence of an obstacle like spells etc. is its cause. And, because the pre-absence of spells etc. is destroyed by the use of spells etc., it is by lack of a set (*sāmagrī*) of causes, not by lack of potentiality, that burning does not appear.

[The Mīmāṃsakas:] Because only an existent has an existent as its cause, [an existent is] not [possible to be] an effect of absence.

(*Continued from the last page*)

atha manyase yathābhūtād eva vahner dāhotpattir avagatā tathābhūtād eva mantrauṣadhisannidhāne sati na dṛśyate. yadi dṛṣṭam eva rūpaṃ dāhasya kāraṇaṃ syāt tasya sambhavād dāhānutpādo na syāt. asti ca tadanutpattiḥ seyam adṛṣṭarūpasya vaiguṇyaṃ gamayantī hutabhuji śakter atīndriyāyāḥ sattvaṃ kalpayati yasya mantrādinābhibhavo vināśo vā kriyate. yatra pratikāravaśena punaḥ kāryodayas tatrābhibhavaḥ, yatra tu sarvathaivānutpattiḥ kāryasya tatra vināśaḥ.

na caitad vācyaṃ na mantro vahnisaṃyukto nāpi tatsamavetaḥ kathaṃ vyadhikaraṇāṃ śaktiṃ vināśayet, vināśayati ced atiprasaṅgaḥ syād iti. taduddeśena prāptatvāt. yathaivāsambaddho 'py abhicāro yam uddiśya kriyate tam eva hinasti na puruṣāntaram evaṃ yām eva vyaktim abhisandhāya mantraḥ prayujyate tasyā eva śaktiṃ niruṇaddhi na sarvāsām. (*Ibid.*, p. 144 *l.* 24 — p. 145 *l.* 6)

[Śrīdhara :] It is not right. Because an evil oppears from non-performance of daily rituals. Otherwise, any ceremony for recompense will not be performed[26]. Because it should be useless.

[The Mīmāṃsakas :] An evil appears from performing another matter without performing daily rituals. Not to perform daily rituals or the pre-absence of performance is not the cause.

[Śrīdhara :] [An evil appears] from the assistant function of non-performance of daily risuals from which surely appears [an evil].

[The Mīmāṃsakas :] If, because the absence of an obstacle is destroyed when the obstacle is used, burning does not appear, then, burning would not appear even if an obstacle of an obstacle should be used. Because the pre-absence [of an obstacle] or the cause of burning is already destroyed at that moment. But, when an obstacle is obstructed by another spells etc., there will be seen burning. Therefore, absence is not the cause. Consequently, it is fixed that potentiality is the cause. There is a room for assuming that potentiality which was obstructed by the first [spells etc.] comes to be prompted by the second [ones].

[Śrīdhara :] This also is not well spoken. Because there is no room for assuming an invisible thing when a visible thing is established. Where should be contradiction — if there should be contradiction, an invisible thing [as is referred to by the Mīmāṃsakas] would be admitted — in assuming that in one case a set of causes accompanied by the absence of spells etc., or an obstacle, is the cause, and that in another case [a set of causes] accompanied by the

26 A similar argument on evil derived from non-performance of an daily ritual is found also in the *Mānameyodaya* (p. 265). Sadānanda in his *Vedāntasāra* mentions as follows : "A daily ritual is a prey in the morning and evening etc. as an instrument which, unless performed, produces an evil." (pp. 6–7)

second spells etc. ? It is a fact that even such an effect as has only one feature has a set of many causes. For example, fire is produced not only by rubbing of wood but also by a sunbeam jewel. This is the secret of the fixed theory of logic. We have in our *Tattvaprabodha*[27] already argued on the secret of the fixed theory of investigation (*mīmāṃsā*)."[28]

Śrīdhara, in discussing cases where an obstacle exists, lists as the causes (a) that whose causal ability is attested to by positive and negative concomitance and (b) the pre-absence of an obstacle. A set of causes is basically composed of these two. He lists as cause (b') a prompter in cases where, even though obstacle exists, an effect appears again because of the functioning of the prompter. Later (b) and (b') come to be combined into one. This is formulated as 'the absence of an obstacle which is qualified by the absence of a prompter.'

27 Śrīdhara's treatise, which is not available now.

28 *na mantrādisannidhau kāryānutpattir adṛṣṭaṃ rūpam ākṣipati. yathānvayavyatirekābhyām avadhṛtasāmarthyo vahnir dāhasya kāraṇaṃ tathā pratibandhakamantrādiprāgabhāvo 'pi kāraṇam. sa ca mantrādiprayoge sati nivṛtta iti sāmagrīvaiguṇyād eva dāhasyānutpattir na tu śaktivaikalyāt. bhāvasya bhāvarūpakāraṇaniyatatvadarśanād abhāvakāryatvaṃ nāstīti cen, na. nityānāṃ karmaṇām akaraṇāt pratyavāyasyotpādāt. anyathā nityākaraṇe prāyaścittānuṣṭhānaṃ na syād vaiyarthyāt. nityānām akaraṇe 'nyakaraṇāt pratyavāyo na tu nityākaraṇasya kāraṇaprāgabhāvasya hetutvam iti cet, nityākaraṇasya tadbhāvabhāvitatvaniyatasya sahāyatvena vyāpārāt. nanu yadi pratibandhakasya prayoge tadbhāvo nivṛtta iti dāhasyānutpattiḥ tadā pratibandhakapratibandhake 'pi dāho na syāt. tatkāraṇasya prāgabhāvasya nivṛttatvāt. dṛśyate ca pratibandhakasyāpareṇa mantrādinā pratibandhe sati dāhaḥ. tena nābhāvaḥ kāraṇam ity avasthiteyaṃ śaktiḥ kāraṇam. sā ca prāguktena pratibaddhā dvitīyenottambhiteti kalpanā avakāśaṃ labhate. tad apy apeśalam. dṛṣṭe sambhavaty adṛṣṭakalpanānavakāśāt. kadācit pratibandhakamantrādyabhāvasahitā sāmagrī kāraṇaṃ kadācit dvitīya-mantrādisahitā kāraṇam ity asyāṃ kalpanāyāṃ ko virodhaḥ yadanurodhād adṛṣṭam āśrīyate. dṛṣṭo hy ekarūpasyāpi kāryasya sāmagrībhedaḥ yathā dārunirmathanaprabhavo vahniḥ sūryakantaprabhavaś ceti tarkasiddhānta-rahasyam. mīmāṃsāsiddhāntarahasyaṃ tattvaprabodhe kathitam asmābhiḥ.* (*Ibid.*, p. 145 *l.* 15 — p. 146 *l.* 4)

...17

C. *Dispute against the Buddhists*

Śrīdhara in *Ātma-nirūpaṇa* develops a long argument against the Buddhist theory of things being momentary (*kṣaṇikavāda*). According to the Buddhists, a real thing is that which has an effective function, and only a momentarily existent is real. Therefore, it is impossible for a Vaiśeṣika-like thing, which has continuance, to produce an effect. To this question Śrīdhara answers as follows :

> "And it is not that that which is not momentary is impossible to have an effective function. That is to say, an existent comes to have the nature of producing an effect when accompanied by assistant causes (*sahakārin*), and it is not that it has the nature of producing [an effect] without being assisted [by assistant causes]. Because an effect is produced in response to the situation where assistant causes come to be attached to an existent whose causal ability is attested to by positive and negative concomitance, [an existent is] possible to produce [an effect] gradually even if [an existent] should be continuous. Because an effect, which rides on many causes, is not [possible to] be produced by a single [cause].
>
> It is not right [to assert] that, if it is admitted that [an effect is] assisted by assistant causes, an existent cannot produce [any effect] because an effect is produced by the prominent power which is produced by these assistant causes. Because it is an empirical fact that [the very prominent power] produces an effect in accordance with the nature of an existent [even though the prominent power is surely produced by assistant causes]. In other words, if [an existent should] not produce an effect, a sprout of rice will be produced by a barley grain when earth and water [as assistant causes] exist nearby. Because [according to the Buddhists] there would exist no determinate cause [which produces a sprout of barley from a barley grain]. Besides, it is not that assistant causes give prominent power to the nature of an existent. Assistant causes remain assistant causes. The prominent power is an existent's state of being accompanied by assistant causes, and the non-prominent power is nothing but its absence. Because, only when it exists, an effect is produced by it, and, when it does not exist, an effect is not produced."[29]

Here, the idea of a set of causes (*sāmagrī*) is stressed. It is possible for existents to produce an effect only when a set of causes is present, but not by itself. Nevertheless, it is the nature of a thing that determines what effect is produced. The nature of a thing is nothing but potentiality. Then, what is the prominent power? It is that which is produced in a thing only when accompanied by assistant causes, and, therefore, it is different from the nature of a thing. Potentiality, as the nature of a thing, however, is nothing but the prominent power in the situation where a set of causes is present. Potentiality, as the nature of a thing, is called 'potentiality' just because an effect is produced by it.

It must be from such a reason that the *Mānameyodaya* explains that the prominent power is nothing but the potentiality of a cause. And positive and negative concomitance, which is used by Śrīdhara frequently, is the means for attesting to the causality of two things, and makes us infer that a prominent power is a potentiality in a particular situation.

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29. *na cākṣaṇikasyārthakriyānupapattiḥ. sahakārisāhitye hi sati kāryakāraṇasvabhāvo hi bhāvo nānapekṣakārakasvarūpaḥ. tasya yathānvaya-vyatirekāvagatasāmarthyaḥ sahakāriṇaḥ sannipatanti tathā kāryotpattir ity upapadyate sthirasyāpi krameṇa karaṇam. anekakāraṇādhīnasya kārya-syaikasmād utpattyabhāvāt.*

na ca sahakārisāpekṣitve sati tatkṛtād evātiśayāt kāryotpatter bhāvo na kāraka iti yuktam. bhāvasvarūpānugamena kāryotpādadarśanāt. akāra-katve hi yavabījasya kṣityudakasannidhau śālibījāṅkuro 'pi syāt. niyama-kāraṇābhāvāt. nāpi sahakāriṇo bhāvasya svarūpātiśayam ādadhati kin tu sahakāriṇa eva te. atiśayaḥ punar etasya sahakārisāhityam, anatiśayo 'pi tadbhāva eva. tasmin sati tataḥ kāryasya bhāvād asaty abhāvāt. (*Ibid.*, p. 76 *l.* 21 — p. 77 *l.* 5)

3. Candramati on potentiality of cause

The Vaiśeṣika argument on potentiality of cause mentioned above is a part of the so-called orthodox system. But Candramati in his *Daśapadārthī* asserts that the potentiality and non-potentiality of a cause are independent categories. They are defined as follows :

> "What is the category of potentiality? That which is inherent in substances, qualities and actions, and is attested regularly to produce their own effects by positve and negative concomitance is called the category of potentiality[30].
>
> What is the category of non-potentiality? That which is inherent in substances, qualities and actions, and is attested regularly not to produce other effects by positive and negative concomitance is called the category of non-potentiality."[31]

The *Daśapadārthī* is a little troublesome because it presents no example. But we can easily think of an example in this case. That is, a rice grain has a potentiality to produce a rice sprout, and a rice grain has a non-potentiality to produce a barley sprout. Anyway, the *Daśapadārthī* on potentiality is too brief for us to understand anything more. Moreover, it is not clear whether the conception of potentiality and non-potentiality can be found in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra.*

4. Bhartṛhari on potentiality

Bhartṛhari in his *Vākyapadīya* 3. 7. 9 introduces the opinion of the Saṃsargavādins (the Vaiśeṣikas) as follows :

30 The *Daśapadārthī* is available in Chinese version only. The Sanskrit text which I reconstructed reads : *kaḥ śaktipadārthaḥ ? yo dravyaguṇakarmasamaveto 'nvayavyatirekābhyāṃ svakāryajanakatvaniyato 'vadhṛtaḥ sa eva śaktipadārtha ity ucyate.* [70]

31 The reconstructed text reads : *ko 'śaktipadārthaḥ ? yo dravyaguṇakarmasamaveto 'nvayavyatirekābhyām anyakāryājanakatvaniyato 'vadhṛtaḥ sa evāśaktipadārtha it uoyate.* [71]

> "According to the Saṃsargavādins, all objects are powers and things having powers. The fact of their being the means is not conveyed by their own words." (Tr. by K. A. Subramania Iyer. 'Power' is 'potentiality.')[32]
>
> (*śaktayaḥ śaktimantaś ca sarve saṃsargavādinām,*
> *bhāvās teṣv asvaśabdeṣu sādhanatvaṃ nirūpyate.*)

Also, in *ibid.* 3. 7. 2 he presents the following noteworthy idea :

> "Since the universe which is a bundle of powers is always there in all its aspects, some power or other is intended to be conveyed to be in a particular context." (*Op. cit.*)
>
> (*śaktimātrasamūhasya viśvasyānekadharmanaḥ.*
> *sarvadā sarvathā bhāvāt kvacit kiṃcid vivakṣyate.*)

Bhartṛhari frequently uses the technical terms of the Vaiśeṣikas, though his use of them does not follow the rules and axioms of the Vaiśeṣikas. Bhartṛhari flourished before Praśastapāda. Curiously enough, Praśastapāda was completely silent about the problem of the potentiality of a cause. Yet, it can be said that in the time of, at least a little before, Bhartṛhari there must have been frequent arguments about the potentiality of a cause among the Vaiśeṣikas. Moreover, the term '*śaktimātrasamūha*' reminds us of several later Vaiśeṣika terms such as '*sāmagrī*' (a set of causes), '*sahakārisāhitya*' (the state of being accompanied by assistant causes) etc.

In fact, Helārāja (tenth century) in his *Prakāśa* on *Vākyapadīya* 3. 7. 18 mentions the following :

> "In the case of 'They (loci of *kārakas*) cook,' as actions are to be established by a set of them, all come indiscriminately to *kārakaness* whose object is appearence of action." (*sāmagrīsādhyatvāt kriyāṇāṃ sarve kārakatvaṃ*

32. K. A. Subramania Iyer, *The Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari*, Chapter III, Part i, English Translation. Deccan College Building Centenary & Jubilee Series 71. Poona : Deccan College Post-graduate and Research Institute, 1971. As for this section, I owe much to Mr. Y. Iwasaki.

kriyāniṣpattiviṣayam abhedena pratipadyante, pacanty eta iti.)

Moreover, commenting on *Vākyapadīya* 3. 7. 56 he says :

> "That which has been *karman* (an object) by its dependence on the function of *kartṛ* (a subject) becomes *kartṛ* when expression of it (the state of being *karman*) is not desired for the sake of intention to denote the prominent efficiency (*saukaryātiśaya*). Thereupon is established *karmakartṛ*." (*kartṛvyāpārāpekṣayā pūrvaṃ karma bhūtvā saukaryātiśayapratipādanaparatayā tadavivakṣāyāṃ kartā sampadyata iti bhavati karmakartā.*)

Helārāja's argument is the same as Śrīdhara's argument on the potentiality of a cause. It is not certain whether concepts like '*sāmagrī*' etc. originated with the Vaiśeṣikas. But we can say that the term 'potentiality,' as used by Bhartṛhari to explain *śabdārtha* (not *vastvartha*), is used in the same way by the old Vaiśeṣikas who lived before the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* and the *Vaiśeṣikasūtrakataṅgī* on which Praśastapāda may have written a commentary. We can guess, therefore, that Bhartṛhari flourished in the golden era of arguments about the potentiality of cause which was represented by Candramati. This is one reason why we may conclude that Candramati flourished far before Praśastapāda and a little before Bhartṛhari. For a detailed chronology, see my forthcoming treatise.

5. Conclusion

The orthodox Vaiśeṣikas conceived of the potentiality of a cause not as some kind of invisible entity as was assumed by the Mīmāṃsakas (especially by the Prābhākaras), but as the nature of a thing. The term 'potentiality' is replaced by the term 'causal ability' (*sāmarthya*), or by the term 'prominent power' (*atiśaya*) in cases where a cause accompanied by assistant causes (a set of causes, *sāmagrī*) is about to produce an effect. It is attested to by positive and negative concomitance (*anvayavyatireka*) whether or not a thing has the causal potentiality to produce a particular

effect. On the other hand, Candramati regards the potentiality and non-potentiality of a cause as independent categories.

However, the problem of the potentiality of a cause is one of the greatest difficulties for the Vaiśeṣika theory of causality, *asatkāryavāda*. They were, of course, eager to deny *satkāryavāda*. But despite their basic standpoint they could hardly assert that a thing is literally produced by an utter absence. Candramati and the Mīmāṃsakas attempted to resolve this difficulty by setting up an independent category of potentiality. However, it could be said that they just devised another version of *satkāryavāda*. The orthodox Vaiśeṣikas, intending to avoid the awkward situation of falling into a kind of *satkāryavāda*, denied the independence of the potentiality, and asserted that it was nothing but the nature of a thing. But in an essential sense they could also not avoid falling into *satkāryavāda*[33]. They could only avoid the appearence that their theory of causality had failed. In short, the problem of the potentiality of a cause remained the biggest weak point for the Vaiśeṣikas.

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33 This point is criticized also by Śaṅkara in his *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* on *Brahmasūtra* 2. 1. 18.

CHAPTER 3

THE THEORY OF PĀKAJOTPATTI

The theory of *pākajotpatti* (the production of a quality which is produced by heat) is one of the most technical Vaiśeṣika theories.[1] It is, therefore, very important to examine it. For it tells us a great deal about atomism, mechanicalism and the thorough realism of the Vaiśeṣikas. And by examining it in detail we can catch a glimpse of a problem in the Vaiśeṣika system of philosophy.

1. The necessity of the theory of pākajotpatti

A dark raw clay pot, when fired in a kiln, becomes red. The pot and a lump of clay from which it is made are both composed of earth. The Vaiśeṣika theory of *pākajotpatti* explains the process and the reasons for the changes in the qualities of earth caused by heat.[2] Before examning this theory in detail, we shall consider its necessity by examining the relevant *sūtras* in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*. They are as follows :

> "Colour, taste, smell and touch [which inhere] in earth are non-eternal when a substance [as their locus] is non-eternal."
>
> *pṛthivyāṃ rūparasagandhasparśā dravyānityatvād anityāḥ.*[3] (7. 1. 4)

1 Others are the theory of *dvitvotpatti* and that of *vibhāgajavibhāga* where a lot of rules of the Vaiśeṣika system are used. It is said that one who is familiar with these theories is called a true Vaiśeṣika. See note 1 on II. 1. The following treatise contains a descriptive study in the theory of *pākajotpatti* : Sudananda Bhaduri, *Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics* Bhandarkar Oriental Series No. 5. Poona : Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1947.

2 Ripeness of fruits, assimilation of plants, digestion in a stomach etc. are listed in the same line.

3 *Vyākhyā* reads : *pṛthivyāṃ rūparasagandhasparśā anityā eva.* (Thakur does not deal with this as an independent *sūtra.*) *Upaskāra* reads: *pṛthivyādirūparasagandhasparśā dravyānityatvād anityāc ca.* (Interpretation is much different from those of the other two.)

"And [colour etc. which inhere in eternal earth—an atom of earth—are non-eternal] because of [its] connection with fire." *agnisaṃyogāc ca.*[4] (7. 1. 5)

"[It is] because of appearance of other qualities [that those which inhere in eternal atoms of earth are non-eternal]." *guṇāntaraprādurbhāvāt.*[5] (7. 1. 6)

"By this is explained the non-eternity [of the qualities which inhere] in eternal [atoms of earth]." *etena nityeṣv anityatvam uktam*[6]. (7. 1. 7)

"[On the other hand, the qualities which inhere] in water, fire and air are eternal when a substance [as their locus] is eternal." *apsu tejasi vāyau ca nityā dravyanityatvāt*[7]. (7. 1. 8)

"[The qualities which inhere] in non-eternal [water etc.] are non-eternal because a substance [as their locus] is non-eternal." *anityeṣv anityā dravyānityatvāt.* (7. 1. 9)

"[The qualities which inhere] in earth are [of two kinds]: those which are derived from qualities of their causes and those which are produced by heat." *kāraṇaguṇapūrvāḥ pṛthivyāṃ pākajāś ca.*[8] (7. 1. 10)

"[The qualities which inhere] in water, fire and air are [only] those which are derived from qualities of their causes. There are no [qualities] which are produced by

4 *Vyākhyā* reads the same, though Thakur does not deal with this as an independent *sūtra. Upaskāra* omits.

5 Both *Vyākhyā* and *Upaskāra* omit.

6 *Vyākhyā* reads : *etena nityeṣv apy anityatvam uktam. Upaskāra* reads : *etena nityeṣu nityatvam uktam.* (With much different interpretation.)

7 *Vyākhyā* reads : *apsu tejasi vāyau ca nityatvaṃ dravyanityatvāt.*

8 *Vyākhyā* (Thakur divides this into two *sūtras*) reads : *kāraṇaguṇapūrvakāḥ pṛthivyām. pākajāś ca. Upaskāra* reads : *kāraṇaguṇapūrvakāḥ pṛthivyāṃ pākajāḥ.*

heat [in this case]. " *apsu tejasi vāyau ca kāraṇaguṇapūrvāḥ pākajā na vidyante.*[9] (7. 1. 11)

" Because a substance which has no quality newly produces qualities, actions and qualities have no quality. " *aguṇavato dravyasya guṇārambhāt karmaguṇā aguṇāḥ.*[10] (7. 1. 12)

" By this are explained the qualities which are produced by heat. " *etena pākajā vyākhyātāḥ.*[11] (7. 1. 13)

" Because [a quality which is produced py heat] has one substance [as its locus.] " *ekadravyavattvāt.*[12] (7. 1. 14)

[A] When a substance is non-eternal, the qualities which inhere in it are non-eternal. For example, when a pot is destroyed, 'the colour of the pot' is destroyed. 'The colour of the pieces of the pot' is not 'the colour of the pot.' This is common to the qualities which inhere in four kinds of non-eternal elements—earth, water fire and air. (The qualities at issue here are colour, taste, smell and touch only.) (From 7. 1. 4, 9)

[B] As for water, fire and air, when a substance is eternal, its qualities are also eternal. (From 7. 1. 8). But, as for earth, even when a substancc is eternal, qualities are non-eternal. (From 7. 1. 7.)

[C] The latter case of [B] is understood from the fact that, when a thing which is composed of earth receives heat, its previous qualities are destroyed and new qualities appear. If a pot is red, its ultimate component, or an aiom, should also be red. And, if a pot is dark, its atom should also be dark. Therefore, it should be considered that, in this case, the previous dark colour

9 *Vyākhyā* reads : *apsu tejaṣi vāyau ca kāraṇaguṇapūrvakāḥ.* But there is seen in a little later place a phrase which reads : *pakajā na vidyante. Upaskāra* omits.

10 *Vyākhyā* reads : *karmaguṇā aguṇāḥ. Upaskāra* omits.

11 *Upaskāra* omits.

12 *Vyākhyā* reads : *ekadravyatvāc ca. Upaskāra* reads : *ekadravyatvāt.*

is destroyed and, then, a new red colour appears in an atom of earth. (From 7. 1. 5, 6)

[D] Yet, there remains a possibility that a dark colour and a red colour may coexist in one and the same atom of earth, and that a red colour comes to be perceived by suppressing the dark colour witb the help of heat. Namely, it may be that the dark colour is never destroyed and the red colour never newly appears. Then, it will not be necessary to assume the non-eternity of qualities of an atom of earth. Against this the Vaiśeṣikas assert that, because a quality has one substance as its locus, it is impossible for it to coexist with another quality of the same class. Namely, it is impossible for colour-A to coexist with colour-B. (From 7. 1. 14)

[E] Nevertheless, there still remains another possibility. Namely, that it may not be necessary to assume the non-eternity of the qualities of an atom of earth if we consider that a dark colour has a red colour. But according to the Vaiśeṣika definition of quality it is impossible for a quality to have a quality.[13] Consequently a quality can only be produced in a substance which does not have another quality of the same class. (From 7. 1. 12)

[F] Therefore, it must be concluded that the dark colour is destroyed before the red colour appears.

The Vaiśeṣikas (and the Naiyāyikas) developed a unique theory of *pākajotpatti* from these grounds. We shall examine it in detail in the next section.

2. Pīlupākavāda and piṭharapākavāda[14]

There were two old theories which explained the process of *pākajotpatti*. One was called '*pīlupākavāda*,' namely, the theory

13 *dravyāśrayī aguṇavān saṃyogavibhāgeṣv akāraṇam anapekṣam iti guṇalakṣaṇam.* (*Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1. 1. 15)

14 They seem to have been named so in considerably later times. Neither Śrīdhara nor Udayana use these names.

that qualities inherent in an atom of earth are both destroyed and produced by heat through the dissolution of the whole (a raw clay pot) into its constituent atoms and their subsequent reconstitution into a new whole. This was the Vaiśeṣikas' theory. The other one was called '*piṭharapākavāda*,' namely, the theory that qualities inherent in an atom of earth are both destroyed and produced by heat without the dissolution and reconstitution of the whole. This was the Naiyāyikas' theory.[15] We shall examine each of these theories and discuss the arguments and counter-arguments made by the Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas.

A. Pīlupākavāda

The so-called '*pīlupākavāda*,' according to the *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya*[16] and its commentaries, is described as follows :

A raw substance composed of earth, for example, a clay pot, has its first connection (*saṃyoga*) with fire. Connection with fire means hit (*abhighāta*) or shaking (*nodana*) by fire. These are particular kinds of connection.[17] As a result of this first connection with fire actions are produced in the atoms which constitute the raw clay pot.[18] These actions produce separations among the atoms, as a result of which the connections among the atoms are destroyed. By destroying the connections among the atoms a substance as an effect, namely, a raw clay pot, composed of diads, triads etc. is destroyed. That is to say, when the connections, or the non-material cause of the diads etc., is destroyed, the diads etc. are destroyed, and, therefore, the substance as an effect is destroyed.

Next, the dark colour, which is inherent in each individual atom, is destroyed by the second connection with fire assisted by heat.[19] The fire which is inherent in the moon, for example, is not able to destroy things because it does not have manifest heat. Therefore the term 'heat' is added to 'the second connection with fire.' Here, heat is the efficient cause[20] while an atom is the material cause and the connection with fire is the non-material cause. Then, as a result of the third connection with fire assisted by heat, a red colour is produced in the atom whose previous colour has already been destroyed.

Now the process of reconstitution begins. An action is produced in an atom whose *pākaja* qualities (such as a red colour) have already appeared.[21] This action is produced by the connec-

15 Jagadīśa Bhaṭṭācārya in his *Tarkāmṛta* mentions thus : "Those which are produced by heat are the proper qualities of earth. They are divided into two classes—those which are promoted by heat and those which are produced [directly] by heat. [The first are] those which are produced by succession of qualities of their causes. The second are those which are produced [directly] by their connection with fire." (*pṛthivīviśeṣaguṇāḥ pākajāḥ, te dvividhāḥ—pākaprayojyāḥ pākajanyāś ca. kāraṇaguṇaprakramajanyāḥ, agnisaṃyogajanyā dvitīyāḥ.* p. 22)

16 It argues on *pākajotpatti* after having finished explaining four kinds of qualities—colour, taste, smell and touch. It mentions as follows: *pārthivaparamāṇurūpādīnāṃ pākajotpattividhānam. ghaṭāder āmadravyasyāgninā sambaddhasyāgnyabhighātān nodanād vā tadārambhakeṣv aṇuṣu karmāṇy utpadyante, tebhyo vibhāgāḥ, vibhāgebhyaḥ saṃyogavināśāḥ, saṃyogavināśebhyaś ca kāryadravyaṃ vinaśyati. tasmin vinaṣṭe svatantreṣu paramāṇuṣv agnisaṃyogād auṣṇyāpekṣāc chyāmādīnāṃ vināśaḥ, punar anyasmād agnisaṃyogād auṣṇyāpekṣāt pākajā jāyante. tadanantaraṃ bhoginām adṛṣṭāpekṣād ātmāṇusaṃyogād utpannapākajeṣv aṇuṣu karmotpattau teṣāṃ parasparasaṃyogād dvyaṇukādikrameṇa kāryadravyam utpadyate. tatra ca kāraṇaguṇaprakrameṇa rūpādyutpattiḥ.*

17 *abhighāto nodanaṃ vā saṃyogaviśeṣaḥ.* (*Nyāyakandalī*)

18 According to the *Vyomavatī*, of actions which are produced, the material cause is atoms, the non-material cause is their connection with fire, and the efficient cause is velocity.

19 Heat is one kind of touch, or hot touch, and is the proper quality of fire. On the other hand, cold touch is the proper quality of water. Earth and air have 'not hot and not cold touch.' There is no other kind of touch.

20 According to the *Vyomavatī*, of destruction of a dark colour etc., the material cause is atoms, the non-material cause is their connection with fire, and the efficient cause is hot touch.

21 Actions are not possible to be produced in such atoms which have no colour etc. Actions of atoms produce diads. If actions should be produced in atoms without colour, their effects, or diads, would also be without colour. This leads to the absurdity that a pot without colour (invisible) appears.

tion of the atom with soul assisted by the *adṛṣṭa*[22] (the merit and demerit) of those who are going to enjoy the substance as an effect, namely, the pot.[23]

According to *pīlupākavāda* a dark clay pot is completely destroyed by heat, and will later be reconstituted as a red pot. At this point, something is required to compell the individual atoms to reconstitute themselves into a pot. This something is the connection of the atom with soul assisted by the *adṛṣṭa* of those who are going to enjoy the effect, namely, the pot. Such a notion might seem odd, but it was quite natural for the Vaiśeṣikas For it was their conviction that the world is composed of the effects of the *adṛṣṭa* or the deeds of beings.

Now, after actions are produced in the atoms, connections among the atoms are produced. First of all, diads are produced, then, triads, and ultimately, the whole substance. And the red colour of an individual atom produces the red colour of a diad, which produces the red colour of a triad. In this way the red colour of the whole substance is produced.[24]

B. Piṭharapākavāda

As far as I know, the complete description of *piṭharapākavāda* is only found in those Vaiśeṣikas' texts which criticize it. So, to begin with, we are forced to examine the version of the theory criticized briefly by Praśastapāda.[25] It is summarized as follows:

22 As for the concept of *adṛṣṭa*, see Section 5 of I. 3.

23 *utpanneṣu ghaṭādiṣu yeṣāṃ tatsādhyayoḥ sukhaduḥkhayor anubhavo bhogo bhaviṣyati te bhoginaḥ teṣām adṛṣṭaṃ dharmādharmalakṣaṇam apekṣamāṇād ātmaparamāṇusaṃyogād utpannapākajarūparasagan-dhasparśeṣu paramāṇuṣu karamāṇy utpadyante.* (*Nyāyakandalī*)

24 There are various arguments on how much moments (*kṣaṇas*) the whole process of *pākajotpatti* takes.

25 *na ca kāryadravya eva rūpādyutpattir vināśo vā sambhavati. sarvāvayaveṣv antar bahiś ca vartamānasyāgninā vyāptyabhāvād. aṇupraveśād api ca vyāptir na sambhavati. kāryadravyavināśād iti.* (*Praśastapādabhāṣya*)

A pot (etc.) has an innumerable number of small gaps between its parts. Minute particles of fire penetrate through these gaps, pervade every part of the pot, and becomes directly connected with the atoms of the pot. As a result of this connection the dark colour is destroyed. Then, the red colour is produced. The structure of the pot as a whole remains unchanged.

According to *piṭharapākavāda*, there is no need to assume that the dark pot is dissolved into atoms and then reconstituted to a red pot with the help of the *adṛṣṭa* of those who are going to enjoy it. Thus, *piṭharapākavāda* seems to be far simpler than *pīlupākavāda*, and also seems to be based upon common sense.

The *Nyāyasūtra* and its commentary, the *Nyāyabhāṣya* of *Vātsyāyana*, do not refer to *piṭharapākavāda*.[26] But in these texts an argument related to *piṭharapākavāda* is found. It is an argument to demonstrate that sense organs are composed of elements. The visual organ, or an eye-beam, is especially at issue.[27] The *Nyāyasūtra* and the *Nyāyabhāṣya* discuss this problem as follows :

"[*Nyāyasūtra* 3. 1. 46:] Since obstructedness [which something has] surely points out [its being composed of elements], it is a property of those which are composed of elements.

[*Nyāyabhāṣya* :] Since sense organs are considered to have obstacles (a wall etc.), [in other words, sense organs

26 The phenomenon of *pākajotapatti* itself is referred to in *Nyāyasūtra* 3. 2. 49, 50, 72 : 4. 1. 5, 47, 67.

27 Existence of an eye-beam was postulated to explain the cognition of the objects like mountains which apparently are not in contact with eyes because they are far larger than eyes. See *Nyāyasūtra* 3. 1. 33–50. This problem is deeply connected with the theory of sense organs functioning after reaching their objects (*prāpyakārivāda*) which equals the opposite theory (*aprāpyakārivāda*) of the Buddhists. Eye-light which is seen of such night-acting animals as cats etc. is the very 'eye-beam' according to the *Nyāyasūtra*. The later Mīmāṃsakas maintain a little different theory of an eye-beam. Cf. *Mānameyoduya*, pp. 11–12.

cannot grasp things behind a wall,] they have obstructedness as to some particular substances. It is a property of those which are composed of elements, and so, it invariably points out [that sense organs are composed of] elements. It is not an empirical fact that that which is not composed of element has obstructedness as its property. On the other hand, non-obstructedness [of something] cannot point out [whether it is composed of elements or not]. Because [non-obstructedness is] common both to that which is composed of elements and to that which is not composed of elements.

It is not right to consider as follows : < It is certainly understood that sense organs are composed of elements if they have obstructedness, but are not composed of elements if they do not have obstructedness. Now, it is experienced that [sense organs] do not have obstructedness. Because [a visual organ] grasps those which are separated by glass, mica or crystal. >

Because there are some cases where even those which are composed of elements are not obstructed. It is so because light of a lamp illuminates those which are separated by glass, mica or crystal. [Besides,] cooking fire is not obstructed by an earthen pan etc."[28]

" [*Nyāyabhāṣya* :] It is not right to consider that those which are composed of elements always have obstructedness. [*Nyāyasūtra* 3. 1. 47 :] Because (1) a sunbeam is not obstructed, (2) [light of a lamp is] not obstructed [by crystal and illuminates] even that which is separated by crystal and (3) [cooking fire is] not obstructed.[29]

[*Nyāyabhāṣya*] ......(1) A sunbeam is not obstructed by a pot etc. Because there are no obstacles. [It] heats water in a pot. That is to say, when [a sunbeam] reaches [a pot [, there is perceived hot touch which is a quality of a substance other [than water]. Cold touch [of water] is suppressed by it (hot touch). (2) Light of a lamp, even when its object to illuminate is separated by crystal, is not obstructed [by it]. As [it is] not obstructed [by crystal], that which is reached [by it] is perceived. (3) Besides, a substance which is inside of a cooking pan etc. is burned by heat of fire. As [heat is] not obstructed by it (a cooking pan), [heat] reaches [a substance which is inside of a cooking pan]. And, when [heat] reaches [the substance], burning [is produced]. Heat is not that which functions without reaching [its object].

...What is then ' not being obstructed ' ? [It means] that a substance is not held back by [another] substance like a shelter whose parts are not [tightly] assembled. Or [it means] that the cause of function is not obstructed. Or [it means] that [fire] reaching [its object] is not obstructed. That is to say, it is experienced that, despite the fact that water was poured into a pot, cold touch comes to be perceived outside [of the pot]. Moreover, it is not [possible] that touch is perceived in a substance which is not in contact with a sense organ. There are seen [of water] spreading and permeation. An eye-beam, as it is not obstructed by glass, mica etc., is possible to grasp the

28 <*avyabhicārāc ca pratighāto bhautikadharmaḥ.*>

yaś cāvaraṇopalambhād indriyasya dravyaviśeṣe pratighātaḥ sa bhautikadharmo na bhūtāni vyabhicarati. nābhautikaṃ pratighātadharmakaṃ dṛṣṭam iti. apratighātas tu vyabhicārī bhautikābhautikayoḥ samānatvād iti.

yad api manyate pratighātād bhautikānīndriyāṇi, apratighātād abhautikānīti prāptam, dṛṣṭaś cāpratighātaḥ kācābhrapaṭalasphaṭikāntaritopalabdheḥ, tan na yuktam.

yasmād bhautikam api na pratihanyate, kācābhrapaṭalasphaṭikāntaritaprakāśāt pradīparaśmīnām. sthālyādiṣu pācakasya tejaso 'pratighātaḥ

29 If we neglect the interpretation by Vātsyāyana, the original meaning of this *sūtra* should be as follows : " Because a sunbeam, even when those to heat are separated by crystal etc., is not obstructed [by crystal etc.]. "

object by contact with it which is separated [by glass etc.]."[30]

The points related to the theory of *pākajotpatti* are as follows:

The parts of a pot etc. are not tightly assembled despite their outer appearance.

Reason 1 : Cooking fire heats water which is inside of the pot.

Reason 2 : Sunbeam heats water which is inside of the pot.

Reason 3 : Cold touch (*śītasparśa*) of water in a pot is perceived outside of the pot.

Hot touch (*uṣṇasparśa*) is a proper quality of fire. Therefore, the phenomenon that water inside of a pot becomes hot because of a sunbeam, or cooking fire, indicates that minute particles of fire penetrate into the pot and become mixed with the water inside of it. Cold touch is a proper quality of water. Therefore, the phenomenon that the cold touch of water in a pot is perceived outside of the pot indicates that minute particles of water permeate out through the pot.

It is easy to understand that such a notion is deeply related to *piṭharapākāvāda* which asserts that minute particles of fire penetrate through the innumerable minute gaps in a pot.

30 *yaś ca manyate na bhautikasyāpratighāta iti tan na.* < *ādityaraśmeḥ sphaṭikāntarite 'pi dāhye 'vighātāt.* >

.......*ādityaraśmiḥ kumbhādiṣu na pratihanyate 'vighātāt. kumbhastham udakaṃ tapati, prāptau hi dravyāntaraguṇasyoṣṇasparśasya grahaṇam, tena ca śītasparśābhibhava iti. sphaṭikāntarite 'pi prakāśanīye pradīparaśmīnām apratighātaḥ, apratighātāt prāptasya grahanam iti. bharjanakapālādistham ca dravyam āgneyena tejasā dahyate, tatrāvighātāt prāptiḥ, prāptau tu dāho, nāprāpyakāri teja iti.*

........*ko 'yam avighāto nāma. avyūhamānāvayavena dravyeṇa sarvato dravyāviṣṭambhaḥ, kriyāhetor apratibandhaḥ, prāpter apratiṣedha iti. dṛṣṭaṃ*

(*Continued on next page*)

C. *Criticism of the Vaiśeṣikas*

The *Praśastapādabhāṣya* and its commentaries criticize *piṭharapākavāda* as follows :

(1) The parts which compose a whole pot are divided into interior parts and exterior parts. Even when fire is connected with exterior parts, it does not reach interior parts which are obstructed by exterior parts.[31]

(2) A pot does not have innumerable gaps. First, a diad does not have a gap. Because, when two atoms, which by definition have no parts, are connected with each other, it is impossible that one atom is connected with only one part of the other atom. Although it is possible for a triad to have minute gaps, we cannot cognize them. They are not the objects of cognition. To assume that there definitely are gaps, therefore, leads to the fault of logical surplus.[32]

(3) Since a pot does not have any gap, it must be postulated, in order to explain how fire pervades all of the parts of a pot, that a pot is dissolved into its constituent atoms by hit or shaking of fire.

(4) Fire has prominent lightness, velocity and prominent touch (prominent hotness), and is endowed with a power to burn not only grains but also very hard jewels like diamonds.

(*Continued from the last page*)

hi kalaśaniṣaktānām apāṃ bahiḥ śītasparśagrahaṇam. na cendriyenāsannikṛṣṭasya dravyasya sparśopalabdhiḥ. dṛṣṭau ca prasyandaparisravau. tatra kācābhrapaṭalādibhir nayanaraśmer apratighātād vibhidyārthena saha sannikarṣād upapannaṃ grahaṇam iti.

31 *antarbahiś ca saraveṣv avayaveṣu vartamānasya samavetasyāvayavino bāhye vartamānena vahninā vyāpter vyāpakasya saṃyogasyābhāvāt kāryarūpādīnām utpattivināśayor akḷpter antarvartinām apākajaprasaṅgād iti bhāvaḥ.* (*Nyāyakandalī*)

32 *Upaskāra* mentions a little different reason as follows : *na, mūrtānāṃ samānadeśatāvirodhāt, avayavāntarayukte madhyabhāge tejaḥsaṃyogāsaṁbhavāt.* As for the meaning of the phrase of '*mūrtānāṃ samānadeśatā virodhāt*,' see Section 2 of I. 3.

(5) The qualities of a substance as an effect are not destroyed as long as their material cause is not destroyed. But we know by our experience that the dark colour of a clay pot is destroyed in a kiln. Therefore, a clay pot must be destroyed by its connection with fire.[33]

D. Criticism of the Naiyāyikas

Here, the Naiyāyikas attempt to point out the problem in *pīlupākavāda* by presenting another point of view. They assert that people who watch a pot being burned in a kiln recognize, or have the cognition of identity, 'This is indeed that pot.'[34] They determine this from the following facts:

(a) A pot of the same form is seen continuously while it is being burned in a kiln.

(b) A dish, which is placed on a pot during its being burned, is not seen to change its position.[35]

(c) The number of parts which compose a pot does not change.

(d) The dimension of a pot does not change.

(e) The scratches impressed on the surface of a pot do not change.

E. Reply from the Vaiśeṣikas

The above criticisms of the Naiyāyikas seem to have been very difficult for the Vaiśeṣikas. Śrīdhara, for example, presents a partial compromise by claiming that the dissolution and reconstitution do not occur all at once, but proceed gradually in such a way that some parts of the pot are destroyed while other parts are being reconstituted.[36] Thus, it was possible for Śrīdhara to explain (a) to (e). He must have thought that he had succeeded in answering to the Naiyāyikas' criticisms based on recognition.

On the other hand, Udayana, who was an expert in arguing, answered to the criticisms based on recognition, or cognition of identity, through the example of a pot in which several triads were destroyed as a result of being pierced by a needle. This extent of destruction does not prevent us from recognizing the pot at all, but according to the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas the pot is destroyed after being pierced by the needle. Therefore, a pot after being pierced by a needle cannot be the same as before. It is impossible even for those who maintain *piṭharapākavāda* to deny this logical fact. Consequently, the fact of recognition cannot be the grounds for demonstrating the non-destruction of a pot. Udayana's argument is much more powerful than Śrīdhara's.

3. Some problems with the theory of pākajotpatti

The basic Vaiśeṣika tenets used in the theory of *pākajotpatti*, especially in *pīlupākavāda*, are summarized as follows:

(i) The qualities of a substance as an effect are produced by the qualities of the substances as causes. (The following three tenets can be considered to be derived from this tenet.)

(ii) The destruction of qualities is possible by the destruction of their material cause.

33 *Nyāyakandalī* presents a syllogism as follows: *ghaṭarūpādaya āśrayavināśād eva naśyanti. kāryadravyagatarūparasagandhasparśatvāt. mudgalābhihitanaṣṭaghaṭarūpavat.*

34 *sa evāyaṃ ghaṭaḥ.* (*Vyomavatī* and *Upaskāra*) *so 'yaṃ ghaṭaḥ.* (*Siddhāntamuktāvalī*)

35 A dish placed on a clay pot does not drop down. If a clay pot should be destroyed, a dish on it would surely drop down.

36 *sarvāvasthopalabdhir api kāryasya vinaśyato 'pi krameṇa vināśāt, na hi ghaṭaḥ paramāṇusañcayārabdho yena vibhakteṣu paramāṇuṣu sahasaiva vinaśyet, kiṃ tu dvyaṇukādiprakrameṇārabdhaḥ tasya dvyaṇukatryaṇukādyasaṅkhyeyadravyavināśāt paramparayā cireṇa vinaśyato yāvad vināśas tāvad upalabdhir asty eva. ekataś ca pūrve 'vayavā vinaśyanti, anyataś cotpannapākajair aṇubhir apūrve tatsthānā eva dvyaṇukādiprakrameṇārabhyante tena pakv pakvāvayavadarśanam.* (*Nyāyakandalī*)

(iii) Plural qualities of the same class do not coexist in one and the same substance.

(iv) The action of an atom is possible only when it has qualities, or colour etc. (Otherwise, an odd substance as an effect, which has no colour etc., should appear. This is absurd.)

Piṭharapākavāda violates rule (ii) not because of logical considerations, but because of a desire to preserve the common sense view that there is neither the destruction nor reconstitution of the pot. Though we can estimate a somehow empiristic attitude of the Naiyāyikas, we cannot help considering that the Vaiśeṣikas are much more logical than they are. It should be said as a matter of course that the logical structure of the old Naiyāyikas was replaced gradually by that of the Vaiśeṣikas.

Navertheless, *pīlupākavāda* also seems to us outsiders to have several problems.

(1) The destruction and reconstitution of the pot is not in accordance with our common sense.

(2) It seems to commit the fault of logical surplus to assume that individual atoms are given action by the *adṛṣṭa* of those who are going to enjoy the pot.

(3) Atoms of earth without colour appear for one moment after the dark colour is destroyed by the second connection with fire and before the red colour is produced by the third connection with fire.[37] Atoms of earth are not qualified by colour at this moment.

(4) A pot without colour also appears at the moment immediately after the pot comes into existence.

Among these, (1) and (2) are not a problem if we admit the logical point of view of the Vaiśeṣikas.

37 *dravyārambhānuguṇāvayavakriyāyā rūpasparśādimaty utpattiniyamāt rūpādivirahiṇo dravyasya kṣaṇamātrasthiteḥ karmaṇaś ca kāraṇāntarāpekṣād iti.* (*Kiraṇāvalī*)

On the other hand, (4) is a general problem for the Vaiśeṣikas because, according to their theory of causality, the production of an effect should surely be preceded by the existence of a cause. To admit the simultaneous production of a cause and an effect is to deny the Vaiśeṣika theory of causality—the theory of new production (*ārambhavāda*)—namely, the theory that an effect never pre-exist in a cause (*asatkāryavāda*). They should have been fully aware that to separate things physically is utterly different from separating them abstractly. Tow things which are connected (*saṃyukta*) to each other can be separated physically while two things which are related by inherence, for example, a pot and its colour, can be separated only abstractly. The appearance of a naked substance, as it were, without colour is the inevitable result of their theory of causality.

(3) may be more difficult than (4). Because, while in case (4) the red colour of a pot is produced by the red colour of its causes, in case (3) the red colour of an atom of earth is not produced by the red colour of its cause(s). This is because, since an atom by definition has no parts, it is uncaused. As was seen above, the third connection with fire assisted by heat produces new qualities, such as red colour, in an atom whose previous qualities were already destroyed. But it is difficult to admit that fire (not earth) or heat (not of earth) produces a quality in earth. It is because of this difficulty that all of the Vaiśeṣika texts avoide discussing this issue in detail.[38]

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38 The *Nyāyabhāṣya* on *Nyāyasūtra* 3. 2. 49 mentions as follows: "A substance does not suffer the absolute destruction of colour. When a dark colour is destroyed, there is produced another quality, or a red colour, which is produced by heat." (*nātyantarūpoparamo dravyasya. śyāme rūpe nivṛtte pākajaṃ guṇāntaraṃ raktaṃ rūpam utpadyate.*) And Udayana in his *Lakṣaṇāvalī* mentions as follows : "A substance is not a substratum of the absolute absence of qualities." (*guṇātyantābhāvānadhikaraṇaṃ dravyam.*) Despite their endeavour fundamental question is not resolved.

CHAPTER 4

ON BODY

The Vaiśeṣikas' argument on which elements make up a body helps us to deepen our understanding of their theory of causality and their strict division between connection, which is a quality, and inherence, which they consider as an independent category. Soul is said to have a body (*dehin, śarīrin,* etc.) when it is in the state of transmigration. And a person who has died and attained perfect final release is said to be devoid of a body (*videha*). To end this treatise with an examination of body will be appropriate since it began with an examination of soul.

1. Various views on body

In the sixth chapter of the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* Uddālaka Āruṇi teaches Śvetaketu, his son, about the emanation of the world from the non-dual single existent (*sat*). The outline of his teaching is as follows :

> At first this world was only the existent which is single and non-dual. It thought, 'I will become multiple. I will breed.' It then produced heat. In the same way heat produced water, and water produced food. The existent entered these three elements together with soul, and made each of them threefold. In this way all things emanated in the world. Eventually human body and mind were also composed out of these three elements. The correspondence between elements and parts of human body and mind is as follows :
>
> food — its rough particles — faeces
> its medium particles — flesh
> its subtle particles — mind
>
> water — its rough particles — urine
> its medium particles — blood
> its subtle particles — breath

> heat — its rough particles — bone
> its medium particles — marrow
> its subtle particles — organ of utterance

Uddālaka Āruṇi's idea of the three elements was followed by the Sāṅkhyas. According to them, all of the things including human bodies and minds are composed of three subordinate components (*guṇa*) — purity, activity and darkness, and the characteristics of all of the things in the world are determined by the percentage of each of these three subordinate components. The Sāṅkhyaṣ also maintained that a body is composed of the five physical elements — earth, water, fire, air and ether.

In the *Pañcīkaraṇa* which is ascribed to Śaṅkara the Vedāntins maintained that all of the things in the world including human bodies are composed of five elements. The percentage of each of these elements determines the characteristic of each thing. The process of their being mixed up in various ratios is called '*pañcīkaraṇa*' (the fivefold production). This theory was evidently influenced by the Sāṅkhyas.

There were some who maintained that bodies are composed of three elements : earth, water and fire, and others who maintained that they are composed of four elements : earth, water, fire, air. This is known from *Nyāyasūtra* 3. 1. 28 and 29 which will be examined later.

On the other hand, the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas maintained that the bodies of all of the beings that inhabit the same world as human beings inhabit are composed only of earth. This assertion sounds very strange, but it is, of course, derived from the basic rules which govern their theory of causality.

The *Nyāyasūtra* mentions briefly as follows :

> "[A body is] composed of earth. Because a particular quality (smell) is cognized [in it]". *pārthivaṃ guṇāntaropalabdheḥ.* (3. 1. 27)

"[A body is] composed of earth, water and fire. Because their qualities are cognized [in it]". *pārthivāpyataijasaṃ tadguṇopalabdheḥ.* (3. 1. 28)

"[A body is] composed of four elements (earth, water, fire and air). Because expiration and aspiration (particular forms of air) are cognized [in it]". *niḥśvāsocchvāsopalabheś cāturbhautikam.* (3. 1. 29)

"[A body is] composed of five elements (earth, water, fire, air and ether) because of [existence of] smell, moisutre, heat, circulation and room [in it]". *gandhakledapākavyūhāvakāśadānebhyaḥ pāñcabhautikam.* (3. 1. 30)

"And because of authenticity of the Vedas". *śrutiprāmāṇyāc ca.* (3. 1. 31)

Vātsyāyana in his *Nyāyabhāṣya* says that the first and the last *sūtras* expound the Naiyāyika theory, and that the other three refer to opinions of the oppontnts. His interpretation is based on the Vaiśeṣika theory of body found in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra.*

2. The Vaiśeṣikasūtra on body

Descriptions of the body in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* are a little complicated. This is why the commentators' interpretations differ so much. These descriptions are, according to the *Vṛtti*, the oldest available commentary on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, as follows :

"Because connection of those which are directly cognized with those which are not directly cognized is not directly cognized, there is not [a body] which is composed of five [elements]". *pratykṣāpratyakṣāṇām apratyakṣatvāt saṃyogasya pañcātmakaṃ na vidyate*[1]. (4. 2. 1)

1 *Vyākhyā* reads : *pratyakṣāpratyakṣavṛtter apratyakṣatvād vāyuvanaspatisaṃyogavat pañcātmakaṃ na vidyate.* According to it, the *sūtra* means : "Because that which exists in both what is directly cognized and what is not directly cognized is not directly cognized like connection of air with a tree, there is not [a body] which is composed of five [elements]." *Upaskāra* reads : *pratyakṣāpratyakṣāṇāṃ saṃyogasyāpratyakṣatvāt pañcātmakaṃ na vidyate.*

"And because other qualities (not of earth) do not appear, there is not (a body) which is composed of three [elements]". *guṇāntarāprādurbhāvāc ca tryātmakam api na*[2]. (4. 2. 2)

"But it is not prohibited that five elements are connected with each other by themselves". (*ātmasaṃyogas tv apratiṣiddho mithaḥ pañcānām*[3]. (4. 2. 3)

2 *Vyākhyā* reads : *tryātmakam api* [*na*]. It interprets that '*api*' means '*caturātmakam.*' *Upaskāra* reads : *guṇāntarāprādurbhāvāc ca na tryātmakam.*

3 The *Vṛtti* interprets '*ātman*' as '*svarūpa*,' and mentions that the *sūtra* is paraphrased as "*svarūpeṇa pañcānām api bhūtānāṃ parasparasaṃyogo na pratiṣidhyate.*" *Vyākhyā* reads : *ātmasaṃyogaś ca pratiṣiddho mithaḥ pañcānām.* It interprets '*ātman*' literally as one of nine kinds of substances, namely, soul, and '*mithaḥ*' as '*parasparasaṃyogaḥ.*' According to it, the *sūtra* means : "Connection of [one of] five [elements] with soul and [connection] of [one of] five [elements] with each other are prohibited." The *Vyākhyā* states, "And it is prohibited that connection of five elements with each other is a non-material cause of a body" (*pañcānāṃ parasparasaṃyogaś ca śarīr[ā]samavāyikāraṇatve pratiṣiddhaḥ*), and presents a syllogism as follows : "[Statement] A body has connection of earth etc. with soul as its non-material cause. [Reason] Because of substanceness. [Illustration] like ether." (*śarīram .. nāpy ātmapṛthivyādisaṃyogāsamavāyikāraṇakam. dravyatvāt, ākāśavad iti*) *Upaskāra* omits.

Immediately after this *sūtra* both *Vyākhyā* and *Upaskāra* set up a *sūtra* which is not seen in the *Vṛtti*. The *Vyākhyā* reads : *aṇusaṃyogas tv apratiṣiddho mithaḥ pañcānām.* According to it, the *sūtra* means : "Connection of five [elements] with each other[, which does not newly produce an effect,] is not prohibited." *Upaskāra* reads : *aṇusaṃyogas tv apratiṣiddhaḥ.* It argues on why heat (hot touch) which is a proper quality of fire exists in a body. It states, "It is not prohibited that connection of five elements with each other is that which supports each other. But it is not [possible to] consider that connection of two atoms of different class is a non-material cause of a substance." (*mithaḥ pañcānāṃ bhūtānāṃ parasparam upastambhakatayā saṃyogo na niṣidhyate, kiṃ tu vijātīyayor aṇvor dravyaṃ praty asamavāyikāraṇaṃ saṃyogo neṣyate.*) Moreover, the *Upaskāra*, after having quoted the *Nyāyasūtra* 3. 1. 27, states "Those [heat etc.] which are qualities of fire are additional [for a body], and smell [which is a proper quality of earth] is of nature." (*teṣām aupādhikatvaṃ gandhasya svābhāvikatvam.*)

To begin with, among the five elements, 'those which are directly cognized' are earth, water and fire, and 'those which are not directly cognized' are air and ether. The Vaiśeṣikas admit only four elements. Ether is not an element for them because it does not take the form of atom. It is the opponents, therefore, who enumerate the five elements.

If a body were produced by the connection of the five elements, the connection would not be cognized. But, every connection between the parts of a body is directly cognized. Therefore, since two of the elements are not directly cognized, it is impossible to assume that the five elements are connected with each other in a body. — A very clear mixed hypothetical syllogism.

Here the opponents present another possibility that, because the connection between the three directly cognized elements — earth, water and fire — is directly cognized, a body must be composed of the three elements. *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 4. 2. 2 refers to and denies the possibility presented by the opponents. The phrase 'because other qualities do not appear' indicates the reason for the denial. The *Vṛtti* mentions the following :

> " If [a body] is newly produced[4] by earth, water and fire, other qualities — colour etc. of [elements] other [than earth] — would be produced in an effect (a body) by colour etc. of [elements] other [than earth]. But they are not so. We cognize in a body only colour etc. of earth. Therefore, [it is] not [possible] that [a body is] composed of three [elements]. "[5]

Now, let's observe our own bodies. They have blood, urine, sweat etc. which cannot be produced without water. They have temperature which is, according to the Vaiśeṣikas, a proper quality of fire. We cannot live without breathing, and breath is one form

4 As for the reason why I translated it in this way, see III. 1.

5 *kṣitisalilānalair ārambhe vilakṣaṇebhyo rūpādibhyaḥ kārye vilakṣaṇāni rūpāṇi guṇāntarāṇi jāyeran. na tv evam. api tu pārthivān eva rūpādīn upalabhāmahe. tasmān na tryātmakam.*

of air. There are also a lot of cavities in our bodies. These cavities are said to be ether which is limited by various parts of the body. These facts suggest that a body is composed of the five elements. The intention of *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 4. 2. 3 is, the *Vṛtti* says, to explain these facts, and yet to deny this idea.

Candrānanda, interpreting this *sūtra*, says that there is no problem in considering that the five elements are simply connected with each other in a body while keeping their own characteristics independently. However, he adds to it a limiting phrase, namely, 'not as those which newly produce [a body],' and mentions the following :

> " Water etc. are connected, not inherent, in a body which is composed of earth. "[6]

That is to say, the question of which elements a body is composed is, for the Vaiśeṣikas, nothing but the question what the material cause which newly produces a body is. According to the Vaiśeṣikas our bodies have colour, taste, smell and touch. It is only earth, however, that has all of these four qualities. But it is rash to conclude directly from these two propositions that a body is composed only of earth. For the touch (temperature) of a body might be the temperature of air, fire or water. A body's colour might be the colour of fire or water, and its taste might be the taste of water. The conclusion that a body is composed of earth originates from the Vaiśeṣika theory of causality, and especially from their atomism. We should examine it in order to understand the Vaiśeṣika theory of body in full.

3. Atoms to body — Conclusion

Now, the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* contains the following two *sūtras* :

> " [Qualities which inhere] in earth are [of two kinds] : those which are produced by qualities of their causes and those which are produced by heat. " *kāraṇaguṇapūrvāḥ pṛthivyāṃ pākajāś ca*[7]. (7. 1. 10)

6 *pārthivaśarīre jalādīni saṃyogīni, na samavāyīni.*

7 As for varient readings of this *sūtra*, see note 8 on III. 3.

> "[Qualities which inhere] in water, fire and air are [only] those which are produced by qualities of their causes. There are no [qualities] which are produced by heat [in this case]." *apsu tejasi vāyau ca kāraṇaguṇapūrvāḥ pākajā na vidyante*[8]. (7. 1. 11)

Except for those qualities which are produced by heat, the four kinds of qualities (colour, taste, smell and touch) of a substance as an effect are produced by the qualities of substances as its causes. Praśastapāda in *Guṇasādharmyavaidharmya-nirūpaṇa* mentions the following :

> "Colour, taste, smell and touch which are not those [qualities] which are produced by heat, and dimension, the number one, separateness of one, weight, fluidity, moisture and velocity are produced by qualities of causes."[9]

Only by this are we able to understand the Vaiśeṣika idea that a body is composed of earth.

Each atom of some class comes to be connected only with another one of the same class — for example, an atom of earth is connected with another atom of earth. Two atoms which have action are connected with each other and produce one diad. Three diads produce one triad. Thus, a substance as a whole is produced. It is impossible for atoms of different classes to be connected with each other and to produce an effect. Because, if they were connected with each other and could produce a substance as a whole, an absurd consequence would arise.

Let's take earth and water for example. While earth has smell, water does not. And, while earth has not cold and not hot touch, water has cold touch. Now, let's suppose that an atom of earth and an atom of water are connected with each other. Their first effect is a diad. Now, the qualities of a substance as an effect are produced, according to the Vaiśeṣikas, by the qualities of the substances which are the causes of the substance. The white colour of a piece of cloth, for example, is produced by the white colours of its threads, not by the white colour of *a single* thread. It is impossible, therefore, for a diad which is composed of an atom of earth and an atom of water to have either smell or touch. It is also impossible for a triad which is composed of three diads to have either smell or touch. Consequently, a substance without smell and touch must be produced. This is absurd because half of the atoms that make up the substance have either smell or touch. According to the Vaiśeṣikas a body is a substance as an effect. Therefoe, it is impossible to consider that it is composed of plural kinds of elements.[10]

8 As for varient readings of this *sūtra*, see note 9 on *loc. cit.*

9 *apākajarūparasagandhasparśaparimāṇaikatvaikapṛthaktvagurutvadravatvasnehavegāḥ kāraṇaguṇapūrvakāḥ.*

Now, our bodies are, according to the Vaiśeṣikas, not composed of air because they have colour, taste and smell which air does not have. They are also not composed of fire because they have taste and smell which fire does not have. And they are not composed of water because they have smell which water does not have. By a process of elimination it can be concluded that a body is composed only of earth.

In short, this conclusion is the necessary consequence of the Vaiśeṣika theory of causality, namely, the theory of new production, or the theory that an effect does not pre-exist in a cause.

The above theory, however, cannot explain the variegated colour (*citrarūpa*) directly. This is because red threads and blue threads do not produce either red or blue cloth. I will discuss this problem in my forthcoming paper.

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10 Uddyotakara in his *Nyāyavārttika* and Vācaspatimiśra in his *Tātparyaṭīkā* on the *Nyāyasūtra* 3. 1. 28–30 argue about this problem in the same way as above. But we can easily grasp the Vaiśeṣika logical procedure in this case without the help of their interpretations.

APPENDIX

THE DAŚAPADĀRTHĪ OF CANDRAMATI

A TRANSLATION

WITH A RECONSTRUCTED SANSKRIT TEXT, NOTES AND A CRITICAL EDITION OF THE CHINESE VERSION

There is only one complete translation of the *Daśapadārthī* by Dr. H. Ui which is available in Chinese version only. Therefore his translation is estimated as imporant and valuable one. However his translation is full of misunderstanding, and hence we find it difficult to understand it in full. This is mainly because, in those days when he tanslated it, there was only Śaṅkaramiśra's *Upaskāra* available as a commentary on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*. By now another two older commentaries — the *Vyākhyā* of probably Bhaṭṭavādīndra and the *Vṛtti* of Candrānanda — have come to light. Besides, the very Chinese version creates many problems the origin of which goes to the misunderstanding and no understanding on the part of the Chinese translator. Nevertheless, we are fortunate in the sense that his translation is amazingly literal one, even though not dependable. His literal translation can help one reconstruct the Sanskrit text. This is why I have made an attempt here to reconstruct the Sanskrit text, and to revise the Chinese version.

My intention is to provide a reference book which will help better understanding of the Vaiśeṣika logic and epistemology.

There is no division of the Chinese version into chapters and sections. It was Dr. H. Ui who introduced such division. I put consecutive numbers in brackets at the end of each paragraph for the sake of convenience.

CHAPTER I

PROPER FEATURES OF TEN CATEGORIES

Section 1 — Ten Categories

There are ten categories of entities : substance, quality, action, universal, particular, inherence, potentiality, non-potentiality, particular universal and negation. (*padārthā daśa — dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyaśaktyaśaktisāmānyaviśeṣapratiṣedhā iti.*) [1]

Section 2 — Substance

What is the category of substance ? Nine kinds of substances are called the category of substance. What are those nine ? Earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, soul and mind are nine substances. (*ko dravyapadārthaḥ ? yāni navavidhāni dravyāṇi sa eva dravyapadārtha ity ucyate. kāni tāni nava ? pṛthivyaptejovāyvākāśakāladigātmamanāṃsīti nava dravyāṇi.*) [2]

What is earth ? That which has colour, taste, smell and touch is called earth. (*kā pṛthivī ? yā rūparasagandhasparśavatī saiva pṛthivīty ucyate.*) [3]

What is water ? That which has colour, taste, touch, fluidity and moisture is called water. (*kā āpaḥ ? yā rūparasasparśavatyo dravatvasnehavatyaś ca tā evāpa ity ucyate.*) [4]

What is fire ? That which has colour and touch is called fire. (*kiṃ tejaḥ ? yad rūpasparśavat tad eva teja ity ucyate.*) [5]

What is air ? That which has only touch is called air. (*ko vāyuḥ ? yaḥ sparśamātravān sa eva vāyur ity ucyate.*) [6]

What is ether ? That which has only sound is called ether. (*ka ākāśaḥ ? yaḥ śabdamātravān sa evākāśa ity ucyate.*) [7]

What is time ? That which is the cause of the expression and cognition, namely, 'prior,' 'posterior,' 'simultaneous,' 'not

simultaneous,' 'slow' and 'rapid' is called time. (*kaḥ kālaḥ? yaḥ parāparayaugapadyāyaugapadyacirakṣiprābhidhānapratyayahetuḥ sa eva kāla ity ucyate.*) [8]

What is space? That which is the cause of the expression and cognition, namely, 'east,' 'south,' 'west,' 'north' and so on is called space. (*kā dik? yā pūrvadakṣiṇapaścimottarādyabhidhānapratyayahetuḥ saiva dig ity ucyate.*) [9]

What is soul? That which is the material cause of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, internal effort, impression, merit, and demerit, and produces cognition is called soul. (*ka ātmā? yo buddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnasaṃskāradharmādharmāṇāṃ samavāyikāraṇaṃ jñānotpādakalakṣaṇaṃ sa evātmety ucyate.*) [10]

What is mind? That which is the non-material cause of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, internal effort, impression, merit and demerit, and produces cognition is called mind. (*kiṃ manaḥ? yad buddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnasaṃskāradharmādharmāṇām asamavāyikāraṇaṃ jñānotpādakalakṣaṇaṃ tad eva mana ity ucyate.*) [11]

Section 3 — Quality

What is the category of quality? Twenty-four qualities are called the category of quality. What are the twenty-four qualities? Colour, taste, smell, touch, number, dimension, separateness, connection, separation, the state of being prior (hereafter expressed as 'priority'), the state of being posterior (hereafter expressed as 'posteriority'), cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, internal effort, weight, fluidity, moisture, impression, merit, demerit and sound are the twenty-four qualities. (*ko guṇapadārthaḥ? caturviṃśatir guṇā guṇapadārtha ity ucyate. ke caturviṃśatir guṇāḥ? rūparasagandhasparśasaṅkhyāparimāṇapṛthaktvasaṃyogavibhāgaparatvāparatvabuddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnagurutvadravatvasnehasaṃskāradharmādharmaśabdā ity caturviṃśatir guṇāḥ.*) [12]

What is colour? That which is perceived only by eyes and has one [substance] as its locus is called colour. (*kiṃ rūpam? yac cakṣurmātragrāhyam ekāśritaṃ tad eva rūpam ity ucyate.*) [13]

What is taste? That which is perceived only by tongue and has one [substance] as its locus is called taste. (*ko rasaḥ? yo jihvāmātragrāhya ekāśritaḥ sa eva rasa ity ucyate.*) [14]

What is smell? That which is perceived only by nose and has one [substance] as its locus is called smell. (*ko gandhaḥ? yo ghrāṇamātragrāhya ekāśritaḥ sa eva gandha ity ucyate.*) [15]

What is touch? That which is perceived only by skin and has one [substance] as its locus is called touch. (*kaḥ sparśaḥ? yas tvaṅmātragrāhya ekāśritaḥ sa eva sparśa ity ucyate,*) [16]

What is number? That, namely, the number one and so on, which inheres in all substances, has one or many substances [as its locus], and which is the cause of the expression and cognition, namely, '[This is] one' and so on is called number. (*kā saṅkhyā? yā sarvadravyasamavetā caikānekadravyā caikādyabhidhānapratyayahetur ekatvādiḥ saiva saṅkhyety ucyare.*) [17]

What is dimension? That which is smallness, largeness, shortness, longness, *pārimaṇḍalya* and so on is called dimension. (*kiṃ parimāṇam? yad aṇutvamahattvahrasvatvadīrghatvapārimaṇḍalyādi tad eva parimāṇam ity ucyate.*) [18]

Smallness: That whose material cause is a diad, which is produced by the number two, has one substance [as its locus], and which is the cause of the expression and cognition, namely, '[This is] small' is called smallness. (*aṇutvam iti yasya dvyaṇukaṃ samavāyikāraṇaṃ yad dvitvajanyam ekadravyaṃ yo 'ṇvabhidhānapratyayahetus tad evāṇutvam itv ucyate.*) [19]

Largeness: That which is produced by plurality, largeness and a particular collection, is inherent in a triad and so on, has one substance [as its locus], and which is the cause of the expression and cognition, namely, '[This is] large' is called largeness.

(*mahattvam iti yad bahutvamahattvapracayaviśeṣajanyaṃ tryaṇukādisamavetam ekadravyaṃ yo mahadabhidhānapratyayahetus tad eva mahattvam ity ucyate.*) [20]

Shortness: That whose material cause is a diad, which is produced by the number two, has one substance [as its locus], and which is the cause of the expression and cognition, namely, '[This is] short' is called shortness. (*hrasvatvam iti yasya dvyaṇukaṃ samavāyikāraṇaṃ yad dvitvajanyam ekadravyaṃ yo hrasvābhidhānapratyayahetus tad eva hrasvatvam ity ucyate.*) [21]

Longness: That which is produced by plurality, longness and a particular collection, is inherent in a triad and so on, has one substance [as its locus], and which is the cause of the expression and cognition, namely, '[This is] long' is called longness. (*dīrghatvam iti yad bahutvadīrghatvapracayaviśeṣajanyaṃ tryaṇukādisamavetam ekadravyaṃ yo dīrghābhidhānapratyayahetus tad eva dīrghatvam ity ucyate.*) [22]

Pārimaṇḍalya is of two kinds — the state of having the smallest size (hereafter expressed as 'the smallest size') and that of having the largest size (hereafter expressed as 'the largest size'). (*pārimaṇḍalyaṃ dvividham — paramāṇutvaṃ paramamahattvaṃ ceti.*) [23]

The smallest size: That which is inherent in an atom, has one substance [as its locus], and which is the cause of the expression and cognition, namely, '[This is] the smallest' is called the smallest size. (*paramāṇutvam iti yad paramāṇusamavetam ekadravyaṃ yaḥ paramāṇvabhidhānapratyayahetus tad eva paramāṇutvam ity ucyate.*) [24]

The largest size: That which is inherent in ether, time, space and soul, has one substance [as its locus], and which is the cause of the expression and cognition, namely, '[This is] the largest' and is named the state of being omnipresent and so on is called the largest size. (*paramamahattvam iti yad ākāśakāladigātmasamavetam ekadravyaṃ yaḥ paramamahadabhidhānapratyayahetur vibhutvādi nāma tad eva paramamahattvam ity ucyate.*) [25]

What is separateness? That, namely, separateness of one [substance] and so on, which is inherent in all substances, has one or many substances [as its locus], and which is the cause of the expression and cognition, namely, '[This]' is separate [from the others]' is called separateness. (*kiṃ pṛthaktvam? yad sarvadravyasamavetam ekānekadravyaṃ yaḥ pṛthagabhidhānapratyayahetur ekapṛthaktvādi tad eva pṛthaktvam ity ucyate.*) [26]

What is connection? The reaching of two [substances which did] not reach [each other earlier] is called connection. (*kaḥ saṃyogaḥ? yāprāptayoḥ prāptiḥ sa eva saṃyoga ity ucyate.*) [27]

It is of three kinds — that which is produced by the action of one [substance], that which is produced by the action of both [substances] and that which is produced by connection. (*sa trividhaḥ — anyatarakarmaja ubhayakarmajaḥ saṃyogajaś ceti.*) [28]

That which is produced by the action of one [substance] is produced by one [substance] with action and another without action. (*anyatarakarmajaḥ kriyāvanniṣkriyābhyāṃ bhavati.*) [29]

That which is produced by the action of both [substances] is produced by two [substances] with action. (*ubhayakarmajaḥ kriyāvadbhyāṃ bhavati.*) [30]

That which is produced by connection is connection with [a place of] ether and so on produced by many actionless substances [each of which is connected with a place of ether and so on]. (*saṃyogajo niṣkriya bahudravyaja ākāśādinā saṃyogaḥ.*) [31]

What is separation? The non-reaching of two [substances which] reached [each other earlier] is called separation. (*kaḥ vibhāgaḥ? yā prāptayor aprāptiḥ sa eva vibhāga ity ucyate.*) [32]

It is of three kinds — that which is produced by the action of one [substance], that which is produced by the action of both [substances] and that which is produced by separation. (*sa trividhaḥ — anyatarakarmaja ubhayakarmajo vibhāgajaś ceti.*) [33]

Among them, that which is produced by the action of one [substance] and that which is produced by the action of both [substances] are to be explained in the same way as [the former two kinds of] connection [are explained]. (*tatrānyatarakarmaja ubhayakarmajaś ca saṃyogavad vyākhyeyau.*) [34]

That which is produced by separation is separation from [a place of] ether and so on, assisted by the destruction of a substance as an effect, of a substance which has already produced an effect and which becomes separated from its other cause. (*vibhāgaja ārabdhakāryadravyasya kāraṇāntarād vibhaktasya kāryadravyavināśāpekṣa ākāśādino vibhāgaḥ.*) [35]

What is priority? That which is produced in one substance, whose production is assisted by the cognition as '[That is] far' [about one] of two substances which are related to one and the same time and so on, and which is the cause of the expression and cognition, namely, '[That is] prior [to this]' is called priority. (*kiṃ paratvam? yad ekakālādisambaddhayor viprakṛṣṭabuddhim apekṣyaikadravye janyaṃ yaḥ parābhidhānapratyayahetus tad eva paratvam ity ucyate.*) [36]

What is posteriority? That which is produced in one substance, whose production is assisted by the cognition as '[This is] near' [about one] of two substances which are related in one and the same time and so on, and which is the cause of the expression and cognition, namely, '[This is] posterior [to that]' is called posteriority. (*kim aparatvam? yad ekakālādisambaddhayoḥ sannikṛṣṭabuddhim apekṣyaikadravye janyaṃ yo 'parābhidhānapratyayahetus tad evāparatvam ity ucyate.*) [37]

What is cognition? It is that by which all objects are cognized. (*kā buddhiḥ? yayā sarve arthā bodhyante sā.*) [38]

It is of two kinds — direct cognition and inferencial cognition. (*sā dvividhā — dṛṣṭam anumānaṃ ceti.*) [39]

Direct cognition: That which takes the form of direct experience which is produced when perceivable substances, colour and so on and sense organs and so on come in contact [with each other] is called direct cognition. (*dṛṣṭam iti prāpyadravyarūpādibhir indriyādisannikarṣe saty utpannaṃ yad upalabdhilakṣaṇaṃ tad eva dṛṣṭam ity ucyate.*) [40]

Inferencial cognition: It is of two kinds — inferencial cognition based on general relationship and inferencial cognition not basen on general relationship. (*anumānam iti tad dvividham — sāmānyatodṛṣṭam anumānam asāmānyatodṛṣṭam anumānaṃ ceti.*) [41]

Inferencial cognition based on general relationship: That cognition which is produced about an invisible probandum, after seeing a probans, and by connection of mind with soul, assisted by the recollection of the relation between the probans and the probadum is called inferencial cognition based on general relationship. (*sāmānyatodṛṣṭam anumānam iti yad liṅgadarśanād liṅgaliṅgisambandhasmaraṇāpekṣād ātmamanaḥsaṃyogāc cādṛṣṭaliṅgiviṣaye jñānam utpannaṃ tad eva sāmānyatodṛṣṭam anumānam ity ucyate.*) [42]

Inferencial cognition not based on general relationship: That cognition which is produecd about that object which has not yet appeared at all but which is [possible to be] seen, after seeing an effect, a cause, a relatum [of connection or inherence], that which is inherent in the same thing or that which is opposite [to another], and by the connection of mind with soul, assisted by the recollection of their relation is called inferencial cognition not based on general relationship. (*asāmānyatodṛṣṭam anumānam iti yat kāryakāraṇasambandhyekārthasamavāyivirodhidarśanāt tatsambandhasmaraṇāpekṣād ātmamanaḥsaṃyogāc ca tadatyantāprādurbhūtadṛṣṭaviṣaye jñānam utpannaṃ tad evāsāmānyatodṛṣṭam anumānam ity ucyate.*) [43]

What is pleasure? That which has one substance [as its locus], is a quality of soul, and is of favorable nature is called pleasure. (*kiṃ sukham? yad ekadravyam ātmaguṇo 'nugraha-svabhāvaṃ tad eva sukham ity ucyate.*) [44]

What is pain? That which has one substance [as its locus], is a quality of soul, and is of unfavorable nature is called pain. (*kiṃ duḥkham? yad ekadravyam ātmaguṇa upaghātasvabhāvaṃ tad eva duḥkham ity ucyate.*) [45]

What is desire? That which has one substance [as its locus], is inherent in soul, and is of the form of wish and so on is called desire. (*kecchā? yaikadravyātmasamavetā prārthanādirūpā saivecchety ucyate.*) [46]

What is aversion? That which has one substance [as its locus], is inherent in soul, and is of the form of will to harm and so on is called aversion. (*ko dveṣaḥ? ya ekadravya ātmasamavetaḥ hiṃsādirūpaḥ sa eva dveṣa ity ucyate.*) [47]

What is internal effort? That which has one substance [as its locus], is inherent in soul, and [is the synonym with] enterprize and enthusiasm, and which is produced by the connection of mind with soul assisted by desire and aversion is called internal effort. (*kaḥ prayatnaḥ? ya ekadravya ātmasamaveta icchādveṣāpekṣād ātmamanaḥsaṃyogād janyaḥ saṃrambha utsāha iti sa eva prayatna ity ucyate.*) [48]

What is weight? That which is inherent in a substance of earth and water, has one substance [as its locus], and is the cause of falling down [of substances] is called weight. (*kiṃ gurutvam? yad pārthivāpyadravyasamavetam ekadravyaṃ patanakāraṇaṃ tad eva gurutvam ity ucyate.*) [49]

What is fluidity? That which is inherent in a substance of earth, water and fire, has one substance [as its locus], and is the cause of flowing [of fluid substances] is called fluidity. (*kiṃ dravatvam? yad pārthivāpyataijasadravyasamavetam ekadravyaṃ syandanakāraṇaṃ tad eva dravatvam ity ucyate.*) [50]

What is moisture? That which is inherent in a substance of water, has one substance [as its locus], and is the cause of holding together of [substances like] earth and so on is called moisture. (*kaḥ snehaḥ? ya āpyadravyasamaveta ekadravyaḥ pṛthivyādisaṅgrahakāraṇaṃ sa eva sneha ity ucyate.*) [51]

What is impression? It is of two kinds — cause of recollection and cause of action. (*kaḥ saṃskāraḥ? sa dvividhaḥ — smṛtihetuḥ kriyāhetuś ceti.*) [52]

Cause of recollection: That which is inherent in soul, has one substance [as its locus], is produced by direct or inferencial cognition or impression, and which is a particular mental act, is called cause of recollection. (*smṛtihetur iti ya ātmasamaveta ekadravyo dṛṣṭānumānajñānasaṃskārajanyo bhāvanāviśeṣaḥ sa eva smṛtihetur ity ucyate.*) [53]

Cause of action: That which is produced by action caused by hit, shaking and so on, which exists in one substance as its locus, and which is velocity of substances which have form is called cause of action, that is, impression called velocity. (*kriyāhetur iti yo 'bhighātanodanādijakarmajanya ekadravyāśrito mūrtadravyāṇāṃ vegaḥ sa eva kriyāhetur saṃskāro vego nāmeti.*) [54]

What is merit? It is of two kinds — inducing [merit] and withdrawing [merit]. (*ko dharmaḥ? so dvividhaḥ — pravartako nivartakaś ceti.*) [55]

Inducing [merit]: That which is the cause of a body and so on and pleasure which are desirable, is inherent in soul, has one substance [as its locus], and is destroyed by its effect is called inducing [merit]. (*pravartaka iti yaḥ iṣṭaśarīrādisukhahetur ātmasamaveta ekadravyaḥ kāryavirodhī sa eva pravartaka ity ucyate.*) [56]

Withdrawing [merit]: That which is the cause of right cognition and delight of one who is free from attachment, is inherent in soul, has one substance [as its locus], and is destroyed by

its effect is called withdrawing [merit]. (*nivartaka iti yo virāgasya samyagjñānānandahetur ātmasamaveta ekadravyaḥ kāryavirodhī sa eva nivartaka ity ucyate.*) [57]

What is demerit ? That which is the cause of a body and so on, pain and erroneous cognition which are undesirable, is inherent in soul, has one substance [as its locus], and is destroyed by its effect is called demerit. (*ko 'dharmaḥ ? yo 'niṣṭaśarīrādiduḥkhamithyājñānahetur ātmasamaveta ekadravyaḥ kāryavirodhī sa evādharma ity ucyate.*) [58]

What is sound ? That which is perceived only by ears and exists in one [substance] as its locus is called sound. (*kaḥ śabdaḥ ? yaḥ śrotramātragrāhya ekāśritaḥ sa eva śabda ity ucyate.*) [59]

Section 4 — Action

What is the category of action ? Five kinds of actions are called the category of action. What are the five ? Upward movement, downward movement, shrinking, expanding and movement. (*kaḥ karmapadārthaḥ ? yāni pañcavidhāni karmāṇi saḥ karmapadārthaḥ. kāni tāni pañca ? utkṣepaṇāpakṣepaṇākuñcanaprasāraṇagamanānīti.*) [60]

What is upward movement ? That which is the cause of connecton and separation of atoms and so on with and from those places of ether and so on which occupy upper sides and lower sides [respectively], and has one substance as its locus is called upward movement. [In other words, that which is the cause of connection of atoms and so on with those places of ether and so on which occupy upper sides, is the cause of separation of atoms and so on from those places of ether and so on which occupy lower sides, and has one substance as its locus is called upward movement.] (*kim utkṣepaṇam ? yad ūrdhvādhobhāgbhir ākāśādipradeśaiḥ paramāṇvādīnāṃ saṃyogavibhāgahetur ekadravyāśritaṃ tad evotkṣepaṇam ity ucyate.*) [61]

What is downward movement ? That which is the cause of separation and connection of atoms and so on from and with those places of ether and so on which occupy upper sides and lower sides [respectively], and has one substance as its locus is called downward movement. [In other words, that which is the cause of separation of atoms and so on from those places of ether and so on which occupy upper sides, is the cause of connection of atoms and so on with those places of ether and so on which occupy lower sides, and has one substance as its locus is called downward movement.] (*kim apakṣepaṇam ? yad ūrdhvādhobhāgbhir ākāśādipradeśaiḥ paramāṇvādīnāṃ vibhāgasaṃyogahetur ekadravyāśritaṃ tad evāpakṣepaṇam ity ucyate.*) [62]

What is shrinking ? That which has one substance as its locus among large and long substances and is the cause of separation and connection of those connected with centre places from and with edge and centre places is called shrinking. [In other words, that which has one substance as its locus among large and long substances, is the cause of separation of those connected with centre places from edge, and is the cause of connection of those connected with centre places with centre places is called shrinking.] (*kim ākuñcanam ? yad mahaddīrghadravyeṣv ekadravyāśriaṃ mūladeśasaṃyogināṃ agramūladeśair vibhāgasaṃyogahetus tad evākuñcanam ity ucyate.*) [63]

What is expanding ? That which has one substance as its locus among large and long substances and is the cause of connection and separation of those connected with centre places with and from edge and centre places is called expanding. [In other words, that which has one substance as its locus among large and long substances, is the cause of connection of those connected with centre places with edge, and is the cause of separation of those connected with centre places from centre places is called expanding.] (*kiṃ prasāraṇam ? yad mahaddīrghadravyeṣv ekadravyāśritaṃ mūladeśasaṃyogināṃ agramūladeśair saṃyogavibhāgahetus tad eva prasāraṇam ity ucyate.*) [64]

What is movement ? That which is inherent in all substances that have form, has one substance as its locus, and is the cause of connection and separation is called movement. (*kiṃ gamanam ?*

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yad sarvamūrtadravyasamavetam ekadravyāśritaṃ saṃyogavibhāgahetus tad eva gamanam ity ucyate.) [65]

Section 5 — Universal

What is the category of universal ? It is the highest universal. (*kaḥ sāmānyapadārthaḥ ? satteti.*) [66]

What is the highest universal ? That which is inherent in all the categories of substance, quality and action, is perceived by all the sense organs, and is the cause of the expression and cognition, namely, ' [This is] *sat* (existent) ' as to substances, qualities and actions is called the highest universal. (*kā sattā ? yā sarvadravyaguṇakarmapadārthasamavetā sarvendriyagrāhyā yo dravyaguṇakarmasu sadabhidhānajñānahetuḥ saiva sattety ucyate.*) [67]

Section 6 — Particular

What is the category of particular ? That which is eternal, exists in [eternal] substances, has one substance as its locus, is the cause of the cognition, namely, ' [This is] excluded from that (any other thing) ' and is as well the cause of the cognition, namely, ' This is represented as it is ' is called the category of particular. (*ko viśeṣapadārthaḥ ? yo nityo dravyeṣu vartamāna ekadravyāśritas tadvyāvṛttibuddhihetur etadvyaktibuddhihetuś ca sa eva viśeṣapadārtha ity ucyate.*) [68]

Section 7 — Inherence

What is the category of inherence ? That which is the relation between substances an so on which are inseparable, is the cause of the expression and cognition, namely, ' [This is] here, ' and is single by its nature is called the category of inherence. (*kaḥ samavāyapadārthaḥ ? yo dravyādīnāṃ ayutasiddhānāṃ sambandha ihābhidhānajñānahetuḥ svabhāvata ekaḥ sa eva samavāyapadārtha ity ucyate.*) [69]

Section 8 — Potentiality

What is the category of potentiality ? That which is inherent in substances, qualities and actions, and is attested regularly to

produce their own effects by positive and negative concomitance is called the category of potentiality. (*kaḥ śaktipadārthaḥ ? yo dravyaguṇakarmasamaveto 'nvayavyatirekābhyāṃ svakāryajanakatvaniyato 'avadhṛtaḥ sa eva śaktipadārtha ity ucyate.*) [70]

Section 9 — Non-potentiality

What is the category of non-potentiality ? That which is inherent in substances, qualities and actions, and is attested regularly not to produce other effects by positive and negative concomitance is called the category of non-potentiality. (*ko 'śaktipadārthaḥ ? yo dravyaguṇakarmasamaveto 'nvayavyatirekābhyām anyakāryājanakatvaniyato 'vadhṛtaḥ sa evāśaktipadārtha ity ucyate.*) [71]

Section 10 — Particular universal

What is the category of particular universal ? Substanceness, qualitiness and actionness, and those such as earthness, colourness, upward-movementness and so on which are inherent in the same thing as the former ones [are inherent in] are called the category of particular universal. (*kaḥ sāmānyaviśeṣapadārthaḥ ? dravyatvaguṇatvakarmatvāni tathā tadekārthasamavāyīni pṛthivītvarūpatvotkṣepaṇatvānīty evamādīni sāmānyaviśeṣapadārtha ity ucyate.*) [72]

Substanceness : That which is inherent in all substances, is the cause of the expression and cognition, namely, ' [This is] a substance ' with reference to all substances, does not exist in qualities and actions, and is perceived by eyes and skin is called substanceness. (*dravyatvam iti yad sarvadravyasamavetaṃ sarvadravyeṣu dravyābhidhānapratyayahetur guṇakarmasv avartamānaṃ cakṣuḥsparśanagrāhyaṃ tad eva dravyatvam ity ucyate.*) [73]

Qualitiness : That which is inherent in all qualities, is the cause of the expression and cognition, namely, ' [This is] a quality ' with reference to all qualities, does not exist in substances and actions, and is perceived by all the sense organs is called qualitiness. (*guṇatvam iti yad sarvaguṇasamavetaṃ sarvaguṇeṣu*

guṇābhidhānapratyayahetur dravyakarmasv avartamānaṃ sarvendriyagrāhyaṃ tad eva guṇatvam ity ucyate.) [74]

Actionness : That which is inherent ln all actions, is the cause of the expression and cognition, namely, '[This is] an action' with reference to all actions, does not exist in substances and qualities, and is perceived by eyes and skin is called actionness. (*karmatvam iti yad sarvakarmasamavetaṃ sarvakarmasu karmābhidhānapratyayahetur dravyaguṇeṣv avartamānaṃ cakṣuḥsparśanagrāhyaṃ tad eva karmatvam ity ucyate.*) [75]

Earthness and so on are [to be explained] in the same way as above. (*pṛthivītvādīni caivam eva.*) [76]

Section 11 — Negation

What is the category of negation ? Five kinds of absences are called the category of negation. What are the five ? Pre-absence, destruction, mutual absence, relational absence and absolute absence are five [kinds of] absences. (*kaḥ pratiṣedhapadārthaḥ? pañcavidho 'bhāvaḥ pratiṣedhapadārtha ity ucyate. ke te pañca? prāgabhāvadhvaṃsānyonyābhāvasaṃsargābhāvātyantābhāvā iti pañcavidho 'bhāvaḥ.*) [77]

Pre-absence : That in which substances, qualities and actions, because their causes are not related to them, are not yet produced is called pre-absence. (*prāgabhāva iti yasmin dravyaguṇakarmāṇi kāraṇāsaṃsṛṣṭāni notpannāni sa eva prāgabhāva iiy ucyate.*) [78]

Destruction : That in which substances, qualities and actions, because the power of their causes came to be exhausted, or because the causes contradictory [to them] were produced, though came into existence, have been destroyed is called destruction. (*dhvaṃsa iti yasmin dravyaguṇakarmāṇi kāraṇavaśakṣayād vā virodhikāraṇotpatter votpannāny api dhvasitāni sa eva dhvaṃsa ity ucyate.*) [79]

Mutual absence : That in which substances and so on do not exist in one another is called mutual absence. (*anyonyābhāva iti yasmin dravyādīny anyonyasminn na santi sa evānyonyābhāva ity ucyate.*) [80]

Relational absence : That in which the highest universal, substances and so on are neither connected with nor inherent in some place is called relational absence. (*saṃsargābhāva iti yasmin sattādravyādīny ekaikapradeśe 'saṃyuktāny asamavetāni vā sa eva saṃsargābhāva ity ucyate.*) [81]

Absolute absence : That which is not produced in three times (past, future and present) because of being void of causes, and which is absolutely not produced is called absolute absence. (*atyantābhāva iti yo 'kāraṇatvāt traikālikājanyo 'tyantānutpādaḥ sa evātyantābhāva ity ucyate.*) [82]

CHAPTER II

COMMON PROPERTIES OF TEN CATEGORIES

Section 1 — Substances

1. Substances with Action etc.

Among these nine substances, how many have action (hereafter sometimes expressed as 'with action'), and how many do not have action (hereafter sometimes expressed as 'without action')? (*etādṛśānāṃ navadravyāṇāṃ kati sakriyāṇi kati niṣkriyāṇi?*) [83]

Five, namely, earth, water, fire, air and mind, are with action. The remaining four substances are without action. (*pañca sakriyāṇi — pṛthivyaptejovāyumanāṃsīti. catvāri niṣkriyāṇi — śeṣadravyāṇīti.*) [84]

As these are with and without action, so they should be known to be with and without form, with and without velocity, and with and without priority and posteriority. (*yathā sakriyaniṣkriyāṇi, tathā mūrtāmurtāni saveganirvegāni saparatvāparatvaniṣparatvāparatvānīti jñeyam.*) [85]

2. Substances with Qualities etc.

Among these nine substances, how many have quality, and how many do not have quality? (*etādṛśānāṃ navadravyāṇāṃ kati saguṇāni kati nirguṇāni?*) [86]

All [substances] are with quality. There is no substance without quality. (*sarvāṇy eva saguṇāni. nāsti nirguṇadravyam.* [87]

As all [substances] are with quality, so they are material causes, with substanceness, with particular, not destroyed by their effects, and the causes of those [qualities, namely, connection and separation] which are dependent [on substances]. (*yathā sarvāṇi saguṇāni, tathā samavāyikāraṇāni sadravyatvāni saviśeṣāṇi kāryāvirodhīni sāpekṣakāraṇāni.*) [88]

3. Substances with Touch etc.

Among these nine substances, how many have touch, and how many do not have touch? (*etādṛśānāṃ navadravyāṇāṃ kati sasparśāni kati niḥsparśāni?*) [89]

Four, namely, earth, water, fire and air, are with touch. The remaining five substances are without touch. (*catvāri sasparśāni — pṛthivyaptejovāyava iti. pañca niḥsparśāni — śeṣadravyāṇīti.*) [90]

As these are with and without touch, so they produce a substance and do not produce a substance, and are common and uncommon to substances, qualities and actions. (*yathā sasparśaniḥsparśāni, tathā dravyārambhakānārambhakāni dravyaguṇakarmaṇāṃ kāraṇāni samānāsamānāni.* [91]

4. Substances with Colour etc.

Among these nine substances, how many have colour, and how many do not have colour? (*etādṛśānāṃ navadravyāṇāṃ kati sarūpāṇi katy arūpāṇi?*) [92]

Three, namely, earth, water and fire, are with colour. The remaining six substances are without colour. (*trīṇi sarūpāṇi — pṛthivyaptejāṃsīti. ṣaḍ arūpāṇi — śeṣadravyāṇīti.*) [93]

As these are with and without colour, so they are visible and invisible, and are directly cognized and not directly cognized. (*yathā sarūpārūpāṇi, tathā dṛśyādṛśyāni pratyakṣāpratyakṣāṇi.*) [94]

5. Substances Eternal etc.

Among these nine substances, five are eternal, and four are eternal or non-eternal. (*etādṛśānāṃ navadravyāṇāṃ pañca nityāni, catvāri vikalpyante.*) [95]

Among these four, those which are not produced are eternal, and those which are produced are non-eternal. (*etaccaturṇāṃ anārabdhāṇi nityāny ārabdhāny anityānīti.*) [96]

As these are eternal and non-eternal, so they are without and with substances, are without and with parts, are non-contradictory to their causes and contradictory to their causes, are with and without ultimate particulars and are of the smallest or the largest size (*parimaṇḍala*) and not of the smallest or the largest size (*aparimaṇḍala*). (*yathā nityānityāni, tathādravyasadravyāṇi niravayavasāvayavāni kāraṇāvirodhyakāraṇāvirodhīni sāntyaviśeṣanirantyaviśeṣāṇi parimaṇḍalāparimaṇḍalāni.*) [97]

6. Substances and Senses

Among these nine substances, five are (take the form of) sense organs, and four are not sense organs. What are the five? [These five, namely,] earth, water, fire, air and ether are sense organs. (*etādṛśānāṃ navadravyāṇāṃ pañcendriyāṇi catvāry anindriyāṇi. kāni tāni pañca? pṛthivyaptejovāyvākāśā itīndriyāṇi.* [98]

Among these five sense organs, the organ of smell is nothing but earth, that of taste is nothing but water, that of sight is nothing but fire, that of touch is nothing but air and that of hearing is nothing but ether. (*etādṛśānāṃ pañcendriyāṇāṃ ghrāṇendriyaṃ pṛthivy eva jihvendriyam āpa eva cakṣurindriyaṃ teja eva tvagindriyaṃ vāyur eva śrotrendriyam ākāśa eva.*) [99]

7. Each Substance and its Qualities

[Earth:] Among these nine substances, with how many qaulities is earth called 'with quality'? With fourteen [qualities]. What are these fourteen? [They are] colour, taste, smell, touch, number, dimension, separateness, connection, separation, priority, posteriority, weight, fluidity and impression. (*etādṛśānāṃ navadravyāṇāṃ pṛthivī katibhir guṇaiḥ saguṇety ucyate? caturdaśabhiḥ. ke te caturdaśa? rūparasagandhasparśasaṅkhyāparimāṇapṛthaktvasaṃyogavibhāgaparatvāparatvagurutvadravatvasaṃskārā iti.*) [100]

[Water:] With how many qualities is water called 'with quality'? With fourteen [qualities]. What are these fourteen? [They are] colour, taste, touch, number, dimension, separateness, connection, separation, priority, posteriority, weight, fluidity, moisture and impression. (*āpaḥ katibhir guṇaiḥ saguṇā ity ucyate? caturdaśabhiḥ. ke te caturdaśa? rūparasasparśasaṅkhyāparimāṇapṛthaktvasaṃyogavibhāgaparatvāparatvagurutvadravatvasnehasaṃskārā iti.*) [101]

[Fire:] With how many qualities is fire called 'with quality'? With eleven [qualities]. What are these eleven? [They are] colour, touch, number, dimension, separateness, connection, separation, priority, posteriority, fluidity and impression, (*tejaḥ katibhir guṇaiḥ saguṇam ity ucyate? ekadaśabhiḥ. ke te ekadaśa? rūpasparśasaṅkhyāparimāṇapṛthaktvasaṃyogavibhāgaparatvāparatvadravatvasaṃskārā iti.*) [102]

[Air:] With how many qualities is air called 'with quality'? With nine [qualities]. What are these nine? [They are] number, dimension, separateness, connection, separation, priority, posteriority, touch and impression. (*vāyuḥ katibhir guṇaiḥ saguṇa ity ucyate? navabhiḥ. ke te nava? saṅkhyāparimāṇapṛthaktvasaṃyogavibhāgaparatvāparatvasparśasaṃskārā iti.*) [103]

[Ether:] With how many qualities is ether called 'with quality'? With six [qualities]. What are these six? [They are] number, dimension, separateness, connection, separation and sound. (*ākāśaḥ katibhir guṇaiḥ saguṇa ity ucyate? ṣaḍbhiḥ. ke te ṣaṭ? saṅkhyāparimāṇapṛthaktvasaṃyogavibhāgaśabdā iti.*) [104]

[Time:] With how many qualities is time called 'with quality'? With five [qualities]. What are these five? [They are] number, dimension, separateness, connection and separation. (*kālaḥ katibhir guṇaiḥ saguṇa ity ucyate? pañcabhiḥ. ke te pañca? saṅkhyāparimāṇapṛthaktvasaṃyogavibhāgā iti.*) [105]

[Space:] As is time, so is space. (*yathā kālas tathā dik.*) [106]

[Soul:] With how many qualities is soul called 'with quality'? With fourteen [qualities]. What are these fourteen? [They

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are] number, dimension, separateness, connection, separation, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, internal effort, merit, demerit and impression. (*ātmā katibhir guṇaiḥ saguṇa ity ucyate? caturdaśabhiḥ. ke te caturdaśa? saṅkhyāparimāṇapṛthaktvasaṃyogavibhāgabuddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnadharmādharmasaṃskārā iti.*) [107]

[Mind :] With how many qualities is mind called 'with quality'? With eight [qualities]. What are these eight? [They are] number, dimension, separateness, connection, separation, priority, posteriority and impression. (*manaḥ katibhir guṇaiḥ saguṇam ity ucyate? aṣṭabhiḥ. ke te 'ṣṭau? saṅkhyāparimāṇapṛthaktvasaṃyogavibhāgaparatvāparatvasaṃskārā iti.*) [108]

Section 2 — Qualities

1. *Qualities Directly Cognized etc.*

Among these twenty-four qualities such as colour and so on, how many are objects of direct cognition, and how many are not objects of direct cognition? (*etādṛśānāṃ rūpādicaturviṃśatiguṇānāṃ kati dṛṣṭaviṣayāḥ katy adṛṣṭaviṣayāḥ?*) [109]

Colour, smell, taste and touch are either objects of direct cognition or not objects of direct cognition. (*rūparasagandhasparśā dṛṣṭaviṣayā vādṛṣṭaviṣayā veti.*) [110]

What are objects of direct cognition? Those which exist in large and plural substances are objects of direct cognition. (*ke dṛṣṭaviṣayāḥ? ye mahadanekadravyāśritās te dṛṣṭaviṣayāḥ.*) [111]

What are not objects of direct cognition? Those which exist in an atom or a diad are not objects of direct cognition. (*ke 'dṛṣṭaviṣayāḥ? ye paramāṇuṣu dvyaṇukeṣu cāśritās te 'dṛṣṭaviṣayāḥ.*) [112]

All sounds are objects of direct cognition. (*śabdāḥ sarve dṛṣṭaviṣayāḥ.*) [113]

As are colour, taste, smell and touch, so are number, dimension, separateness, connection, separation, priority, posteriority, fluidity, moisture, weight and velocity. (*yathā rūparasagandhasparśāḥ, tathā saṅkhyāparimāṇapṛthaktvasaṃyogavibhāgaparatvāparatvadravatvasnehagurutvavegāḥ.*) [114]

Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and internal effort which belong to soul are objects of direct cognition. (*buddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnā ātmano dṛṣṭaviṣayāḥ.*) [115]

Merit, demerit and impression are not objects of direct cognition indeed. (*dharmādharmasaṃskārā adṛṣṭaviṣayā eva.*) [116]

2. *Qualities as Products etc.*

Among these qualities, how many are products, and how many are non-products? (*eteṣāṃ guṇānāṃ kati kāryāḥ katy akāryāḥ?*) [117]

Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, internal effort, merit, demerit, impression, connection, separation, priority, posteriority and sound are product sonly. (*buddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnadharmādharmasaṃskārasaṃyogavibhāgaparatvāparatvaśabdāḥ kāryā eva.*) [118]

The remaining ones are either products or non-products. (*śeṣāḥ kāryā akāryā vā.*) [119]

Colour, taste, smell and touch of earth, all [of them] are products. (*rūparasagandhasparśāḥ pārthivāḥ sarve kāryāḥ.*) [120]

Colour, taste, touch, fluidity and moisture of water, when they inhere in atoms, are non-products, and, when they inhere in diads and so on, are products. (*rūparasagandhasparśadravatvasnehā āpyāḥ paramāṇusamavetā akāryā dvyaṇukādisamavetāḥ kāryāḥ.*) [121]

So is weight. (*gurutvaṃ tathaiva.*) [122]

As are those of water, so are colour and touch of fire, and touch of air. (*yathāpyāḥ, tathā taijasau rūpasparśau vāyavyaḥ sparśaḥ.*) [123]

Fluidity of earth and fire is indeed a product. (*pārthiva-taijasaṃ dravatvaṃ sarvaṃ kāryam eva.*) [124]

The number one and separateness of one [substance] are products or non-products according to the fact whether they inhere in substances as products or in substances as non-products. Number two and so on and separateness of two [substances] and so on, all [of them] are products. (*ekatvaikapṛthaktve kārya-dravyākāryadravyasamavāyānuvidhānāt kāryākārye bhavataḥ. dvitvādisaṅkhyādvipṛthaktvādipṛthaktve sarve kārye eva.*) [125]

Largeness, smallness, shortness and longness, all [of them] are products. *Pārimaṇḍalya* is indeed a non-product. (*mahattvāṇutvahrasvatvadīrghatvāni sarvāṇi kāryāṇy eva. pārimaṇḍalyaṃ sarvam akāryam eva.*) [126]

Connection of [a substance] with form with that with form or that without form is a product. (*mūrtasya mūrtāmūrtena saṃyogaḥ kāryaḥ.*) [127]

3. *Qualities Eternal etc.*

As those are products and non-propucts, so they are non-eternal and eternal. (*yathā kāryākāryāḥ, tathānityanityāḥ.*) [128]

4. *Qualities as Perceived by....*

Among these qualities, sound, touch, colour, taste and smell are perceived each by one sense organ. Number, dimension, separateness, connection, separation, priority, posteriority, weight, fluidity, moisture and velocity are perceived by eyes and skin. (*eteṣāṃ guṇānāṃ śabdasparśarūparasagandhā ekaikaśa ekendriya-grāhyāḥ. saṅkhyāparimāṇapṛthaktvasaṃyogavibhāgaparatvāpa-ratvagurutvadravatvasnehavegāś cakṣuḥsparśanagrāhyāḥ.*) [129]

5. *Causes of Qualities*

Among these qualities, which is the cause of which? (*etādṛśānāṃ guṇānāṃ kaḥ kasya kāraṇam?*) [130]

Of colour, taste, smell, and touch which are inherent in a diad and so on, the causes are those of the same class. (*teṣāṃ rūpa-rasagandhasparśānāṃ samānajātīyāḥ kāraṇāni ye dvyaṇukādi-samavetāḥ.*) [131]

Of colour, taste, smell and touch of an atom of earth and of fluidity of earth and fire, the cause is connection with fire. (*teṣām agnisaṃyogaḥ kāraṇaṃ ye pārthivaparamāṇurūparasagandhasparśāḥ pārthivataijasadravatvaṃ ca.*) [132]

Of weight of earth and water, of fluidity and moisture of water, which are inherent in a diad and so on, the causes are those of the same class. (*ye pārthivāpyagurutvam āpyadravatvasnehau ca dvyaṇukādisamavetās teṣāṃ samānajātīyāḥ kāraṇāni.*) [133]

Of the number one and separateness of one [substance] which are inherent in a diad and so on, the causes are those of the same class. Of number two and so on and separateness of two [substances] and so on, the causes are those both of the same class and of different class. Of the number two and so on and separateness of two [substances] and so on, the cause is the cognition as efficient cause. (*ye ekatvaikapṛthaktve dvyaṇukādisamavete tayoḥ samānajātīyāni kāraṇāni. ye dvitvādisaṅkhyādvipṛthaktvādi-pṛthakatve tayoḥ samānāsamānajātīyāni kāraṇāni. yāni dvitvādi-dvipṛthaktvādīni teṣām apekṣābuddhiḥ kāraṇam.*) [134]

Of largeness and longness, the cause is plurality, largeness, longness and a particular collection of their [material] causes. Of smallness and shortness, the cause is the number two of their [material] causes. (*ye mahattvadīrghatve tayoḥ kāraṇabahutva-mahattvadīrghatvapracayaviśeṣāḥ kāraṇam, ye aṇutvahrasvatve tayoḥ kāraṇadvitvaṃ kāraṇam.*) [135]

Of connection and separation, the cause is the action of one [of two substances], the actions of both [substances], [another]

connection and separation [respectively]. (*yau saṃyogavibhāgau tayor anyatarakarmobhayakarmasaṃyogavibhāgāḥ kāraṇam.*) [136]

Of priority and posteriority, the cause is the cognition as efficient cause, namely, '[This is] far' and '[This is] near' of two things which are related with one and the same time and so on. (*ye paratvāparatve tayor ekakālādisambaddhayor viprakṛṣṭa-sannikṛṣṭety apekṣābuddhiḥ kāraṇam.*) [137]

Cognition is of two kinds — direct cognition and inferencial cognition. (*jñānaṃ dvividham — dṛṣṭam anumānaṃ ceti.*) [138]

Direct cognition is of four kinds—doubtful cognition, definite cognition, erroneous cognition and right cognition. (*dṛṣṭaṃ caturvidham — saṃśayajñānaṃ nirṇayajñānaṃ mithyājñānaṃ samyagajñānaṃ ceti.*) [139]

What is the cause of doubtful cognition? That whose cause is contact of mind with soul, assisted by the recollection of one particular feature, after seeing many common features [of objects], and which is the cognition of the form of 'what is it?' is doubtful cognition. (*saṃśayajñānasya kiṃ kāraṇam? anekasādharmyadarśanapūrvakaḥ pratyagviśeṣasmaraṇāpekṣa ātmamanaḥsannikarṣaḥ yasya kāraṇaṃ yac ca kiṃ svid iti jñānaṃ tat saṃśayajñānam.*) [140]

What is the cause of definite cognition? That whose cause is contact of mind with soul, assisted by ascertaining one particular feature, after [having] doubtful cognition, and which is the cognition invariably of the form of 'It is surely this' is definite cognition. (*nirṇayajñānasya kiṃ kāraṇam? saṃśayajñānapūrvakaḥ pratyagviśeṣāvadhāraṇāpekṣa ātmamanaḥsannikarṣaḥ yasya kāraṇaṃ yac ca niyamena etad evedam iti jñānaṃ tan nirṇayajñānam.*) [141]

What is the cause of erroneous cognition? That whose cause is contact of mind with soul, assisted by misapprehending one particular feature, after seeing many common features [of objects],

and which is the cognition of the form of 'the definite cognition in darkness' is erroneous cognition. (*mithyājñānasya kiṃ kāraṇam? anekasādharmyadarśanapūrvakaḥ pratyagviśeṣadṛṣṭyapekṣa ātmamanaḥsannikarṣaḥ yasya kāraṇaṃ yac cāndhakāre vyavasāya iti jñānaṃ tan mithyājñānam.*) [142]

What is the cause of right cognition? That whose cause is contact of mind with soul, assisted by seeing one particular feature, after seeing many common features [of objects], and which is the cognition of the form of 'non-erroneous cognition' is right cognition. (*samyagjñānasya kiṃ kāraṇam? anekasādharmyadarśanapūrvakaḥ pratyagviśeṣadarśanāpekṣa ātmamanaḥsannikarṣaḥ yasya kāraṇaṃ yac cāviparyayam iti jñānaṃ tat samyagjñānam.*) [143]

As is the direct cognition, so is the inferencial cognition. (*yathā dṛṣṭam, tathānumānam.*) [144]

Direct cognition is of three kinds — that which is produced by contact of four, that which is produced by contact of three and that which is produced by contact of two. (*dṛṣṭaṃ trividham — catuṣṭayasannikarṣajaṃ trayasannikarṣajaṃ dvayasannikarṣajaṃ ceti.*) [145]

What is direct cognition which is produced by contact of four? It is that which takes the form of direct experience. Of cognition of the perceivable colour, taste, smell, touch, number, dimension, separateness, connection, separation, priority, posteriority, weight, fluidity, moisture, velocity, substances as earth, water and fire, actions as upward movement and so on, and the highest universal, [and of cognition of the perceivable] particular universals, potentialities, non-potentialities, with the exception of sounds, and the potentialities, non-potentialities, soundness and the highest universal which are inherent in sounds, the cause is contact of four, namely, soul, a sense organ, mind and an object. (*kiṃ catuṣṭayasannikarṣajaṃ dṛṣṭam? upalabdhilakṣaṇam iti. prāpyarūparasagandhasparśasaṅkhyāparimāṇapṛthaktvasaṃyogavibhāgaparatvāparatvagurutvadravatvasnehavegapṛthivyaptejodravyotkṣepa-*

ṇādikarmasattāsv anyatra śabdāc ca śabdasamavetaśaktyaśakti-śabdatvasattābhyaś ca sāmānyaviśeṣaśaktyaśaktiṣu yad jñānaṃ tasyātmendriyamano 'rthacatuṣṭayasannikarṣaḥ kāraṇam.) [146]

What is direct cognition which is produced by contact of three? Of cognition of such objects as sounds, and as potentialities, non-potentialities, soundness and the highest universal which are inherent in sounds, the cause is contact of three, namely, soul, a sense organ and mind. (*kiṃ trayasannikarṣajaṃ dṛṣṭam? śabde ca śabdasamavetaśaktyaśaktiśabdatvasattāsu ca viṣayeṣu yad jñānaṃ tasyātmendriyamanaḥtrayasannikarṣaḥ kāraṇam.*) [147]

What is direct cognition which is produced by contact of two? Of cognition of such objects as pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and eternal effort, and of such objects as their potentialities, non-potentialities, particular universals, and the highest universal, the cause is contact of two, namely, soul and mind. (*kiṃ dvayasannikarṣajaṃ dṛṣṭam? sukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatneṣv viṣayeṣu teṣāṃ ca śaktyaśaktisāmānyaviśeṣasattāsv viṣayeṣu yad jñānaṃ tasyātmamanodvayasannikarṣaḥ kāraṇam.*) [148]

Of inferencial cognition, the cause is contact of mind with soul after [having] the cognition of that which is connected, that which is inherent, that which is inherent in the same thing and that which is opposite [to another], assisted by recollection of the relation of them (connection, inherence, inherence in the same thing and opposition respectively).' (*yad anumānaṃ tasya saṃyogisamavāyyekārthasamavāyivirodhijñānapūrvakaḥ tatsambandhasmaraṇāpekṣa ātmamanaḥsannikarṣaḥ kāraṇam.*) [149]

Of pleasure and pain, the cause is contact of four, three or two assisted by merit and demerit. (*sukhaduḥkhayor dharmādharmāpekṣaś catuṣṭayatrayadvayasannikarṣaḥ kāraṇam.*) [150]

Of desire and aversion, the cause is connection of mind with soul assisted by pleasure and pain, by recollection or by erroneous cognition. (*icchādveṣayoḥ sukhaduḥkhasmaraṇamithyājñānāpekṣa ātmamanaḥsaṃyogaḥ kāraṇam.*) [151]

Of internal effort, the cause is connection of mind with soul assisted by desire and aversion. And [of eternal effort] as the cause of such actions as expiration, aspiration and so on of one who has no desire, the cause is life-activity. (*prayatnasyecchādveṣāpekṣa ātmamanaḥsaṃyogaḥ kāraṇam, jīvanaṃ ca kāraṇam anicchataḥ prāṇāpānādikarmakāraṇatvena.*) [152]

What is the cause of velocity? An action which is produced by hit and shaking is the cause of velocity. (*vegasya kiṃ kāraṇam? abhighātanodanajakarma vegasya kāraṇam.*) [153]

Of merit and demerit, the cause is connection of mind with soul after [the production of] desire and aversion, assisted by both pure and impure intention on those means for performing merit and demerit which are ordered and prohibited by the Vedas and the authoritative sacred texts. (*dharmādharmayor icchādveṣapūrvakaḥ śrutismṛtivihitapratiṣiddhadharmādharmasādhanaśuddhāśuddhābhisandhyubhayāpekṣa ātmamanaḥsaṃyogaḥ kāraṇam.*) [154]

Of impression as the cause of recollection, the cause is connection of mind with soul assisted by direct or inferencial cognition and impression. (*smṛtihetoḥ saṃskārasya dṛṣṭānumānajñānasaṃskārāpekṣa ātmamanaḥsaṃyogaḥ kāraṇam.*) [155]

Sound is of three kinds — that which is produced by connection, that which is produced by separation and that which is produced by [another] sound. (*śabdas trividhaḥ — saṃyogajo vibhāgajaḥ śabdajaś ceti.*) [156]

Of that which is produced by connection, the cause is connection of a substance with touch with a place of ether, aasisted by connection of [two] substances with touch and by velocity. (*saṃyogajasya sparśavaddravyasaṃyogavegāpekṣaḥ sparśavaddravyākāśapradeśasaṃyogaḥ kāraṇam.*) [157]

Of that which is produced by separation, the cause is separation of a substance with touch from a place of ether, assisted by sepa-

ration of [two] substances with touch and by velocity. (*vibhāgajasya sparśavaddravyavibhāgavegāpekṣaḥ sparśavaddravyākāśapradeśavibhāgaḥ kāraṇam.*) [158]

Of that which is produced by [another] sound, the cause is a sound having an adjoining place of ether which is produced by connection and separation of [two] substances with touch and by velocity. (*śabdajasya sparśavaddravyasaṃyogavibhāgaveganiṣpanno 'vyavahitākāśapradeśaḥ śabdaḥ kāraṇam.*) [159]

6. Qualities as exist in one Substance etc.

Among these twenty-four qualities, how many have one substance as their locus, and how many have many substances as their locus ? (*etādṛśānāṃ caturviṃśatiguṇānāṃ katy ekadravyāśritāḥ katy anekadravyāśritāḥ.*) [160]

Colour, taste, smell, touch, dimension, priority, posteriority, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, internal effort, merit, demerit, impression, weight, fluidity, moisture, velocity and sound, all these twenty-one have one substance as their locus. (*rūparasagandhasparśaparimāṇaparatvāparatvabuddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnadharmādharmasaṃskāragurutvadravatvasnehavegaśabdā ity ekaviṃśatiḥ sarva ekadravyāśritāḥ.*) [161]

Connection and separation have two substances as their locus. (*saṃyogavibhāgau dvidravyāśritau.*) [162]

Number has either one substance or many substances as its locus. (*saṅkhyaikadravyāśritā vānekadravyāśritā vā.*) [163]

What has one substance as its locus ? The number one. (*kaikadravyāśritā ? ekatvasaṅkhyeti.*) [164]

What has many substances as its locus ? The number two and so on. (*kānekadravyāśritā ? dvitvādisaṅkhyeti.*) [165]

As is number, so is separateness. (*yathā saṅkhyā, tathā pṛthaktvam.*) [166]

7. Qualities as pervade their locus etc.

Among these twenty-four qualities, how many pervade their locus, and how many do not pervade their locus ? (*etādṛśānāṃ caturviṃśatiguṇānāṃ katy āśrayavyāpakāḥ katy āśrayāvyāpakāḥ ?*) [167]

Colour, taste, smell, touch, number, dimension, separateness, priority, posteriority, fluidity, moisture, weight and velocity pervade their locus. (*rūparasagandhasparśasaṅkhyāparimāṇapṛthaktvaparatvāparatvadravatvasnehagurutvavegā āśrayavyāpakāḥ.*) [168]

The remaining ones do not pervade their locus. (*śeṣā āśrayāvyāpakāḥ.*) [169]

8. Qualities destroyed by their Effects etc.

Among these twenty-four qualities, which is destroyed by which ? (*etādṛśānāṃ caturviṃśatiguṇānāṃ kaḥ kena virodhī ?*) [170]

Sound which is produced by connection or separation is destroyed by every sound, its effect, which produces another sound. (*saṃyogavibhāgajaśabdo 'nyaśabdārambhakasarvaśabdena kāryeṇa virodhī.*) [171]

Merit is destroyed by its effect, namely, pleasure and right cognition. (*dharmaḥ sukhasamyagjñānābhyāṃ kāryābhyāṃ vrodhī.*) [172]

Demerit is destroyed by its effect, namely, pain and erroneous cognition. (*adharmo duḥkhamithyājñānābhyāṃ kāryābhyāṃ virodhī.*) [173]

Every cognition is destroyed by its effect, namely, impression. (*sarvaṃ jñānaṃ saṃskāreṇa kāryeṇa virodhī.*) [174]

Each cognition is destroyed by any cognition and its effect, namely, impression. (*ekaikajñānaṃ sarvajñānena [ca] saṃskāreṇa kāryeṇa [ca] virodhī.*) [175]

The last sound is destroyed by all its causes. (*antyaśabdaḥ sarvakāraṇavirodhī.*) [176]

So are the last qualities of soul. (*antyātmaguṇāś caivam eva.*) [177]

Pleasure and pain are destroyed by their effect, namely, desire and aversion [respectively]. (*sukhaduḥkhe icchādveṣābhyāṃ kāryābhyāṃ virodhinī.*) [178]

Merit and demerit do not coexist with their causes. (*dharmādharmau kāraṇavirodhinau.*) [179]

Desire and aversion are destroyed by their effect, namely, internal effort. (*icchādveṣau prayatnena kāryeṇa virodhinau.*)] 180]

Pleasure and pain do not coexist with their causes. (*sukhaduḥkhe kāraṇavirodhinī.*) [181]

So is sound in the middle. (*madhyaśabdaś caivam eva.*) [182]

Internal effort, a quality of soul, and connection of substances with touch—these two do not coexist [with each other] though they are not in relation of causality. (*ātmaguṇaprayatnaḥ sparśavaddravyasaṃyoga iti dvayam akāryakāraṇabhūtam api virodhi.*) [183]

Impression : Impression as a quality of soul, namely, the cause of recollection, is destroyed by pain though they are not in relation of causality. (*saṃskāra iti. ātmaguṇasaṃskāraḥ smṛtihetur duḥkhenākāryakāraṇabhūto 'pi virodhī.*) [184]

Impression as the cause of recollection is destroyed by its effect. (*saṃskāraḥ smṛtihetuḥ kāryavirodhī.*) [185]

[Impression as] the cause of action and connection of substances with touch do not coexist [with each other] though they are not in relation of causality. (*kriyāhetuḥ sparśavaddravyasaṃyogo 'kāryakāraṇabhūtāv api vinodhinau.* [186]

The number two and so on is not destroyed by its effect, namely, the cognition of '[These are] two [substances]' and so on. (*dvitvādisaṅkhyā dve ityādibuddhyā kāryeṇāvirodhinī.*) [187]

As is the number two and so on, so is separateness of two [substances] and so on, priority and posteriority. (*yathā dvitvādisaṅkhyā, tathā dvipṛthaktvādipṛthaktvaṃ paratvāparatve.*) [188]

Colour, taste, smell and touch which are inherent in an atom of earth are destroyed by [their] connection with fire though they are not in relation of causality. (*rūparasagandhasparśāḥ pārthivaparamāṇusamavetā agnisaṃyogenākāryakāraṇabhūtā api virodhinaḥ.*) [189]

Connection and separation do not coexist with each other though they are not in relation of causality. (*saṃyogavibhāgau parasparato 'kāryakāraṇabhūtāv api virodhinau.*) [190]

That which has one substance [as its locus], namely, colour and so on, which exists in an atom, and which produces colour and so on of the same class in a diad is not destroyed by its effect of the same class. (*ekadravyaṃ paramāṇurūpādi samānajātīyadvyaṇukarūpādyārambhakaṃ samānajātīyena kāryeṇāvirodhi.*) [191]

Effect—colour and so on—in a substance as a final whole coexists with colour and so on of the same class in [material] causes [of the substance]. (*antyāvayavidravyarūpādikāryaṃ kāraṇarūpādinā samānajātīyeṇāvirodhi.*) [192]

Colour and so on in a substance as a middle whole coexists with colour and so on of the same class in an effect and causes [of the substance]. (*madhyāvayavidravyarūpādi samānajātīyena kāryakāraṇarūpādināvirodhi.*) [193]

Colour and so on in the same substance do not coexist with each other though they are not in relation of causality. (*ekadravyarūpādi parasparato 'kāryakāraṇabhūtam api virodhi.*) [194]

Any quality is not destroyed by substances. (*sarve guṇā dravyair avirodhinaḥ.*) [195]

9. *Qualities associated with Substance etc.*

Among those twenty-four qualities, how many are associated with substance, how many are not associated with substance?

(*etādṛśānāṃ caturviṃśatiguṇānāṃ kati dravyavantaḥ katy adravyavantaḥ?* [196]

All [qualities] are associated with substances. (*sarve dravyavantaḥ*) [197]

As they are associated with substance, so they are without quality and action, are non-material causes, are the probans of substances which have the qualities, and are without form and part. (*yathā dravyavantaḥ, tathā nirguṇā niṣkriyā asamavāyikāraṇāni tadguṇavaddravyāṇāṃ liṅgāny amūrtā niravayavāḥ.*) [198]

Section 3 — Actions

1. Actions with a Substance etc.

Among these five actions, how many are associated with substance, how many are not associated with substance? (*etādṛśānāṃ pañcakarmaṇāṃ kati dravyavanti katy adravyavanti?*) [199]

All [actions] are associated with substance. (*sarvāṇi dravyavanti.*) [200]

As they are associated with substance, so they have one substance as their locus, are without form, quality and part, are the causes of connection and separation, are causes and [at the same time] effects, do not form collection, are the probans of substances [where they exist]. They, being assisted by hit, shaking and so on, are the causes of impression, and are the causes of those belonging to different class. (*yathā dravyavanti, tathaikadravyāśritāny amūrtāni nirguṇāni niravayavāṇi saṃyogavibhāgakāraṇāni kāraṇakāryabhūtāny apracitāni dravyaliṅgāni. tāny abhighātanodanādyapekṣāṇi saṃskārakāraṇāny asamānajātīyakāraṇāni*) [201]

2. Action having Substances as their Locus

Among these five actions, which has which substance as its locus? (*etādṛśānāṃ pañcakarmaṇāṃ kiṃ kiṃdravyāśritam?*) [202]

Of upward movement, the locus is all of earth, water, fire, air and mind. (*utkṣepaṇasya sarvapṛthivyaptejovāyumanāṃsy āśrayaḥ*. [203]

As is of upward movement, so is of downward movement and movement. (*yathotkṣepaṇasya, tathāpakṣepaṇasya gamanasya ca.*) [204]

Of shrinking, the locus is a large and long substance which is the product of particular arrangement of very loosely tightened parts. (*ākuñcanasyātipraśithilāvayavavyūhaviśeṣakāryāṇi mahaddīrghadravyāṇy āśrayaḥ.*) [205]

As is of shrinking, so is of expanding. (*yathākuñcanasya, tathā prasāraṇasya.*) [206]

3. Actions pervading their Locus etc.

Among these five actions, how many pervade their locus, and how many do not pervade their locus? (*etādṛśānāṃ pañcakarmaṇāṃ katy āśrayavyāpakāni katy āśrayāvyāpakāni?*) [207]

All [actions] pervade their locus. (*sarvāṇy āśrayavyāpakāni.*) [208].

Some say that those [actions] which have atoms and mind as their locus pervade them, while those which have diads and so on as their locus do not pervade them. (*eka āhuḥ paramāṇumanaāśritāny āśrayavyāpakāni dvyaṇukādyāśritāny āśrayāvyāpakānīti.*) [209]

4. Actions in a Body etc.

Of the following internal actions, the material cause is: a body; those which are its causes; sense organs, namely, nose, tongue, skin and eyes, which are connected with a body; and mind. (*etādṛśānāṃ karmaṇāṃ antargatānāṃ śarīraṃ ca tatkāraṇāni ca śarīrasaṃyuktaghrāṇarasanatvaccakṣūṃsīndriyāṇi ca manaś ca samavāyikāraṇam.*) [210]

Among them, of the first of actions of a body, the non-material cause is connection [of the body] with soul and internal

effort which are preceded by desire. (*tatra śarīrakarmaṇām ādyasyecchāpūrvakāv ātmasaṃyogaprayatnāv asamavāyikāraṇam.*) [211]

And of the second [action] and so on [of a body], the non-material cause is impression. (*dvitīyādīnāṃ ca saṃskāro 'samavāyikāraṇam.*) [212]

As are of actions of a body, so are of actions in mind and in parts [of a body]. (*yathā śarīrakarmaṇām, tathā manaavayavagatakarmaṇām.*) [213]

Of the first of actions of nose, tongue, skin and eyes, the non-material cause is connection [of a body] with soul, internal effort and connection [of nose and so on] with the body. (*ghrāṇarasanatvaccakṣuḥkaramaṇām; ādyasyātmasaṃyogaprayatnaśarīrasaṃyogā asamavāyikāraṇam.*) [214]

And of the second [action] and so on [of nose and so on], the non-material cause is impression. (*dvitīyādīnāṃ ca saṃskāro 'samavāyikāraṇam.*) [215]

As are of actions of nose and so on, so are of actions in a pestle, a stick and so on, and of those in a garland of flower, a necklace, sandal paste and so on attached to a body. (*yathā ghrāṇādikarmaṇām, tathā musaladaṇḍādigatānāṃ śarīrānubaddhasragmālācandanādigatānāṃ ca karmaṇām.*) [216]

Of the first of falling actions of a sleeping man, the non-material cause is weight. (*suptasya śarīrapatanakarmaṇāṃ ādyasya gurutvam asamavāyikāraṇam.*) [217]

Of the second [action] and so on [of a sleeping man as mentioned above], the non-material cause is weight and impression, (*dvitīyādīnāṃ gurutvasaṃskārāv asamavāyikāraṇam.*) [218]

Of actions of expiration and aspiration of a sleeping man, or of the first of actions [at the time of waking up] of a sleeping man who has no desire, the non-material cause is internal effort which is preceded by life-activity and connection [of air in the former case, of mind in the latter case] with soul. (*suptasya prāṇāpānakarmaṇām athavā suptasyānicchato [manasaḥ] karmaṇām ādyasya jīvanapūrvakaprayatnātmasaṃyogāv asamavāyikāraṇam.*) [219]

And of the second [action] and so on [of two kinds of actions as mentioned above], the non-material cause is impression. (*dvitīyādīnāṃ ca saṃskāro 'samavāyikāraṇam.*) [220]

Of the first of [such actions] as streaming down of water and so on, the non-material cause is fluidity. (*nimnābhisarpaṇam apām ity evamādīnām ādyasya dravatvam asamavāyikāraṇam.*) [221]

Of the second [action] and so on [of water and so on], the non-material cause is fluidity and impression. (*dvitīyādīnāṃ dravatvasaṃskārāv asamavāyikāraṇam.*) [222]

Of the first of [such actions as] flaring upward of fire and zigzag blowing of air, the non-material caue is merit, demerit and connection [of fire and air] with soul. (*agner ūrdhvajvalanasya vāyos tiryakpavanasyādyasya dharmādharmātmsaṃyogā asamavāyikāraṇam.*) [223]

Of the second [action] and so on [of flaring upward and so on, the non-material cause is] as stated above. (*dvitīyādīnāṃ yathā pūrvoktam.*) [224]

Of the first action of atoms of four kinds of elements which produce the causes of a body, the non-material cause is merit, demerit and connection [of atoms] with soul. (*caturmahābhūtaparamāṇūnāṃ śarīrakāraṇārambhasyādyakarmano dharmādharmātmasaṃyogā asamavāyikāraṇam.*) [225]

Of the second [action] and so on [of atoms, the non-material cause is] as stated above. (*dvitīyādīnāṃ yathā pūrvoktam.*) [226]

As is of producing a body, so is of producing such various things as trees and so on, and of actions which exist in diads and so on. (*yathā śarīrārambhasya, tathā vṛkṣādivividhārambhasya dvyaṇukādigatakarmaṇaś[ca].*) [227]

Of the first of such actions as moving near and moving away of mind, the non-material cause is merit, demerit and connection [of mind] with soul. (*manaupasarpaṇāpasarpaṇakarmaṇām ādyasya dharmādharmātmasaṃyogā asamavāyikāraṇam.*) [228]

Of the second [action] and so on [of mind, the non-material cause is] as stated above. (*dvitīyādīnāṃ yathā pūrvoktam.*) [229]

Of the first of actions of the Lord [at the time of creation of the world] which reveals results of deeds which lead to happiness and unhappiness of beings, the non-material cause is merit and demerit [of beings] and connection [of atoms] with souls [of beings]. (*bhuvanapatikarmaṇāṃ prāṇihitāhitavipākavyañjakānām ādyasya dharmādharmātmasaṃyogā asamavāyikāraṇam.*) [230]

Of the second [action] and so on [of the world creation, the non-material cause is] as stated above. (*dvitīyādīnāṃ yathā pūrvoktam.*) [231]

Of actions belonging to earth, water or fire which is shaken, hit or connected [with another part which is shaken or hit], the non-material cause is connection, weight, fluidity, internal effort and velocity. (*pṛthivyaptejaḥsu nudyamānābhihanyamānasaṃyukteṣv anugatānāṃ karmaṇāṃ saṃyogagurutvadravatvaprayatnavegā asamavāyikāraṇam.*) [232]

Actions like upward movement and so on are dependent on each case [as to their own non-material causes]. Namely, of those in fire, [the non-material cause is] other than weight; of those in wind, [it is] other than fluidity; of those in mind [it is] other than hit and shaking. (*yathātatham utkṣepaṇādikarmāṇi. tejogatānām anyatra gurutvād vāyugatānām anyatra dravatvān manogatānām anyatrābhighātanodanābhyām iti.*) [233]

Section 4 — Universal

Is this highest universal a product or a non-product ? (*etādṛśā sattā kiṃ kāryāthavākāryā ?*) [234]

[It is] definitely a non-product. (*niyamenākaryā.*) [235]

As it is a non-product, so it is eternal, and is without quality, action and part. (*yathākāryā, tathā nityā nirguṇā niṣkriyā niravayavā.*) [236]

[It is] inherent in *sats* (existents), substances, qualities and actions while not inherent in universals, potentialities, non-potentialities, particular universals and particulars, is single, is the cause of the expression and cognition, namely, '[This] is *sat*' or '[This is] common,' and is an independent entity. (*saddravyaguṇakarmasv anyatra sāmānyaśaktyaśaktisāmānyaviśeṣaviśeṣebhyaḥ samavetaikā satsamānābhidhānapratyayahetur arthāntaram.*) [237]

Section 5 — Particular

A particular exists in [eternal] substances, has one [eternal] substance as its locus, is the cause of the cognition, namely, '[This is] excluded from any other [substance],' is as well the cause of the cognition, namely, 'This is represented as it is,' is the cause of the names 'ether' and so on being present in ether, space and time, is eternal, is a non-product, is without quality, action and part, inheres in those [catagories of entities] whose exceptions are the highest universal, potentialities, non-potentialities, particular universals and particulars, and is plural. (*viśeṣo dravyeṣu vartamāna ekadravyāśrito 'nyavyāvṛttibuddhihetur etadvyaktibuddhihetur ākāśadikkāleṣu vartamāna ākāśādisañjñāhetur nityo 'kāryo nirguṇo niṣkriyo niravayavo 'nyatra sattāśaktyaśaktisāmāuyaviśeṣaviśeṣebhyaḥ samaveto 'nekaḥ.*) [238]

Section 6 — Inherence

Inherence is singular, is eternal, is a non-product, is without part and form, and is the cause of the expression and cognition, namely, '[This is] here' of all substances, qualities, actions, [the highest] universal, particulars, potentialities, non-potentialities, particular universals which are in relation of superstratum and substratum. (*samavāya eko nityo 'kāryo niravayavo 'mūrtaḥ sarvadravyaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣaśaktyaśaktisāmānyaviśeṣāṇām ādhāryādhārabhūtānām ihābhidhānapratyayanimittam.*) [239]

Section 7 — Potentiality

Is this potentiality a product or a non-product? (*etādṛśā śāktiḥ kiṃ karyāthavākāryā?*) [240]

[It is] invariably a non-product. (*niyamenākāryā.*) [241]

As it is a non-product, so it is eternal, is without quality, action, part and form. (*yathākāryā, tathā nityā nirguṇā niṣkriyā niravayavāmūrtā.*) [242]

That which is inherent in each substance, quality and action with the exception of [the highest] universal, potentialities, non-potentialities, particular universals and particulars, and is plural, and which is the cause of the expression and cognition, namely, '[This effect and its cause are] of the same class' is potentiality. (*yā dravyaguṇakarmasv pratyekam ekaikaśo 'nyatra sāmānyaśaktyaśaktisāmānyaviśeṣaviśeṣebhyaḥ samavetā cānekā yad samābhidhānapratyayanimittaṃ saiva śaktiḥ.*) [243]

Section 8 — Non-potentiality

So is non-potentiality. (*aśaktiś caivam eva.*) [244]

Section 9 — Particular universal

Among [various] particular universals, substanceness is inherent pervadingly in the category of substance, is single, is without form, part, action and quality, is a non-product, is common to substances which are distinguished from each other, and at the same time is uncommon to qualities and actions. (*sāmānyaviśeṣāṇāṃ dravyatvaṃ dravyapadārthe vyāpya samevetam ekam amūrtaṃ niravayavaṃ niṣkriyaṃ nirguṇaṃ nityam akāryam. dravyeṣu parasparaviśiṣṭeṣu sāmānyam evaitad guṇakarmabhyo viśeṣaḥ.*) [245]

So is qualitiness, actionness, earthness and so on. (*tathā guṇatvakarmatvapṛthivītvādīni.*) [246]

Section 10 — Negation

1. Negation as Eternal etc.

Among these five kinds of categories of negation, how many are eternal, and how many are non-erernal? (*etādṛśānāṃ pañcavidhapratiṣedhapadārthānāṃ kati nityāḥ katy anityāḥ?*) [247]

Pre-absence is non-eternal. Because [it is] destroyed by the production of substances, qualities and actions. (*prāgabhāvo 'nityo dravyaguṇakarmotpattivirodhāt.*) [248]

Destruction, mutual absence and absolute absence, all [of them] are eternal. Because [they are] not destroyed by substances and so on. (*dhvaṃso 'nyonyābhāvo 'tyantābhāvaḥ sarve nityā dravyādyavirodhāt.*) [249]

Relational absence may be eternal and non-eternal. (*saṃsargābhāvo nityo 'nityaś ca.*) [250]

What [kind of relational absence] is eternal? It is that where qualities other [than their own] do not inhere in substances like earth and so on, or where particular universals like substanceness and so on, potentialities, non-potentialities and particulars do not inhere in loci other than their own loci, or where the highest universal does not inhere in [the highest] universal and so on. (*ko nityaḥ? tad yathā pṛthivyādidravyeṣv anyaguṇā asamavetāḥ, athavā dravyatvādisāmānyaviśeṣāḥ śaktyaśaktiviśeṣāś ca svāśrayebhyo 'nyatrāsamavetāḥ, athavā sattā sāmānyādiṣv asamavetā.*) [251]

What [kind of relational absence] is non-eternal? It is that where a substance which, though it is not connected with [another] substance, is surely to be connected [with it] is not now in the latter, or where, though substances, qualities and actions of some substance are surely to inhere in the substance, they are not now in it. (*ko 'nityaḥ? tad tathā yad dravyaṃ yena dravyeṇāsaṃyuktam api niyamena saṃyujyeta tad tasmin nāsti, athavā*

yasmin dravye yāni dravyaguṇakarmāṇi niyamena samaveyāt tāni tasmin na santi.) [252]

2. *Absences as the Objects of Direct Cognition etc.*

Among these five [kinds of] absences, how many are the objects of direct cognition, and how many are not the objects of direct cognition? (*etādṛśānāṃ pañcābhāvānāṃ kati dṛṣṭaviṣayāḥ katy adṛṣṭaviṣayāḥ ?*) [253]

Any [kind of absence] is not the object of direct cognition. But all [kinds of absences], which exist without having any locus other [than their own], are the objects of inference. (*sarve 'dṛṣṭaviṣayāḥ. kiṃ tv ananyāśritya vartamānāḥ sarve 'numānaviṣayāḥ.*) [254]

Section 11 — Conclusion

Among these ten categories of entities, how many are cognizable and how may are non-cognizable? (*eteṣāṃ daśapadārthānāṃ kati jñeyāḥ katy ajñeyāḥ?*) [255]

All are cognizable and are the cause of expressions. (*sarva eva jñeyāḥ. te caivābhidhānahetuḥ.*) [256]

[Here ends the *Daśapadārthī* (On Ten Categories of Entities) written by Venerable Candramati.
(*iti Daśapadārthī Śrīmac Candramatinā viracitā samāptā.*)] [257]

NOTES ON APPENDIX

*The number put in bracket denotes that of each paragraph of the reconstructed Sanskrit text with the translation of it.

*II. 3, for example, denotes the Chapter 3 of the Part II of the present treatise.

[1] (a) The term '*padārtha*' does not appear in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* except in the version of the *Upaskāra* whose readings are full of doubts and faults.

(b) It is inferred from one mistranslation in the Chinese version that the original Sanskrit term which corresponds to 'particular universal' is '*sāmānyaviśeṣa.*' See notes 101 on my critical edition of the Chinese version.

(c) The term '*pratiṣedha*' as the synonym of '*abhāva*' appears four times in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* (6.2.7; 7.2.30; 9.10.11)

[2] *Ibid.* 1.1.4 : *pṛthivy āpas tejo vāyur ākāśaṃ kālo dig ātmā mana iti dravyāṇi.*

[3] *Ibid.* 2.1.1 : *rūparasagandhasparśavatī pṛthivī.*

[4] *Ibid.* 2.1.2 : *rūparasasparśavatya āpo dravāḥ snigdhāś ca* (Both *Vyākhyā* and *Upaskāra* read : ...*snigdhāḥ.*)

[5] *Ibid.* 2.1.3 : *tejo rūpasparśavat.*

[6] *Ibid.* 2.1.4 : *vāyuḥ sparśavān.* (*Upaskāra* reads : *sparśavān vāyuḥ.*)

[7] *Ibid.* 2.1.26 : [*śabdo*—my complement] *liṅgam ākāśasya.* (*Vyākhyā* reads : *śabdo liṅgam ākāśasya iti. Upaskāra* reads : *pariśeṣāl liṅgam ākāśasya.*)

[8] (a) *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 2.2.6 : *aparasmin paraṃ yugapad ayugapad ciraṃ kṣipram iti kālaliṅgāni* (*Upaskāra* reads : *aparasminn aparaṃ yugapat ciraṃ kṣipram iti kālaliṅgāni.*) *Praśasta-*

pādabhāṣya: *kālaḥ parāparavyatikarayaugapadyāyaugapadyacira-kṣiprapratyayaliṅgam*.

(b) The words *abhidhāna* (*śabda*) and *pratyaya* (*jñāna*) are possible to be replaced by the only one word '*vyavahāra*.' For example, the *Nyāyakandalī* on *Saṅkhyā-prakaraṇa* of the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* paraphrases it in the following way: *vyava-hṛtir vyavahāro jñeyajñānam. vyavahrīyate 'neneti vyavahāro śabdaḥ. ekādivyavahāraḥ ekaṃ dve trīṇītyādipratyayaḥ śabdaś ca tayor hetuḥ saṅkhyeti*. The term '*vyavahāra*' also means our behaviour based on some acquired cognition, which is, according to the *parataḥprāmāṇya* theory of the later Naiyāyikas and Vaiśe-ṣikas, the determinator of truth and fault of the cognition, and means secular life in general as well. This term quite resembles the modern philosophical term, namely, 'pragmatics,' which is argued on among a lot of contemporary philosophers in order to conquer the modern nihilism and reductionism.

[9] *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 2. 2. 12: *ita idam iti yatas tad diśo liṅgam.* (*Vyākhyā* reads: ...*diśām*... *Upaskāra* reads: ...*diśyam*...) This *sūtra* contains some kind of difficulty. In this case, the *Daśa-padārthī* is far closer to the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*: *dik pūrvāparādi-pratyayaliṅgā*. But this compound is, it is clear, of the *bahuvrīhi* type. This fact causes another difficulty.

[10] *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 3. 2. 4: *prāṇāpānanimeṣonmeṣajīvanama-nogatīndriyāntaravikārāḥ sukhaduḥkhe icchādveṣau prayatnaś cety ātmaliṅgāni.* (*Vyākhyā* reads: ...*vikārāḥ parātmani liṅgam.* [*sukhā-dayaś ca parātmani ca svātmani ca liṅgam iti Bhāṣyakārāḥ.*] *Upaskāra* reads: ...*sukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnāś cātmano liṅgā-ni.*) *Nyāyasūtra* 1. 1. 10 runs: *icchādveṣaprayatnasukhaduḥkha-jñānāny ātmano liṅgam iti.* It is notable that the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* does not enumerate cognition (*buddhi, jñāna* etc.) as a quality or the probans of soul.

[11] (a) This way of definition is unique, and is likely to be fit for logical economy (*lāghava*). Praśastapāda mentions the inference of existence of mind as follows: *saty apy ātmendri-yārthasānnidhye jñānasukhādīnām abhūtvotpattidarśanāt kāraṇā-ntaram anumīyate.* This is based on *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 3. 2. 1 which is as follows: *ātmendriyārthasannikarṣe jñānasyābhāvo bhāvaś ca manaso liṅgam.* (*Upaskāra* reads: ...*jñānasya bhāvo 'bhāvaś ca*...) *Nyāyasūtra* 1. 1. 16: *yugapajjñānānutpattir manaso liṅgam.*

(b) As will be seen in paragraphs [10] and [11], Candra-mati divides causes into two, namely, material cause (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*) and non-material causes (*asamavāyikāraṇa*). He does not set up 'efficient causes' (*nimittakāraṇa*), the term of which does not appear in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* too. But, now, mind can-not be an non-material cause of cognition. *Tarkāmṛta*: *tatra samavāyikāraṇaṃ dravyam eva. asamavāyikāraṇaṃ dravye guṇaḥ, guṇe guṇaḥ karma ca.* (p. 11) It should be that the term '*asama-vāyikāraṇa*' used in the present paragraph means merely 'the cause which is different from the material cause.' Cf. my forth-coming paper whose temporal title is "The Early Vaiśeṣikas on *asamavāyikāraṇa* and the term '*apekṣ-*'," *A Jubilee Volume to Professor Junkichi Imanishi's Sixtieth Birthday : The Indian Thoughts and Buddhist Culture*, Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1996.

[12] *Veiśeṣikasūtra* 1. 1. 5: *rūparasagandhasparśāḥ saṅ-khyā parimāṇāni pṛthaktvaṃ saṃyogavibhāgau paratvāparatve buddhayaḥ sukhaduḥkhe icchādveṣau prayatnaś ca guṇāḥ.* (*Upas-kāra* reads: ... *prayatnāś ca* ...). However, the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* refers to the other qualities dispersedly. As to *gurutva*, *ibid.* 1. 1. 27 (*gurutvaprayatnasaṃyogānām utkṣepaṇam*) etc. As to *dravatva* and *sneha*, *ibid.* 2. 1. 2 (*rūparasasparśavatya āpo dravāḥ snigdhāś ca*). As to *saṃskāra*, *ibid.* 5. 1. 17 (*nodanād ādyam iṣoḥ karma karmakāritāc ca saṃskārād uttaraṃ tathottaram uttaraṃ ca*) etc. As to *dharma* and *adharma*, *ibid.* 6. 2. 17 (*icchādveṣapūrvikā dharmādharmayoḥ pravṛttiḥ*) etc. (or as to *adṛṣṭa* which came later to be identified with *dharmādharma*, many *sūtras*). And as to *śabda*, *ibid.* 2. 1. 26 ([*śabdo*] *liṅgam ākāśasya*). The number and order of qualities which are set up by Candramati is comple-tely the same as those set up by Praśastapāda.

...27

[13]~[16] Candramati is very rigid as to whether a quality concerned has a single locus or not. This division is based on that into *ekadravya[vat]* and *anekadravya[vat]* which appears in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* and Candramati's *Daśapadārthī* frequently. This develops to the strict division into *avyāsajyavṛtti* and *vyāsajyavṛtti* of the later Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas. I owe the present note to Prof. V. N. Jha.

[17] (a) *Praśastapādabhāṣya : ekādivyavahārahetuḥ saṅkhyā. sā punar ekadravyā cānekadravyā ca.* As for the term '*vyavahāra,*' see note (b) on paragraph [8].

(b) The theory of number, which is not so clear in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra,* must have been almost completed in the days of Candramati. In paragraph [134] he uses the term 'cognition as efficient cause' (*apekṣābuddhi*), namely, the key-word of the theory of number the whole of which is seen in the *Praśastapādabhāṣya,* As for the detail, see II. 1 and 2.

[18] (a) It is not clear what the term 'and so on' (*ādi*) indicates.

(b) *Praśastapādabhāṣya : parimāṇaṃ mānavyavahārakāraṇaṃ. tac caturvidhaṃ aṇu mahad dīrghaṃ hrasvaṃ ceti. Ibid. : anityaṃ caturvidham api saṅkhyāparimāṇapracayayoni.*

[19] *Ibid. : dvitvasaṅkhyā cāṇvor vartamānā dvyaṇuke 'ṇutvam ārabhate.*

[20] *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 7. 1. 16 : *kāraṇabahutvāt kāraṇamahattvāt pracayaviśeṣāc ca mahat.* (*Upaskāra* reads : *kāraṇabahutvāc ca.*)

[21] *Praśastapādabhāṣya : aṇutvavad dvyaṇuke dvitvasaṅkhyāto hrasvatvasyotpattiḥ.*

[22] *Ibid. : mahattvavat tryaṇukādau kāraṇabahutvamahattvasamānajātīyapracayebhyo dīrghatvasyotpattiḥ.*

[23]~[25] (a) According to Praśastapāda *pārimaṇḍalya* means *paramāṇutva* only. All of the later Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas follow his interpretation. But *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 7. 1. 26 (*nityaṃ parimaṇḍalam*) seems to support Candramati. For *ibid.* 7. 1. 25 maintains that dimension which exists in a non-eternal substance is non-eternal (*tad anitye 'nityam*). No reason is found here to exclude '*paramamahat*' or '*vibhu*' from the extension of the term '*parimaṇḍala.*' *Ibid.* 7. 1. 27–32 can be considered to divide the eternal *parimaṇḍala* into *paramamahat* (ether, soul, space and time) and *paramāṇu* (mind). Eternity of atoms (*paramāṇu*) of four kinds of elements is not referred to here. It is self-evident that atoms (*paramāṇu*) are '*paramāṇu*' in dimension.

(b) The term '*parimaṇḍala*' means 'circle, globe' and so on, namely, a kind of 'shape' of things. I have no good idea, for the time being, as to how to translate this term. We should consult and investigate Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (1. 10) which enumerates shapes (*saṃsthāna*) including '*dīrgha*', '*hrasva*' and '*parimaṇḍala.*'

[26] *Praśastapādabhāṣya : pṛthaktvam apoddhāravyavahārakāraṇam. tat punar ekadravyam anekadravyaṃ ca.*

[27] *Ibid. : aprāptayoḥ prāptiḥ saṃyogaḥ.*

[28] *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 7. 2. 10 : *anyatarakarmaja ubhayakarmajaḥ saṃyogajaś ca saṃyogaḥ.*

[29] Praśastapāda's illustration : *yathā sthāṇoḥ śyenena vibhūnāṃ ca mūrtaiḥ.*

[30] Praśastapāda's illustration : *yathā mallayor meṣayor vā.*

[31] Praśastapāda enumerates three kinds — that produced by one substance, that produced by two substances and that produced by many substances. His explanation is as follows : *sa caikasmād dvābhyāṃ bahubhyaś ca bhavati. ekasmāt tāvat tantuvīraṇasaṃyogād dvitantukavīraṇasaṃyogaḥ. dvābhyāṃ tantvākāśasaṃyogābhyāṃ eko dvitantukākāśasaṃyogaḥ. bahubhyaś ca tantuturīsaṃyogebhya ekaḥ paṭaturīsaṃyogaḥ.* The *Daśapadārthī*

seems to suppose such a case as "*niṣkriyabahutantvākāśasaṃyogebhya ekaḥ paṭākāśasaṃyogaḥ.*

[32] *Praśastapādabhāṣya : prāptipūrvakāprāptir vibhāgaḥ.*

[33] *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 7. 2. 11 : *etena vibhāgo vyākhyātaḥ.* See *ibid.* 7. 2. 10 (quoted in note on paragraph [28]).

[34] *Praśastapādabhāṣya : tatrānyatarakarmajobhayakarmajau saṃyogavat.*

[35] Praśastapāda enumerates two kinds of *vibhāgajavibhāga* as follows : *vibhāgajas tu dvividhaḥ kāraṇavibhāgāt kāraṇākāraṇavibhāgāc ca.* The former is illustrated as follows (summary) : A two-fingered form is made of two fingers. When one finger moves and is separated from another finger (*kāraṇavibhāga*), then the two-fingered form comes to be destroyed. This means that the finger comes to be separated from the place of ether which was previously connected with the two-fingered form. The latter is illustrated as follows (summary) : A hand (*akāraṇa*) is made of fingers (*kāraṇa*). When the hand moves and comes to be separated from the place of ether which was previously connected with it (*akāraṇavibhāga*), then every finger comes to be separated from the place of ether which was previously connected with it (*kāraṇavibhāga*). These separations produce connections of them with another places of ether. Here is produced a 'new' hand with fingers which are connected with another places of ether. New connection is the cause of the destruction of the previous connection, that is to say, is the cause of separation. This means that the hand (*kārya*) and its fingers (*akārya*) come to be separated from the places of ether which were previously connected with them. These separations are produced by *kāraṇākāraṇavibhāgas*. The latter type of *vibhāgajavibhāga* is complicated. The *Daśapadārthī* refers to the former type only.

[36]~[37] This 'and so on' (*ādi*) denotes space. *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 7. 2. 25 : *ekadikkālābhyāṃ sannikṛṣṭaviprakṛṣṭābhyāṃ param aparam.* (*Vyākhyā* reads : *ekadikkālābhyāṃ sannikṛṣṭaviprakṛṣṭābhyāṃ param aparaṃ ca. Upaskāra* reads : *ekadikkābhyām ekakālābhyāṃ sannikṛṣṭaviprakṛṣṭābhyāṃ param aparaṃ ca.*) As for the detail, see II. 2.

[38] Namely, cognition reveals all of the objects in the world. (I owe this explanation to Prof. V. N. Jha.) Cf. paragraph [256] where the thorough realism of the Vaiśeṣikas is explicitly declared.

[39] (a) The term '*pratyakṣa*' is more popular in the Vaiśeṣika texts. But the same Chinese word evidently corresponds also to the term '*darśana.*' Besides, in paragraph [94] there appears another Chinese word which is a literal translation of '*pratyakṣa*' (*prati* = to, against; *akṣa* = eyes).

(b) [Right] cognition is divided into two kinds (*dṛṣṭa* and *anumāna*) by Candramati while being divided into four kinds (*pratyakṣa, anumāna, smṛti* and *ārṣa*) by Praśastapāda. Both divisions seem to have ground in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra.* But it is not so clear which kind of cognition the *Sūtrakāra* regarded as [right] cognition.

(c) Candramati refers only to right cognition (*pramiti*), but never to instrument of right cognition (*pramāṇa*). Or, he recognized that cognition itself is instrument with which to cognize objects. This is inferred from his definition of cognition (see paragraph [38]). The *Nyāyasūtra,* Vātsyāyana and Praśastapāda know very well about difference between *pramiti* and *pramāṇa.* and, in fact, use these terms. Nevertheless, they neglect the difference between them frequently. I owe the present note to Prof. V. N. Jha.

[40] (a) The term '*prāpya*' stresses that only those which satisfy all conditions for being directly cognized are possible to be directly cognized. The Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika '*prāpyakārivāda*' is sharply contrasted with the Buddhist '*aprāpyakārivāda.*' Moreover, 'contact' (*sannikarṣa*) as the cause of direct cognition requires examination as to whether an object in concern is *prāpya* or not. This examination led to the division of contact into five, six or nine kinds (see note on paragraph [145]), and to the

division of direct cognition into *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* (see II. 3).

(b) It is not completely impossible to reconstruct such a Sanskrit phrase as '*prāpte dravyarūpādibhir indriyādisannikarṣe sati.*' But the structure of this phrase is, as Prof. V. N. Jha pointed out while discussing with me, too loose to be recognized as a normal Sanskrit structure. According to the normal Sanskrit, this phrase ought to run: *dravyarūpādibhir indriyādisannikarṣe prāpte sati.*' But this is impossible from the word order of the Chinese version.

[41]~[43] (a) Praśastapāda mentions the division of *anumāna* into *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* and *dṛṣṭa* and defines them as follows: *tatra dṛṣṭaṃ prasiddhasādhyayor atyantajātyabhede 'numānam. yathā gavy eva sāsnāmātram upalabhya deśāntare 'pi sāsnāmātradarśanād gavi pratipattiḥ. prasiddhasādhyayor atyantajātibhede liṅgānumeyadharmasāmānyānuvṛttito 'numānaṃ sāmānyatodṛṣṭam. yathā karṣakavanigrājapuruṣāṇāṃ ca pravṛtteḥ phalavattvam upalabhya varṇāśramiṇām api dṛṣṭaṃ prayojanam anuddiśya pravartamānānāṃ phalānumānaṃ iti.* The *Daśapadārthī* presents no example. But it is clear that *anumāna* as *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* is to infer those which cannot be directly cognized, namely, *adṛṣṭa* or *atīndriya*. Therefore, this *anumāna* needs the help of general relationship (*sāmānya*). On the other hand, *anumāna* as *asāmānyatodṛṣṭa* or *dṛṣṭa* is to infer those which are not directly cognized for the time being on account of some reason, but which could surely be directly cognized (*dṛṣṭa*) when the reason has got to be removed. Praśastapāda, who flourished quite probably later than Candramati, is considered to have omitted the term '*asāmānyataḥ*' from the viewpoint of expressional economy. Indeed, no problem arises without the term.

Vātsyāyana on *Nyāyasūtra* 1. 1. 5 offers two ways of interpretation on the three kinds of *anumāna*, namely, *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*. According to his first interpretation, *pūrvavat* is to infer raining in the future from rising of clouds, *śeṣavat* is to

infer raining in the past from the swollenness and rapidness of the stream of the river, and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* is to infer the movement of the sun etc. from Caitra's movement which is preceded by his transferring to another place. Vātsyāyana does not use such terms as *dṛṣṭa*, *adṛṣṭa*, *atīndriya* etc. But it is clear that raining is *dṛṣṭa*, and that the movement of the sun is *adṛṣṭa* or *atīndriya*. Therefore, we can conclude that, as far as the first interpretation of Vātsyāyana is concerned, *pūrvavat* and *śeṣavat* are equal to *asāmānyatodṛṣṭa* of Candramati and *dṛṣṭa* of Praśastapāda, and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* is equal to *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* of both of them. It is likely that, as for the division of *anumāna*, Candramati was hinted by Vātsyāyana, and Praśastapāda inherited Candramati though he used another expression.

Probably, Vātsyāyana borrowed the idea of three kinds of *anumāna* from the Sāṅkhyas. But his two ways of interpretation stimulated the Vaiśeṣikas who were eager to set in order the dispersed explanations of the *Sūtrakāra* who had much interest in the division of *anumāna* into *dṛṣṭa* and *adṛṣṭa*, and eventually helped Candramati etc. to establish the divison of *anumāna* which is, to our surprise, based on the strict logic. I owe the present note to Prof. V. N. Jha.

(b) *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 3. 1. 8: *saṃyogi, samavāyi, ekārthasamavāyi, virodhi ca. kāryaṃ kāryāntarasya, kāraṇaṃ kāraṇāntarasya. virodhy abhūtaṃ bhūtasya, bhūtam abhūtasya, abhūtam abhūtasya, bhūtaṃ bhūtasya.* (*Vyākhyā* reads: ... *bhūtaṃ bhūtasya, abhūtam abhūtasya. Upaskāra* reads: (five *sūtras*) *saṃyogisamavāyy ekārthasamavāyivirodhi ca. kāryaṃ kāryāntarasya. virodhy abhūtaṃ bhūtasya. bhūtam abhūtasya. bhūto bhūtasya.*) *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 9. 18: *asyedaṃ kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ sambandhi ekārthasamavāyi virodhi ceti laiṅgikam.* (*Vyākhyā* lacks the latter half of the ninth *Adhyāya*. *Upaskāra* reads: *asyedaṃ kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ saṃyogi virodhi samavāyi ceti laiṅgikam. Upaskāra* put after this the *sūtra* which *Vṛtti* omits. It is as follows; *asyedaṃ kāryakāraṇasambandhaś cāvayavād bhavati.*)

[44] *Praśastapādabhāṣya : anugrahalakṣaṇam sukham.* '*Anukūla*' is also possible here instead of '*anugraha.*'

[45] *Ibid. : upaghātalakṣaṇaṃ duḥkham.* '*Pratikūla*' is possible instead of '*upaghāta.*'

[46] *Ibid. : svārthaṃ parārthaṃ vāprāptaprārthanecchā.*

[47] *Nyāyakandalī : enam ahaṃ hanmīti prayatnaḥ dveṣāt.*

[48] *Praśastapādabhāṣya : prayatnaḥ saṃrambha utsāha iti paryāyāḥ.*

[49] *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 5. 2. 6 : *apāṃ saṃyogābhāve gurutvāt patanam. Praśastapādabhāṣya : gurutvaṃ jalabhūmyoḥ patanakarmakāraṇam.*

[50] *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 5. 2. 5 : *dravatvāt syandanam. Praśastapādabhāṣya : dravatvaṃ syandanakarmakāraṇam.*

[51] *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 2. 1. 2 (see note on paragraph [4]). *Praśastapādabhāṣya : sneho 'pāṃ viśeṣaguṇaḥ. saṅgrahamṛjādihetuḥ. Tarkasaṅgraha* [32] : *cūrṇādipiṇḍībhāvahetur guṇaḥ snehaḥ.*

[52] Praśastapāda enumerates three kinds — *vega, bhāvanā* and *sthitisthāpaka.* The *Daśapadārthī*'s *smṛtihetu* corresponds to *bhāvanā*, and *kriyāhetu* to *vega.* The *Daśapadārthī's* explanation of *kriyāhetu* mentioned below is not likely to include *sthitisthāpaka.* The division of *saṃskāra* is obscure in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra.*

[53] *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 9. 22 : *ātmamanasoḥ saṃyogaviśeṣāt saṃskārāc ca smṛtiḥ.* (*Vyākhyā* lacks the latter half of the ninth *Adhyāya.*) *Praśastapādabhāṣya : bhāvanāsañjñakas tv ātmaguṇo dṛṣṭaśrutānubhūteṣv artheṣu smṛtipratyabhijñānahetur bhavati jñānamadaduḥkhādivirodhī.* Immediately after the above passage Praśastapāda commences to explain the causes of 'prominent impression' (*saṃskārātiśaya*). As to one of them, he mentions as follows : *vidyāśilpavyāyāmādiṣv abhyasyamāneṣu tasminn evārthe pūrvapūrvasaṃskāram apekṣamāṇād uttarottarasmāt pratyayād ātmamanasoḥ saṃyogāt saṃskārātiśayo jāyate.* This corresponds to the passage '*-saṃskārajanyaḥ*' of the present paragraph.

[54] *Praśastapādabhāṣya : tatra vego mūrtimatsu pañcasu dravyeṣu nimittaviśeṣāpekṣāt karmaṇo jāyate.* The *Nyāyakandalī* paraphrases '*nimittaviśeṣa*' as '*nodanābhighātādinimittaviśeṣa.*' *Vṛtti* on *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 5. 1. 3 : *vegavaddravyasaṃyogo 'bhighātaḥ. Ibid.* on the *sūtra* 5. 1. 8 : *nudyate 'neneti nodanaṃ vegaprayatnāpekṣaḥ saṃyogaviśeṣaḥ.*

[55]~[56] *Praśastapādabhāṣya* on *Apavarga-nirūpaṇa* : *aviduṣo rāgadveṣavataḥ pravartakād dharmāt prakṛṣṭāt svalpādharmasahitāt ... āśayānurūpair iṣṭaśarīrendriyaviṣayasukhādibhir yogo bhavati ... evaṃ pravṛttilakṣaṇād dharmād adharmasahitād devamanuṣyatiryaṅnarakeṣu punaḥ punaḥ saṃsārabandho bhavati.* The compound '*iṣṭaśarīrendriyaviṣayasukhādibhiḥ*' is paraphrased by Vyomaśiva as '*iṣṭāni ca tāni* (*yāni ?*) *śarīrendriyaviṣayasukhādīni taiḥ,*' and is interpreted by Śrīdhara as '*iṣṭaśabdaḥ pratyekaṃ śarīrādiṣu sambandhyate. dvandvānantaraṃ prayogāt.*' That is, '*iṣṭa-*' in the present paragraph [56] modifies every following item. Then, '*iṣṭaśarīrādisukha-*' should be paraphrased as '*iṣṭāni yāni śarīrādīni ca yad iṣṭaṃ sukhaṃ ca teṣām.*' Therefore, the term '*ādi-*' indicates '*indriya-*' and '*viṣaya-.*' Besides, the Vyomaśiva, by mentioning '*pravartakād dharmāt saṃsārotpattim upadiśya nivartakāt tannivṛttim āha — jñānapūrvakāt tu kṛtād iti,*' clarifies that inducing merit is that which induces transmigration, and that withdrawing merit is that which withdraws from transmigration.

[57] *Praśastapādabhāṣya, loc. cit.* : ......*rāgādinivṛttau nivṛttilakṣaṇaḥ kevalo dharmaḥ paramārthadarśanajaṃ sukhaṃ kṛtvā nivartate.* The term '*sukha-*' corresponds in the present text to '*ānanda-,*' which sounds, however, like a Buddhistic or Vedantic term.

[58] *Ibid. loc. cit.* : *tathā prakṛṣṭād adharmāt svalpadharmasahitāt pretatiryagyonisthāneṣv aniṣṭaśarīrendriyaviṣayaduḥkhādibhir yogo bhavati.*

[59] See note on paragraphs [13] ~ [16].

[60] *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1. 1. 6 : *utkṣepaṇāvakṣepaṇam ākuñcanaṃ prasāraṇaṃ gamanam iti karmāṇi.* The term '*avakṣepaṇa*' is frequently replaced by the term '*apakṣepaṇa.*' I adopted the latter.

[61] *Praśastapādabhāṣya* : *tatrotkṣepaṇaṃ śarīrāvayaveṣu tatsambaddheṣu ca yad ūrdhvabhāgbhiḥ pradeśaiḥ saṃyogakāraṇam adhobhāgbhiś ca pradeśair vibhāgakāraṇaṃ karmotpadyate gurutvaprayatnasaṃyogebhyas tad utkṣepaṇam.*

[62] *Ibid.* : *tadviparītasaṃyogavibhāgakāraṇaṃ karmāpakṣepaṇam.*

[63] *Ibid.* : *ṛjuno dravyasyāgrāvayavānāṃ taddeśair vibhāgaḥ saṃyogaś ca mūlapradeśair yena karmaṇāvayavi kuṭilaḥ sañjāyate tad ākuñcanam.*

[64] *Ibid.* : *tadviparyayeṇa saṃyogavibhāgotpattau yena karmaṇāvayavi ṛjuḥ sampadyate tat prasāraṇam.*

[65] *Ibid* : *tad aniyatadikpradeśasaṃyogavibhāgakāraṇaṃ tad gamanam iti.*

[66] *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1. 2. 4 : *bhāvaḥ sāmānyam eva.* (*Vyākhyā* reads : *bhāvaḥ. Upaskāra* reads : *bhāvo 'nuvṛtter eva hetutvāt sāmānyam eva.* All commentaries agree in interpreting that '*bhāva*' is nothing but '*sattā*') *Ibid.* 1. 2. 5 : *dravyatvaṃ guṇatvaṃ karmatvaṃ ca sāmānyāni viśeṣāś ca.* (*Vyākhyā* omits the first '*ca.*') *Ibid.* 1. 2. 6 : *anyatrāntyebhyo viśeṣebhyaḥ.* Chandramati is very faithful to the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* in this point. For his *sāmānya, viśeṣa* and *sāmānyaviśeṣa* correspond precisely to that of *sūtra* 1. 2. 4, that of *sūtra* 1. 2. 6 and that of *sūtra* 1. 2. 5 respectively. On the other hand, Praśastapāda divides *sāmānya* into two kinds, namely, *parasāmānya* and *aparasāmānya.* The former indicates *sattā* only, and the latter indicates *dravyatva, guṇatva, karmatva, pṛthivītva, gotva* and so on which is usually called '*jāti,*' and corresponds to '*sāmānyāni viśeṣāś ca*' of *sūtra* 1. 2. 5 and to Candramati's '*sāmānyaviśeṣa.*' The *Sūtrakāra,*

Candramati and Praśastapāda agree in assering that *viśesa* is *antyaviśeṣa* only. Praśastapāda's division must be based on his conviction that the compound '*sāmānyaviśeṣa*' is liable to make confusion as to whether it denotes merely '*sāmānya*' and '*viśeṣa*' or '*sāmānya* and at the same time *viśeṣa.*' However Praśastapāda himself sometimes uses the term '*sāmānyaviśeṣa*' as evidently indicates that of *sūtra* 1. 2. 5 and of Candramati. By the way, it is interesting that Śivāditya in his *Saptapadārthī* [6] divides *sāmānya* into three kinds. He mentions thus : *sāmānyaṃ param aparaṃ parāparaṃ ceti trividham.* Though commentators seem to be embarassed by this passage, it is natural to consider that *parasāmānya* means *sattā*, *aparasāmānya* means *gotva. ghaṭatva* and so on, and *parāparasāmānya* means *dravyatva, pṛthivītva* and so on. Cf. *Tarkāmṛta* : *sāmānyaṃ trividam—vyāpakaṃ vyāpyaṃ vyāpyavyāpakañ ca. vyāpakaṃ sattā, vyāpyaṃ ghaṭatvādi, dravyatvādi vyāpyavyāpakaṁ.* (p. 32)

[67] (a) *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1. 2. 7 : *sad iti yato dravyaguṇakarmasu.* (*Vyākhyā* reads : *san yato dravyaguṇakarmasu sā sattā. Upaskāra* reads : *sad iti yato dravyaguṇakarmasu sā sattā.*) *Praśastapādabhāṣya, Dravyagranthe sādharmyavaidharmyanirūpaṇa* : *dravyādīnām api sattāsambandhaḥ sāmānyaviśeṣavattvaṃ svasamayārthaśabdābhidheyatvaṃ dharmādharmakartṛtvaṃ ca. Ibid., loc. cit.* : *ṣaṇṇām api padārthānām astitvābhidheyatvajñeyatvāni.* Thus, the term '*sattā*' is a hightly technical term in the Vaiśeṣika system. It exists only in three caregories, namely, substance, quality and action. It is *astitva* which exists in all categories. Therefore, it is almost incorrect to translate the term '*sattā*' as 'existence,' which much more fit the term '*astitva.*' I owe the present note to Prof. V. N. Jha.

(b) *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* (4. 1. 14) : *etena guṇatve bhāve ca sarvendriyajñānaṃ vyākhyātaṃ.* (Both *Vyākhyā* and *Upaskāra* read : ...*sarvendriyaṃ jñānam*...)

[68] *Ibid.* : *anteṣu bhavā antyāḥ svāśrayaviśeṣakatvād viśeṣāḥ. vināśārambharahiteṣu nityadravyeṣv aṇvākāśakāladigātmamanassu pratidravyam ekaikaśa vartamānāḥ atyantavyāvṛttibuddhihetavaḥ.*

Candramati's '*etadvyaktibuddhihetu*' is likely to correspond to '*svāśrayaviśeṣaka*' in Praśastapāda's passage.

[69] *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 7. 2. 29–31 : *iheti yataḥ kāryakāraṇayoḥ* sa *samavāyaḥ.* (Both *Vyākhyā* and *Upaskāra* read : *ihedam iti yataḥ kāryakāraṇayoh sa samavāyaḥ.*) *dravyatvaguṇatvakarmatvapratiṣedho bhāvena vyākhyātaḥ.* (*Vyākhyā* reads : *dravyaguṇakarmatvapratiṣedho bhāvena vyākhyātaḥ. Upaskāra* reads : *dravyatvaguṇatvapratiṣedho bhāvena vyākhyātaḥ.*) *tattvaṃ ceti.* (*Vyakhyā* reads: *tattvaṃ bhāve*[*na*]—complement by A. Thakur. *Upaskāra* reads: *tattvaṃ bhāvena.*) *Praśastapādabhāṣya* : *ayutasiddhānām ādhāryādhārabhūtānāṃ yaḥ sambandha ihapratyayahetuḥ sa samavāyaḥ.*

[70]~[71] Seee III. 2.

[72] See note on paragraph [66]. The accurate translation of this category is 'universal and at the same time particular.'

[73] (a) *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1. 2. 12 : *ekadravyavattvena dravyatvam uktam.* (*Vyākhyā* reads : [*aneka*]*dravyavattvena dravyatvam uktam. Upaskāra* reads : *anekadravyavattvena dravyatvam uktam. Vyākhyā* does not comment on this *sūtra.* Of course, '[*aneka*]' is the term which A. Thakur added taking the reading of *Upaskāra* into consideration, for mere '*dravyavat*' means almost nothing here. However, '*anekadravyavat*' is incorrect in this case. For all non-eternal substances are *anekadravyavat,* too. Namely, the reading '*anekadravyavat*' cannot exclude substances from the definition of *dravyatva.* Only the reading of the *Vṛtti* is correct. For any substance cannot be *ekadravyavat.* Eternal substances are *adravyavat* while non-eternal substances are *anekadravayavat.* This *sūtra* expounds that, as substanceness has one substance as its locus, it is by no means a substance. Thus comes to be established the clear distinction between substanceness and substance.) The next *sūtra* (1. 2. 13) : *sāmānyaviśeṣābhāvena ca. Vṛtti*'s intrepretation : *dravyādiṣv iva dravyādīnāṃ madhyāt kaścit sāmānyaviśeṣo dravyatve varteta yadi* [*dravyatvaṃ*] *dravyaṃ guṇaḥ karma vā syāt. tasmān na dravyādīni dravyatvam.*

(b) The passage '*dravyābhidhānapratyayahetuh*' can be deduced by analogy with *Veiśeṣikasūtra* 1. 2. 7 (quoted in note on paragraph [67]). It is the same with similar passages in the following paragraphs [74] and [75].

[74] *Ibid.* 1. 2. 14: *guṇe bhāvād guṇatvam uktam.* (*Upaskāra* reads : *tathā guṇeṣu bhāvād guṇatvam uktam.* A. Thakur complemented this and the next *sūtras* borrowing those of the *Upaskāra.*) *Ibid.* 1. 2. 15 : *sāmānyaviśeṣābhāvena ca.* As for the phrase '*sarvendriyagrāhya-.*' see *ibid* 4. 1. 14 quoted in note (b) on paragraph [67].

[75] *Ibid.* 1. 2. 16 : *karmaṇi bhāvāt karmatvam uktam.* (*Upaskāra* reads : *karmasu bhāvāt...*) *Ibid.* 1. 2. 17 : *sāmānyaviśeṣābhāvena* ca.

[76] See notes on paragraphs [66], [67], [73], [74] and [75].

[77] (a) This must be the first explicit division of absence from the purely metaphysical point of view in the history of Indian philosophy. Vasubandhu (contemporary with or only a little later than Candramati) in his *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya,* depending on the traditional views of the Sarvāstivādins, divides *asaṃskṛtadharmas* into *pratisaṅkhyānirodha, apratisaṅkhyānirodha* and *ākāśa.* However, such a division by Vasubandhu or by the Sarvāstivādins is not done from the purely metaphysical point of view, but from the considerably practical one. There are found several arguments on absence in the *Nyāyasūtra* and the *Nyāyabhāṣya.* Though they are interesting enough to investigate, therein is found no intention to set up the division of absence.

(b) Candramati is very faithful to the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra,* where absence play an important role in concern with inference. It is doubtless that his division of absence originates from *sūtras* 9. 1–5. They are as follows :

kriyāguṇavyapadeśābhāvād asat. (9. 1)

(*Upaskāra* reads : *kriyāguṇavyapadeśābhāvād prāg asat.*)

sad asat. (9. 2)

(*Vyākhyā* omits.)

asataḥ sat kriyāguṇavyapadesā(sa?)bhāvād arthāntaram (9. 3)

(*Vyākhyā* reads : *asati kriyāguṇavyapadeśābhāvād arthāntaram. Upaskāra* reads : *asataḥ kriyāguṇavyapadeśābhāvād arthāntaram.*)

sac cāsta. (9. 4)

yac cānyat satas tad apy asat. (9. 5)

(*Vyākhyā* reads : *yac cānyat satas tad asat. Upaskāra* reads : *yac cānyad asad atas tad asat.*)

Candramati seems to have drawn out his five kinds of absences from these *sūtras* in order. It is as follows : *asat* in 9. 1 is *prāgabhāva* : that in 9. 2 is *dhvaṃsa* (or *pradhvaṃsa*); that in 9. 3 is *anyonyābhāva*; that in 9. 4 is *saṃsargābhāva*; that in 9.5 is *atyantābhāva*. The commentators agree in explaining that *asat* in 9. 1 is *prāgabhāva*, that in 9. 2 is *pradhvaṃsa*, that in 9. 4 is *anyonyābhāva*, and that in 9. 5 is *atyantābhāva*. Of course, in those days of the commentators, it is already the established notion that absence is of four kinds only, and that *saṃsargābhāva* is the general term of the three, namely, *prāgabhāva*, *pradhvaṃsa* and *atyantābhāva*. The division of absence into four kinds only originates probably from the division by Kumārila, a Mīmāṃsaka. It is evident that *saṃsargābhāva* of Candramati is problematic. Although Praśastapāda neglected the topic of absence or negation, the Vaiśeṣikas amended the division of absence at last by the time of Vācaspatimiśra, probably taking the more rational division by Kumārila into consideration. The established division of absence of the later Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas is as follows : Absence is of two kinds, namely, *saṃsargābhāva* and *anyonyābhāva*. The former is subdivided into four kinds, namely, *prāgabhāva*, *pradhvaṃsa* and *atyantābhāva*. (Only, all kinds of absences should be called '*saṃsargābhāva*' in a fundamental sense. Because even *anyonyābhāva* is also the absence of the relationship (*saṃsarga*) named *tādātmya* [identity]—Prof. V. N. Jha.)

[78] This is usually illustrated by the absence of a pot before its coming into existence. Pre-absence comes to play an important role in the argument of causality of the Vaiśeṣikas, namely, *asatkāryavāda* or *ārambhavāda*.

[79] This is usually illustrated by the absence of a pot after its destruction.

[80] This is usually illustrated by the absence of a man in a pile, or the absence of a pile in a man. This absence is indicated by such an expression as 'A man is not a pile' or 'A pile is not a man.' Therefore, the term '*anyonyābhāva*' is frequently replaced by another term, namely, '*bheda*' (division). Division is not the same as separateness (*pṛthaktva*), a quality. As is pointed out by all commentaries on *Pṛthaktva-nirūpaṇa* of the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, while 'division' is the content of such a negative sentence as 'A is not B,' 'separateness' is the content of such a sentence as 'A is separate (different) from B.'

[81] Examples, though a litte abstract ones, are presented in paragraphs [251] and [252]. From the viewpoint of the later Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, some type of Candramati's *saṃsargābhāva* should be absorbed into *prāgabhāva*, and another into *atyantābhāva*. See note on *loc. cit.* Besides, we should pay attention to the following two *sūtras*. *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 9. 10 : *nāsti ghaṭo geha iti sato ghaṭasya gehasaṃyogapratiṣedhaḥ.* (*Vyākhyā* lacks the latter half of the ninth *Adhyāyā.*) *Ibid.* 9. 11 : *nāsty anyaś candramā iti sāmānyāe candramasaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ.* (*Upaskāra* omits.)

[82] This absence is usually illustrated by '*bhūtale ghaṭābhāvaḥ*' or '*vāyau rūpābhāvaḥ.*' The former is of the case of '*asaṃyukta.*' and the latter is of the case of '*asamaveta.*' Both belong to *saṃsargābhāva* shown in the last paragraph [81]. It is possible that Candramati illustrated this absence by '*śaśaviṣāṇa*,' '*khapuṣpa*' etc., which the Yogācāras favored to use in order to illustrate erroneous cognition or illusion. Candrā-

nanda in his *Vṛtti* on *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 9. 5 presents '*śaśaviṣāṇādi*' as an exampls of absolute absence.

[83]~[85] *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1. 1. 14 : *kriyāvad guṇavat samavāyikāraṇam iti dravyalakṣaṇam.* (*Upaskāra* reads : *kriyāguṇavat....*) But, as is shown in the present paragraphs, there are substances without action. Then, there arises a suspicion that the definition of substance shown by the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* is incorrect. Nevertheless, it is, I think, a correct and quite elaborate definition. As for detail, see I. 3. The *Praśastapādabhāṣya, Dravyagranthe sādharmyavaidharmya-nirūpaṇa : kṣitijalajyotiranilamanasāṃ kriyāvattvamūrtatvaparatvāparatvavegavattvāni.* As for the true meaning of the term '*mūrta,*' see I. 2 and I. 3 (especially the latter). The *Vṛtti* maintains here that the compound '*samavāyikāraṇa*' is *karmadhāraya* as well as *tatpuruṣa.* (*sa* [*samavāyaḥ*] *yasyāsti tat samavāyi, kāraṇāṃ ca tad eva, samavāyino vā kāryasya kāraṇam.*)

[86]~[87] See the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* quoted in note on paragaphs [83]~[85]. But, especially in the process of *pākajotpatti,* there appear substances without quality. The Vaiśeṣika system will collapses unless such apparently odd substances are not admitted. Then, there arises a suspicion that the definition of substance shown by the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* is incorrect. As for the detail, see III. 3. Thereupon, Udayana in his *Lakṣaṇāvalī* defined *dravya* thus : *guṇātyantābhāvānadhikaraṇaṃ dravyam.* Strangely enough, there is found no definition of substance in the *Praśastapādabhāṣya.*

[88] (a) As for the term '*samavāyikāraṇa,*' see the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* quoted in note on paragraphs [83]~[85].

(b) In fact, only eternal substances have particulars (ultimate distinguishers). Nevertheless, this description of the *Daśapadārthī* is quite correct. For it is only substances that have particulars. This way seems to be the basic logic of definition of the early Vaiśeṣikas.

(c) *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1. 1. 11 : *kāryāvirodhi dravyaṃ kāraṇāvirodhi ca.* (*Upaskāra* reads ; *na dravyaṃ kāryaṃ kāraṇañ ca badhati.*) About the term '*virodhi*' or '*virodha,*' *Vṛtti* : *vināśo virodhaḥ pratibandhaḥ* and *Vyākhyā*: *kāryam avirodhi anāśakaṃ yasya tat kāryāvirodhi.* As for '*kāraṇāvirodhi,*' see paragraph [97] which does not seem to agree with the present *sūtra.*

(d) *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1. 1. 15 : *dravyāśrayī aguṇavān saṃyogavibhāgeṣv akāraṇam anapekṣa iti guṇalakṣaṇam.* The *Vṛtti* interprets '*saṃyogavibhāgeṣv akāraṇam anapekṣa[ḥ]*' as follows : *tathā hi — aṅgulyor ākāśasaṃyogo dvyaṅgulākāśasaṃyoge kartavye dvyaṅgulotpattim apekṣate, aṅgulyoḥ parasparavibhāgo dvyaṅgulākāśavibhāgaṃ prati kāryavināśam apekṣate, evaṃ saṃyogavibhāgalakṣaṇa eva guṇaḥ saṃyogavibhāgeṣu sāpekṣaḥ kāraṇam.* From this context, we can assume that substances. namely, two fingers, are the cause (*kāraṇa*) of connection and separation which are dependent on (*sāpekṣa*) two fingers or substances. However, I am not confident of whether the reconstructed term '*sāpekṣakāraṇa*' is correct or not. It will be necessary for us to investigate further the usage of the term '*apekṣ-*' and its derivatives.

[89]~[91] (a) *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1. 1. 8 : *dravyāṇi dravyāntaram ārabhante. Vṛtti : dravye ca dravyāṇi ceti vigrahād ekam anārambhakam. samavāyikāraṇāni dravyāṇi svātmavyatiriktaṃ kāryam ārabhante. ākāśādyantyāvayavidravyāṇi tu dravyaṃ nārabhante, tulyajātīyānāṃ mūrtikriyārūpādimatāṃ dvayor bahūnāṃ vā kāraṇānāṃ kāryārambhakatvāt. na caivaṃvidhāny ākāśādīni. manaso 'sparśavattvād dravyākāraṇatvam antyāvayavidravyāṇāṃ cādṛṣṭatvāt.* The *Vṛtti*'s interpretation is a little complicated in comparison with the description of the *Daśapadārthī.* Among nine kinds of substances, it is ether, time, space, soul and mind only that are without touch and that do not produce another substance. Despite its extreme briefness the description of the *Daśapadārthī* is quite accurate in this point. It is the same with the case of the *Praśastapādabhāṣya, Dravyagranthe sādharmyavaidharmya-nirūpaṇa : caturṇāṃ dravyārambhakatvasparśavattve.*

(' Four ' in this case are earth, water, fire and air.) *Ibid., Mano-nirūpaṇa : [manaso] mūrtatvāt paratvāparatve saṃskāraś ca. asparśavattvād dravyānārambhakatvam.* It is not clear why the *Vṛtti*'s interpretation is so complicated.

(b) *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1. 1. 17 : *dravyaguṇakarmaṇāṃ dravyaṃ kāraṇaṃ sāmānyam.* (*sāmānya* = *samāna* according to the *Vṛtti.*) (*Vyākhyā* reads : *dravyaṃ dravyaguṇakarmaṇāṃ sāmānyaṃ kāraṇam.*) According to the *Vṛtti,* (i) earth, water, fire and air are causes common to substances, qualities and actions ; (ii) ether, time, space and soul are causes common to qualities only (namely, not common to substances and actions), and (iii) mind is a cause common to qualities and actions (namely, not common to substances).

[92]~[94] (a) There might arise a suspicion that atoms of earth, water and fire are neither visible nor directly cognized despite their being with colour. But we should consult the following *sūtras. Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 4. 1. 6 : *mahaty anekadravyavattvād rūpāc copalabdhiḥ. Ibid.* 4. 1. 7 : *adravyavattvāt paramāṇāv anupalabdhiḥ* (*Vyākhyā* seems to omit though A. Thakur complements the following *sūtra* : [*adravyatvāt paramāṇāv anupalabdhiḥ.*] *Upaskāra* omits.) *Ibid.* 4. 1. 8 : *rūpasaṃskārābhāvād vāyāv anupalabdhiḥ.* (*Vyākhyā* reads : *rūpasaṃskārābhāvād vāyor anupalabdhiḥ. Upaskāra* reads : *saty api dravyatve mahattve rūpasaṃskārābhāvād vāyor anupalabdhiḥ.*) *Ibid.* 4. 1. 9 : *anekadravyeṇa dravyeṇa samavāyād rūpaviśeṣāc copalabdhiḥ.* (*Vyākhyā* omits. *Upaskāra* reads : *anekadravyasamavāyāt rūpaviśeṣāc ca rūpopalabdhiḥ.*) It is clear that the Vaiśeṣikas mantained since their earliest stage that those substances and colour which do not fulfill the sufficient conditions cannot be visible or directly cognized. However, among substances, it is only those with colour that are visible or directly cognized. Therefore, the present definition of the *Daśapadārthī* comits no fault, The Vaiśeṣikas later came to set up another condition for objects being directly cognized. *Praśastapādabhāṣya, Pratyakṣa-nirūpaṇa* : *dravye tāvad dvividhe mahaty anekadravyavattvodbhūtarūpaprakāśacatuṣṭayasannikarṣād dharmādisāmagrye ca svarūpālocanamātram.* The most notable in this description is the term ' *udbhūta* ' (manifested) which modifies ' *rūpa.* ' The later Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas divide colour and touch into two kinds by each — *udbhūta* and *anudbhūta,* and assert that *udbhūtatva* of colour and touch is indispensable for our acquiring direct cognition. Cf. *Tarkāmṛta : atha pratyakṣāpratyakṣadravyāṇi. paramāṇudvyaṇuke apratyakṣe. mahadudbhūtarūpavattvaṃ yatra, tāni pṛthivījalatejāṃsi pratyakṣāṇi, ātmā ca pratyakṣaḥ. vāyvākāśakāladiṅmanāṃsi tu apratyakṣāṇi. bahirindriyapratyakṣaṃ prati mahattve saty udbhūtarūpavattvaṃ prayojakam.* (p. 9)

By the way, Candramati as well as Praśastapāda does not mention thal soul is directly cognized. Soul is out of their definition of the substances which are (can be) directly cognized. *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 9. 13 (*ātmany ātmamanasoḥ saṃyogaviśeṣād ātmapratyakṣam*) is interpreted to expound that soul is directly cognized by special persons like *ṛṣis, siddhas* and *yogins.*

(b) As why I selected here the word ' *pratyakṣa* ' not ' *dṛṣṭa,* ' see note (a) on paragraph [39].

[95] ' Five ' are ether, time, space, soul and mind. ' Four ' are earth, water, fire and air.

[96] *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 4. 1. 1 : *sad akāraṇavat tan nityam.* (Both *Vyākhyā* and *Upaskāra* read : *sad akāraṇavān nityam.*) This is the fundamental definition of eternity of entities by the Vaiśeṣikas. Those which are *anārabdha* are eternal because they have no causes, while those which are *ārabdha* are non-eternal because they have causes.

[97] (a) *Ibid.* 2. 1. 11 : *adravyavattvād dravyam.* (*Upaskāra* reads : *adravyavattvena dravyam.* The *Vṛtti* says that *adravyavattva* means *samavāyikāraṇarahitatva.*) *Ibid.* 4. 1. 7 : *adravyavattvāt paramāṇāv anupalabdhiḥ.* (*Vyākhyā* reads : [*adravyatvāt paramāṇāv anupalabdhiḥ.* — A complement by A. Thakur]. *Upaskāra* omits. The *Vṛtti* says that *adravyavattva* means *samavāyikāraṇadravyābhāva.*) In fact, a substance as ' *sadravya* ' is noth-

ing but '*anekadravya,*' as is explained by the *Vṛtti* on *sūtra* 2. 1. 11 as follows : *dravyaṃ hy adravyam anekadravyaṃ ca*. There are no substances which are *ekadravya* (= *ekadravyāśrita*). It is some kinds of qualities and all actions that are *ekadravya*. See paragraphs [160]~[166] and [199]~[201].

(b) Atoms are the minimum units and are, by definition, not to be divided further. This tells that they have not their material causes (*adravya* or *adravyavat*) and are not composed of parts (*nirbhāga* or *niravayava*).

(c) *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1. 1. 11 : *kāryāvirodhi dravyaṃ kārṇāvirodhi.* (*Vyākhyā* reads : ... *ca. Upaskāra* reads : *na dravyaṃ kāryaṃ kāraṇam ca badhati.*) *Praśastapādabhāṣya, Dravyagranthe sādharmyavaidharmya-nirūpaṇa : pṛthivyādīnāṃ navānām api dravyatvayogaḥ svātmany ārambhakatvaṃ guṇavattvaṃ kāryakāraṇāvirodhitvam antyaviśeṣavattvam.*

(d) Ultimate particulars exist in eternal substances only.

(e) As for the term '*parimaṇḍala*' see note (a) on paragraphs [23]~[25].

[98] See the *Vaiśesikasūtra* quoted in the next note. *Praśastapādabhāṣya* (*loc. cit.*) : *pṛthivyādīnāṃ pañcānām api bhūtatvendriyaprakṛtitvabāhyaikaikendriyagrāhyaviśeṣaguṇavattvāni.* And, interestingly enough, *ibid., Pratyakṣa-nirūpaṇa,* mentions thus : *akṣāṇīndriyāṇi ghrāṇarasanacakṣustvacchrotramanāṃsi ṣaṭ.* Namely Praśastapāda divides sense organs into external sense organs and internal one, while Candramati does not so at least in the present text. The *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* seems to support the attitude of Candramati in this point, though the later Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas follow Praśastapāda. Cf. *Tarkāmṛta : ghrāṇendriyaṃ pārthivam, rasanendriyaṃ jalīyam, cakṣurindriyaṃ taijasam, tvagindriyaṃ vāyavīyam, śrotrendriyaṃ karṇaśaṣkulyavacchinnanabhaḥpradeśaḥ, etāni pañca bahirindriyāṇi. mano 'ntarindriyam, tena ṣaḍ indriyāṇi.* (p. 8)

[99] *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 8. 15-17 : *dravyeṣu pañcātmakaṃ pratyuktam: bhūyastvād gandhavattvāc ca pṛthivī gandhajñāne. tathāpas tejo vāyuś ca rasarūpasparśajñāneṣu rasarūpasparśaviśeṣād iti.* (*Vyākhyā* reads : *dravyeṣu pañcakātmakam. bhūyastvād gandhavattvāc ca pṛthivī gandhajñāne. tathāpas tejo vāyuś ca. rasarūpasparśāt. Upaskāra* reads : *dravyeṣu pañcātmakatvaṃ pratiṣiddham. bhūyasvād gandhavattvāc ca pṛthivī gandhajñāne prakṛtiḥ. tathāpas tejo vāyuś ca rasarūpasparśāviśeṣāt.*)

[100]~[108] The enumerated qualities belonging to each substance are the same as those in the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*.

[109]~[112] Cf. note (a) on paragraphs [92]~[94].

[113] *Praśastapādabhāṣya, Guṇagranthe sādharmyavaidharmya-nirūpaṇa : śabdasparśarūparasagandhā bāhyaikaikendriyagrāhyāḥ.*

[114] *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 4. 1. 12–13 : *saṅkhyāḥ pavimāṇāni pṛthaktvaṃ saṃyogavibhāgau paratvāparatve karma ca rūpidravyasamavāyāc cākṣuṣāṇi. arūpiṣv acākṣuṣatvāt. Praśastapādabhāṣya* does not admit that weight is directly cognized. *Ibid., loc. cit.* : *gurutvadharmādharmabhāvanā hya tīndriyāḥ. Ibid., Gurutvantrūpaṇa* : *gurutvam . . . apratyakṣam ...*

[115] *Ibid., Guṇagranthe sādharmyavaidharmya-nirūpaṇa : buddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnās tv antaḥkaraṇagrāhyāḥ.* However, it is not mentioned in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* that cognition is directly cognized. This is a big problem.

[116] See note on paragraph [114].

[117]~[118] Those qualities which are produced by non-material cause are products. See paragraphs [130]~[159].

[119]~[123] (a) *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 7. 1. 4 : *pṛthivyāṃ rūparasagandhasparśā dravyānityatvād anityāḥ.* (*Vyākhyā* reads : *pṛthivyāṃ rūparasagandhasparśā anityā eva. Upaskāra* reads : *pṛthivyādirūparasagandhasparśā dravyānityatvād anityāś ca.* — problematic.) *Ibid.* 7. 1. 5 : *agnisaṃyogāc ca.* (*Upaskāra* omits.)

Ibid. 7. 1. 6 : *guṇāntaraprādurbhāvāt.* (Both *Vyākhyā* and *Upaskāra* omit.) *Ibid.* 7. 1. 7 : *etena nityeṣv anityatvam uktam.* (*Vyākhyā* reads : *etena nityeṣv apy anityatvam uktam. Upaskāra* reads : *etena nityeṣu nityatvam uktam.*) *Ibid.* 7. 1. 10 : *kāraṇaguṇapūrvāḥ pṛthivyāṃ pākajāś ca.* (*Vyākhyā* reads : *kāraṇaguṇapūrvakāḥ pṛthivyāṃ pākajāś ca. Upaskāra* reads : *kāraṇaguṇapūrvakāḥ pṛthivyāṃ pākajāḥ.*) This is the theory of *pākajotpatti* of earth, the outline of which is found in the *Praśastapādabhāṣya.* As for the detail, see III. 3. Candramati does not use the term '*pākaja.*' But this does not mean that he did not know the theory of *pākajotpatti.* He must have not used the term because it is not necessary here.

(b) *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 7. 1. 8 : *apsu tejasi vāyau ca nityā dravyanityatvāt.* (*Vyākhyā* reads : *apsu tejasi vāyau ca nityatvaṃ dravyanityatvāt.*) *Ibid.* 7. 1. 9 : *anityeṣv anityā dravyānityatvāt. Ibid.* 7. 1. 11 : *apsu tejasi vāyau ca kāraṇaguṇapūrvāḥ pākajā na vidyante.* (*Vyākhyā* reads : *apsu tejasi vāyau ca kāraṇaguṇapūrvakāḥ pakajā na vidyante. Upaskāra* omits.)

[124] *Ibid.* 2. 1. 6 : *sarpirjatumadhūcchiṣṭānāṃ pārthivānām agnisaṃyogād dravatādbhiḥ sāmānyam.* (Both *Vyākhyā* and *Upaskāra* read : *sarpirjatumadhūcchiṣṭānām agnisaṃyogād dravatvam adbhiḥ sāmānyam.*) *Ibid.* 2. 1. 7 : *trapusīsaloharajatasuvarṇānāṃ taijasānām agnisaṃyogād dravatādhiḥ sāmānyam.* (*Vyākhyā* reads : *trapusīsaloharajatasuvarṇādīnāṃ ca taijasānām agnisaṃyogād dravatvam adbhiḥ sāmānyam. Upaskāra* reads : *trapusīsaloharajatasuvarṇānām agnisaṃyogād dravatvam adbhiḥ sāmānyam.*) *Prasatapādabhāṣya* : *tat* (*dravatvaṃ*) *tu dvividhaṃ sāṃsiddhikaṃ naimittikaṃ ca. sāṃsiddhikam apāṃ viśeṣaguṇaḥ. naimittikaṃ pṛthivītejasoḥ sāmānyaguṇaḥ.*

[125] *Ibid.* : *sā* (*saṅkhyā*) *punar ekadravyā cānekadravyā ca. tatraikadravyāyāḥ salilādiparamāṇurūpādīnām iva nityānityatvaniṣpattayaḥ. anekadravyā tu dvitvādikā parārdhāntā. tasyāḥ khalv ekatvebhyo 'nekaviṣayabuddhisahitebhyo niṣpattir apekṣābuddhivināśād vināśa iti.* As for the detail of production and destruction of the number two, see II. 1.

[126] According to the *Daśapadārthī*, *pārimaṇḍalya* stands for both *paramāṇutva* and *paramamahattva.* They are non-products because they are inherent in eternal substances. See note on paragraphs [23]~[25].

[127] That connection is a product is already expounded in paragraph [118]. The intention of the present paragraph may be to deny the notion that connection of *mūtra* with *amūtra* (*pāramamahat* and, therefore, eternal substances) is eternal, or a non-product.

[128] The extention of *kārya* and *anitya*, or that of *akārya* and *nitya* is one and the same. Cf. note on paragraph [96].

[129] (a) *Praśastapādabhāṣya, Guṇagranthe sādharmyavaidharmya-nirūpaṇa* : *śabdasparśarūparasagandhā bāhyaikaikendriyagrāhyāḥ. saṅkhyāparimāṇapṛthaktvasaṃyogavibhāgaparatvāparatvadravatvasnehavegā dvīndriyagrāhyāḥ.* All the commentators explain that '*dvīndriyagrāhya*' means '*cakṣuḥsparśanagrāhya.*'

(b) Weight is not perceived by sense organs according to *ibid., loc. cit.*, which runs : *gurutvadharmādharmabhāvanā hy atīndriyāḥ.*

[130] Causes mentioned in the present section are non-material causes only.

[131] *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 7. 1. 10 : *kāraṇaguṇapūrvāḥ pṛthivyāṃ pākajāś ca. Ibid.* 7. 1. 11 : *apsu tejasi vāyau ca kāraṇaguṇapūrvāḥ pākajā na vidyante.* As for variant readings, see note on paragraphs [119]~[123]. *Praśastapādabhāṣya, Guṇagranthe sādharmyavaidharmya-nirūpaṇa* : *apākajarūparasagandhasparśaparimāṇaikatvaikapṛthaktvagurutvadravatvasnehavegāḥ kāraṇaguṇapūrvakāḥ.*

[132] *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 7. 1. 5 : *agnisaṃyogāc ca.* The present paragraph refers to the production of *pākaja* qualities. See note on paragraphs [119]~[123].

[133] It is the same with paragraph [131].

[134] (a) The first sentence; See the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* quoted in note on paragraph [131].

(b) The second sentence; This is likely the opinion peculiar to the *Daśapadārthī*. The present paragraph presupposes probably two cases. One case is that of 'those of the same class' where a cow and a cow, for example, make two substances. And another case is that of 'those of different class' where a cow and a horse, for example, make two substances. Both cases produce the cognition 'These are two substances.'

(c) The last sentence; It has been considered by modern scholars that *apekṣābuddhi* is the term which Praśastapāda devised for the first time, and that Candramati did not know it. In fact, modern scholars have been deceived by mistranslation or mistranscript of Chinese version. We ought to recognize the fact that Candramati uses the term '*apekṣābuddhi*' here. It is quite probable that the term '*apekṣābuddhi*' and the theory of *dvitvotpatti* the key word of which is '*apekṣābuddhi*' were known to the Vaiśeṣikas in those days almost immediately after the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* was completed. As for the detail of the way of usage and the meaning of the term, see II. 2.

[135] (a) *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 7. 1. 16 : *kāraṇabahutvāt kāraṇamahattvāt pracayaviśeṣāc ca mahat.* (*Upaskāra* reads : *kāraṇabahutvāc ca.*) As *dīrghatva* is always accompanied by *mahattva*, this *sūtra* can be easily replaced by such a sentence as '*kāraṇabahutvāt kāraṇadīrghatvāt pracayaviśeṣāc ca dīrgham.*'

(b) *Ibid.* 7. 1. 17 : *tadviparītam aṇu.* (*Vyākhyā* omits. *Upaskāra* reads : *ato viparītam aṇu.*)

[136] See paragraphs [27] ~ [35].

[137] See paragraphs [36] and [37]. As for the detail, see II. 2.

[138] See paragraphs [39] and note on it.

[139] *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 10. 3 : *saṃśayanirṇayor arthāntarābhāvaś ca jñānāntaratve hetuḥ.* (*Vyākhyā* lacks the tenth *Adhyāya*. *Upaskāra* reads : *saṃśayanirṇayāntarabhāvāc ca jñānāntaratve hetuḥ.*) *Ibid.* 10. 4 : *tayor niṣpattiḥ pratyakṣalaiṅgikābhyāṃ jñānābhyām vyākhyātā.* (*Upaskāra* reads : *tayor niṣpattiḥ pratyakṣalaiṅgikābhyām.*) Praśastapāda divides cognition into two kinds—right cognition (*vidyā*) and erroneous cognition (*avidyā*). The former is subdivided into direct cognition, inferencial cognition, recollection (*smṛti*) and *ṛṣi*'s or *yogin*'s intuition (*ārṣa*), while the latter is subdivided into doubt (*saṃśaya*), erroneous cognition (*viparyaya*), non-determining cognition (*anadhyavasāya*) and dream (*svapna*). The *Vṛtti* on *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 10. 3 introduces an opinion of some that decision is not different from direct cognition and inferencial cognition (*nirṇayas tu pratyakṣānumānābhyāṃ na bhidyata iti kecit*). The way of division of cognition was not fixed even after Gaṅgeśopādhyāya. For example, *Tarkāmṛta* : *buddhir jñānam, tad dvividhaṃ smaraṇānubhavaś ca ... anubhavo dvividhaḥ—pramā, ayathārthañ ca ... ayathārthajñānam—saṃśayaḥ, viparyayaḥ, svapnaḥ, anadhyavasāyaś ceti* (p. 2); *atha pramā kathyate, sā caturvidhā—pratyakṣānumityupami iśābdabhedāt.* (p. 36) Anyway, Candramati's way of division is quite unique.

By the way, *Nyāyasūtra* 1. 1. 2 says as follows : *pramāṇaprameyasaṃśayaprayojanadṛṣṭāntasiddhāntāvayavatarkanirṇayavādajalpavitaṇḍāhetvābhāsachalajātinigrahasthānānāṃ tattvajñānān niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ.* *Saṃśaya* to *nirṇaya* indicate the process of our acquiring right cognition or opinion, with which debates (*vāda*) begin. *Saṃśaya* is the starting point as it were, and *nirṇaya* is the goal. Candramati must have been well acquainted with the *Nyāyasūtra*. Therefore, it is possible to guess that he interpreted *saṃśaya* and *nirṇaya* referred to by *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 10. 3 as those which are the starting point and the goal respectively in a sense as is shown by the *Nyāyasūtra*. However, *saṃśaya* and *nirṇaya* make one set, and erroneous cognition and right cognition make one set, too. The former set is that which is related to the process of our acquiring right cognition while the latter set is related

only to the values (fault and truth) of the cognition in concern. Although it can be said that erroneous cognition is derived from some defect in the process of *saṃśaya* to *nirṇaya*, we are perplexed by the fact that Candramati puts these four kinds of cognition side by side without showing the difference between two sets.

[140] *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 2. 2. 19 : *sāmānyapratyakṣād viśeṣāpratyakṣād viśeṣāsmṛteś ca saṃśayaḥ*. The *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* argues on *saṃśaya* in detail in the following several *sūtras*. *Praśastapādabhāṣya* : *saṃśayas tāvat prasiddhānekaviśeṣayoḥ sādṛśyamātradarśanād ubhayaviśeṣānusmaraṇād adharmāc ca kiṃ svid ity ubhayāvalambī vimarṣaḥ saṃśayaḥ*. *Nyāyasūtra* 1. 1.23 : *samānānekadharmopapatter vipratipatter upalabdhyanupalabdhyavyavasthātaś ca viśeṣāpekṣo vimarṣaḥ saṃśayaḥ*. (Vātsyāyana expresses it as '*tadanavadhāraṇaṃ jñānaṃ saṃśayaḥ*.') Cf. *Tarkāmṛta* : *saṃśayo yathā—samānadharmavaddharmijñānaviśeṣādarśanakoṭidvayasmaraṇair ayaṃ sthāṇur vā puruṣo veti jñānaṃ jāyate sa eva saṃśayaḥ*. (p. 28)

[141] The definition of *nirṇaya* is not found in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*. *Praśastapādabhāṣya* : *viśeṣadarśanajam avadhāraṇajñānaṃ saṃśayavirodhī nirṇayaḥ*. *Nyāyasūtra* 1. 1. 43 : *vimṛṣya pakṣāpratipakṣābhyām arthāvadhāraṇaṃ nirṇayaḥ*.

[142] (a) *Praśastapādabhāṣya* : *viparyayo 'pi pratyakṣānumānaviṣaya eva bhavati. pratyakṣaviṣaye tāvat prasiddhānekaviśeṣayoḥ pittakaphānilopahatendriyasyāyathārthālocanād asannihitaviṣayajñānajasaṃskārāpekṣād ātmamanasoḥ saṃyogād adharmāc cātasmiṃs tad iti pratyakṣo viparyayaḥ*. This is partly based on *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 9. 25 : *indriyadoṣāt saṃskārāc cāvidyā* (*Vyākhyā* lacks the latter half of the ninth *Adhyāya*. *Upaskāra* reads : *indriyadoṣāt saṃskāradoṣāc cāvidyā*.) '*Atasmiṃs tad iti pratyakṣaḥ*' is expressed by the later Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas as '*tadabhāvavati tadprakārakaṃ jñānam*.' Cf. *Tarkāmṛta* : *viparyayas tu - samānadharmavaddharmijñānaviśeṣādarśanaikaikakoṭismaraṇaiḥ śuktāv idaṃ rajatam iti jñānaṃ jāyate*. (p. 28)

(b) The term '*dṛṣṭi*' here means 'misapprehending.' Such a way of usage of the term is quite Buddhistic. There are two possibilities. One is that I failed to find the proper word in reconstructing the Sanskrit text from the Chinese version. Another is that Candramati actually used the term being somehow influenced by the Buddhist terminology.

[143] This definition of *samyagjñāna* resembles that of *nirṇaya*. It is understandable that some people considered that *nirṇaya* is not different from right cognition, as is introduced by the *Vṛtti* on *sūtra* 10. 3. See note on paragraph [139].

[144] *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 10. 4 (see note (a) on paragraph [139]), no doubt, also asserts that doubt (*saṃśaya*) is followed by decision (*nirṇaya*), and that they are produced by direct cognition as well as by inferencial cognition.

[145] The notion that contact (*sannikarṣa*) is the only source of direct cognition is basic for the Vaiśeṣikas (and the Naiyāyikas). The biggest difficulty of this notion exists in the axiom that contact, as it is nothing but connection (*saṃyoga*), is possible only between substances. Therefore, there arises no problem when the object (*artha*) in concern belongs to the category of substance. But, then, why is it possible for us to directly cognize colour and so which are not substances? The eighth and nineth *Adhyāyas* of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* is the answer to such a question. This develops to the theory of six kinds of contact (*saṃyoga*, *saṃyuktasamavāya*, *saṃyuktasamavetasamavāya*, *samavāya*, *samavetasamavāya* and *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva*) of Uddyotakara, and to that of nine kinds of contact (Uddyotakara's plus *jñānalakṣaṇā* [*pratyāsatti*], *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* and *yogajalakṣaṇā*) of much later Naiyāyikas. Praśastapāda presents, though a little complicatedly, five kinds of contact (from *saṃyoga* to *samavetasamavāya*). But, curiously enough, Candramati does not refer directly to such a way of division of contact. We hesitate to conclude that he, who is no doubt, in many points, far more faithful to the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* than Praśastapāda, was not acquainted with this problem. It is quite probable that he implicated it by the term '*prāpya*' which is found in the next paragraph.

[146] (a) The usage of the term '*upalabdhi*' here seems to be concomitant with that in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra.* The passage of the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* which expounds '*buddhir upalabdhir jñānaṃ pratyaya iti paryāyāḥ*' is problematic.

(b) As for '*prāpya,*' namely, 'with sufficient conditions for being able to be directly cognized,' see the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* (*Pratyakṣa-nirūpaṇa*), though he does not use the very term.

]147] (a) As is seen here, 'three' does not include 'object.' Such a way of thinking about 'contact' is common to the early Vaiśeṣikas (including Praśastapāda) as well as to the early Naiyāyikas (including Vātsyāyana). What should we cognize without contact with objects? (I owe the present note to Prof. V. N. Jha.)

(b) *Ibid., loc. cit.* : *śabdasya trayasannikarṣāc chrotrasamavetasya tenaivopalabdhiḥ.* According to the Vaiśeṣikas, *śabda* is a proper quality of ether, and *śrotra* is nothing but ether (limited ether) which is essentially only one.

[148] (a) See note (a) on paragraph [147].

(b) *Ibid., loc. cit.* : *buddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnānāṃ dvayor ātmamanasoḥ saṃyogād upalabdhiḥ.* Paragraph [115] enumerates cognition as one of the objects of direct cognition. Therefore, it is quite possible that the Chinese translator forgot to translate the beginning word '*buddhi.*' But, the *Vṛtti,* for example, while commenting on *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 9.17 (*ātmasamavāyād ātmaguṇeṣu*), mentions as follows : *tathaiva svātmasamaveteṣu sukhādiṣu jñānam utpadyate.* I cannot tell the reason why the objects here should be '*sukhādi,*' not '*buddhyādi.*'

[149] See note (b) on paragraphs [41] ~ [43]. It is not problematic that '*sāmānyatodṛṣṭam*' is not referred to here. For the present paragraph intends to explain only the fact that inferencial congnition is also produced by 'contact.' Since inferencial cognition is nothing but cognition, it is also produced through the mental process, namely, '*ātmamanaḥsannikarṣa.*' In

other word, even logic functions through mental process (not through mentality at all). (I owe the present note to Prof. V. N. Jha.)

[150] *Ibid.* 5.2.16–17 : *ātmendriyamano'rthasannikarṣāt sukhaduḥkhe tadanārambhaḥ. ātmasthe manasi saśarīrasya sukhaduḥkhābhāvaḥ sa yogaḥ.* (*Vyākhyā* reads : [*ātmendriyamano'rthasannikarṣāt sukhaduḥkhe.*—A complement by A. Thakur.] *tadanārambhaś cātmasthamanasi. Upaskāra* reads : *ātmendriyamano'rthasannikarṣāt sukhaduḥkhe. tadanārambha ātmasthe manasi śarīrasya duḥkhābhāvaḥ sa yogaḥ.*) As was seen in paragraph [148], 'cognition of pleasure and pain' is produced by contact of two. Here, it is asserted that pleasure and pain themseves are produced by every kind of contact. Besides, these two, unlike the other qualities proper to soul, do not come into existence without being directly cognized. The apparently complicated expression of the present paragraph should have resulted from this reason. The following explanation by Praśastapāda assists our understanding of the present paragraph. *Praśastapādabhāṣya* (on *sukha*) : *sragādyabhipretaviṣayasānnidhye satīṣṭopalabdhīndriyārthasannikarṣād dharmādyapekṣād ātmamanasoḥ saṃyogād anugrahābhiṣvaṅganayanādiprasādajanakam utpadyate tat sukham. Ibid.* (on *duḥkha*) : *viṣādyanabhipretaviṣayasānnidhye saty aniṣṭopalabdhīndriyārthasannikarṣād adharmādyapekṣād ātmamanasoḥ saṃyogād yad amarṣopaghātadainyanimittam utpadyate tad duḥkham.*

[151] *Ibid.* (on *icchā*) : *sā cātmamanasoḥ saṃyogāt sukhādyapekṣāt smṛtyapekṣād votpadyate. Ibid.* (on *dveṣa*) : *sa cātmamanasoḥ saṃyogād duḥkhāpekṣāt smṛtyapekṣād votpadyate.* It is interesting that Praśastapāda does not refer to 'erroneous cognition' as an assistant cause of desire and aversion.

[152] *Ibid.* : *sa ca dvividho jīvanapūrvaka icchādveṣapūrvakaś ca. tatra jīvanapūrvakaḥ suptasya prāṇāpānasantānaprerakaḥ prabodhakāle cāntaḥkaraṇasyendriyāntaraprāptihetuḥ. asya jīvanapūrvakasyātmamanasoḥ saṃyogād dharmādharmāpekṣād utpattiḥ. itaras tu hitāhitaprāptiparihārasamarthasya vyāpārasya hetuḥ śarīra-

vidhārakaś ca. sa cātmamanasoḥ saṃyogād icchāpekṣād dveṣāpekṣād votpadyate. Śrīdhara's definition of the term '*jīvana*' is as follows : *sadehasyātmano vipacyamānakarmāśayasahitasya manasā saha saṃyogaḥ sambandho jīvanam.*

[153] *Ibid.* : *tatra vego mūrtimatsu pañcasu dravyeṣu nimittaviśeṣāpekṣāt karmaṇo jāyate.* Śrīdhara interprets '*nimittaviśeṣa*' as '*nodanābhighātādinimittaviśeṣa.*' which coincides well with the present paragraph.

[154] *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 6. 2. 17 : *icchādveṣapūrvikā dharmādharmayoḥ pravṛttiḥ.* (*Vyākhyā* omits. *Upaskāra* reads : *icchādveṣapūrvikā dharmādharmapravṛttiḥ.*) *Ibid.* 6. 2. 1 : *dṛṣṭānāṃ dṛṣṭaprayojanānāṃ dṛṣṭābhāve prayogo 'bhyudayāya.* (*Upaskāra* reads: *dṛṣṭādṛṣṭaprayojanānāṃ dṛṣṭābhāve prayojanam abyudayāya.*) *Ibid.* 6. 2. 2 : *abhiṣecanopavāsabrahmacaryagurukulavāsavānaprasthyayajñadānaprokṣaṇadiṅnakṣatramantrakālaniyamāś cādṛṣṭāya.* (*Vyākhyā* reads : ...... *-vānaprastha-* ......) *Praśastapādabhāṣya* (on *dharma*) : [*dharmaḥ*] *puruṣāntaḥkaraṇa*(=*ātmamanaḥ*)*saṃyogaviśuddhābhisandhijaḥ varṇāśramiṇāṃ pratiniyatasādhananimittaḥ. tasya tu sādhanāni śrutismṛtivihitāni varṇāśramiṇāṃ sāmānyaviśeṣabhāvenāvasthitāni dravyaguṇakarmāṇi. Ibid.* (on *adharma*) : *tasya* (=*adharmasya*) *tu sādhanāni śāstre pratiṣiddhāni dharmasādhanaviparītāni hiṃsānṛtasteyādīni vihitākaraṇaṃ pramādaś caitāni duṣṭābhisandhiṃ cāpekṣyātmamanasoḥ saṃyogād adharmasyotpattiḥ.*

[155] *Ibid.* 9. 22 : *ātmamanasoḥ saṃyogaviśeṣāt saṃskārāc ca smṛtiḥ.* (*Vyākhyā* lacks the latter half of the ninth *Adhyāya* which must include the present *sūtra.*) Cf. paragraph [53] and note on it. *Praśastapādabhāṣya* : *bhāvanāsañjñakas tv ātmaguṇadṛṣṭaśrutānubhūteṣv artheṣv smṛtipratyabhijñānahetur bhavati jñānamadaduḥkhādivirodhī. paṭvabhyāsādarapratyayajaḥ paṭupratyayāpekṣād ātmamanasoḥ saṃyogād āścarye 'rthe paṭuḥ saṃskārātiśayo jāyate.*

[156] *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 2. 2. 36 : *saṃyogād vibhāgāc chabdāc ca śabdaniṣpatteḥ.* (*Vyākhyā* reads : ...*śabdaniṣpattiḥ. Upaskāra* reads : *saṃyogād vibhāgāc ca śabdāniṣpattiḥ.*) Praśastapāda does not seem to be so interested in such a division of sound as is shown in the present paragraph, though his explanation is virtually based on it. His biggest interest was in the division of sound into *varṇalakṣaṇa* (language or utterence) and *dhvani* or *avarṇalakṣaṇa* (mere sound).

[157] *Praśastapādabhāṣya* : *avarṇalakṣaṇo 'pi bherīdaṇḍasaṃyogāpekṣād bheryākāśasaṃyogād utpadyate.*

[158] *Ibid.* : *veṇuparvavibhāgād veṇvākāśavibhāgāc ca.*

[159] *Ibid.* : *śabdāc ca saṃyogavibhāganiṣpannād vīcisantānavac chabdasantānaḥ. Nyāyakandalī* : *tathā śabdād utpannāt tadavyavahite deśe śabdāntaram...*

[160] ~ [166] : *Praśastapādabhāṣya, Guṇagranthe sādharmyavaidharmaya-nirūpaṇa*:*saṃyogavibhāgadvitvadvipṛthaktvādayo 'nekāśritāḥ. śeṣās tv ekaikadravyavṛttayaḥ.*

[167] ~ [169] *Ibid., op. cit.* : *saṃyogavibhāgaśabdātmaviśeṣaguṇānāṃ pradeśavṛttitvam. śeṣānām āsrayavyāpitvam.* This rule becomes later that of *vyāpyavṛtti* and *avyāpyavṛtti,* and plays an important role in the argument on the definition of *vyāpti.*

[170] (a) *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1. 1. 12: *ubhayathā guṇaḥ.* (*Vṛtti*: *kāryakāraṇobhayānubhayair avirodhī virodhī ca* [*guṇaḥ*]. *Vyākhyā*: *kāryavirodhī kāraṇavirodhī ca na tu karyāvirodhī kāraṇāvirodhī ceti. Upaskāra* : *kāryabadhyāḥ kāraṇabadhyāś cety arthaḥ.*) Only the *Vṛtti* agrees with the content of the present subsection of the *Daśapadārthī.* There must have been a lot of arguments on the present *sūtra* in the days of Candramati, or at least before Praśastapāda. But, curiously enough, Praśastapāda is not eager on this problem. The *Vyākhyā* and the *Upaskāra* did not inherit the old arguments. This should be said to be a big evidence for the assumption that the *Vṛtti* is far older than the *Vyākhyā,* not to speak of *Upaskāra.*)

(b) I translated the term '*virodhin*' as 'be destroyed by' in some cases, and as 'do not coexist with' in the other cases.

[171] (a) No reference to the present problem is seen in the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*. *Vṛtti* on *sūtra* 1.1.12: *virodhina ādyamadhyāntyaśabdaḥ kāryobhayakāraṇaiḥ*. (This can be paraphrased as '*virodhy ādyaśabdaḥ kāryeṇa, madhyaśabdaḥ kāryakāraṇābhyām, antyaśabdaḥ kāraṇena.*') *Nyāyakandalī* on *Dravyagranthe sādharmyavaidharmya-prakaraṇa* of the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*: *guṇo hi kvacit kāryeṇa vinaśyate yathādyaḥ śabdo dvitīyaśabdena kvacit kāraṇena vinaśyate yathāntyaḥ śabda upāntyaśabdena.*

(b) The adjective phrase '*śeṣaśabdārambhaka*' plays a role to exclude '*antyaśabda*.'

[172]~[173] See paragraphs [56] and [57]. Praśastapāda agrees with the present paragraphs when he says '*pūrvasañcitayoś* [= *dharmādharmayoś*] *copabhogān nirodhe*' (*Apavarga-nirūpaṇa*), but does not necessarily so when he says '[*dharmaḥ*] *antyasukhasaṃvijñānavirodhī*' (*Dharma-nirūpaṇa*) and [*adharmaḥ*] *antyaduḥkhasaṃvijñānavirodhī*' (*Adharma-nirūpaṇa*). Candramati says only that both merit and demerit are destroyed by their effects ('*upabhoga*' or 'enjoyment of their effects' after the saying of Praśastapāda). The *Vṛtti* on *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1.1.12 (quoted in note on paragraph [170]): [*virodhi*] *adṛṣṭam* (= *dharmādharmau*) *kāryeṇa.*

[174] But there are cognitions which do not produce impression according to the *Saṅkhyā-nirūpaṇa* of the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* which mentions as follows: *samūhajñānasya saṃskārahetutvāt samūhajñānam eva saṃskārakāraṇaṃ nālocanajñānaṃ.* As for the detail of '*samūhajñāna*' and '*ālocanajñāna*' which is deeply related to the division of direct cognition into '*savikalpakajñāna*' and '*nirvikalpakajñāna*,' see II. 3. It is interesting that Candramati does not refer to this division which, it is clear, originates from *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 8. 5–9.

[175] According to *Saṅkhyā-nirūpaṇa* of the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, two kinds of cognitions are not in relation of '*sahānavasthāna*' (impossibility to coexist), but in relation of '*vadhyaghātaka*' (a to be killed and a killer). Therefore, they coexist for one but only one moment (*kṣaṇa*). As is referred to by Praśastapāda himself, this assumption is based on *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 3.2.3 which is as follows: *prayatnāyaugapadyāj jñānāyaugapadyāc caikaṃ manaḥ.* (*Upaskāra* omits *manaḥ.*) As for the detail, see II. 2.

[176] See note on paragraph [171]. The meaning might be as follows: The last sound is not one which produces any other sound. And yet it is destroyed. Therefore it is not destroyed by its effects, but by its causes.

[177] This occurs when a person has acquired the perfect final release at the time of his death (*videhamukti*). Qualities of soul referred to here are — cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, internal effort, merit, demerit and mental impression. Cf. *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, *Guṇagranthe sādharmyavaidharmya-nirūpaṇa*: *apākajarūparasagandhasparśaparimāṇaikatvaikapṛthaktvasāṃsiddhikadravatvagurutvasnehānām yāvaddravyabhāvitvam. śeṣāṇām ayāvaddravyabhāvitvaṃ ceti.* As soul is eternal, the remaining qualities of soul are eternal.

[178] As for the effects of pleasure and pain, see paragraphs [152] and [154]. The content of the present paragraph seems to be quite natural according to Candramati's way of thinking in which we are becoming well versed. But I could find no parallel passages in another texts.

[179] The causes of merit and demerit are mentioned in paragraph [154]. In short, they are desire and aversion, which in turn produces real actions performed by a body and so on. Merit and demerit are their effects as a sort of latent entities (*āśaya*, *karmāśaya*). In other words, merit and demerit are able to come into existence only after real actions which were produced by desire and aversion have been destroyed.

[180] The case is the same as that of paragraph [178].

[181] Contact of four, that of three and that of two are the causes of pleasure and pain. See paragraph [150]. The case is

the same as that of paragraph [179]. Pleasure and pain are able to come into existence only after contact has been destroyed. When a person practices *yoga*, his mind continues to be in contact with soul, and consequently plesure and pain do not come into existence. See *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 5. 2. 16–17 quoted in note on paragraph [150].

[182] See note on paragraph [171].

[183] *Vṛtti* on *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1. 1. 12 (quoted in note on paragraph [170]) : *sparśavaddravyasaṃyogena vegaprayatnau, saṃyogavibhāgau sukhaduḥkhe icchādveṣau parasparato 'kāryakāraṇabhūtau virudhyete.* Velocity produces action which produces in turn connection and separation. It is destroyed when a substance with touch in which it exists has stopped moving by force of connection of the substance with another substance with touch. *Praśastapādabhāṣya* : [*vegaḥ*] *sparśavaddravyasaṃyogaviśeṣavirodhī.* The case of internal effort is the same as that of velocity.

[184] *Praśastapādabhāṣya : bhāvanāsaṃjñakas tv ātmaguṇo dṛṣṭaśrutānubhūteṣu smṛtipratyabhijñānahetur bhavati jñānamadaduḥkhādivirodhī.*

[185] 'Its effect' is recollection (*smaraṇa*) by definition. It is not certain whether 'recognition' (*pratyabhijñāna*) is implied here or not. Cf. note on paragraph [184].

[186] See note on paragraph [183].

[187]~[188] The number two and so on are destroyed by the destruction of *apekṣābuddhi*. As for the detail, see II. 1.

[189] The direct cause which destroys colour and so on in an atom of earth is heat (*auṣṇya* or *uṣṇasparśa*) of fire. This is explained by the theory of *pākajotpatti*. As for the detail, see III. 3.

[190] See *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1. 1. 12 and the *Vṛtti* on it quoted in note on paragraph [183].

[191]~[193] *Vṛtti* on *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1. 1. 12 : *paramāṇudvyaṇukādyantyāvayavidravyeṣu rūpādayaḥ kāryobhayakāraṇair avirodhino yathāsambhavam.* This can be paraphrased as '*rūpādayaḥ paramāṇuṣu kāryeṇa, dvyaṇukādiṣu* (= *madhyāvayavidravyeṣu*) *kāryakāraṇābhyām, antyāvayavidravyeṣu kāraṇenāvirodhinaḥ.*

[194] *Ibid., op. cit.* : *rūparasagandhasparśā akāryakāraṇabhūtā avirodhinaḥ parasparеṇa.* ('*avirodhinaḥ*' must be '*virodhinaḥ.*') For example, a dark colour and a red colour do not coexist in one and the same atom of earth.

[195] This originates probably from the definitions of substance and quality which are expounded in *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1. 1. 14–15 which are as follows : *kriyāvad guṇavat samavāyikāraṇam iti dravyalakṣaṇam. dravyāśrayī aguṇavān saṃyogavibhageṣv akāraṇam anapekṣa iti guṇalakṣaṇam.* (*Vyākhyā* reads : *dravyāśrayī na guṇavān saṃyogavibhāgeṣv akāraṇam anapekṣa iti guṇalakṣaṇam.*)

[196]~[198] See *ibid.* 1. 1. 15 quoted in note on paragraph [195]. *Ibid.* 8. 8 : *guṇakarmasu guṇakarmābhāvād guṇakarmāpekṣaṃ na vidyate. Praśastapādabhāṣya, Guṇagranthe sādharmyavaidharmya-nirūpaṇa : rūpādīnāṃ guṇānāṃ sarveṣāṃ guṇatvābhisambandho dravyāśritatvaṃ nirguṇatvaṃ niṣkriyatvam.*

[199]~[201] (a) As to '*dravyavat,*' *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1. 1. 14 : *kriyāvad guṇavat samavāyikāraṇam iti dravyalakṣaṇam.* (See note on paragraphs [82]~[85].

(b) As to '*ekadravyāśrita,*' '*nirguṇa,*' '*saṃyogavibhāgakāraṇa*' and '*asamānajātīyakāraṇa,*' *ibid.* 1. 1. 16 : *ekadravyam aguṇaṃ saṃyogavibhāgeṣv anapekṣaṃ kāraṇam iti karmalakṣaṇam.* (*Upaskāra* reads : ... *anapekṣakāraṇaṃ* ...), *ibid.* 1. 1. 28 : *saṃyogavibhāgāḥ karmaṇām.* (*Upaskāra* reads : *saṃyogavibhāgāś ca karmaṇām.*), and *Praśastapādabhāṣya* : *ekadrvyavattvaṃ kṣaṇikatvaṃ mūrtadravyavṛttitvam aguṇavattvaṃ gurutvadravatvaprayatnasaṃyogajatvaṃ svakāryasaṃyogavirodhitvaṃ saṃyogavibhāganirapekṣākāraṇatvaṃ asamavāyikāraṇatvaṃ svaparāśrayasama-

vetakāryārambhakatvaṃ samānajātīyānārambhakatvaṃ dravyānārambhakatvaṃ ca pratiniyatajātiyogitvam.

(c) As for '*abhighātanodanādyapekṣāṇi saṃskārakāraṇāni,*' see note on paragraphs [54] and [85].

[202]~[206] I have never seen such an argument in any other Vaiśeṣika or Naiyāyika text. Paragraph [203] agrees with the passage '*mūrtadravyavṛttitva*' of Praśastapāda quoted in note (b) on paragraphs [190]~[201]. As for '*atipraśithila ...*' cf. *Praśastapādabhāṣya, Parimāṇa-nirūpaṇa*: *pracayas tūlapiṇḍayor vartamānaḥ piṇḍārambhakāvayavapraśithilasaṃyogān apekṣamāṇa itaretarapiṇḍāvayavasaṃyogāpekṣo vā dvitūlake mahattvam ārabhante na bahutvamahattvāni.*

[207]~[209] I have never seen such an argument in any other text. We can get through the present paragraphs the information that there was a dispute among the Vaiśeṣikas as to whether actions pervade their loci or not. It is only here that Çandramati introduces a different opinion. But he does not present any bit of comment on the opinion of '*eke.*' This tells us that he admitted that it is sufficiently logical. For, in fact, there is a case, for example, where, even when a bough of a tree moves, its stem or its root does not move, or a case where, even when a finger moves, another parts of a body do not move. This problem seems to be that of '*kapivṛkṣasaṃyoga*' which makes the key concept in concern with the definition of *vyāpti* of the Navya-naiyāyikas. I owe the present note to Prof. V. N. Jha.

[210] *Ibid.* : *tatrotkṣepaṇaṃ śarīrāvayaveṣu tatsambaddheṣu etat ... pañcavidham api karma śarīrāvayaveṣu tatsambaddheṣu ca satpratyayam asatpratyayam.* Śrīdhara interprets '*śarīrāvayaveṣu tatsambaddheṣu*' as '*śarīrāvayaveṣu hastādiṣu tatsambaddheṣu.*' See also paragraph [216].

[211] *Ibid.* : *satpratyayakarmavidhiḥ katham? cikīrṣiteṣu yajñādhyayanadānakṛṣyādiṣu yadā hastam utkṣeptum icchaty apakṣeptuṃ vā tadā hastavaty ātmapradeśe prayatnaḥ sañjāyate taṃ prayatnaṃ gurutvaṃ cāpekṣamāṇād ātmahastasaṃyogād dhaste karma bhavati.* Internal effort, as it is one of the proper qualities of soul, is not able to produce action in a thing unless the thing is connected with soul. This is the reason why the item of '*ātmasaṃyoga*' is put in here. The case is, I think, the same with Śrīdhara's argument that *adṛṣṭa* functions in producing flaring upward only when its locus, namely, soul, is connected with fire. As for the detail, see I. 3.

[212] The *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* and the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* do not refer to such as assumption that the second action and so on of a body is produced by impression (velocity). Praśastapāda seems to assert that the second action and so on of a body in this case is still produced by internal effort. The *Daśapadārthī* is probably unique in this point too. Cf. paragraphs [214] and [216].

[213] (a) Action of mind. *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 5. 2. 15 : *hastakarmaṇā manasaḥ karma vyākhyātam.* (*Vyākhyā* omits.)

(b) Action of parts of a body. *Ibid.* 5. 1. 1 : *ātmasaṃyogaprayatnābhyāṃ haste karma.*

[214]~[215] Nose and so on are connected with a body which is in turn connected with soul. Cf. note on paragraph [212]. As for impression (velocity), see note on the next paragraph.

[216] *Ibid.* 5. 1. 1–6 : *ātmasaṃyogaprayatnābhyāṃ haste karma. tathā musalakarma hastasaṃyogāc ca.* (*Vyākhyā* omits. *Upaskāra* reads : *tathā hastasaṃyogāc ca musale karma.*) *abhighātaje musalakarmaṇi vyatirekād akāraṇaṃ hastasaṃyogaḥ.* (*Upaskāra* reads : *abhighātaje musalādau karmaṇi vyatirekād akāraṇaṃ hastasaṃyogaḥ.*) *tathātmasaṃyogo hastamusalakarmaṇi.* (*Vyākhyā* and *Upaskāra* read : *tathātmasaṃyogo hastakarmaṇi.*) *musalābhighātāt tu musalasaṃyogād dhaste karma.* (*Vyākhyā* reads : *musalābhighātāc ca musalasaṃyogād dhaste karma.* *Upaskāra* : *abhighātān musalsaṃyogād dhaste karma.*)

tathātmakarma hastasaṃyogāc ca. As for the detail of interpretations by commentators of these *sūtras,* see I. 3. *Praśastapādabhāṣya : tato 'ntyena musalakarmaṇolūkhalamusalayor abhighātākhyaḥ saṃyogaḥ kriyate sa saṃyogo musalagatavegam apekṣamāṇo 'pratyayaṃ musale utpatanakarma karoti. tat karmābhighātāpekṣaṃ musale saṃskāram ārabhate tam apekṣya musalahastasaṃyogo 'pratyayaṃ haste 'py utpatanakarma karoti.* Both the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* (5. 1. 9–10) and Praśastapāda explain the process of action of a thing thrown by a hand of a person, and that of an arrow shot from a bow by a man. Curiously enough, Candramati does not refer to them.

[217]~[218] *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 5. 1. 13 : *prayatnābhāve gurutvāt suptasya patanam.* (*Upaskāra* reads : *yatnābhāve prasuptasya patanam.*)

[219]~[220] *Ibid* 5. 1. 11-12 : *hastakarmaṇā dārakakarma vyākhyātam. tathā dagdhasya visphoṭanam.* (*Vyākhyā* omits. *Upaskāra* reads : *tathā dagdhasya visphoṭane.*) Only the *Vṛtti* interprets these two *sūtras* as explaining actions which are produced by internal effort assisted by life-activities. Interpretations shown by the *Vyākhyā* and the *Upaskāra* are quite different from that of the *Vṛtti,* and seem to make no sense. *Praśastapādabhāṣya : prāṇākhye tu vāyau karma ātmavāyusaṃyogād icchādveṣapūrvakaprayatnāpekṣāj jāgrata icchānuvidhānadarśanāt suptasya tu jīvanapūrvakaprayatnāpekṣāt ... suptasya prabodhakāle jīvanapūrvakaprayatnāpekṣāt [manasi karma].* Cf. paragraph [152].

[221]~[222] *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 5. 2. 5 : *dravatvāt syandanam. Praśastapādabhāṣya : srotobhūtānām apāṃ sthalān nimnābhisarpaṇaṃ yat tad dravatvāt syandanam.*

[223]~[226] *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 5. 2. 14 : *agner ūrdhvajvalanaṃ vāyoś ca tiryakpavanam aṇumanasoś cādyaṃ karmety adṛṣṭakāritāni.* (*Upaskāra* reads : *agner ūrdhvajvalanaṃ vayos tiryakpavanam aṇūnāṃ manasaś cādyaṃ karmādṛṣṭakāritam.*) As for *adṛṣṭa,* see I. 3.

[227] The argument shown by the present paragraph must be the same as that which is found in the explanation of the process of *pākajotpatti.* Cf. *Praśastapādabhāṣya, Guṇagranthe rūpādīnāṃ pākajotpatti-nirūpaṇa : tadanantaraṃ bhoginām adṛṣṭāpekṣād ātmāṇusaṃyogād utpannapākajeṣu aṇuṣu karmotpattau teṣāṃ parasparasaṃyogād dvyaṇukādikrameṇa kāryadravyam utpadyate.* As for the detail of *pākajotpatti,* see III. 3.

[228]~[229] *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 5. 2. 19 : *apasarpaṇam upasarpaṇam aśitapītasaṃyogaḥ kāryāntarasaṃyogāś cety adṛṣṭakāritāni.* This *sūtra* is considered to explain the features of transmigration. As for its detail, see I. 3. *Praśastapādabhāṣya : apasarpaṇakarmopasarpaṇakarma cātmamanaḥsaṃyogād adṛṣṭāpekṣāt.*

[230]~[231] The present paragraphs are quite notable for it has been believed that the direct reference to the Lord (*Īśvara, Maheśvara* or *Bhuvanapati*) appears for the first time in the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* (of course, among those Vaiśeṣika texts which are available now), and that Candramati did not refer to it. Although the description by Candramati is extremely brief, it agrees completely with that of Praśastapāda. See *Dravyagranthe sṛṣṭisaṃhāravidhi-nirūpaṇa* of the *Praśastapādabhāṣya.*

[232] *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1. 1. 27 : *gurutvaprayatnasaṃyogānām utkṣepaṇam* [(*samānam kārya*) — my complement]. *Abhighāta* and *nodana* are particular kinds of *saṃyoga.* See note on paragraph [54]. *Ibid.* 5. 2. 1 : *nodanād abhighātāt saṃyuktasaṃyogāc ca pṛthivyāṃ karma.* (*Vyākhyā* and *Upaskāra* read : *nodanābhighātāt saṃyuktasaṃyogāc ca pṛthivyāṃ karma.*) *Ibid.* 5. 2. 3 : *apāṃ saṃyogābhāve gurutvāt patanam. Ibid.* 5. 2. 5 : *dravatvāt syandanam. Ibid.* 5. 2. 16 : *pṛthivīkarmaṇā tejaḥkarma vāyukarma ca vyākhyātam.* (*Vyākhyā* reads : ... *tejasaḥ karma...*) Internal effort and velocity as non-material causes of actions are already explained in several places. Candrānda's interpretation on *sūtra* 5. 2. 1 is a sort of summary of the beginning part of *Karmagranthe 'pratyayakarma-nirūpaṇa* of the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*

which I do not quote here because this part is very long. While Candramati synthesizes the causes of actions of earth, water and fire in a very short paragraph, Praśastapāda analyzes them one by one. That is to say, Candramati must have supposed such a sentence as '*saṃyogagurutvadravatvaprayatnavegānāṃ pṛthivyaptejasaḥ karma samānaṃ kāryam*' which is based on *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1. 1. 27 quoted at the beginning of the present note. However, the intention of Praśastapāda in this point, I think, is the same as that of the present paragraph. Cf. *Praśastapādabhāṣya, Guṇagranthe sādharmyavaidharmya-nirūpaṇa* : *gurutvadravatvavegaprayatnadharmādharmasaṃyogaviśeṣāḥ kriyāhetavaḥ.*

[233] *Vṛtti* on *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1. 1. 27 : *ādityaraśmīnām agurutvāt parvate tathābhūtaprayatnābhāvāt loṣṭasya ca hastenāsaṃyuktatvād anutkṣepaṇam iti gurutvādīnām utkṣepaṇaṃ samānaṃ kāryam.* Candramati seems to have intended to apply the same way of thinking as that of the *Vṛtti* as to all kinds of actions in all substances that are loci of actions.

[234]~[237] (a) *Praśastapādabhāṣya, Guṇagranthe sādharmyavaidharmya-nirūpaṇa* : *guṇādīnāṃ pañcānām api nirguṇatvaniṣkriyatve. Ibid., loc. cit.* : *sāmānyādīnāṃ trayānāṃ svātmasattvaṃ buddhilakṣaṇatvam akāryatvam akāraṇatvam asāmānyaviśeṣavattvaṃ nityatvam arthaśabdānabhidheyatvaṃ ceti. Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1. 2. 11, 1. 2. 13, 1. 2. 15, 1. 2. 17 and so on maintain that *sāmānyaviśeṣa* (including *sattā*) not have *sāmānyaviśeṣa* as its locus.

(b) *Ibid.* 1. 2. 18 : *salliṅgāviśeṣād viśeṣaliṅgābhāvāc caiko bhāva iti.* The *Vṛtti* interprets the term '*eka*' thus : '*eka*'-*śabdena abhedaḥ kathyate, na tu saṅkhyā.* That is to say, as the number one is a quality, it is impossible to exist in universal. *Praśastapādabhāṣya, loc. cit.*: *dravyādīnāṃ pañcānāṃ samavāyitvam anekatvaṃ ca.* According to Vyomaśiva and Śrīdhara, plurality of universal means that *sattā*, substanceness, earthness, potness and so on are different from each other because the resulting cognition differs in such a way as 'This is *sat*,' 'This is a substance' and so on. But there is on difference in each universal. If *sattā* is different (= plural) according to each locus, then, there will arise such absurdity as that, when some locus, for example, a pot, is destroyed, *sattā* of the pot comes to be destroyed. This means that *sattā* is not eternal. Therefore, *sattā* is only one. *Ibid.* (*Sāmānya-nirūpaṇa*), while being based on the *sūtra*, mentions as follows : *pratyekaṃ svāśrayeṣu lakṣaṇāviśeṣād viśeṣalakṣaṇābhāvāc caikatvam.*

(c) As for the term '*arthāntara*,' see *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1. 2. 8 : *dravyaguṇakarmabhyo 'rthāntaraṃ sattā.*

[238] Each of those which are many in number has its own universal and particular universal, namely, *sattā*, substanceness, potness etc. According to the Vaiśeṣikas, things are named after such universal or particular universals. But, ether, time and space are each only one. In other word, they do not have universal or particular universals. The expression 'etherness' (*ākāśatva*), and so on is possible, but it is not a true particular universal. Therefore, 'etherness' and so on is called '*upādhi*' (individual attribute), which does not produce the name of its locus. But, in reality, there are names such as 'earth,' 'time' and 'space.' Then, from what do such names originate? Candramati's answer is that they originate from particulars because particular is '*anyavyāvṛttibuddhihetu*' and '*etadvyaktibuddhihetu.*' His idea is understandable, but was not directly inherited by the later Vaiśeṣikas. Praśastapāda's reply is as follows (*Ākāśa-nirūpaṇa*) : *ākāśakāladiśām ekaikatvād aparajatyabhāve pāribhāṣikyas tisraḥ sañjñā bhavanti. Nyāyakandalī* : *yasyāḥ sañjñāyā vinā nimittena sṛṅgagrāhikayā saṅketaḥ sa pāribhāṣikī yathāyaṃ devadatta iti. yasyāḥ punar nimittam upādāya saṅketaḥ sa naimittikīti vivekaḥ.* Both the *Nyāyakandalī* and the *Vyomavatī* say that these artificial names are possible on account of that those which have them are distinguished from each other. Here we can recognize the relic of Candramati's idea. I owe the present note to Prof. V. N. Jha. Cf. K. Miyamoto, "The Concept of *sañjñā* according to the Early Vaiśeṣikas," Nagoya Studies in Indian Culture and Buddhism : *Sambhāṣā* 16, 1995.

[239] See note on paragraph [69]. *Praśastapādabhāṣya, Dravyagranthe sādharmyavaidharmya-nirūpaṇa*: *dravyādīnāṃ pañcānāṃ samavāyitvam anekatvaṃ ca. guṇādīnāṃ pañcānām api nirguṇatvaniṣkriyatve.*

[240]~[244] See III. 2.

[245]~[246] (a) See the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* quoted in note on paragraph [239]. As for the term '*eka*', see note (b) on [234]~[237].

(b) *Ibid.* (on *sāmānya*) : *tatra dravyatvaṃ parasparaviśiṣṭeṣu pṛthivyādiṣv anuvṛttihetutvāt sāmānyaṃ guṇakarmabhyo vyāvṛttihetutvād viśeṣaḥ.*

[247]~[250] According to the later texts, for example, the *Tarkāmṛta*, it is said as follows : *prāgabhāvo vināśī ajanyaḥ. dhvaṃso janyaḥ avināśī ca. atyantābhāvānyonyābhāvau tv ajanyāv avināśinau ca.* (p. 35) *Saṃsargābhāva* is the general term of *prāgabhāva, dhvaṃsa* and *atyantābhāva* according to the later Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas.

[251] The first case is, for example, *vāyau rūpābhāvaḥ.* The second is, for example, *guṇe dravyatvābhāvaḥ* The last is, for example, *sattāyāṃ sattābhāvaḥ.* These are nothing but examples of *atyantābhāvaḥ* in the later texts.

[252] The first case is, for example, *paramāṇor dvyaṇukābhāvaḥ* before creation of the world. The second is, for example, *ghaṭe rūpābhāvaḥ* at the very moment when a pot has just been produced. These are nothing but examples of *prāgabhāva* in the later texts.

[253]~[254] The later Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas maintain that absence is also directly cognized. *Maṇikaṇa* : *yatrādhikaraṇe yasya pratiyogiyogyānupalabdhiḥ sa tatrābhāvo yogyaḥ.* (p. 22) In the case of '*bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti.*' *adhikaraṇa* is *bhūtala*, *pratiyogin* is *ghaṭa*, and absence is *ghaṭābhāva.* Candramati's passage of paragraph [254] expresses, though quite implicitly, the fundamental structure by which absense comes to be cognizable.

[255]~[256] These paragraphs declare the utter realism of the Vaiśeṣikas. *Praśastapādabhāṣya, Dravyagranthe sādharmyavaidharmya-nirūpaṇa* : *ṣaṇṇām api padārthānām astitvābhidheyajñeyatvāni.*

[257] This colophon is my composition based on the beginning part of the Chinese version which shows the title of the present treatise and the name of the author. '*Candramatinā Vaiśeṣikeṇa viracitā*' is also possible. For Chinese Buddhists interpreted the term '*vaiśeṣika*' as 'excellent.'

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bhuvanapati' and '*maheśvara*' are used by Praśastapāda in order to explain the destruction and creation of the world, which is nothing but the theme of the present paragraph.

94 All the versions read 別有 instead of 別義. See the reconstructed Sanskrit text and note on it.

95 All the versions read 生至因 instead of 至因生. I guess that 生至因 corresponds to '*ādhāryādhārabhūta*-.' Probably, '*ādhārya*-' incorrectly corresponds to 至, '*ādhāra*-' to 因, and '*bhūta*-' to 生.

96 T reads 同 (*samāna*- and the like) instead of 此 (*iha*). 同 is probably a mistranscript which was caused by the fact that there is a similar phrase, namely, 同詮緣相 (*samābhidhānapratyayanimitta*-) in paragraph [243] in the next section. The other versions omit 同 as well as 此.

97 Th reads 合 instead of 爾. A mistranscript.

98 All the versions read 諸實展轉共 instead of 展轉異實共. The Chinese translator wanted to give the meaning 'different' to the term 諸. But we cannot understand the precise meaning of this phrase by reading 諸實展轉共. See the reconstructed Sanskrit text and note on it.

99 All the versions read 等性 (-*āditva*-) instead of 性等 (-*tvādi*-). The latter shows the normal word order of Sanskrit.

100 U reads 巳 instead of 已. A mere misprint.

101 All the versions read 同異 (*sāmānyaviśeṣa*-) instead of 俱分. The term '*viśeṣa*-' (異) as an independent category appears in the same clause, and the term '*sattā*-' (有性), namely, '*sāmānya*-' (同), appears in the next sentence. Therefore, this '*sāmānyaviśeṣa*-' ought to be the same as the precedent terms, namely, '*dravyatvādi*-' (實性等), which is translated as 俱分 in all other cases. It should be said ironical that this careless literal translation by the Chinese translator supplies us with the supreme evidence to demonstrate that the orignal Sanskrit term which corresponds to 俱分 is nothing but '*sāmānyaviśeṣa*.'

102 U omits 一卷.

INDEX TO THE DAŚAPADĀRTHĪ

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ERRATA

page, line	For	Read
5, 11	difference	differences
5, 22	[to that]	[to that] '
5, 32	*-sādhukam*	*-sādhakaṃ*
5, 34	*yaugapadyā' i-*	*yaugapadyādi-*
6, 34	of other	of ether
7, 2	*Praśastapāda*	Praśastapāda
7, 24	awakened Second	awakened. Second,
7, 30	exeellent	excellent
9, 33	*sarvam*	*sarvaṃ*
10, 24	1. 1	1. 2
10, 30	II. 1	I. 2 and 3
10, 33	*utpadyamānam*	*utpadyamānaṃ*
11, 17	snpposed	supposed
12, 31	*dravyaiva-*	*dravyatva-*
13, 22	*-uityatvc*	*-nityatve*
13, 24	*Kārya-*	*kārya-*
13, 28	*-nimeṣoñmeṣa-*	*-nimeṣonmeṣa-*
14, 20	thaugh	though
15, 31	‘aggrcga-	‘aggrega-
15, 33	III. 2	III. 1
16, 28	1–3	I–3
22, 11	with	without
22, 14	is the same as	means
22, 32	*aha*	*āha*
22, 35	*śabdatpattiḥ*	*śabdotpattiḥ*
23, 27	*-saṃyogitvam*	*-saṃyogitvaṃ*
23, 34	*paramā-*	*parama-*
23, 36	Gaṅgānāths	Gaṅgānātha
25, 22	*vāc cātmano*	*vaṃ cātmano*
25, 33	*tatsyātma-*	*tasyātma-*
27, 34	*'nityatvā-*	*'nityatva-*

28, 29	to you, [it is]	to you, it is]
29, 6	used	as used
33, 19	That they	That is to say, they
34, 28	*-didātmabhyaḥ*	*-digātmabhyaḥ*
35, 13	destructed	destroyed
35, 30	*api. tadanumānāt.*	*api tadanumānāt.*
35, 33	*idyate' sminn*	*vidyate 'sminn*
35, 35	*prāgabhāvḡdhikaraṇaṃ*	*prāgabhāvādhidaraṇaṃ*
36, 7	*sūtras*	*sūtra*
36, 30	*bhvāpradhvaṃsayoḥ*	*bhāvapradhvaṃsayoḥ*
36, 33	Vo. 3. Iwanami	Vol. 3. Tokyo: Iwanami
37, 14	etc...	etc.,
38, 18	text, after	text after
39, 4	phsases	phrases
39, 13	'*gam-*' [which	'*gam-*' which
39, 15	is] as	is [as
39, 17	[with thm]	[with them]
39, 29	*samyogi-*	*saṃyogi-*
40, 16	coagul-	coagula-
40, 30	stage. familiar	stage, familiar
40, 32	I. 1	I. 2
41, 10	largest	the largest
41, 12	action does	action, does
42, 17	conition	cognition
43, 3	soul] is	soul is
43, 24	*Upaskāra* : reads	*Upaskāra* reads :
43, 26	*Upaskāāra*	*Upaskāra*
44, 8	of an a thumb,	of a thumb,
44, 10	of hand	of a hand
44, 18	*śarīrāvayava*)	(*śarīrāvayava*)
44, 31	*tasmia*	*tasmin*
44, 32	*anguṣṭhamatraḥ*	*anguṣṭhamātraḥ*
45, 16	nonmaterial	non-material
45, 23	be	we
45, 31	*cādyam*	*cādyaṃ*
45, 31	*adṛṣṭakārītāni*	*adṛṣṭakāritāni*

46, 3	[produeed]	[produced]
46, 21	releas	release
47, 8	eonceiving	conceiving
47, 12	*sūtras* (5. 2. 14-17).	*sūtras* 5. 2. 14-17.
47, 14	The there	Then, there
47, 21	a hand] is	a hand [is
48, 26	*prādurbhāvaḥ*	*'prādurbhāvaḥ*
48, 32	*adṛṣṭakāriiāni*	*adṛṣṭakāritāni*
49, 19	apparantly	apparently
50, 1	on	no
50, 15	do	did
50, 19	category. and	category, and
51, 5	' air	' air '
51, 26	*Vyākhya*	*Vyākhyā*
51, 29	*cādyaṁ*	*cādyaṃ*
52, 2	whieh	which
52, 3	41 There	41 *another line* There
52, 13	indiffernt	indifferent
52, 34	*ābhiṣecanopavāsa-*	*abhiṣecanopavāsa-*
52, 35	*kṣaṇadiṅadiṅ-*	*kṣaṇadiṅ-*
53, 1	of	or
53, 2	too	not
53, 5	fired	fixed
53, 20	apparantly	apparently
53, 21	Sānkhya	Sāṅkhya
53, 23	is an just	is just
53, 35	demerit,	demerit
53, 38	*Bukkyogaku*	*Bukkyōgaku*
54, 2	tranmigrates	transmigrates
55, 3	his cvidence	its evidence
55, 16	largert	largest
56, 2	largest of	largest because of
59, 17	following	the following
59, 18	[and	[the production and
59, 20	burning	heat
59, 26	seç	see

60, 4	dvitvattva	dvitvatva
60, 22	dist.nguish	distinguish
60, 28	non eternal	non-eternal
60, 31	sūpādīnām	rūpādīnām
60, 33	eternal	are eternal
60, 34	burning *twice*	heat
61, 20	tam	tām
61, 35	thls	this
64, 2	sa	as
64, 23	on the Vaiśeṣika-	on Vaiśeṣika-
64, 27	tadanvayatirekeṇā-	tadanvayavyatirekeṇā-
64, 27	-ānuvidhāyitvāsyo-	-ānuvidhāyitvasyo-
64, 28	dvitvābhivyañjakaive	dvitvābhivyañjakatve
65, 32	vibhāgeṣvakāraṇam	vibhāgeṣv akāraṇam
66, 1	af	of
66, 30	guṇānām	guṇānāṃ
67, 5	(nirvikalpajñāna)	(nirvikalpakajñāna)
67, 20	the cognition of mere	the cognition 'He is a man with a stick (daṇḍiṇ), it is not the cognition of a mere
67, 31	Vaiśeṣika-	Vaiçeṣika-
67, 32	1818	1918
69, 4	qualificed	qualificand
69, 24	vivādhādhyasitaṃ	vivādādhyāsitaṃ
69, 26	eognition	cognition
70, 28	-pratipatiim	-pratipattiṃ
70, 31	ayaṃ cāsyo-	ayam eva cāsyo-
71, 10	rhe	the
71, 26	' these	' These
72, 25	carman	caramaṃ
72, 26	apekṣanīyā-	apekṣaṇīyā-
72, 28	śvaityasāmānyāt śvaityasāmānyāt	śvaityasāmānyāt
72, 30	viśesyabu ' dhiḥ	viśeṣyabuddhiḥ
73, 35	-pratyakṣeāṇvasite	-pratyakṣeṇāvasite

73, 35	viśeṣaṇasam	viśeṣaṇasam-
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74, 22	uktam	uktaṃ
74, 26	cash	case
184, 7–8	sāntyaviśeṣanirantya- viśeṣāṇi	antyaviśeṣavadanantya- viśeṣavanti
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218, 16	karmaṇāvayavi	karmaṇāvayavī
219, 33	Ibid.	Praśastapādabhāṣya
219, 35	ekaikaśa	ekaikaśo
221, 1	-hetuh	-hetuḥ
229, 15	pavimāṇāṇi	parimāṇāni
229, 19	hya tindriyāḥ	hy atīndriyāḥ
229, 31	anityāś	anityāc

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